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Abstract  
The general perception that the Christian message of the gospel[s] is about disinterested love 
raises many difficulties. This is because disinterested love at its core is the assumption that 
self-love is synonymous with selfishness, but self-love is not the same as selfishness. 
Contrary to this, the message of the Gospel embodied in the activities and the person of Jesus 
Christ focused on correct self-love. It is from this self-love that Jesus draws up the second 
command to love our neighbour as ourselves. To love one's neighbour self disinterestedly is 
an oxymoron. True neighbour love is conditioned by self-love. Aristotle contemplates self-
love as legitimate and necessary for an individual and one is entitled to it. Augustine suggests 
that to love God who created is to love oneself, therefore self-love is loving God and it is 
common to all human beings. Kant subscribes to the idea of self-love by suggesting that we 
each have a duty to ourselves, such duty cannot be formed of our disinterestedness, but that 
duty to ourselves is the duty to love our selves. Adam Smith offers an everyday practice of 
self-love coached in the language of self-interest as dynamic economic law. Smith showed 
that in everyday life self-love is exercised by traders and customers each appealing to the 
self-love of the other in order to enter into exchange. Jesus in his activities and person 
demonstrates how God self-loves as Father who has the welfare of his children at heart. God 
has his interest in his children for his own sake and theirs. God cannot therefore be devoid of 
self-love, and Jesus is the dynamic equivalent of this God, relating to himself in self-love. 
Would be followers of Jesus each hear his messages appealing to their self-interest or self-
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    Chapter 1     
    Introduction 
 
The compatibility of self-love concept and the message of the gospel Jesus proclaimed as 
recoded in the New Testament texts: a challenge for greater relevance. 
Posing the research question: Is the message of the gospel Jesus proclaimed 
recorded in the New Testament texts only about disinterestedness, which has nothing 
to do with self-love?  
-following on I ask: are persons by virtue of the gospel message Jesus proclaimed 
ever morally permitted to act out of self-interest within specific constraints in spheres 
of creation order1 ?  
-If the message of the gospel Jesus proclaimed is about disinterestedness how can we 
live and practice it in an economic order patterned on Adam Smith self-interest/self-
love in our everyday economics? 
1.2 The Methodology 
 
In my attempts to respond to these questions, I begin by discussing the works of four 
important philosophers whose works remain pertinent to my examining self and self-love in 
relation to the message of the gospel that Jesus proclaimed and by which persons are 
expected to live. The first of the four is, Aristotle, whose philosophy of self, constructed in 
                                               
1 According to Brunner (1937) Divine Imperative, London, Lutterworth Press; God has ordained certain “orders 
of creation” that are part of God's preserving grace for organizing human life. These orders include human 
communities in the “economic, technical, purely social, and intellectual spheres.” Brunner is very explicit, that 
community is not tantamount to the state; indeed, such creation orders exist apart from and prior to the state. For 
example, the family is the “primal community” whose “rights take absolute precedence” over any other 
institution. It is in these spheres of creation order that God’s act of love revealed in Christ is actualised. Here we 
find not merely particular sphere of life within which to act, but also orders in accordance with which to act 
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terms of a hylomorphic2 understanding of self remains within the scope of his general 
epistemology that claims sensible things are the origin of all human cognition, including that 
of self. Self is therefore only known on the foundation of contemporaneous sentience in the 
discernment of sensible things. Such a self is relational and reflective, would be Aristotle’s 
dictum.  
The second philosopher is St Augustine, for whom self implies freedom, that is, every 
self is immediately conscious of itself as willing and as possessed of the power of choice. 
God creates this freely willing self and foreknows (without willing) its evil choices; 
Augustine will concur. But the evil of these human purposes is simply to be regarded 
according to Augustine as a privation of being rather than as positive evil. Augustine will 
argue that away from the privation of being, the human self when it wills in conformity with 
God’s purposes is “free” in a second and higher sense; it is a good and obedient self. Such is 
a self that is relational.  
Thirdly, I will discuss Immanuel Kant, who offers an array of understandings of what 
constitutes the self or the metaphysics of the self: these include the self as a substance or as a 
bundle of representations [à la Hume], as force or the self as a form or structure. Kant arrives 
successfully at a fragmented self that is depicted by these possibilities of the metaphysics of 
the self. The truism of self in Kant is that it assigns duties and respect.   
Fourthly, I will discuss Adam Smith, who, in his discussion of the self’s development, 
expressed a basic tenet of [symbolic interactionism] the notion that the social self cannot 
emerge unless an individual is able to take account of others’ images of herself. Smith 
suggests that, when surveying one’s self and conducts as they appear to self, one enters into 
                                               
2 Hylomorphism-the theory that every physical object [but here we are thinking specifically of human beings] is 
composed of two principles, the first being an unchanging prime matter and the second a form deprived of 
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emotions or judgments previously alien to herself, sentiments that could be entertained only 
through sympathy. Sympathy allows the image of self as the template on which to construct 
images of others although there is no restriction not to view others as identical to oneself all 
the time. Sympathy as the vicarious experience of others’ actions, emotions, tastes, and 
reasons allows Adam Smith to present a reflective self.  
The discussions of these four philosophers set the foundation to demonstrate how 
important the understanding of the self is in providing the basis on which to build self-love. It 
is this self-love and its relation to the message of the gospel as proclaimed in biblical texts 
that is crucial in developing the important part of this research. Self–love understood from the 
various proclamations of Jesus’ message is legitimate and negates the too often peddled 
assumptions that Jesus and the New Testament texts proclaimed a disinterested message. 
 Jesus proclaimed the good news that through him the kingdom of God had come. The 
one who proclaimed, that is Jesus, became the subject of the proclamation. It was now his 
words and actions that constituted what, was proclaimed as the good news, the gospel. I will 
claim in this dissertation that Jesus proclaimed a single gospel, one by which he was to 
become a causa efficiens summoning into existence new love that would reflect back on 
himself. This new love anticipates the moral excellence of communion of giving and 
receiving love often lost sight of in Christian ethics. 
I argue that, Jesus’ summation of the laws of Israel with his commandment to love 
God and to love neighbour as self (Matt. 22:37-40; Mark 12:29-31; Luke 10:27) is key to the 
gospel he proclaimed. This summation itself implies that Christian love is located in the 
triadic fellowship between God, self and other(s). All too often however, selfless love, a love 
utterly heedless of self and entirely one-way rather than circular in its movement, is thought 
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 I argue that a "true" or proper self-love defined as the pursuit of one's own good 
found in the gospel Jesus proclaimed, within the context of triadic communion can be 
distinguished from both selfishness that is, the pursuit of one's own separate interests and 
self-infatuation. Consequently, not all self-love is to be caged although those who idealise 
selfless love generally albeit mistakenly start with this assumption. It is the case therefore, 
that the compatibility of the concept of self–love and the gospel message proclaimed by Jesus 
[in Christian tradition] remains a challenge for greater relevance. This then brings me to the 
determination of this dissertation, which is: 
This dissertation is set to discuss the compatibility of the concept of self-love and the 
message of the gospel in Christian tradition in contemporary times. The methodology used 
for achieving the objectives of this dissertation is placed in four areas of discussions 
significant to responding to the question of compatibility of self-love and the message of the 
gospel. The four areas offer the possibility of examining the concept of self-love and its lived 
experience in the Christian message of the gospel from a variety of positions.  
 In the first of these four sections, the introductory chapter attempts to situate the 
concept of self-love in the Christian tradition, by providing a clarification of the concept of 
self-love that is specific in its understanding and application to this dissertation. This 
clarification begins with examining the problems faced in the application of the concept of 
self-love in Christian tradition. It will require paying attention to the challenges to normative 
accounts of the self. A particular attention to the social constructions of selves is in order as 
these constructions are responsible on how to be a coherent self. 
 The second section includes the three chapters on Aristotle, Augustine and Kant.  The 
three demonstrate how the self and self-love concepts have been understood and applied in 
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Chapter two in this section addresses Aristotle’s understanding of the self and self-love, with 
a conclusion that shows in his treatment of the self and self-love the enduring motif is of an 
agent relating to herself. The self and self-love in Aristotle expresses the relational sense of 
self-reflection. Chapter three examines Augustine’s understanding and discussion of self and 
self-love. The sense of entering the inner self [interiority] is foundational for an Augustinian 
understanding self and self-love, a reflective [or perhaps an inner reflective] motif becomes 
overarching.   
 Chapter four in this section addresses a Kantian thinking and discussion of the self 
and self-love. This discussion quickly develops into a sense of respect and duties to one’s 
self. Kant’s understanding of the self is one of the most protracted discussions; perhaps it 
should be so, considering that he attempts to discuss the self in its perceived fragmented 
states.  The question of the self and self-love eventually is brought into perspective via the 
agent’s recognition of her sense of respect and of being obligated to duties. 
 The third section examines philosophies of self and self-love and a theological 
commentary in the understanding of Adam Smith. The section asks whether Adam Smith can 
be discussed beyond stereotyping; as the father of all that is bad about market economics 
fronted by self-interest [self-love]. The discussion is intended to show self and self-love in 
application.  
 It is the relational, the reflective and the self-respect aspect of self and self-love as 
expressed in everyday life that remains key to the economic order as a sphere of creation 
obligated for the provision of material goods necessary for the preservation of life. This 
discussion allows the visualisation of the need to appeal to another’s self-interest or self-love 
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butcher, baker and brewer] appeal to the self-love of the customer, just as the customer 
appeals to the self-love of the trader to facilitate an economic exchange. 
The economic order is a means rather than an end providing an avenue through which 
the self and self-love may be expressed, albeit making the economic order easily suspect to 
ethical problems. Chapter five hence discusses Adam Smith’s philosophical understanding of 
the self and self-love and how these impacted on the notion of ‘homo oeconomicus’. Chapter 
six attempts to situate this ‘homo oeconomicus’ understanding in Adam Smith’s own 
theological thought that runs through his works, particularly, Theory of Moral Sentiments and 
The Wealth of Nations.  
 The fourth section comprising chapter seven and eight respectively first, chapter 
seven examines the use of the bible. At the forefront by first allowing the discussion of what 
the message of the gospel Jesus proclaimed constitutes. I then survey the Christian discourse 
of self-love focusing on two specific texts Leviticus 19: 17-18; Mathew 22: 39. This textual 
discussion is followed by discussing how Jesus related to himself and what is the gospel he 
proclaimed on relating to oneself.   
 In chapter eight I discuss self’s freedom from itself and other. That when this freedom 
is experienced on account of the gospel Jesus proclaimed, such is the highest freedom of the 
self, and yet still it remains compatible with the command to love ourselves.  
 In this section I argue that right or correct self-love consists in a self-determining 
response to God that is actualised in the not exhaustible love of the neighbour. I discuss 
further what I consider to be the idea of right self-love and its contribution to moral life, and 
what that idea lends to the relation between Christian faith and moral life. 
 The fifth section is a conclusion, the gathering of thought where drawing out key 
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gospel Jesus proclaimed as recorded in the New Testament texts, is not about disinterested 
love. The gospel message is about communion between God, self, and other(s).  
 Such communion cannot be love that calls for self-abnegation or heedless 
selflessness, this understanding of selfless love misleadingly exaggerates the principle of 
unselfishness, while resting on an unsatisfactory concept of God. It is the case that true self-
love and love for God are co-extensive, and that my interlocutors implied this understanding 
where they did not state it categorically.  
 I will hope to have made a successful case for the retrieval of the Augustinian 
assumption that the service of the most lasting significance for the other(s) is the restoration 
of the divine-human encounter that issues in true happiness. Indeed, the ontological fact 
remains that there is no lasting human happiness that is other than happiness in loving God. I 
will also attempt to show that while the concept of the self is plagued with innumerable 
controversies of interpretation, it is a useful concept designating identity between oneself and 
the other(s).  
1.3 The point of departure: working hypothesis 
 
The proclamation of the Gospel includes an invitation to recognize and accept in a 
personal decision “the saving lordship of Christ."  The proclamation of the gospel is not a 
disinterested storytelling. Persons tell the story of the gospel hoping public decisions will 
follow. When such decisions are made they affect the human person’s life style.  They affect 
how a person relates to herself and to others.  
To open the word of God, to announce its meaning to the human community, is an 
exercise of hope in the action of the Holy Spirit that provokes the miracle of a response of 
faith (Morris 1989, p.115-116; Tyson 1984, p.577-78), even to our very limited testimony of 
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an offer, an invitation, as a call to people to respond [interpellation3] personally and socially 
to God is imperative.  
The imperative draws out the importance of a process through which people come to 
understand their own predicament and recognize the forces that are at work in their lives and 
in the life of society. As a consequence, the need for persons to become protagonists both of 
their own destiny and the destiny of their community cannot be underestimated.  
Since conversion is the moment of awareness of a personal relationship with God in 
Christ, an invitation is signalled to enter with Christ into the actual task of transforming 
oneself and the world according to God's will. This transforming presence is synonymous 
with Christ’s kenotic self-emptying as we shall see later on. The “the paradox of kenotic self-
emptying arises because the self that is emptied must continue to exist as a self for itself to be 
emptied.” (Lippitt 2009, p. 131).  
One cannot sacrifice one’s self to cease to exist, simply because one cannot care for 
another if it kills her in doing so. While sacrificing self may not necessarily be evil, ‘proper 
self-sacrifice must emphasise the worth of the self that is emptied out’ (Ibid. p. 132), this is 
what makes emptying self a sacrifice, because self is precious. In being precious the self 
relates to itself with a sense of value and worth that are both inherent. Such value is 
seemingly re-enforced by the suffering of the divine human in the person of Jesus. 
1.3.1   God’s suffering not devoid of self-concern 
There is a claim that the highest form of love is utterly heedless of self. This is a 
common depiction of the religious ethics aligned to Western Christianity that elevates the 
Saint who stands high above the province of ordinary human experience to be one completely 
devoid of self-love or concern. This is Nygren’s conception of agape central to it is emphasis 
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on human sinfulness (1982, p248-249), the necessity of grace, the transcendence of God, and 
the distinctiveness of Pauline Christianity (Vacek 1996, p.29). Nygren gives classic 
expression of a view of Christian love that is treated as the only valid view.  One 
misconception of selfless love is that in achieving complete self-abnegation in one’s love for 
one’s fellow human, one certainly gains one faith. This idealisation of selfless love not only 
misleadingly exaggerates a valid principle of unselfishness (Nygren 1982, p.644-651); it rests 
on an unsatisfactory concept of God. Stephen Post (1988, 213) argues that, 
‘Mutual love or reciprocity is the only appropriate fundamental 
norm for human interrelations, and for the divine-human encounter as well.’ 
 
 The divine love on which the neighbour love concept is founded or modelled cannot 
be devoid of self-concern and therefore unreservedly heedless of self (Nygren 1982, p. 104). 
The admonition of the neighbour love mirroring a Judaic understanding accepts that Judaism 
is the awareness of the reciprocity of God and man, of man’s togetherness with divine. It is 
therefore not surprising that the ideal of selfless love is not to be found in Judaism. Judaism 
does not demonstrate a religion of self-satisfaction nor one of self-annihilation [except for 
mystical path of Dov Ber of Mesritch] (Grozinger 2014, p. 17-20), rather it idealises love as 
fellowship. 
In Judaism and Christianity, scripture discloses a deity who experiences grief: ‘He 
was sorry that he had made man on earth, and he was grieved at heart’ (Genesis 6:6). I argue 
the divine love on which the teachings of neighbour love are founded is not bereft of self-
concern and that divine suffering results from limited human reciprocation. Divine self-
concern expressed in love for the mutual good of reciprocity cannot taint the purity of the 
divine act. Recognising that the egocentric love of self that places "I" at the centre of the 
universe is anathema, the abandonment of all self-concern confusing the valid prohibition 
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incomprehensible unless a response from the beloved is sought after, if this were not the case 
there can be no reason for divine grief. When divine love is left unreciprocated humanity is 
charged with infidelity (Deuteronomy 1-11).  
Forgiveness is then sought after as it represents the hope that a free response to the 
divine ultimately is imminent. If the divine had no interest in reciprocation then, forgiveness 
would be both unnecessary and pointless. It is therefore a mistake to misconstrue a steadfast 
and forgiving divine love as beyond self-concern, when divine love is indicative of such self-
concern.  
Divine love hence cannot be an overflowing plenitude as some theologians suggest 
(Spicq 1965, p.34). Debatably, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity contains the proposition 
that within the divine there exists a triadic mutuality that completely satisfies the condition of 
reciprocity (John 17). This triadic mutuality conceals the divine need for human response 
wherein insights can be gleaned from Judaism. Consequently, to misapprehend divine love as 
spontaneous, unmotivated and unconditional is to remove the basis for the urgent religious 
vocation of soothing divine agony. Divine love that so often is understood as the perfect 
example to which human love must conform, when claimed as selfless love, it is mistakenly 
interpreted as containing no element of self-concern. Unfortunately, this is a view based on 
the false assumption that the divine neither needs nor seeks the mutual good of fellowship 
with humanity. 
1.3.2  Radically disinterested love for God a mistaken conception 
It is disingenuous to claim legitimacy to a radically disinterested love for God that 
denies any place for self-concern in the divine-human relation. It may be true of the 
theological virtue of charity / agape to argue that such a pure love is both desirable and 
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of the kind necessary for ‘becoming a self’.  On the understanding of Christ’s kenotic 
emptying, the message of the gospel cannot be argued to support disinterestedness. 
Disinterestedness stemmed into the Christian contemplative mysticism (Mennite 2014, p. 2), 
refers to detachment from selfish interest in sense-based, emotional, or temporal 
acquisitiveness synonymous with self-love in favour of seeking the welfare of others.   
Disinterested love as a theological teaching of St John of the Cross claims charity / 
agape requires only an interior loss of desires for friendships and other temporal goods, not 
the literal sacrifice of these goods. But this statement is not true, because any action or no 
action regarding temporal goods or hypergoods (Taylor 1989, p.63-73) has strong bearing on 
the self. The proposition is false in appearing to support the idea that God is devoid of self-
concern in the divine-human relation. 
Proponents of disinterestedness argue that Christian neighbour–love must be seen as 
wholly self-denying, self-emptying (Nygren 1982 p.222-3); while this Christian ethical 
thought may remain intimately linked it is inadequate and misleading. Long (2000, p.27) 
observes the claim Christian moral action should be disinterested was an eighteenth-century 
innovation. For Stephen Post (1986, p.356), the problem of disinterested benevolence was a 
nineteenth-century issue.  
In discussing the nature of Christian love, Post discovers that Christian ethicists like 
Samuel Hopkins and his adherents subscribed to a concept of radically self-denying love that 
undermined any place for self-concern in the divine-human relation. Sanderlin (1993, p.89) 
argues that Post does not ‘deal with arguments such as St. John's of the Cross, that 
disinterestedness is necessary for a ‘pure gift-love for God and neighbour’. Expressing the 
thoughts of St. John of the Cross, Sanderlin (Ibid. p. 90) asserts one should desire God alone 
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such as a human friendship. I argue it may be true following Sanderlin’s argument and that of 
St. John of the Cross that; the complete formulation of this position is that for human 
happiness one should love God solely for God's own sake. Accordingly, there is self-interest 
for God and us, and rightly so, for God is the source of true happiness.  
Notwithstanding, this critique carries a mistrust of the radical renunciation of the 
natural inclination of the self towards personal happiness. The central message of the Bible is 
the good news about the person and work of Jesus Christ. The love of an agent’s own 
happiness is embedded in this good news and cannot be eradicated by Christianity. It is the 
case that the natural man, replete with tendencies toward self-fulfilment and well-being is the 
fundamental fact with which God works4.  
Our relationships begin in God who lives in eternal triune relationship, the creator of 
all that is very good. He is the one who is present and involved with His creation. He is not a 
disinterested God distant and removed from His creation, nor should He be confused with His 
creation. He is always the God of compassion and grace. So, the gospel begins (John 1) with 
a God who has taken the initiative to be present in loving relationship. I argue therefore, that 
                                               
4 Jonathan Edwards, wrote critically regarding the debate over disinterested benevolence, and acknowledged in 
his own theology that the influence of his maternal grandfather, Solomon Stoddard, an orthodox Puritan, in his 
suspicion of the radical renunciation of the natural inclination of the self towards personal happiness. Jonathan 
observed that "Mr. Stoddard of this town of Northampton" developed the "best philosophy that I have met with 
of original sin" because "that natural and necessary inclination that man has to his own benefit" is not thrust 
aside (Townsend, ed., 1955:242). (1955) “Miscellany 301.” p. 242 in The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards, Ed. 
Harvey G. Townsend, Oregon.  
Stephen Post writes of Jonathan Edwards that, “Edwards never allowed his notion of Christian love to ignore 
the basic constitution of human persons, i.e., to go far beyond nature. This aspect of Edwards' thought can be 
traced back to the influence of Samuel Willard (1640-1707) as well. Willard's lectures on the relation of love 
and happiness were given in the 1680s and 1690s, simultaneous with the famous "Pure Love" controversy in 
late seventeenth-century France involving François Fénelon and the Quietists.” (1986, p. 357).  
Barbara Falgoust Mennite in her PhD dissertation (2014) discussed ‘The Philosophical and Theological 
Foundations of François Fénelon’s Political Theory: Love, Free Will, and Disinterested Virtue.’ In her 
discussions in chapters 2 & 3 she examine Fénelon’s thoughts on, ‘The Roots of Amour pur and 
Disintéressment in Philosophical Theology, & Fénelonean Amour Pur and Disintéressement,’ respectively both 
steeped in the renunciation of most if not all self-regard claims, makes little sense. Mennite does not seem to 
carry any suspicion of exaggerated demands for self-denial in Fénelon’s thoughts that can be related to more 
than a respect for Puritan orthodoxy. On reading the two chapters mentioned above in Mennite dissertation one 
has the suspicion that even practical interests did not persuaded neither Fénelon nor Mennite that proper self-
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any Christian saint’s quest for happiness, is as necessary to her own nature as the faculty of 
her will is, and therefore it is impossible that such a love should be destroyed in any other 
way than by destroying her being.  
Christian virtue ought not to soar too high above the range of human nature, it is the 
only way benevolence does not become so radically pure and disinterested as to demand that 
persons act "inconsistent with themselves”. On the other hand, it is the cases that in the long-
term interest of an agent, to develop, maintain, and act on other-regarding attitudes. 
Compliance with familiar other-regarding moral norms of restraint, cooperation, and aid is 
mutually advantageous (Brink 1997, p. 123).  
Morality stems from the fact that experience is relational. Good will is what is most 
perfect in humans, and the will can experience its goodness only when it is creative and free 
of encumbrance, including limits to reason. The basis of the morally good will is ontological. 
The will always seeks the happiness of the agent such that the notion of selfless love is an 
abstraction divorced from concrete human experience. The idea of union as Infinite Goodness 
is the basis of the message of the gospel’s system of ethics, in which Scripture promises 
happiness and reward (Mathew 5), the cornerstone of the prudential aspect of Christianity. 
God who is the exemplar of perfect happiness shares this aspect of himself with the saints.  
I consider that the message of the gospel taps into innate spiritual and aesthetic 
experiences that inform moral persons, and these voluntary experiences are not contrary to 
universal truths that can be reached through reason. It is my conviction that what can be 
empirically ascertained accords with scriptural warrant. Whilst love that "seeketh not its 
own," is acknowledged, it is worth recognising that "from one end of the Bible to the other" 
there are appeals to "the principle of self-love". It is arguable that whether seeking for 
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‘counsels to seek our own good’ (Matthew13: 44-46), to ignore this prudential aspect of New 
Testament ethics is to err. Christian love can be defined solely in terms of self-love, and this 
is without curtailing the importance of disinterested motives. The need to carefully balance 
disinterested motives within the framework of reciprocal love undermines the doctrine of the 
‘willingness to be damned.’ 
My primary purpose is to survey how the message of the gospel is akin to the concept 
of self-love while distancing itself from the self-sacrificial morality purported by a sense of 
disinterested love. Against Stackhouse’s cosmopolitan social ethics (Long 2000, p. 27), I 
argue that it is not the case that the message of the gospel allows our actions and our gifts to 
others to be alienated, with no expectation of return. The consideration I presuppose is that 
communion in God carried through the message of the gospel, self, and other(s) is the highest 
ideal of Christian love.  
1.3.3  Divine love Considered as Un-teleological is false 
The assumption that God's love is "un-motivated," un-conditional, uncaused, and un-
calculating is false. Joseph Haroutunian (1965, p.207) critically describes such an assumption 
as "negative" definitions of love:  
"... the definition of love in negatives as unconditional, uncaused, unmotivated, 
groundless, uncalculating; as self-giving, self-denying, self-crucifying, simply 
outgoing; as unprudential unevaluating unteleological, etc., leaves us with a 'love' that 
is not only impossible for human beings, regenerate or unregenerate, but also of 
doubtful Biblical and theological validity."  
 
From scripture God's love is motivated by a concern for the divine-human good. Biblical 
characters depict specific relations they associate with the divine; Jeremiah and Hosea both 
refer to God as the jealous husband of Israel. There are also narratives and language of love 
between father and son and between husband and wife that are central throughout the biblical 
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Israel’s sorrows. This biblical language indicates that mutuality is a moral excellence. 
Against Blum (1980, p.75), friendship should not be pictured negatively as a kind of 
extension of self, in the sense that “when one acts for the other one is simply extending what 
is in a sense one’s own good”. Also, the entire course of Old Testament the narrated history 
Jewish people must be understood in terms of a God who attempts to restore the communion 
lost due to the Fall.  
Adams has pointed with reference to the Old Testament, "God's love for us is surely 
seen as involving a desire for certain relationships….’ These relationships are between God 
and humans not for God’s own sake and not merely as good for humans. For  “..God seems at 
least as interested in divine-human relationships as in human happiness per se" (Adams 1980, 
p.96). For Haroutunian and Adams it is the intentions of the divine will, to be with humans, 
the ‘will to belong,’ and the symbol of the cross can be interpreted in the light of divine 
longing for communion.   
I maintain that the idealisation of selfless love, both divine and human has an 
emotional appeal to it despite normative flaws. Claims of perfect self-forgetfulness or total 
dying to friendship violate the moral structures of both social and personal existence. 
Unfortunately, this perennial preoccupation with motivational selflessness is deeply 
embedded in Christian tradition and hence continues to obscure the actual giving and 
receiving that is the telos of love. Post (1988) suggests that the prevailing of idealising 
selfless love needs a ‘prophetic tradition,’ (p.22 citing Buber 1959, p. 82)  
“You know always in your heart that you need God more than everything; but do you 
not know too that God needs you – in the fullness of His eternity needs you”? 
 
One is inclined to think of the God of Buber as the kind of God who suffers due to divine 
exile from humanity. Although the will of God is to be established on earth, manifest and 
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his will defied, God withdraws leaving human beings to themselves (Romans 1: 17 -32). God 
did not leave of his own accord, he was in a sense exiled, and while we are careful not to 
assign human-like features to the divine often the scriptural evidence of suffering is ignored 
hence the proliferation of the claim of the divine devoid of self-concern and self-suffering. 
Classical Christian theology has argued that Jesus suffered only in his human aspect 
that is distinct from his divine nature. Accordingly, Jesus’ suffering was not as God and not 
even as a representation of the nature of God, since the divine nature is eliminated of all 
manner of suffering. This teaching fosters a selfless divinity above all need, and it is this that 
was considered the exemplar of the morally worthy love. McWilliams (1985, p.15) reasons 
out this presumed traditional idealisation of selfless love presently revisited, it still is 
increasingly untenable to accept this view, in the light of a God who exemplifies the 
persistent reciprocity of need.  
I contend that, while there may be a limited strategic value to occasional 
considerations of what appear to be exaggerated claims against self-love, such considerations 
might act as a deterrent against selfishness. Nevertheless, any strategic value of these 
considerations must both be distinguished from normative importance and carefully 
scrutinized. This schema is being effectively carried out in feminist literature, the 
development of which constitutes a second line of criticism against selfless love that 
complements the theme of divine self-concern (Post 198, p.223).  
1.4 Problematic and Self-Referring Self-love in Christian tradition 
 
The self-referring disposition comprised in self-concept brings to the open the 
problem of the relation between egoism and altruism, of self-regarding and other regarding 
action, of self-love and benevolence. The central issues are the motivation of moral action 
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problem is most evident among those of the view that people are naturally moved only by 
self-love, or self-regard for their own interest. In the Christian tradition accounts of self-love 
and self-sacrifice are notorious problems, espousing apparently incompatible claims of self-
love and self-sacrifice. Example, might be Kierkegaard “self-denial ... is Christianity’s 
essential form‟ (Frankfurt 2004, p.68). Alasdair MacIntyre (1999, p.160) on the contrary, 
“self-sacrifice ... is as much of vice, as much of a sign of inadequate moral development, as 
selfishness‟.  
To argue that love should be directed at others and that focusing it on oneself is vain 
and self-absorbed is erroneous.  Furthermore, terms like true and false self-love complicate 
the more theological and philosophical discussions of self-love leaving them to struggle with 
what is proper self-love. In Christian tradition self-love is viewed by most as a necessary evil. 
The perennial traditional understanding being, Christians are called to love like Jesus, self 
sacrificially, on grounds that Jesus showed the ultimate act of love by dying on the cross. 
Christians are to imitate Christ’s love by sacrificing themselves for others (Nygren 1982. 
218). Christian traditional thought and practice holds that self-love leads to selfishness and 
pride – both vices; claiming to be a true and good Christian one is called to imitate Jesus 
Christ, in whom are embedded acts of self-denial. 
Considering certain texts of the Gospels and the Pauline Epistles, it is easy to see why 
Christian thinkers focus on service to others. For Martin Luther self-love is fairly similar to 
Augustine’s and Aquinas,’ except Luther’s more negative anthropology resembles 
Augustinian views more than Aquinas’. Luther did not believe self-love to be important or a 
just act. Brady citing the Institutes explains that Luther, “…. is deeply suspicious of the idea 
we ought to love ourselves. Because of sin we are inclined toward excessive self-love.” 
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p.190). Therefore, appreciating true self-love one must be so disgusted with one’s self to the 
point of actually hating oneself.  
On account of the influence of the New Testament and the focus on loving and 
serving others in order to obtain eternal life, Luther perceived self-love as sinful and 
dangerous for Christians. I maintain contra Luther that there is a danger when one denies 
oneself self-love. In the Christian tradition the idea of self-sacrifice rather than self-love has 
been propagated to the extreme perhaps, without intention, but detrimental to self. Lippitt 
correctly observes that,  
“The Christian tradition has perhaps tended to warn more forcefully of the dangers of 
improper self-love than of improper self-sacrifice. But either, taken to an extreme, 
can be both practically disastrous and incompatible with the Christian ideal.” (2009, 
p. 132).  
 
I argue that self-love is the first and most important component for successfully completing 
the love command of Jesus. At the same time, each individual has a moral obligation not to 
relate to others in a way that is truly destructive of herself as a person. 
1.4.1 Moral or theological considerations of Self-love 
A correct theory of motivation shows that both self-love and altruism are acquired 
dispositions. Not being original ingredients in human psychological make-up, each of them 
may be either morally good or reprehensible. I maintain that human native impulses and acts 
are neither egoistic nor altruistic. They are not actuated by conscious regard for one’s own 
good or the good of others. They are simply responses to situations.  
No suggestion is given implying that conscious regard for self is morally bad and 
regard for the other necessarily good. Acts are not necessarily selfish because they evince 
considerations for the future well being of the self. This is the context into which the gospel 
message of good news that Jesus proclaimed is presented, and where it is capable of changing 
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many respects. Jesus’ proclamations themselves are personally tailored, so the individual is 
invited to make a decision by herself. She responds to Jesus’ calls for the Kingdom addressed 
at her self-love.  
Jesus appeals to the self–love [self-interest see Smith below] of each individual.  It is 
also true that Jesus’ own interests are met in this appeal to an individual’s self-interest or self-
love regarding the Kingdom of God. As a matter of fact, the relationship between Jesus’ call 
for a response, can be paralleled with economic relationships between the Smithian traders 
[butcher, brewer, and baker] and their customers.  
Each appeal to the interests and the self-love of the other.  Self-love is a phrase that 
shuttles between distinct experiences and different concepts, sometimes rival ones. This 
propensity affects how ethics arises in response to the demand to orient and guide one’s life 
(Weaver 2002, p.1). The problem of how to practically and morally love one’s self rightly 
surfaces. The answer must necessarily be that the right self-love designates a particular form 
of self-relation. We understand ourselves fully and truly and are prepared to embody this 
understanding in our actions and relations. 
Self-love often explains self-related actions that reflect the negative, neutral and 
positive aspects of an action. The foundations of self-love are not narcissistic instincts or 
desires (Thomas 1997, p.3) but rather parental love. Aristotle, in Nicomachean Ethics 
(1155b18, 1156a5) speaks of self-love as capable of vicious and virtuous acts.  
Loving oneself beyond the reasonable limit is censured and rejected. He speaks of 
virtuous people as being proper self-lovers who neither harm others nor themselves (NE 
1168b29-1169a11). Not hurting others for the sake of gaining for oneself, one will not be 
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of self-love as referring to negative, neutral and positive dimensions of human action (1979, 
p.90, 91, 137).   
Joseph Butler, in his Sermons, equates self-love with the idea of selfishness that few 
define as ‘immoderate or excessive’ self-love, an excessive calculating concern for one’s own 
interest or advantage (Butler 1827, p.153).  He also considers it a ‘reasonable’ or ‘cool’ self-
love that takes care of the interests of others. For Butler the call of benevolence - acting for 
the sake of others - is not contrary to self-love since, “there is no peculiar contrariety between 
self-love and benevolence, no greater competition between these than between any other 
particular affections and self-love” (Butler 2006, p.54).   
Kant implying self-love asserts that one must not give up her claims to her own 
happiness because under certain circumstances, it is a duty to her to be concerned with it. 
Kant observes further health, wealth, and the like may be necessary means for fulfilling one’s 
duty, the lack of happiness resulting from being too poor can prevent one from fulfilling her 
duty (Kant 2002, p.119).  
For Nygren, self-love, is wholeheartedly pernicious and ‘a devilish perversion’ 
(Nygren 1969, p.740).  Nygren’s opposition against self-love is based on the distinction 
between the natural and divine love and non-believer and believer love as well as on the fact 
that he believes self-love has no proper consideration of others. These suggestions display 
how easily self-love is widely employed to explain the act of selfishness and inconsiderate 
self-interest. My contention is that the notion of self-love must be disentangled from 
sounding the meanings of selfish and uncharitable self-interested actions.  
To distinguish self-love from selfishness and discourteous self-interest one is faced 
with examining how self-love is conceived in moral theology. It is to redefine the notion of 







  29 
neighbour. Such self-love is rooted in the Gospels, for example in Luke, where and when Jesus 
calls his disciples to love God and “your neighbour as yourself.” It is expected the disciples 
will discover personal self-love by focusing on one’s self and one’s happiness for the sake of 
others. Such self-love is different from selfishness because it never implies excessive love for 
one’s self to the exclusion and manipulation of others.  
It inclusively embraces others identifying them as part of one’s self. This kind of self-
love is distinguished from self-interest as its acts of self-love seek others’ advantage and 
attempts to motivate oneself to see the well-being of others for their own sake. A well-adjusted 
theological understanding of self-love would contribute to this interpretation. Stephen Post 
(1988, p. 346) writes that,  
‘True self-love is justified by Augustine, for it is love fully coextensive with and 
supportive of love for God.’  
 
I contend that, an Augustinian view of love for God with the ideal of communion insists that 
the last iota of self-concern must be renounced to achieve a perfectly "pure" motivation. The 
distinction is based on the distinctive nature of love that is essentially relational, that moves 
the person toward the good, uniting her with God who is the ultimate good and the source of 
all good.  
 Outka (1972, p.63) understands self-love to carry value judgements and views it as 
being wholly nefarious; as normal, reasonable, and prudent. Therefore, self-love is able to be 
justified derivatively from other regards; and as a definite obligation, independent of other-
regards (Ibid, p.55-74). Outka advocates a relatively straightforward assumption, that persons 
do not in general need to be urged toward concern about their own welfare, since they already 
have plenty of attachment to their welfare of an immediate and unreflective kind. Self-love 
considered this way dispels Nygren’s unease and distrust that prudential self-regard totally 
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Augustine placed limits on the piety of self-denial by appropriating true self-love into 
the Christian framework, albeit remaining ambiguous. Christians, he argued, "do not strive to 
destroy themselves" (Augustine 1958, p.21). "All men," Augustine (1948, p.320) declared, 
"desire to live happily." Moreover, "Following after God is the desire for happiness; to reach 
God is happiness itself" (1948, p. 320). Notwithstanding that they remain theoretically 
distinct, love for God and true well being are in practice one and the same. Without love for 
God, there can be neither true self-love nor true happiness. God alone is the natural end or 
"chief Good" of the self. It will become obvious later on that Augustinian self-love is not a 
self-referring duty independent of God, yet it is still self-love.  
The self, according to Augustine, is never free from desire or from love of self. The 
possibility of fulfilment comes when the self desires the one thing worth desiring, namely, 
God (O'Donovan 1980, p.37). A false self-love enters when communion with God is 
belittled, blighted or relegated to the background, such that one petitions or coaxes God for 
"external" goods, i.e., goods other than God himself. For Outka  (1972, p. 63) a value 
judgment that may be placed on self-love is that it is normal, reasonable and prudent.   
It may not be especially praiseworthy nor is it necessarily blameworthy. This self-love 
is taken to be a paradigm for equal regard of others per se, being basically independent of 
idiosyncratic attractiveness. This self-love is neither a precondition nor a remainder of 
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1.5 The concept and the changing ideas of the Self  
 
“…I will try and convince you that there is no such thing as a self. Contrary to what 
most people believe, nobody has ever or had a self. But it is not just that the modern 
philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience together are about to shatter the myth 
of the self.” (Metzinger 2009, p. 1) 
 
These are the opening lines in Thomas Metzinger’s book The Ego Tunnel: the Science 
of the Mind and the Myth of the Self, 2009, (New York, Basic Books). If Metzinger is correct 
I do not need to write this section of this thesis, and yet there is something about self that 
defies the self illusion Metzinger advocates.  
In the first section of his book, Metzinger appeals his claim to empirical studies on 
phenomena such as the well-known rubber hand illusion5. In that section of the book one is 
confronted by the need to make a difference between saying that ‘there is no such thing as the 
self’ and saying that ‘the self is not quite what we supposed it to be.’  
Therefore, whilst Metzinger remains justified in his scientific and philosophical 
pursuit of the question of the existence of consciousness in particular, he still has to contend 
with his further claims that, ‘‘say that the self is a widely distributed process in the brain. . . 
[or that] the system as a whole. . . can be called a ‘self’’’ (p. 208).  
It seems Metzinger and other propagators of epistemological self cannot explain away 
the ontological self. Metzinger is simply faced with the same issues Hume faced regarding 
the existence of the self.  In light of this we need to pay attention to Klein (2012, p. 255) that, 
‘…we need a new, more inclusive metaphysic in which reality is not reduced to only that 
which can be manipulated by science.’   The self is a term that has remained inter-
                                               
5 In this illusion, a subject’s real hand is covered from view, and a rubber hand is placed next to it on a table. 
The real and rubber hands are then stroked simultaneously with a probe; eventually, subjects come to experience 
the rubber hand as their own, even feeling the presence of a ‘phantom arm’ leading up to the hand. These 
experiments, it seems however, that they can be interpreted to imply only that our brains sometimes and, in 
some ways, misrepresent the nature of the self, rather than that our sense of self is always and nothing but an 
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disciplinary and more widely in its application, and yet it also remains less well understood. 
Not only is self a fundamental concept in psychology around which all else revolves, this is 
true of philosophy, anthropology, economics, theology, biology and so forth. 
 James Walkup (1987, p. 3) observed that the visibility of the term self in public and 
academic discussions is a sure sign that the self can no longer be taken for granted to means 
the same thing for everybody. It may be the case that the difficulties encountered with so 
much contemporary commentary on the self is founded on a desperate, quite fundamental, 
uncertainty about the value judgments that are implicit in our attempts to contemplate its 
meaning. 
A unitary sense of self that exists across time and place is a central feature of human 
experience, at least for most people. Consequently, most people intuitively understand what 
is meant by the term self; definitions have tended toward the philosophical and metaphysical. 
Efforts at creating more formal definitions have largely been unsuccessful, as many features 
of self are empirically murky, difficult to identify and assess using objective methods.  
The phenomenological experience of self remains highly familiar to everyone 
(Heatherton et al 2004, 1-2). So, at issue is not whether the self exists, but how best to study 
it, seeing a lot of conceptual difficulties to the question of what the term “self” refers to 
persist. The self can be approached on two levels, the scientific inquiry or the epistemological 
self, and that of the personal experience or the ontological self (Klein 2012, p. 254)6.  
Klein argues that it is the epistemological self that is causally accountable for the 
ontological self to be conceived as a subjective, singular self of everyday experience. That 
means, it is the neuropsychological self (epistemological self) that accounts for episodic 
                                               
 457-461)6 The scientific inquiry of the self or the epistemological self has to do with the behavioral, affective, 
cognitive, and neural systems, that are assumed to be causally responsible at least in part for providing the 
personal experience or the ontological self (i.e., the conscious, phenomenological self of first-person 
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memories of an agent’s life event, of her semantic trait summaries [personality traits], 
knowledge [facts about her life], her experience of continuity through time, personal agency 
or ownership, self-reflection, acknowledgment of physical self and finally the awareness of 
emotional self (Klein et al 2010, p. 2).  
These are the components that result in the subjective, singular everyday experience 
of the self. Although these systems are functionally independent, as sources of knowledge in 
one’s self they work together as the epistemological self to help create a subjective unity. 
Taken independently, emotional self alone as a system becomes neither logically nor 
empirically necessary to maintain the experience of the self as a singular, subjective point of 
view7.  
Philosophical conceptions of the self equally do not yield a unified self as they lead to 
an account of the ‘minimal self’ a self devoid of temporal extension and the ‘narrative self’ 
that involves personal identity and continuity across time (Gallagher 2000, p.14). This 
philosophical understanding of the self is prevalent because it permits much allowance to the 
distinction between knowledge of the self by acquaintance and knowledge of the self by 
description. Knowledge by description subscribes to epistemological understanding of the 
self, while knowledge by acquaintance appears firmly locked on to the ontological 
understating of the self.  
It is the ontological understanding of the self that shall be the focus of the discussion 
in this study. The ontological self permits us to have knowledge by acquaintance when we 
know something via direct personal contact (that may include sensory or introspective) and 
                                               
7 It continues to be demonstrated that sources of self-knowledge can be lost or partially impaired without a 
corresponding loss in the ability to experience the self as a singular, subjective point of everyday experience. 
Notably, in neuropsychological studies  (Klein et al 2010), in the archives of the neurology are embedded cases 
of individuals who lack access to differing degrees to their self-constituting knowledge of episodic memories of 
one’s life events, or semantic summary representation of one’s personality traits or even of one’s semantic 
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manifest that knowledge by using terms referring to that knowledge to communicate with 
others. In this discussion self is a word familiarly used and easily recognised. A person 
certainly understands what is meant by the word both when she uses the word herself and 
when she hears it used by others. Considering the self8, others can see this knowledge by 
acquaintance in the ease with which we talk about the self as well as we understand talk 
about self by them. 
Ontological self or the self of personal experience is too poorly understood 
(scientifically) to satisfy the definitional adequacy required of terms referring to causal 
relations between the self and the brain. It is also a poor candidate for current scientific 
exploration. This is because scientific exploration is an enterprise predicated on 
understanding objects and their relations.  
The self of my focus is derived from years of direct acquaintance that confers a sense 
of confidence that the readers know what it is the author refers to. This does not remove the 
problem of the self, for it remains unclear what the author refers to when she applies the label 
“self.”  I advocate a tacit assumption that there is a substantive self-apprehending of this 
knowledge. That a self like any object (provided proper tools are available), can be treated as 
“other” and located, grasped, and studied scientifically (Klein 2012, p. 255).  
This claim is made to accommodate the scientific focus on the self, whose 
investigating is the multiplicity of social and neural systems assumed to provide the 
                                               
8 Despite centuries of thought committed to the problem of the self, it has proven notoriously difficult to provide 
a set of propositions capable of transforming our acquired knowledge into a satisfying description of what a self 
is. So that when we try to pin down what it is we refer to by the word “self”, problems immediately arise to try 
describing what the word “self” means. However, similar difficulties arise also when considering the word 
“time.”  “What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I wish to explain it to one that asked, I know not . . 
.” (St. Augustine Confessions Book XI.14, 15, p.263-266) Klein & Gangi (2010, p. 1-2) argue that questions 
pertaining to the ontology of the self include problems of synchronicity that is to ask what is it that accounts for 
the apparent phenomenal unity of self at a single moment? Self equally accounts for diachronicity that is to say 
the perceived continuity of self over time. Similarly, the notion of personal identity embodies the belief that the 
self, as presently experienced, is continuous with the self I experienced in the past and the self I will experience 
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ontological self with knowledge. This self may be construed as a reflexive arrangement of the 
subjective “I” and the constructed “Me,” that is evolving and expanding over the human life 
course. 
This self begins life as a social actor, construed in terms of performance traits and 
social roles (Meads 1934, p. 140-141). At the end of childhood, the self has become a 
motivated agent, whose personal goals, motives, values, and envisioned projects for the 
future become central features of how the I conceives of the Me. Another layer of selfhood 
then inaugurates the self as the autobiographical author purposes to construct a story of the 
Me, to provide her adult life with broad purpose and a dynamic sense of temporal continuity9. 
Meads (1925, p.268) observes that ‘the self that is central to so-called mental experience has 
appeared only in the social conduct of human….’  
Earlier on (p. 267) he had argued that exchange whether be of food or some other 
form is an act in which a person excites herself to give by making an offer. Exchange is 
therefore achieved by ‘putting one’s self in the attitude of the other party to the bargain.’ The 
individual’s action in the exchange process is the reason for the self [this understanding is 
covered late in Adam Smith]. The individual has become a self by virtue of organising her 
own response by the tendencies on the part of others to respond to her acts. The self it seems 
can exist for the individual only if she assumes the roles10 of others. 
                                               
9 McAdams (2013, p. 272) has argued that the progression of a psychological self ensue into an integrative 
theory that envisions the ‘self as a developing I-Me configuration of actor, agent, and author that helps to 
synthesize a wide range of conceptions and findings on the self from social, personality, cognitive, cultural, and 
developmental psychology and from sociology and other social sciences.’ McAdams is inevitably suggesting 
that the “I” may reflexively construe the “Me” as both a collection of abstract traits and an anthology of 
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1.5.1 Self concept in discussions of self 
My focus remains the concept of the self, here I have an opportunity to examine how 
it relates to self-concept. The Self is not synonymous with self-concept. Self gives rise to 
self-concept that is built up by the responses of others to a given person, and these responses 
influence and shape one’s self-definitions (Reeder et al 1960, p. 153). Self-conception is 
related to the responses of others and to the individual's perception of those responses. These 
responses in themselves carry distinctions between the actual response of the other, and the 
subject’s perception of the response of the other.  
In determining self-concept there is also the question of the self, taking on the role of 
the ‘generalised other’, that is, of  ‘the individual’s conception of the organised process of 
which she is a part.’ Another key dimension of the self-concept discussion is the individual’s 
own conception of herself based upon the actual responses of the others; as well as other 
psychological determinants. Regarding the question of the self taking the role of the 
generalised other, Mead (1956, pp. 231-232) draws out three aspects of the generalised other. 
These include attitudes of other individuals toward the self, toward one another, and "toward 
the various phases or aspects of the common social activity or set of social undertakings that 
as members of an organized society or social group, individuals are all engaged.  
It is obvious that the responses of others to an individual have an influence in shaping 
her self-definition. This self-definition is chiefly derived from the perception of the 
‘generalised other.’  Walker et al (2013, p. 153) have argued that previous research on the 
self-concept has been mistaken by focusing only on those relationships specific to a given 
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The general view espoused by identity11 theorists’ claims ist that the self is composed 
of multiple identities attached to multiple roles through patterned ties to role based others. 
This role based others is not independent since it is embedded in the larger network of social 
ties that comprise one’s personal social network (Owen et al 2010, p. 479).  Self-concept is 
conditioned it seems by the various identity theories focusing on internalisation of ‘social 
positions within a self-structure and those that focus on how consensual and or cultural 
identity meanings that evoke them’ (Ibid. p. 478).  Mead (1934, p. 134) illustrated the self as 
a phenomenon of the human mind born out of reflexive action, stemming primarily from a 
person’s interactions with others.  
He stressed the ability to imagine oneself from the standpoint of another person. The 
self consists, he argued, of two components: the “I” and the “me” (Ibid. p.173-178). The “I” 
(or subject) is the dynamic, novel, spontaneous aspect of the self that constitutes the 
individual as knower and actor. The “me” (or object) is all the learned perspectives a person 
takes toward herself and the attitudes that the “I” assumes toward one’s own person, 
especially when taking the role of the other.  From Mead’s expression of the self-
phenomenon it is the “me” aspect of the self that includes the self-concept and the identities 
incorporated into it. 
Following Mead, once the self emerges in the human organism, a nascent self-concept 
soon follows. Rosenberg (1979, p.15-17) expressed self-concept as the entirety of a specific 
person’s thoughts and feelings toward herself as an object of reflection. The self-concept (or 
                                               
11 We will not here delve into details on the question of identity, but it suffices to suggest that identity concept 
finds its place in the broader concepts of the self and self-concept. Identity occupies a very unique place vis-à-
vis these wider concepts (of self and self-concept). Identity is at the same time a nested component of the more 
general self-structures, yet also refers to social positions that exist outside the individual actor that are available 
to be ascertained, enacted, and potentially internalised. Owen et al (Three Faces of Identity 2010, in Annual 
Review of Sociology vol. 36, Pp. 377- 499) among others, provide an extensive review of literature accounting 
for the vast array of identity understandings. We can summarily suggest that for many theorists who emphasise 
the internalised nature of identity within the context of a stable self-structure, the concept of identity is nested 
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the “me”) can be thought to comprise of three broad classes of individual attributes; self-
referring dispositions, physical characteristics, and identities12. These individual attributes are 
significant to the self-concept and affect the contemporary understanding of selfhood. 
1.5.2 Seigel on the question of contemporary self and selfhood 
Modern thought cannot dispense with the self and what it stands for. To proclaim the 
death of the author or the end of the human self or the individual as subject is to be mistaken 
(Seigel 2005, p. 39). It is this mistakenness that draws Seigel to the question of selfhood in 
contemporary “post-modern” notions of the demise of the human self or subject (ibid. p. 4).  
Such notions he argues derive from the privileging of the reflective aspect of self, which 
purportedly enables the self to escape any or all of its concrete determinants “on behalf of a 
vision of transcendent freedom that overwhelms . . . more modest visions of personal 
integration and regulated autonomy” (Ibid, p. 4). Seigel challenges the idea that a naive, 
Cartesian concept of the self that has been hegemonic in the modern West, presumed 
responsible for a “demise of the human self or subject” ((Seigel 2005, p. 4). He wants to reject 
“one-dimensional” notion of the self, that illustrates the self as essentially rational or basically 
a function of the body, or as merely a function of social relations. He combines different 
dimensions of the self and has tried to get a more unified conception of the self.  What he has 
                                               
12 Self-referring dispositions denote the abstract categories people develop over their life courses and then use to 
shape their response tendencies, including attitudes such as liberalism, traits such as altruism, values such as 
patriotism, and abilities such as athletic skill. It is notable that these traits represent ways to differentiate oneself 
from others (as opposed to representing communalities with others through roles or group membership). 
Physical characteristics include one’s external attributes such as being obese, deaf, or tall. Physical 
characteristics become sociologically interesting when they are also incorporated into a person’s self-image and 
thus have the potential to shape one’s behaviour or one’s social and psychological well-being. They also have an 
external character that influences how others respond to us, shaping their internalisation into the self-concept. A 
third component of self-concept is the identity. There are four key sources of identity characterizations (Owen et 
al 2010, p. 479) draws out of Rosenberg 1979 includes personal or individual identity, role-based identity, 
category-based identity, and group membership–based identity. Personal identity is the most elementary type of 
identity, defined as the social classification of an individual into a category of one. It denotes a unique 
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achieved is not a theory of the self, or at least he doesn’t set it out to be so; rather it is a theory 
about the history of thinking about the self.  
Seigel advises of the importance of harbouring a lot of scepticism about the notion that 
the self is a thing or an object. For him, the self is an idea, and as an idea, it’s something human 
beings use as a vehicle for trying to make sense out of the different components of their lives, 
and they do that according to what sort of understanding of human existence they want to have.  
The difficulties one encounters in this demarcation are that if there is only a bodily 
awareness of the sense of the self for example, what happens to the actual body? The emphasis 
on interconnections of the dimensions raises difficulties in definition; is Descartes’ reflection 
the same as Locke’s or Fichte’s or Heidegger’s? No not necessarily, since they were all trying 
to solve different problems, thereby defined the body, for example, in very different ways, even 
in some sense as different things (Izenberg 2005, p.398).  
Seigel’s accounts of the scientific, commercial, political and intellectual revolutions 
within which the self’s bodily, relational and the reflective sense of awareness are figured 
during the self’s development stages to its modern idea of the self he has to accentuate the 
priority of each dimension. Seigel’s conception of the self is along one or more of these three 
dimensions, the bodily, the relational and the reflective (Smith 2006, p. 93).  
He contends for the need of a “multi-dimensional” model of the self, in this case 
consisting of three dimensions: the “bodily or material”; the “relational,” which “arises from 
social and cultural interactions”; and the “reflective” or self-conscious aspect of the self (Seigel 
2005, 5-6; Garrett 2006, p. 300).   
The important question for Seigel in respect of these dimensions is, in what relationship 
are they put? How do people view or imagine the relations between these three dimensions of 
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the multidimensional selves, and one-dimensional self (Seigel 2005. p. 10). A 
multidimensional self combines two or three dimensions of the self that is never wholly 
coherent because it experiences tensions between its constituents. If founded on a dimension 
of reflectivity it has some degree of independence, but its freedom will be limited by the 
material and social conditions of its being.  
Thus, multidimensional selves experience both a degree of autonomy and a set of 
limitations to themselves. One-dimensional selves, on the contrary are permeated by the 
qualities of the single dimension that constitutes them. Seigel (2006, p. 340) refutes the views 
of Peter Gordon (2006, p. 324) who regards one-dimensional views of the self as “flat” and 
argues to their being notably bubbly and effervescent.  
The self may be purely bodily, or may be dominated by its relational dimension, or the 
self may be wholly reflective and thus essentially independent of both the physical and the 
social worlds. It is to this tripartite model of the self we turn beginning with the bodily 
dimension providing awareness as a sense of the self. 
1.5.3  The continuity of bodily awareness of the sense Self 
The self for Seigel is not a free-floating consciousness, because the self is also defined 
by its corporeal existence. Such recognition of the self depends not simply on memory and 
consciousness but also on its peculiar physical characteristics. Seigel typically refers to this 
aspect of the discourse of the self as ‘the body’.  
The idea of bodily selfhood has entailed a concept of self independent of time and place 
as a set, in essence, of universal biological needs. Seigel’s corporeal dimension of the self is 
highly compatible with the development of the sociology of the body as in part a critique of 
Descartes. Although the terminological apparatus is missing, Seigel works with a distinction 
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the conscious self is a reflective agent, the body is not necessarily an object, but participates in 
an embodied subjectivity towards the world. 
To emphasize the first dimension is to highlight the self’s quality as embodied, that is 
human beings are physical creatures, subject to passions and impulses and characterized by 
certain temperaments. The body dimension of the self suggests corporeal dimensions; a view 
that Aristotle and Plato recognised and subscribed to. Theories holding to a bodily awareness 
foundation of self account for the nervous feedback, emotions, awareness of controlled body 
movements and one’s mental image of her own body as proof of that. Aristotle (Ross 1942) 
accounted for the local body movement and nervous system as essential to the soul or the self 
notwithstanding, this constituted in the mind of Aristotle the irrational lower self.  
The bodily awareness has two features recommending it; the first is that the human 
body is a continuous entity existing in physical space. A second feature of a bodily continuous 
awareness is having an immediate experience. Considering these two features one could hardly 
be or remain unaware of the continuities of awareness of one’s body.  
Difficulties however, arise in identifying the self with continuities of bodily awareness 
when, the experienced body begins to change radically due to age, illness, transplantation, or 
loss of parts of the body, although these changes may not effect a change in the individual's 
sense of who she is.  
Again, total identification of the sense of self with body awareness precludes any view 
of the self as including important elements of social roles or values. Seigel in addressing these 
difficulties treats the body like reflection, thus flattens the changing historical meaning of the 
body. The body surely has to be the body of material self-interest full of the passion - like 
aggression against which it has to be defined. Pre-Seigel (2005, 209) it seems the seventeenth 
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body. For Izenberg (2005, 404) the idea of the body powered but also legitimately empowered 
by material self-seeking drives engendered much of Enlightenment reflection on ways of 
socializing and moralizing the self. 
1.5.4  The relational dimension as basis for a sense of self 
To stress the relational dimension of the self, is to insist that people belong to cultures 
or societies that give them certain characteristics that they share with other people around them 
(Prinz 2004, p. 14-15). The relational dimension marks selfhood with patterns of belief and 
behaviour derived from historically particular social or cultural matrices.  
This self is determined by a lifetime of social and cultural relations allowing one to be 
oneself in relation with society and with others, while playing numerous social roles of 
interpersonal interaction. Roles organise behaviour and attitudes of individuals toward one 
another making social interaction predictable and efficient, and persons as continuous entities 
of the roles they play that accounts for self. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries spawned 
the principal ideas of contemporary social role theories of self.  
Theories that suggest there exists a "self to be studied for each individual, and that this 
self is the basic determinant of her behaviour, a self developed through social interaction (Mead 
1934, p. 200-9). Selves are also developed through legitimate processes out of the same 
materials, so that one can know oneself only to the extent that others know one. A relational 
dimension as a basis for sense of self suggests that individuals engage in a constant search for 
mutually good secure and intimate anxiety free relationships with others.  
This promotes a positive development of a reliable self, acceptable to others as it 
remains consistent. An inconsistent self promotes a negative stimulus and removes from 
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of realty that satisfy their individual needs. The self in a relational dimension comprises some 
abstraction of the most important or most continuously played roles.  
For example, Miller (1963, p. 672) suggests, "a person’s self may be defined in terms 
of her unique manner of playing her roles", because there is no core personality underneath 
one’s behaviour and feeling. There are those who argue that thinking about the self is shaped 
by the subject-object predicate (Seigel 20005, 14). Subject-object ground signposts the 
reflective dimension of the self with language as focus. Language then becomes key to a 
relational foundation of the sense of self. Language encourages the location of selfhood in close 
proximity in relation to others. It accommodates the subject as an agent of thoughts and 
identified through its relations to others. This supports the claim that for the self to be most 
useful must agree closely in form with the reciprocal definition maintained by others, thereby 
stressing the importance of social definition to the sense of self.  
The discourse between the self and the other, as envisioned by the self through “taking 
the role of the other”, i.e. the process of role taking, is considered constitutive of the self as a 
social object (Harnish 2010, p. 5). Descartes locates the essence of the self within the body and 
mind of the actor, i.e. individually. Nonetheless the self cannot conceive itself as an object 
without the other, i.e. socially., and the development of the self and mind arise from social 
contexts.  
1.5.5  The Reflective dimension as basis of a sense of self 
To conceive the self along the third dimension is to point to the independence humans 
acquire reflecting on their being and establishing a distance from their bodily or social 
existence. For Gordon (2006, p, 323) reflectivity must enjoy a distinctive, even primary role in 
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Reflectivity suggests human beings’ ability as selves to think critically about their own 
positions and this is a constitutive, and pre-eminent, aspect or dimension of human selfhood 
(Surkis 2006, p. 315). Seigel sees the usefulness of the term reflectivity to include certain 
features of the wider vocabulary used when talking and thinking about the self. Seigel is 
referring to the vocabulary of disciplines such as human biology, psychology and other social 
relation whose contents he observes are complex and far exceeding the ability to be examined 
in his present work (Seigel 2005, 11-12).   
The human capacity for reflection has been understood as enabling the self to become 
aware of its bodily and social characteristics. Through such self-awareness the self gets to know 
exactly how and to what degree there is an issue for self in reflection to detach itself and obtain 
independence from the bodily and relational. Reflectivity as the contribution made to self by 
the mind provides ingredients for intellectual self awareness in selfhood. A reflective 
dimension of the self permits the self to be an active agent of its own realisation as it establishes 
order among its own attitudes and beliefs therefore providing order to its actions (Gordon 2006, 
p. 323).  
Reflectivity assumes self rationality and appears particularly mode of mental agency 
that bears on the self’s relations to itself and to the world outside. It is reflectivity’s self 
rationality that is responsible for the choice of means to achieve any given ends. A reflective 
relationship to the contents of experience suggests the apprehending of impressions and ideas 
as objects of concern in themselves.  When modulated by reflection, the mental content of 
human attention focuses less on what is outside in the surrounding world, and more on what 
these mental contents seem to tell of things inside human beings13. The reflective dimension 
                                               
13Seigel with a little digression highlights the difference between reflectivity and reflexivity, which are almost 
unwittingly assumed as synonyms. The two however carry opposed meanings where - reflex suggests an 
automatic or involuntary action or an uncontrolled response to stimulus this includes mirror images referred to 
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suggests goal-oriented behaviour as contributing to the sense of self. It suggests values, and 
activities which when they are engaged in become relatively persistent through the life of an 
individual hence giving the individual a sense of self. The sense of self in reflective dimension 
is based partly on the valuing process, therefore conceivably based on a continuing capacity to 
value, a point strongly made by Charles Taylor in Sources of the Self (1989).  
The continuities of the reflective process act as potential contributors to the sense of 
self. In this valuing process one’s underlying values may or may not be known to oneself, 
although one is continually repeating behaviours that she labels good or bad. The labelling 
results from the immediate experience associated with one’s like of the good and dislike of the 
bad.  
The capacity to reflect is consequently attractive as an experiential continuity 
potentially basic to the sense of self, since a sense of the self is based partly on the process of 
valuing. In the process of valuing, the self depends on feelings that one's actions and beliefs 
are in harmony - that she understands the world in a way consistent with her actions in it. 
Valuing or reflectivity is a feature self engages in precisely because selves are both corporeal 
and relational (Ibid. p. 17) and cannot be either corporeal or relational only.  
By reflectivity or valuing selves address a bodily sense of being and what social and 
cultural existence imposes or permits. Korsgaard (1996, p. 369) observes that reflectivity 
allows some form of independent moral agency, a capacity to determine one’s own will 
reflectively. Reflectivity permits capacity for one to posit in a Kantian understanding the 
necessary ground of morality and freedom. Reflectivity however, requires reason to be able to 
                                               
stimulus it is rather self-directed (2005, 13). The two terms therefore suggests two distinct forms of self-
reference, a passive and an active response reflexive and reflection respectively. Reflectivity suggesting a more 
active attentiveness that establishes relationships is the term Seigel applies to the self as he argues reflectivity is 
always taking place below the level of unconsciousness. Reflection itself is set in motion by both inner and 
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adjudicate between competing motives driven by corporeal (bodily) awareness sense as basis 
of self and relational or social awareness sense as basis of self.  
A reflective dimension cannot be perceived to constitute selfhood independent of the 
corporeal and the relational (Gordon 2006, p. 322–323). This dismisses those who have made 
it to be the only true basis of self-existence, or that it provides access to the deep essential self 
or subject. Such a claim will find basic incoherence in the view that there is a self that comes 
first to know itself through conscious reflection.  
  The idea of reflective dimension of the self is attractive due to its continuity and 
availability to organise consistent and continuous corporeal and relational awareness of the 
self. But it faces its principle difficulties in attempting to integrate reflectivity with the 
corporeal and relational continuities.  The self, as a reflective process, i.e. "it is an object to 
itself." It is the reflexivity of the self that "distinguishes it from other objects and from the 
body." The body and other objects are not objects to themselves in the way that the self is. It 
is, furthermore, this reflexivity of the self that distinguishes human from animal consciousness.  
1.5.6  Concluding remark on Seigel and the Self 
Seigel’s three-dimensional model of the self conceptually, presupposes the modern 
Western self, a complex rather than a simple entity, notwithstanding the supposedly nefarious 
influence of Descartes. A Western European self has taken on a normative status that prescribes 
how we should conceive the self. From this normative perspective, the bodily, relational, and 
reflective aspects of the self need to be properly balanced in order for culture to have a healthy 
notion of the self.  
When the self model assumes normative status, it is no longer a “model” but the way 
the self “really” is or can be. For Seigel at different historical junctures and in different national 
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internally. Whilst he does not dwell on the point, an accentuation of any one aspect can create 
certain “pathologies” in the self. Gratuitous emphasis on the social dimension leads to the view 
of the self as essentially passive and/or paranoid.  
Underscore reflectivity too much and the self floats free of all specific connections and 
situations, while a purely bodily self has scarcely any human qualities at all. Altogether, the 
three-dimensional self is a thoroughly “situated” self, though neither a prisoner of its social-
cultural environment nor a plaything of bodily impulses (King 2008, 428).  
Additionally, while the three dimensions taken together are necessary to a full 
conception of the self, reflectivity—the capacity of the self to examine itself in all its 
manifestations including the act of self-awareness itself becomes first among equals and 
becomes a central characteristic of the most complex tradition of the self.  
1.5.7  The Self in moral spaces – Taylor, Charles 
Discussing Jerrold Seigel’s thoughts in ‘The idea of the self: Thought and experience 
in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century’ (2005), his was a response to ‘postmodern’ 
challenges to the autonomy and integrity of the human subject. Sixteen years earlier Charles 
Taylor in ‘Sources of the self: The making of modern identity (1989)’, attempted responding to 
postmodern challenges to selfhood and subjectivity.  
Taylor considered the philosophical questions; of who we are and how should we 
live…the response is an adventure of self-discovery for readers (Teske 1990, p. 159-60). In 
Taylor’s monumental work several areas enrich this discussion of the self. 
Taylor traces the historical sources of the modern understanding of selfhood aiming to 
reconstruct this understanding. He investigates how the modern sense of selfhood came about 
through the influences of philosophy and popular thought. Taylor lays a philosophical 
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history of mentalities. His fundamental argument is that the concept of the self is linked to 
morality (Schneewind 1991, p. 424).  
Morality is not simply a set of claims about what one ought to or not do to be moral; 
rather what one ought to be or not be. Taylor concedes morality is related to the self by a 
framework (Taylor 1989, p. 17). That is to say, how one thinks about oneself depends first, on 
what one considers to be the Good, and how one relates to that Good (Taylor 1989, p. 20-23; 
Larmore 1991, p. 159). One can only think of oneself as one thinks of oneself in relation to 
what is most important. 
Taylor’s insight that selfhood is dependent on the Good and on one’s relation to it 
permits him to ask how those conceptions of self have changed over time (Ibid. p. 21-22), as 
people hold and relate to different goods differently. Taylor describes a transition from an 
external sense of the self to an interior sense of the self, echoing Augustinian Confessions.  
It is also a transition from finding meaning in extraordinary deeds to finding meaning 
in everyday actions, ‘affirmation of ordinary life’ (Ibid. p. 23; MacIntyre 1994, p. 187). Taylor 
raised questions about how people conceived who they are, and how religion has influenced 
that conception, similarly he provides ways of thinking about religion and the self.  
Taylor argues the self is indefinable apart from the Good. But since religion is proficient 
in defining for many people the Good and how to relate to it, religion becomes a powerful key 
to understanding people’s sense of self. This is a way to use religion as a lens to view self, 
without treating religion as something merely epiphenomenal.  
Taylor focuses on first-person, subjective, affirmed identity, category identity and the 
understanding of authenticity to address the self. His creates the intellectual space necessary 
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descriptions of the self should be radically revised to take seriously the independent claims of 
values having objective reality.  
Objective reality support claims that moral sensibility is important in determining what 
it means to be a self. Contemporary attitudes of the self as modern constructs necessitate 
alternative formulations of naturalistic views of the self (Schneewind1991, p. 422). Taylor 
perceives that experiencing structures of selfhood as given does not allow for freedom to seek 
remedies to difficulties and anomalies embedded in those structures therefore alternative 
formulations are needed.  
Any narrative of the self should therefore acknowledge the extent to which the identity 
of a human being is deeply interwoven with the understanding of the good (Teske 1990, p. 
160). The idea of the good implies being engaged in a form of judgement. For Taylor, human 
experience is without any doubt coloured by human being’s capacity or need to be engrossed 
in qualitative judgments (Taylor 1989, 27). Human beings therefore desire to be rightly related 
to what it is to be good, since this constitutes the human life (ibid. 44). 
1.5.8  The self and value relationship 
Taylor considers it reductionism to view the self from a perspective stripped of its moral 
and aesthetic framework. The framework provides values and norms to be understood and 
engaged, they are not mere projections of sentiments or ideas or Platonic ideas somewhere 
beyond the commonplace life-world. Rather, values and norms are aspects of the world of self 
(Laitinen 2008, p. 2) and individuals live by assessing the qualitative dimensions of things 
around them and their own selves in the world (MacIntyre 1981, p. 33).  
The endless sifting and measuring of these assessments turn out to be a major 
component of each individual action subsequently supplying the rationale for every decision 
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from within the context of a moral/aesthetic framework. Taylor navigates away from the 
cognitive function and toward narrativity and metaphors such as the quest for the good or the 
question of being rather than doing (MacIntyre 1994, p.189).  
Taylor’s self suggests a response to ethical questions about the meaning and value of 
life and of one’s life in particular. To define the self is to answer the question ‘Who am I? This 
is a question about one’s values, ideals and attachments. It is about what makes one’s life 
meaningful to oneself; it is intensely personal, subjective question distinct from questions of 
social category (Weir 2009, p. 536). 
  Taylor is concerned the language of contemporary moral philosophy guided by natural 
science unfortunately generalises all dimensions of human life (Taylor 1989, 58; Anderson 
1996, p. 24). The fallacy of this natural science generalisation is that it is only possible when 
aspects central to making life humane are denied or ignored.   
 Contemporary moral philosophy correspondingly tends to narrow down the ethical, 
while distilling the moral self through few abstract principles to include for example, Kantian 
categorical imperative or Habermas’ universal justice (Taylor 1989, 64). Contemporary moral 
philosophy’s tendency to limit the range of human moral reflection runs as a counterpart to the 
augmentation of natural science. To its natural conclusion science has rendered society 
inarticulate regarding the basis of moral judgments (Taylor 1989, p. 53-91; Teske 1990, pp. 
161-162), it has removed the foundation from which to explain or justify who a person is and 
why such a person responds in the world in the way she does.  
Modern moral philosophy dependent on science portrays a picture where the self can 
be identified independent of values, however for Taylor identity is tied up with the values that 
give an agent structure and direction to her life. Natural science has inevitably argues Taylor, 
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enforcing the fact that one cannot just climb out of the framework of human reflection, as 
natural science appears to suggest.  
Framework is always in part structured by valuative thoughts, feelings, goals, and all 
these cannot be accurately described without the qualitative dimension; for to do so is to 
describe a world without human experience. Taylor cautions the readiness of modern 
descriptions of the self that render incomprehensible the kind of activities that form the 
substance of human experience. The caution is given from examining the complicated Western 
European’s description of the self.  
Science, Taylor argues, is a form of inquiry whose objective purpose has been to 
describe things from a perspective freed of anthropocentric conceptions. It cannot leap and say 
that notions of the good and right are not as real, objective, and non-relative as any other part 
of the natural world (Taylor 1989, 56).   
In his defence the language of values has no desire or interest to foster an attitude of 
the sixteenth – and seventeenth century obscurantists who fought feverishly against the natural 
sciences in aid of preserving the theological basis of human dignity. His starting point is that 
human beings are essentially dialogical beings that define their identities through relationships 
with (and struggles against) others and themselves.  
Human beings define themselves always in linguistic and cultural contexts of meaning. 
For Taylor, the self to whom one is related is, to its core, a dialogical self, dependent on 
dialogue and on relations of recognition and misrecognition with others.  It is a self with 
background meanings and languages and always in a process of change through dialogue, 
through relationship and interaction with others and with the world. No scientist can accurately 
describe a humanly inhabited world without the qualitative dimension; any such a world is only 
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understood in the West, stems from allowing a particularly powerful type of discourse (natural 
science) that extends its range beyond that task for which it was designed (ibid. 59).  
1.5.9  Values on being more than epiphenomenal 
Taylor is persuaded natural science’s construction of a value-neutral, mechanistic 
universe is an illusion (Schneewind 1991, p. 422-423). This is because the human value terms 
purport to give insight into what it means to live in the universe as a human being, which is 
something of a different matter from what physical science claims to reveal and explain (Taylor 
1989, p. 59; Teske 1990, p. 162).  
Taylor argues for a re-construction of the modern understanding of selfhood that points 
toward the possibility of a newer reconstructed discourse of self that eschews natural science’s 
interpretations. Such a reconstructed discourse must not give the idea of belonging or of 
identity, because to do so is to be left with a world in which nothing matters.  
This reconstructed discourse must affirm the objective reality of qualitative distinctions 
and values, observes Bernard Williams (The New York Review of Books November 8, 1990).  
Blattberg (2007, pp. 802-832) on the other hand is critical of Taylor for providing a detailed 
account of the historical text of the life of the self, while his own reconstructed discourse of 
the self is limited.  
Taylor suggests, that new approaches to the self ought to proceed from the background 
of values of hypergoods, that set the stage for human moral and aesthetic judgements. These 
hypergoods serve to orient persons to themselves and to the world around and provide persons 
with their human identities. Consequently, for one to be a self is to have the capacity to take an 
evaluative position with respect to the things she confronts in her world.  
It means engaging into the pursuit of these hypergoods that are components of the 
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individuals might make meaning of human identity. This is because for Taylor, to be a self at 
all is to have the capacity to take an evaluative position with respect to the things one confronts 
in the world. Blattberg again is critical of Taylor who seemingly assumes that hypergood-
driven conflicts can be solved rationally which is not the case (Ibid. p. 815). 
In his quest to restore the self discourse of values and qualities as well as to engage in 
a constructive description of hypergoods, Taylor affirms the ontological status of value. A 
reconstructed discourse of selfhood constitutes a quest for authenticity.  The ideal of 
authenticity does not presume a fixed, pre-given self, nor is the ideal of authenticity about the 
metaphysics of substance, or about metaphysics at all.  
For Taylor, it is about ethics, and an ethical relation to self. The question ‘Who am I?’ 
when raised in Taylorean terms, is a question about an individual’s goods. It is about what 
matters to her and what constitutes a good life for her. Certainly, for Taylor, this question 
demands developing an authentic relationship to oneself to others and to ideals and values. The 
ideal of an authentic relation to oneself is that of being true to oneself, to one’s own particularity 
and uniqueness from which an individual call into account a truth and moral dimensions.  
It is the case also that one’s inner voice and inner feelings are important because they 
tell her what is the right thing to do. That is to say, one has a moral responsibility to oneself 
comparable to one’s responsibility to others. In this particular circumstance the point of the 
truth dimension is for an individual to be true to oneself, calling into perspective self-love.  
What is important is that one engages in and commits to a relationship of integrity with 
oneself. It is exercising the care of the self, in a specifically modern way (Weir 2009, p.537) 
where an individual must be attentive and receptive to herself. She listens to herself, respect 
and foster her own uniqueness and originality. When an individual fails to do so, she is missing 
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or, the meaning of her life. The modern ideal of authenticity pacts moral importance to a 
particular kind of relation to one’s self. It is also a relationship in, which one must struggle to 
discover or respect truth about oneself. 
1.5.10  Self as positing identity 
Authenticity for Taylor remains important as it aids an individual to discover the 
meaning and value of her life (Schneewind, 1991, p. 422; Anderson 1996, p. 17-18). It is up to 
the individual to find out and create meanings through dialogue and reflection carried out 
through a relationship of integrity with oneself. Authenticity re-enforces one’s identity that is 
made up of one’s commitments to her values and her attachment to a community that helps her 
to define these commitments to values (Taylor 1989, p.36).  
Authenticity is important also for self-interpretation that constitutes Taylor’s 
understanding of the self. Taylor contends that the capacity to discover, create and affirm one’s 
own identity developed historically with liberation from fixed social positions. It entails one’s 
freedom and responsibility for the generation of meaning, for self-definition. Modern 
development of both individual and collective identities, Taylor argues, corresponds to 
liberation from fixed social positions, and works to undermine those fixed positions.  
However, these modern identities remain socially constituted through background 
ontologies and relations of meaning (Turner 2008, pp. 33-34). Taylor is focusing on first-
person, subjective, affirmed identity to demonstrate that authentic identity of the self requires 
a receptive relation to self and to the truth of the self or the pursuit of self-knowledge.  
But identity also means one is constituted through webs of interlocutions, from whereby 
she is defined through her relation to the good, or goods, of her social world. One’s identity is 
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to others, goods and to herself. Identities are in essence connections in which an individual is 
a participant in the construction of her own self through dialogue with others and with self. 
Taylor’s valuation of community and an individual’s embeddedness in it, contra Meads 
(1934) is conservative. Taylor sees social influences as benign.  So that the question “who am 
I?” central to establishing the place of the self, is for Taylor primarily a question about the 
values, goods, commitments and attachments that an individual affirms. He therefore pays no 
attention to the degree to which individuals are still very much fixed in hierarchical social 
positions defined by categories like race, class, gender and sexuality, and still are very much 
fixed by ascriptions of identity categories.  
Antony Appiah (2005, p. 54) is concerned that developing the argument in this fashion 
allows Taylor’s thesis to rely upon an unresolved tension between a ‘subject-centred’ and a 
‘social-centred’ model of interpretation. Taylor’s response is that assigning dignity to an 
individual solves this problem of hierarchical social positions. Dignity is important because it 
is an affirmation of an individual’s place in ordinary life. The absence of dignity can be 
catastrophic, can shatter an individual’s ‘sense of dignity by totally undermining her feelings 
of self-worth’ (Taylor 1989: 16). An example Taylor would observe, is how the affirmation of 
an individual’s ordinary life, as specifically a modern good becomes essential to the 
individual’s identity, and therefore to a meaningful life. 
1.5.11  Concluding remarks on the Self in Taylor 
Taylor ‘s central historical category in tracing the emergence of the idea of the self is 
the rise of modernity, a process he certainly sees as many-layered and complex but which he 
treats largely as the rise of individualism. He makes this conclusion by attempting to answer 
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The first level is that of identity, and the second is that of values. His response is tailored 
to the fact the question ‘who’ a person is has to do with issue of the meaning of the person’s 
life. To know the meaning of life an individual has to respond to another question that of 
authenticity and that is not just about knowing the truth of the self but being true to oneself. 
One’s relation to self is an ethical relation, on account that it focuses on the question of the 
meaning of life.  
For Taylor, what gives an individual meaning to her life is the central subject of identity 
and belonging. Lives have meaning only insofar as persons experience themselves importantly 
connected to their defining communities, to their background horizons, to their ideals and 
goods.  
Meaningful life for Taylor involves connections, but it also means breaking away from 
something. A life without meaning is the kind lived without one being importantly connected 
to something, or someone. Being connected means identifying oneself with some past tradition, 
with defining communities, with values or ideals and with the future one can foresee or 
imagine. The relation to self and to one’s telos is one’s identity or an essential part of one’s 
identity. Taylor has argued that the beautiful life may be one telos among possible goods 
recognised by modern western individuals. He identifies several such goods, and many more 
can surely be identified, especially once the individual broadens her global horizons.  
Taylor also acknowledges that presently individuals generally embrace several 
competing and conflicting goods. The remedy to reconcile the competing and conflicting goods 
is by developing capacities for articulating these goods, more carefully and clearly, so that 
there may be possibilities of reconciling some of these conflicts. For Taylor, however, the 
connection to an ideal self, without any account of connection to defining communities, or 
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1.6  Conclusion 
 
In negotiating everyday living the mystical language of self-abandonment, death to 
self, and allied terms forming a matrix for understanding disinterested love is hard to grapple 
with. It is true that disinterested love can be joined to Augustinian anthropology that gives 
primacy to the will. Such love entails radical adherence to the will of God, and replacement 
of self-will by the divine and the forgetfulness of self, of all that hinders becoming one with 
God.  
A central issue however, arises as to what extend disinterested love could be said to 
be truly disinterested? It is difficult to concede the highest form of love of God as renouncing 
all desire for reward or purified of all self-interest. While there exists a radical antinomy 
between love of God and love of self there remains an impossibility of separation.  
I argued that renouncing all hope of reward would be a deformation of the love of 
God, not its perfection. True love of God and true love of self include hope, acknowledging 
and affirming God as good in himself encompassing loving God as good for the self. 
In the discussion above once it became obvious that the idea of a disinterested love 
was untenable, this opened the way for love of God and true self-love. Love of God includes 
any act, thought or impulse that is in concurrence with human beings’ created teleology. I 
concluded that love of God and self-love are possible and that the perfection of the one is the 
perfection of the other.  
In discussing Augustinian self-love later, it will become obvious that, Augustine 
acknowledged as entirely coincidental and coextensive with the love of God the principle of 
right self-love. Any right kind of self-love necessarily imply the love of God, and there is no 
way in which God could be loved without the lover loving herself as well. But this is just 
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The problem of self-abnegation in Christian tradition stands in the way of self-love, 
and challenges normative accounts of self and is suspicious of the self.  Moral 
anthropological thinking has drifted from ontological to epistemological ones that are 
concerned largely with the limitations of human knowledge. Moral matters are now primarily 
of personal or communal choice and situation specific. 
What is required, as I shall argue later, is a moral anthropology that illuminates the 
relation between moral beings and moral thinking, while orienting humans practically in a 
manner consonant with the insights of these present challenges. The prevailing accounts of 
the self, academic or cultural, show the need for a theological moral anthropology as the 
foundation for a norm of right self-love. An account of true self-love, I argue is imperative 
for orienting one’s life toward the hypergoods. In previous epochs the claim that God is the 
highest good and the good of human beings, weds personal flourishing to the self’s relation 
with God. So that proper self-relation and proper God-relation coincide. When the question 
of proper self-love is settled it contributes on how to be a coherent self. A self that is 
multidimensional and one that functions in moral spaces, that has value relationships capable 
of posting identity; that is exactly what Aristotle’s considerations on self and self-love 
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     Chapter 2  




Fundamental to Aristotle’s ethics is his concept of living well (eudaimonia). For 
Aristotle living well is living in accordance with the virtues, and friendship is one of the 
virtues necessary for living well. In fact, friendship is an essential ingredient for attaining the 
virtuous life14.  
Aristotle appears adamant that any discussion of virtues must include a discussion of 
friendship as a natural progression.  Friendship is a virtue, or implies virtue and is most 
necessary with a view of living well15. Friendship is an essential aspect of a life of happiness 
and morality16. Friendship has this exceptionally close connection with moral virtue.  
Friendship is also a crucial link in a chain in which the treatment of the separate virtues is not 
yet completed.  
In the lives of virtuous agents, friendship is far more involved and is more significant 
than just good will.  Friendship aids agents’ progression towards fulfilling their ultimate end 
goals, for Aristotle that is human flourishing. Aristotle is committed to the unity of virtue and 
happiness and rejects the commonly held notion that what is really good for human beings is 
                                               
14 Virtues in Nicomachean Ethics VI (Aristotle [2000] Nicomachean Ethics, Eds. Terence Irwin, Indianapolis, 
Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 2nd ed…) are accounts of the spheres of action or feelings of character. These 
states of character are the result of habituation, which is learning by practice to do the appropriate kinds of 
actions (NE 1103b21-5). This is contrary to teaching and learning of the intellectual virtues (NE 1103al4-17). 
However, the right state of action or feeling of character requires more than the just the right actions. It also 
requires the tendency to take pleasure in the actions or feelings themselves (NE 1104b3-16). We can infer by 
implication that someone whose desires and emotions have been trained to make him do the virtuous action and 
enjoy it, such a person has a virtue of character 
15 Aristotle writes that; ...“For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods” 
(1155a). 
16 ….“the friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to 
become better by their activities and by improving each other; for from each other they take the mold of the 
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not what is most pleasant, and that what is right or noble is often neither good nor pleasant. 
Aristotle argues, to the contrary, that the activity of virtue is the very substance of human 
happiness and is best achieved within the context of serious friendship.  
Serious friendship has love as an end and not love as a means, which makes the 
notion of self-love a primacy. Aristotle insisted that serious friendship by implication is 
dependent on both correct decisions and actions and these in turn depend on true practical 
thought and on right desire respectively; since "thought by itself moves nothing," and the 
thought which is practical depends on desire (EN 1139a35-b4). While my focus in this 
section of Aristotle is to understand how he treated the subject of self-love, a number of 
considerations become necessary for in order to arrive at Aristotle’s understanding of self-
love. There is the unique way of understanding Aristotle’s account of the virtues or virtue.  
In this unique way of understanding virtues or virtue, I discuss the way his treatment 
of virtues provides a foundation for his understanding of self-love.  I will also discuss self 
that in Aristotle’s understanding is tied to his account of friendship and from friendship to 
self-love. We begin with the question of virtue or virtuous persons in Aristotle’s ethics. 
2.2  Aristotle on realised moral virtues 
Virtue can be argued a matter both of being knowledgeable and of having one's 
emotions and desires properly organized. This is an inclusive view of the virtuous internal 
condition adopted by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. For Aristotle at (EN 1106b36-7a2) 
'virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to 
us, this being determined by reason, the reason by which the practically wise person would 
determine it’. So, it will seem virtue is a matter of developing the appropriate moral character 
key to the self and that involves both the acquisition of practical knowledge and some kind of 
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formation] that one aims to reach, rather than a tool one can use to work out what one ought 
to do.  
She is convinced that Aristotle’s account of virtue is a dominant account that rests 
unchallenged in virtue ethics. Its core motif of ‘the doctrine of the mean17’, remains central to 
understanding virtue ethics.  In Aristotle’s understanding of virtue ‘the doctrine of the mean,’ 
is important to his ethics, although now it is being left out by the neo-Aristotelians in 
discussions of virtue ethics (Ibid. p. 3).  
Aristotle recognised that the exercise of moral virtue founded on what is fine as the 
dominant constituent of eudemonism [a life well lived]. He therefore easily endorsed 
eudemonism. Eudemonism for Aristotle is a product of habituation, a process of learning; an 
on-going process of learning that starts in childhood and continues all one’s life it is not mere 
routine habit.  
It is this habituation that is responsible for the formation of the love for self or the 
self-lover. It needs experience and the ability to apply that experience in ways that 
intelligently appreciate what is worthwhile and what is not. This is why Aristotle’s account of 
friendship embraces virtue ethics. True friendship unlike political friendship based on utility 
of some kind, offers the proposition, and requires a friend to apply what was learnt in the past 
to the present relationship. It is applying deliberative, emotional, and social skills that enable 
one to put one’s general understanding of well being into practice in ways that are suitable to 
                                               
17 In his ethics Aristotle produces a table of virtues and vices, the table false between the excesses and 
deficiencies. Aristotle then argues that for an agent to be virtuous he will need to apply his principle of reason to 
be able to balance between his virtues and vices - there has to be found the mid-point. It is this midpoint, which 
demonstrates that the person is capable of rational planning. For example, a virtuous person who is capable of 
rational planning would consider the spheres of action or feeling between fear and confidence and decide that 
courage is the midpoint that for Aristotle calls the ‘mean’ between rashness into action and cowardice – staying 
away from entering the action or another example would be by applying reason an agent finds that temperance 
is the mean that lies between self-indulgence and insensibility. Aristotle expects this model of reason and acting 
to be applied to major and minor spheres of actions or feelings, and the ability to apply this principle renders an 
agent decent or morally astute. An agent who is unable to apply this principle has difficulties finding the ‘mean’, 
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each occasion. A person should aim at eudaimonia not as an end, and the eudaimonia in 
question is one’s own. Thinking reflectively how one should live one realises that her 
fundamental concern is with making her own life realise eudaimonia.  
The pursuit of eudaimonia becomes the process that should organize one’s other 
concerns and commitments, including the commitments that the agent would think of as 
moral. Eudaimonia involves the understanding that it is not only a matter of acting in a 
particular way that will best promote one’s own happiness, as we understand happiness, it’s 
more than that (Ackrill 12978, p.595-7).  
Noticeably, Aristotelian eudaimonia includes virtue, or virtuous actions, and some 
virtues-especially justice and friendship remarkably are directed at the good of others. In 
acting to achieve one’s own eudaimonia [that is responding to self loving] one will in fact be 
acting in ways that benefit other people. A virtuous person must have practical wisdom. Her 
feelings must be such that she enjoys doing and wants to do what her good deliberations urge 
her to do. The rational and desiderative parts of her soul are in harmony so that she does not 
suffer from akrasia [the state of acting against one's better judgment] (Homiak 1981, p. 634).  
Emotions play only a secondary role in the deliberations of a virtuous person, reason 
is the primary element that guides the soul of the virtuous person. The virtuous person is said 
to do the virtuous thing willingly or ungrudgingly making virtue enjoyable, therefore, 
contrasted with the vicious person who does the opposite, although Augustin would beg to 
differ with this conclusion. Of course, one may ask, but what is enjoyable about virtue? 
Aristotle’s interpretation of the virtues in terms of self-love helps us to see what Aristotle 
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expressive of who she is. Aristotle's annotations at (1 168a9-15) indicate that what is most 
noble is most pleasurable, and that depends on activity.  
Such an activity is the kind which is expressive of a person's power to order and plan 
her own life. The virtuous person consequently loves rational planning above all else, and 
when she acts for the sake of the noble, she acts from this love. The mention of ends and 
goals here is out of question, for the point is that an agent’s enjoyment of planning causes her 
to act in the ways she does.18  This is the character of the virtuous person and as I shall 
comment below it is true of the self-lover in Aristotle’s understanding. Both the virtuous 
person and the self-lover whose behaviour is a natural causal consequence of her self-love, 
may actually be the same person acting from rational planning. 
Aristotle declares that, applying reason, the practically wise person deliberates well 
about what sorts of things conduce to the good life in general (1140a25-8). Such a person’s 
practical wisdom is concerned with 'things just and noble and good for people' (1143b21-3). 
In these passages Aristotle suggests that the virtuous person deliberate well not merely about 
how to achieve the ends but more importantly about what ends to adopt.  
Applying reasons, she deliberates well about what the good life consists in and makes 
clear that virtue does not lack direction and good judgment. Consequently, to be virtuous one 
must not only act; one must also understand why she acts the way she does (1105a31-2). 
Actions have to be seen in the context of one’s view of the nature of human good, that is, to 
                                               
18 Understanding Aristotle from this premise suggests that just as the presence of self-love will cause one to act 
virtuously, its absence will equally cause one to act in any number of morally deficient or vicious way, 
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be able to explain actions in terms of conceptions of human good. These are the sentiments 
Aristotle carries into the relation of the self.  
 
2.3 Aristotle on Self  
 
Aristotle’s discussion of self can be contrasted with modern present day 
understandings of the self that have a bias towards Cartesianism. The Aristotelian self has 
substantial reality as an individual self, and his idea of the self stands in a marked contrast to 
the modern notion of selves derived from Descartes’s conception of the self.  
Descartes’ idea of the self is something substantial; however his way of understanding 
this self leads too easily to the loss of substantiality (Seigel 2005, p. 59-61). Aristotle’s idea 
of the self has substantial reality as an individual self, whereas Descartes identifies 
substantiality with consciousness, which is an act or a series of acts and not a substance, and 
this consciousness is also passive and not active.  
Aristotle would reject the notion of a Cartesian ego, which is supposed to be a unitary 
given even in absence of reference to the body. This Cartesian understanding expresses the 
self as disembodied, in its mode of experiencing itself and not in its mode of moving itself 
(Taylor1989, 146-147). The separating of the body from the self or the loss of the embodied 
animality of the self, viewed as the chief legacy of Cartesianism leads to the loss of substance 
and action.  
The Cartesian concept communicates the self in its mode of experiencing itself and 
not in its mode of moving itself. The attempt to separate the body from the self is the chief 
legacy of Cartesianism leading to the loss of substance and action. It presupposes the 
Humean idea of the self as a bundle or a collection of different perceptions (Hume 1969, p. 
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nevertheless they are a natural development from it. A bundle of feelings or impressions is 
what consciousness, understood as identical with conscious acts, must always threaten to 
become (Simpson 2001, p. 309-310). 
Aristotle contrary to Descartes insists on the reality of the object of immediate 
perception (NE 9.91170a29-32), to include the reality of one’s own body. Aristotle's 
epistemology allows no direct self-knowledge to the human cognitive agent. An agent’s 
cognition is always directly of something else. Therefore, what Aristotle terms the self, is 
aware of itself only concomitantly.  
That is in terms of the external sensible things that are its direct object. It is in this 
concomitant cognition that there arises an immediate and unshakable awareness of a single 
agent, namely oneself. This immediate awareness is not of a sense, or of a mind, or of a soul, 
rather it is of the person as cognitive agent (Taylor 1989, p. 27). It is an immediate awareness 
of a person who thinks and acts by means of those faculties of a sense, of a mind, or of a soul.  
Ethically then, one is consequently and immediately aware of oneself as the moral 
agent, as the source of one's free conduct. And therefore, one draws the firm conclusion that 
she is responsible for her deliberate actions (NE 5.1113b3-21). In spite of the apparent 
difficulties in explaining the nature of a self of which an agent has no direct knowledge, there 
is no doubt that Aristotle’s text expresses the immediate factual awareness of an agent’s self 
as a unitary cognitive and moral agent19.  
Aristotle provides a fully articulated account of substance as the ontological or 
metaphysical reality of each particular thing, or simply that, what makes the thing stand out 
from bare nothingness is its substantial being. This enables Aristotle to keep the substantial 
                                               
19 Difficulties arise from this claim, that is, from an epistemological setting that precludes any direct knowledge 
of the nature of the agent self, there is no knowledge of what the agent is. This is because the natures known are 
those of sensible external things, things other than the percipient. In this cognitive awareness knowledge of all 
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reality of the self as the abiding source and ultimate object of consciousness. The self cannot 
therefore be reduced to its properties; on the contrary it is its properties that are reducible to 
the self as substance. An Aristotelian understanding of self will then make the claim that one 
must always bear in mind that human cognition originates in sensible things. 
Considering cognition, Aristotle gives an example with the sun’s rays; that sensations 
of sensible things are receptions of forms, as when the sun’s rays warm a thing, cognitional 
reception of forms takes place without matter. Since the cognitional or immaterial reception 
of the same form in sensation causes one to feel warm, it is just as authentically a reception of 
form and just as indisputably a cause of being. Owens (1988, p. 712) observes that form for 
Aristotle is always a cause of being, and the cause of a thing's being what it is’. Aristotle is 
perceived to claim that, received in matter, the form makes the thing what it is physically. A 
thing perceived can never be reducible to its sensations, since the substance of a thing is a 
real given of experience and its form or constituting principle. Simpson (2001, p.314) 
observes that,  
‘The particular form or principle of a thing is sufficient, not only to individuate the 
thing as what it is, but also to make it the same individual thing throughout all 
changes. The doctrine of substantial form is what explains, for Aristotle, the identity 
over time of individual material things.’ 
 
This principle of substantial form is what Aristotle relies on to respond to the problem of 
personal identity. Aristotle maintains many tend to wonder whether such identity should be 
explained by references to either bodily or psychological continuity or both. Aristotle’s 
response inferred that personal identity can only be explained by identity of form or of the 
structuring code that keeps the body the same despite changes. Identity is derived from the 
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 The structuring principle constituting personal identity over time is the soul according 
to Aristotle; it is the first actuality of the organic body. The soul sets the body in action as a 
body and as a living body. The soul becomes the source of being for the body and the 
foundation for all the acts of the body. Therefore, the principle of personal identity is not 
indistinguishable from acts of self-consciousness. It is a reality that becomes an object of 
self-consciousness, having a being independent of self-consciousness and acts of self-
consciousness.  
 The idea of the primary self for Aristotle is the ontological reality of the composite of 
body and soul, but this biological or ontological self, is not all there is to Aristotle’s idea of 
the self. For Aristotle the biological self is the lowest level of selfhood. Beyond the unity of 
the animal’s substance, the immediate given, there is also the unity of the animal’s powers 
and acts. This unity of powers and acts is however, not an immediate given and does not 
automatically follow from the unity of the body. This is because the unity of the body’s 
substance can be affected without impacting the unity of powers and acts, and the unity of 
powers and acts can be affected without impacting the body’s substance.   
 A person may be oneself in her substance, but many and conflicting selves in her acts 
(NE 1.13.1102b16-28). This consideration leads to the moral self, that unlike the ontological 
or biological self, a given of nature; the moral is an achievement of practice and habituation 
and therefore a result of virtue. Without virtue an individual or even a community is torn and 
divided. An individual who is divided and torn is represented by the bad person of Aristotle’s 
texts (NE 9.4.1166b7-22). Who is not really a unity when contrasted with the good person of 
(NE 9.4.1166a13-29).  
Concerning the moral self, Aristotle articulates the thought that virtue is what brings 
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other, since all virtues are united in the virtue of prudence, right reason falls into the 
definition of each of them (NE 6.1, 5, 13.). Because human virtues accord with reason and 
nature, they integrate the human soul with itself and with its acts. They also integrate the acts 
with each other.  
Virtue is for the sake of acts and the good person is good in action, not simply in 
having the power and disposition to act (NE 1.8.1098b31-9a7). It is in activity with the self 
that the good person is come fully into being as a self, although the action is itself completed 
in and through the body. In the ethical order Aristotle recognises in a person something 
higher and dominating, as though it should be in control of a person's conduct.  
Aristotle is accused of peddling fragmented selves akin to Kant when he claims that 
the non-virtuous person has many selves because she is not unified. The difference between 
Kantian selves and the selves of Aristotle is that each of the individual selves of Aristotle is a 
real substance capable of communicating and sharing with others. Aristotle’s starting point in 
relation to selves is that they are embodied rational animals with a capacity to share goods of 
the soul over and above the goods of the body.  
In the act of sharing the animal comes fully to itself thus becoming fully a self, this is 
contra Kant whose view of self are founded on apperception – that conclusions of explaining 
the self are founded on internal reasoning that cannot be experienced through the senses. 
Aristotle's notion of self is not that of an impersonal, objective or transcendent mind; on the 
contrary, the self is simply the individual who thinks, acts, has affections, wishes, and 
chooses (Taylor 1989, p. 27). It is the whole human individual who is this self, one who 
knows another and thereby recognizes herself as an individual self. For Aristotle, a person is 
related to her friend as she is to herself because the friend is another self (NE 1166a3, 
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Another mirrors the friend as friend and so gives the ability to recognizes herself as 
the friend she is to herself. Therefore, a person is related to her friend as she is to herself as a 
second self.  Aristotle also puts a marker on something else unique about the individual who 
embodies the self, that within that individual there is a divine element, perhaps represented 
by the self, "It may be even held that this is the true self of each, in as much as it is the 
dominant and better part" (NE 1178a2); "the intellect more than anything else is man" (NE 
1178a7).   
The true human self taking on divinity, and it is this true self’s divine feature that 
Aristotle urges persons to attend to as the supreme goal of their lives by suggesting, “It would 
be a strange thing if a person should choose to live not his own life [that is, be most truly his 
own self] but the life of some other than herself. (1177b3, 1178a4).” All human activity 
should be oriented as much as possible toward this life, but the express condition for 
possessing it is that the individual remain somehow her own self (NE 1159a8-12, 1178a2-3).  
This self must have self-regard, and one most really feels integral in one’s own 
relationship with one’s self.  Only with one’s own self is one of ‘one soul’ and therefore 
being one’s best friend. This conclusion allows one to be able to love one’s self most of all 
(1168b.9-12); this loving of oneself issues into self-love. The self of Aristotle denies the idea 
of self-abnegation, or radical self-denial. Aristotle’s self in friendship shows it’s neither 
solipsistic nor a social construct, rather it keeps the mean between these two contemporary 
extremes thereby achieving a higher degree of selfhood and community collectively. 
2.4  Friendship in Aristotle  
 
Philosophical and societal reflections on friendship have an extended history in Greek 
thought prior to Aristotle, but his discussion remains a watershed. It is a discussion that 
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and activity, but these alone are not sufficient. It is not friendship until the attitude is 
reciprocated and mutually acknowledged’ (NE 8.1.1155b33f.). Friendship subsequently, is 
reciprocal and explicit goodwill expressed in activity carried out in the presence of the friend. 
For Aristotle a friend, is a “second self,” although Valk (2004-2005, p. 50) is of the opinion 
that it is not clear what Aristotle meant by this phrase. Aristotle writes that friendship begins 
from an impulse of admiration and goodwill. 
‘Good will may arise of a sudden, as it does toward competitors.’ (9.5.1166b35). ‘No 
one loves if he has not first been delighted by the form of the beloved.’ (9.5.1167a6) 
Good will, admiration and delight are only but avenues to the beloved and are not 
love, until she who is admired and offered goodwill remains the focal point of delight, is 
longed for when absent and their presence craved (NE 9.5.1167a6). It is a sharing of life (NE 
8.5.1157b18-20).  Friendship is a partnership and as a person is to herself so is she to her 
friend.  Aristotle maintains that this activity of a person being friends to herself is a conscious 
one and desirable to herself.  But this too can be extended to a friend, where a person is able 
to produce the same activity of consciousness when together with her friend for the sake of 
the friend.            
 A person always perceives herself in her friend; the reason true friends want to spend 
time together (NE 9.12.1171b33-34). Real friendship, Aristotle would argue is difficult to find, 
because it requires time and familiarity for each to be found lovable and to be trusted. 
Therefore those who hurriedly exhibit signs of friendship to those they want to be friends 
with should know that they cannot be friends unless they are lovable and know that for a fact. 
It is easier for one to wish to be friends with somebody, the wish may arise quickly, but 
friendship does not. For Tessitore (1996, 75) treating friendship as ethical, virtue is afforded 
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that once we have established Aristotle’s main meaning of friendship it should be possible to 
work out the variants. Pakaluk argues that there are many sorts of relationships that people 
call “friendship,” but Aristotle thinks it is philosophically important to place these 
relationships in some order by selecting one form of friendship that qualifies as “friendship” 
in the proper sense (Pakaluk, 2005, p.258).  Once the central form of friendship is correctly 
identified and described one can make sense of other forms and phenomena of friendship, in 
relation to this central case of friendship.       
 Pakaluk claims the central form of Aristotle’s friendship is a relationship of reciprocal 
affection between two equal and similar adults with affection for each other. These two 
equals each recognises and enjoys the virtues of the other (Ibid, p.258-9). Declaring 
friendship, a form of virtue Aristotle puts it to the test of a virtuous person who by reason and 
planning puts friendship through its paces to establish whether it subscribes to the 
foundational idea of living life well. After establishing this criterion Aristotle treats one 
species of friendship as superior to the others.  True friendship is complete friendship with its 
concern for the good of the friend rather than the advantages gained through the friendship. 
This is presented as the paradigmatic case of friendship and remains the compass from which 
to work out other forms of friendships.       
 Aristotle differentiates between three species of friendship arguing that ‘not 
everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, that is good, pleasant, or useful.’(NE 
8.1.1155b17-18). This leads Aristotle to conclude that love of the good, pleasant, and useful, 
leads to different sorts of friendships to include virtue or complete friendship, pleasure 
friendship, and advantage friendship. Each form of friendship, although related to the other 
forms in a number of ways, remains distinct in that its enabling medium (goodness, pleasure, 
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persons who are good, and alike in virtue. Such persons wish each other well qua good, and 
they are good in themselves. Notwithstanding, complete friendship is however exceedingly 
rare. Valk (2004-2005, p. 51) contends as the case is for its nature, it is natural that complete 
friendships should be infrequent. Aristotle tells us, “..for such men are rare.” On account that 
different classes of people value different things in life, they share lives of many different 
kinds; the result is the three kinds of friendships based on utility, pleasure and goodness.  But 
Aristotle has already argued that usefulness cannot form a genuine basis for friendship (NE 
8.3.1136b19-20) because useful implies valued as a means, but friendship needs to be valued 
as an end in itself, a good end which means valuable intrinsically.      
 Of the three types of friendships Aristotle concedes friendship based on goodness as 
the most important arguing that good people are useful as well as pleasant to one another. 
Noticeably, the third kind of friendship includes the other two (NE 8.3.1156b13-35) and 
transcends them in various ways. In the third kind of friendship each friend loves the other 
entirely for the other’s sake, contrary to the other two kinds of friendship where a person is 
loved not for whom they are but rather for providing some good and pleasure.  
 Aristotle writes of the later kind of friendship, that friendship founded on goodness is 
easily dissolved if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if the other party is no longer 
pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him’ (8.2.1156a15f). But friends who are good and 
not just exercising friendship based on utility and pleasure will always wish well to one 
another ‘qua good’, since they are good in ‘themselves.’ Their friendship is not incidental 
and it ‘lasts as long as they are good …and goodness is an enduring thing’ (NE 8.2.1156b5f). 
 I concede Aristotle is saying that friendship as virtue is more deeply and permanently 
embedded in a human being’s nature than other useful and pleasant qualities. Of course, 
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virtues is to love theme incidentally and not for themselves. Nonetheless, it is also possible to 
love others for themselves even when they lack good qualities. Friendship can also break, and 
Aristotle contends that often when that happens it is because one person is in friendship for 
personal gain. Given such statuses, Aristotle observes, the need for remembrance of moments 
of former intimacy is necessary, and some allowance for former friendship is appropriate 
when the breach of friendship has not been due to excess of wickedness (NE 8.5.1165b35) 
although the friendship is ended. In this context it seems that a one-sided love may remain 
where one may love or continue to love another for herself although this person has lost or 
has never had good qualities that forge true friendship.      
 The evidence suggests that reciprocal friendship cannot be maintained unless both 
parties are more or less equally good, an attribute that cements friendships, which friends 
apply to themselves well before they extend it to the other. So far, I have been exploring 
Aristotle’s 'perfect' friendship (8.3.1156 b6-), friendship 'firstly and in the proper sense' 
(8.4.1157 a31). This friendship is 'perfect' in the sense that it is the goal.  Any real friendship 
tends to become such if circumstances permit pleasant and useful exchanges gradually 
deepen into a sharing in the activities which give life its value. For the perfection of real 
friendship both parties must be virtuous, because the good life requires virtue. But Aristotle 
argues too that most persons are only 'in progress' to virtue, and the third kind of friendship 
can perhaps exist inchoately between people not yet perfectly virtuous.  
'The friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship; and 
they are thought to become better too by their activities and by improving each other; 
for each takes from the other the mould of the characteristics they approve' 
(IX.112.1172 a12-).  
 
To live in the eye of a friend who values the good life is a support in living life well; such 
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b5). True friendship requires independence in order to recognise the needs of the other, it also 
need independence to recognise mutuality in the desire to participate in other people’s lives. 
Friendship may be practiced in the social settings of the polis, thus friendship guides the 
formation of the human good. This formation of the good is not only in individual persons 
but in life of the state also. Friendship is in essence a virtue practised over a lifetime and is by 
nature practised in human community together with one’s friends and others. Its moral 
contribution is what I now discuss in theology of friendship.  
2.5  Aristotle’s Friendship with a theological Component 
 
A connection exists between Aristotle’s understandings of ‘primary’ or perfect 
friendship and theology. Friendship emerges as a complex and protean dimension of human 
life. Its richness cannot be fully grasped without an understanding of its relationships towards 
other issues of high philosophical relevance: goodness, justice, happiness and self-identity. 
These are areas that Jesus addressed specifically in his ministry. Friendship is therefore an 
important theological concept. Both the Old Testament and New Testament model friendship 
in varying relationships. In the Hebrew texts Moses is called a friend of God. We find 
friendship modelled in the relationships of Naomi and Ruth and David and Jonathan. Most 
significantly Jesus, on the threshold of his passion and death, invited his followers to no 
longer think of themselves as his servants. The Gospel of John 15:15 is taken as the locus 
classicus of the biblical concept of friendship.  
It is here that Jesus tells his disciples that they are no longer servants but are now 
equals a concept that runs through in Aristotle’s discussion of true friendship. Jesus’ 
invitation to his disciples to view themselves as his friends and therefore practice friendship 
echoes Aristotle’s thoughts in, ‘‘it will be appropriate to discuss friendship, since friendship 
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living’ (NE VIII, 1155a3-5). Aristotle introduces the idea of friendship as a kind of 
excellence or something related to it that is necessary for human life. So, what did Jesus 
expect of his disciples’ new designations as friends?  
Jesus speaks of a new relationship or an improved way of relating that went far 
beyond the psychological pleasure or participation in a shared activity. Friendship was to be 
central, or the central, organising principle of a disciple’s life. Jesus like Aristotle did not see 
friendship as an end in itself but as virtue, a way of being with fulfilment elsewhere. Jesus 
anticipated a [koinonia] community of followers, seeing from Aristotle’s theory friends form 
a community held together by pursuit of a common goal, a good though not necessarily the 
good. Aristotle, rather than presenting friendship as a kind of relation, seems to be keener on 
stressing its closeness to virtue as though he meant to emphasize the ethical aspect of 
friendship.  It is not true however that Aristotle should be seen to argue— on this view — 
that one cannot be a friend to another without possessing a virtuous state of character 
contrary to Irrera’s (2005, p.567) observation. Friendship in Aristotle is described as a 
necessary thing for human life. Again, Irrera continues to question the idea of the necessity of 
friendship with a view to living, when it’s just mere living, but Aristotle has already argued 
that it is for living well and not just living (NE VIII, 1155a5-9).  
Jesus’ demand of his disciples in John 15:15, hints at the fact that friendship is 
important in understanding the Trinity. Trinity holds the very heart of God where we find not 
solitude and isolation but intimacy and community. It is therefore rather difficult to 
understand why Nygren in the company of Kierkegaard regards friendship as having an 
essentially selfish nature and disregards friendship as being of any importance in theological 
thinking. It is in biblical [theological] thinking we find the highest friendships especially 
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their friends. They pursue the good on behalf of the friend, and for the friend’s own sake. 
This concern for the friend for his or her own sake is captured in the friendship with God, 
which is a friendship that certainly presupposes God’s initiative and choice.  
It is God’s movement towards us in love and friendship that allows us to move 
towards God in friendship, nonetheless not everyone in the world can be called a friend of 
God. Only those who have entered into covenant with him20 are able to share friendship with 
him and with one another. This concept remains important for doing Christian theology in 
modern times. Jesus was offering the friendship of God to all humanity. The friendship-motif 
itself from the Biblical message and from the Christian tradition suggests that the Church is a 
community existing precisely in order to enjoy friendship with Christ, and consequently, 
friendship with one another. In Christ and through the Holy Spirit’s gift of friendship and 
love believers have become friends of God. In the community of the Church the friendship of 
the believers reflects none other than the friendship and the love of God Himself.  
The relationship of friendship incessantly has served as a model for shaping spiritual 
and moral life (Van Asselt 2010, p. 2). For McEvoy (1999, 3-44) an Augustinian, Thomas 
Aquinas and other fathers had no problems in holding that friendship was a central virtue in 
Christian ethics. The Reformers [Luther and Calvin] on the contrary rejected the Aristotelian 
tradition of inquiry and adopted notions of ideal friendship as a disinterested bond cultivated 
among the virtuous. These Reformers on the other hand were strongly civic-minded in the 
                                               
20 In the texts of John 15:15 (‘I have called you friends’) Jesus seems to offer the blessing of friendship brought 
about by the operation of the Holy Spirit as first of all experienced in the personal faith of the individual 
believer. The blessing of friendship could then be enjoyed in prayer, in which God and the believer relate to 
each other ‘as a friend enjoys her friend and shares all good things with him. Following on the Great 
Commission of Mathew 28; 18 – 20, individual’s experience of friendship with God and others was most 
prominently present in the community of believers, notably in the liturgical practises of the Church. The 
sacraments are the means by which this intimate friendship with God could be primarily experienced. In the 
mystery of the Lord’s Supper we cannot help finding its meaning illuminated precisely in the experience of 
intimate friendship with God in the community of believers. It is the special characteristic of friendship to live 
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tradition of other classical modes of friendship [Cicero], because such friendship was to serve 
a public good, which was for Cicero the preservation of social order of the administrative 
machinery of the (Roman) imperium (Heilke 2004, p. 11). Heilke quickly counters that 
Cicero actually formulated an account of friendship akin to an Augustinian one, who himself 
found Aristotelian philosophy informing his narrative ethical analysis. 
  Hume (201, p. 35) reasons that examining Luke-Acts among the New Testament texts 
gives a unique picture in how friendship provides the key to understanding the way 
characters [persons] depicted in Luke-Acts negotiated their narrative world. In New 
Testament texts Hume contends God’s presence in the community in Jerusalem evokes a 
friendship response among believers (Ibid. p.36). This response is distinctive from friendship 
practices of the Greco-Roman world, because its a response embedded in the narrative 
contexts of God’s story in the community of believers (Luke 2: 41-47; 4: 32-35). Hume 
provides a summary of the application of the friendship motif in the Luke-Acts texts:  
‘The discussion of the friendship virtue – and the narrative depiction of friends in its 
literature- provide the Greco-Roman culture a medium to consider the dimension and 
directions of human moral agency when the individual came face to face with the 
needs of others (Ibid. 36)  
   
Hume concedes that the understanding of friendship in Luke-Acts takes on the Aristotelian 
definition of the virtue.  Whatever we might consider the Greco-Roman culture to be, it still 
made sense of friendship with the Aristotelian definition of friendship as a virtue. This 
understanding gives the concept the ability to lay down markers for the dimension and 
directions of human moral agency when persons come face to face with the needs of others. 
In Aristotle’s thought, in good communities friendship was a kind of sui generis 
where the search for utility does not prevent people from displaying ‘other-regarding’ 
qualities like cooperation, trust and loyalty, that are typical of friendship of virtuous 
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subsist in a friendship based on ethical excellence, i.e. a kind of love that is not conceivable 
between citizens who do not know each other personally. The believers’ friendship is in 
accord with and is a result of God’s community shaping activity in their midst. Such 
friendship informed by covenant appears to dispense with Aristotelian categorisations of 
friendship as the believers’ friendship highlights themes of possessions, hospitality, and bold 
witness as found throughout Luke-Acts.  Thinking about the divine covenant as friendship 
with God will not only mean reflecting on the bond that links Christian believers together in 
their journey toward God, but that it also enables the believer to relate to the tradition in his 
search for biblical truth. The uniqueness of the believers’ friendships is that it is entered into 
as community of believers without first having to engage a one to one friendship formation. 
2.6  The Self in Friendship 
 
Aristotle’s movement from disinterested love to loving a friend like oneself brings us 
to the connections between Aristotle's theory of friendship and the basic principles of his 
ethics (NE IX, chapter 8; Notopoulos 1953, p. 215 - 216). The connection is made through 
the idea that a friend is another self (EN 9.4.1166 a31, 9.9.1170 b7). The fundamental 
question Aristotle asked was whether a person should love herself most or someone else? In 
itself this is a graphic way of saying that disinterested love is possible, that we can 'identify' 
with another and make that person's good, one of our own goals, sought for, for its own sake. 
'As a person is to herself, so is she to her friend' (NE 9.11.1171 b34). Now a person's 
happiness lies in living and being active in certain ways; more exactly it lies in conscious 
activity; and a person's happiness is  
'to contemplate worthy actions and actions which are his own, and the actions of a 
good man who is her friend are both' (NE 1170 a3).  
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finds in herself that she looks for in the other. Aristotle observes that as the virtuous person is 
to herself that is how she is to her friend (for her friend is another self).  Therefore, the good 
person takes pleasure in perceiving her friends' activity. Such a good person needs, 
consequently to be conscious of the existence of her friend. This generally will be realised by 
friends living together and sharing in discussion and thought. This living well is unique to 
humans and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place' (NE 1170 a15-b15). 
 'Discussion and thought', between friends generates happiness that is primary in their 
relationship, nonetheless friends also share secondary happiness of the life of practical virtue.  
There is an aspect characteristic of friendship that points to a key importance of friends that is 
happiness. Human beings always desire to spend time in the company of those whose 
presence pleases.  It is only natural for persons to try to avoid what is painful and seek what 
is pleasant therefore the natural desire for pleasure plays a central role not only in pleasurable 
friendships, but also in those that are grounded in moral goodness. Aristotle claims that good 
human beings love that which is good and pleasurable simply as that, it is good and 
pleasurable for them. 
‘..for that which is without qualification good or pleasant seems to be lovable and 
desirable, and for each person that which is good or pleasant to him;..’(8.5.1157b25) 
 
 Aristotle by this argument prepares grounds for introducing the possibilities of a 
person being friends with herself. Having introduced the idea of a thing or person being 
lovable, he offers a comparison between love and friendship. He categorises love as a 
passion, and friendship as a state, observing that love may be felt just as much towards 
lifeless things, although mutual love involves choices and choice springs from a state of 
being. Persons wish well to those whom they love, ‘for their sake, not as a result of passion 
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essence loves what is good for herself. A concept of utility friendship is implied but argued as 
being in fact superseded by pleasure-based friendship (8.5.1158a18-26). From this 
understanding Aristotle develops the concept that a friend is actually an “other self,” on 
grounds that a good person is related to a friend as to herself. This notion of “other self,” for 
Aristotle constitutes the fundamental ideal of friendship. In so far as someone counts as a 
friend in any respect, that someone plays the role of an “other self.” (Pakaluk, 2005, 259) The 
notion of a friend as an “other self” easily prepares Aristotle to reach the claim of a person 
being friends with themselves and later on create grounds for examining self-love. The notion 
of one being friends with oneself seems at odd with the common idea that self-love is bad 
since its focus is a selfish self-centredness activity. But later on in 9.8 Aristotle rescues this 
notion of self-love from its negative connotations by arguing that there is actually a good 
kind of self-love as well as a bad kind of self-love, echoing Augustinian tripartite forms of 
self-love. Aristotle finds it self evident that a good person should love herself, but even more 
so love herself more than he loves anyone else21.  
To understand friendship with self or oneself, there is raised a need to look at whether 
it is possible to wish the greatest goods for friends, given the all too well known fact of the 
tendency that persons wish good things most of all for themselves. Aristotle claims that if we 
are right in saying that a person wishes good to a friend for friend’s sake the friend must 
remain the sort of being she is, whatever that may be. It is for the friend only so long as she 
remains a human being that she will wish the greatest goods to her friend. Aristotle retracts 
this thought process to argue that a person does not necessarily wish the greatest good to her 
friend since it is for ‘herself most of all that each person wishes what is good.’ (NE 
                                               
21 Many religious groups that put more emphasis on love of the neighbour always struggle with this admonition 
from Aristotle that reflects theology self-love. It is an issue for many religious groups to accommodate the idea 
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8.7.1159a5-12)  Aristotle comes close to the thematic consideration of self-love by way of a 
second reflection, of the possibility of friendship with oneself. He remarks further that 
friendly relations with one’s neighbours, as the marks by which friendship are defined, is 
proceeded by a person’s ‘relations to herself.’(9.4.1166a1-2). Friendship with others has its 
source from a prior friendship that rational or decent people have with themselves. For 
Tessitore, Aristotle was committed to the fact that decent persons are of one mind and desire 
the same things with every part of their soul. They wish for their own good for their own sake 
and seek it through action (1996, 83-84). These decent persons desire their own company 
with which they express agreeable memories of their past and good hopes for the future.  
 Aristotle suggests that such a person wishes to live with herself first. For she does so 
with pleasure, since the memories of her past acts as delightful and her hopes for the future 
are good and therefore pleasant (NE 9.4.1166a24-24). Such a rational person is keenly aware 
of her own joys and sorrows. This is because on account of her good character the same 
things always give rise to pleasure or pain. She rejoices and grieves more than any other, with 
herself. To the rational person the same thing is always painful and the same thing always 
pleasant and not one thing at one time and another at another; ‘he has, so to speak, no regret.’ 
(NE 9.4.1166a26-29)  
Aristotle concedes this thinking has to do with the rational part of the soul of a person, 
since it would appear that the thinking part is what each person is, being more the self than 
anything else. At the same time, he observes that the attitudes of the rational person, that is of 
a decent person endowed with friendship as a virtue characterises “friendship” for another, 
but this leads also to the characterisation of friendship with self.  A friend is in fact another 
self. The characteristics of a rational planner belong to the good person in relation to herself, 
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Friendship too is thought to be one of these attributes, and those who have these attributes to 
be friends…’ (NE 9.4.1166a31-33).  
Tessitore concludes that although Aristotle never says whether the notion of 
friendship with oneself is, strictly speaking, meaningful he does maintain that it possesses a 
certain plausibility given the dual or composite nature of human being. (1996, p. 84).  
Aristotle seems to concede that friendship with self does have certain meaningfulness. 
Whereas previously on the same plausibility he ruled out any meaningfulness between 
oneself and justice, except only in a highly attenuated understanding. Aristotle’s more open-
ended treatment of friendship with oneself permits friendship in this context to hold a 
somehow special status different from friendship and the city and political friendship.   
While still examining friendship with oneself, there is depicted an interiority of the 
rational of the decent person contrasted with a corresponding description of the morally base. 
The morally base persons are characterised by certain deficiencies, the likes of lacking unity 
of soul since they are constantly at odds with themselves. The morally base desire one thing 
while choosing a different, they might wish for themselves the good but almost always they 
fail to do what is necessary to attain it because of cowardice or idleness.  
Earlier on in (NE 9.4.1166a30-40) Aristotle argued that because friendship is also an 
attribute of the rational or decent person, it implied that the morally base person cannot attain 
it, and since they cannot attain friendship with the other it follows that they are unable to 
attain friendship with themselves. The morally base observes Tessitore, (1996, p. 84) are also 
unable to enter into their own joys and sorrows because there is a factional conflict in their 
souls. These morally base person is devoid of affection for herself for the simple reason that 
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2.7  Self-love in Aristotle  
 
Aristotle’s discussion of self-love is placed within the considerations of ethical or moral 
virtues. These moral virtues provide a peculiar character to ethical inquiry. In Nicomachean 
Ethics chapter IX.7, just prior to Aristotle’s claim in IX.8, that the good person is her own best 
friend and ought to love herself best, Aristotle explains why benefactors love those they have 
benefited more than those who have been well-treated love their benefactors. He explains that, 
…., 'existence is to all people a thing to be chosen and loved, and that we exist by virtue 
of activity (i.e., by living and acting), and the handiwork is in a sense, the producer in 
activity; he loves his handiwork, therefore, because he loves existence. And this is 
rooted in the nature of things; for what he is in potentiality, his handiwork manifests in 
activity' (NE 1 168a5-9).  
 
Aristotle explains existence in terms of activity. His remarks suggest that persons love 
the actions they perform because these actions are expressions of who they are. Activities are 
expressions of what persons can do. They actualise persons’ potentialities, which are 
expressions of who they are, of their existence. These are activities they love and find most 
pleasant (1153a12-5, 1153b9-17). The activities are not products of random action, but 
characteristic of human activities most expressive of human beings. They are activities born 
out of the rational choices of life planning. It is the activity of planning their lives [of the 
virtuous person] that is most pleasant and lovable. Persons who love planning the activities 
they perform in effect are true lovers of themselves and virtuous persons (NE 1168b35-69a3). 
These are people, who have performed activities on a rational principle and their actions are 
properly their own acts and voluntary acts for that matter.  
Such persons must truly be lovers of self. The true lover of self therefore first of all is 
a rational planner having a conception of the good that she has rationally chosen. Such a person 
has a view of what is valuable in life and how to organise her life so as to obtain her goals and 
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does, when she loves that activity, she loves herself. For Homiak (1981, p. 639) the self-lover 
‘must not simply be a planner or even someone who likes planning; she must love rational 
activity above all else.’ Strikingly, because of the rationality of activity the Aristotelian self-
lover is engaged with she does not suffer from the kind of self-love normally condemned. She 
does not suffer from excessive self-concern or think herself better than others22.  
Since the virtuous person is most truly a lover of self, it follows that such a person loves 
rational activity above all else and her love for rational activity has important moral 
consequences. Following Aristotle’s thinking about self-love it becomes apparent that self-love 
is best seen as the cause of virtuous behaviour and not the end for which virtuous actions are 
performed. Homiak (1981, p. 640) argues that in being of a higher-order attitude towards 
planning, self-love ‘is not a part of one’s life-plan and hence not something one strives for qua 
part of one’s plan.’   
For Homiak self-love belonging to the higher – order attitude does not constitute one’s 
reason or purpose for acting. Self-love cannot be the goal a person strives to achieve; 
nevertheless, a person with appropriate feelings of self-love will act virtuously. Fundamentally 
it seems self-love when thought through fully, provides a sufficient foundation for the other 
virtues. Virtues therefore form a unity implying that all other virtues can be grounded in the 
appropriate feelings of self-love. The true lover of self thus loves most what is rational activity; 
so for example, she will not be overly attracted by the pleasures of touch and taste. She will 
                                               
22 Seeing that Aristotle’s self-lover does not suffer from the kind of self-love generally condemned, what should 
we make of a person perhaps suffering from what we may term as Aristotelian self-hatred? It seems a person 
suffering from what may be termed Aristotelian self-hatred may not be conscious of these negative views about 
his life. He cannot engage rationally in planning his life. He simply does not take sufficient pleasure in planning 
his life. He is therefore likely to find herself living out the wishes of others – perhaps his parents – and this may 
be despite the fact that he activities actually realize many of his talents, but these activities actually do not 
realize him fully. This is because these activities have not sufficiently drawn on his life-planning abilities. Such 
a person has not taken sufficient pleasure in planning he simply finds it easier for others to plan for him. The 
activities he engages are then expressions of what others want him to be. We can conclude from this observation 
that Aristotelian self-hatred does not require that one explicitly denigrate oneself, just like Aristotelian self-love 
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like them, but will not crave them. Nor will she shun these pleasures; for she does find them 
pleasant even though there is something she loves more. If we could extend Aristotle’s account 
of self-love to cover all the virtues, we could say that acting virtuously is feeling and behaving 
the way the true lover (i.e., the true lover of self) would feel and behave. 
Aristotle addresses the question whether a person ought to love oneself or someone 
else most. The person that Aristotle is talking about inevitably is a rational person or a decent 
person. The question of loving oneself is on the contrary one that cannot be raised by a base 
person who always is unable to love herself objectively. Tessitore observes that, for Aristotle, 
the morally base do everything for their own sake while the decent are willing to act for the 
sake of their friends therefore putting their own concerns aside (1996, p. 91). For the rational 
love for her friend or others takes priority over self-love. If this is true how do, we account 
for Aristotle’s (9.4.1166a1-66b29) claim that actually love for others almost always 
designates feeling of friendship for oneself and his discription a primary relationship as that 
which one has with self. Aristotle has note of this difficult aspect of self-love and accepts that 
people will always find it difficult to accept all the aspects of self-love. 
  Some aspects of self-love rightly blamed, as it may seem so, are its most common 
forms in evidence. These aspects are those by which persons are led to indulge their appetites 
and passions; it is the irrational part of the soul. It is also true that to strive to secure the noble 
or a decent person practices virtues and is hardly blameworthy and yet it will seem she is 
practicing self-love to an exceptional degree. Aristotle adds further that those who use the 
term as one of reproach ascribe self-love to people who assign to themselves the greater share 
of wealth, honours, and bodily pleasures.  
 These are things most people desire and busy themselves about to have. Aristotle 







  87 
good, which includes being friends with herself. He notes the difficulties of differentiating 
those who are grasping for regard to gratify their appetites, feelings and the irrational 
elements of their souls, and those who act because it is noble to practice self-love.  
The irrational and therefore morally base persons who self-love with intentions of 
gratifying their appetites, feelings and the irrational elements of their souls are justly blamed 
for being lovers of self.  Such an irrational person is contrasted with a noble person who at all 
times assigns herself the things that are noblest and best, doing so out of rational planning. 
Her rational planning, at all events assigns to herself the things that are noblest and best, she 
gratifies the most authoritative element in herself and in all things obeys these basic 
requirements of decent person.  
Aristotle makes a comparison a rational planner and a city or a well organised system 
observing that, just as a city or any other systematic whole is most properly identified with 
the most authoritative element in it, so is a decent person; ‘….this and gratifies it is most of 
all a lover of self.’ (9.8.1169a30-334) The rational or decent person is one who loving and 
gratifying the part of her soul, which is her true self, proves to be a true lover of self in the 
truest sense. For Aristotle the good, decent or rational persons ought to be a lovers of 
themselves because by doing noble acts they benefit both themselves and others including the 
morally base persons.  
 2.8 Aquinas: Translating Aristotle into a Christian Context  
Although Aquinas is sometimes described as an Aristotelian, he is not an uncritical 
reader of Aristotle’s works. Having started as Neo-Platonist in tradition23, in addressing the 
                                               
23 Aquinas as one of the theologians of the early Church perceived value in the philosophical tradition of the 
pagans, but why? It seems that these pagans responsible for ancient Greek philosophy as taught by Plato and 
Aristotle and later on other Neo-Platonists were able to offer teachings of what these early theologians had 
discerned as the fundamental importance of a transcendent ‘One’. While the Roman schools held on the 
plurality of deities [gods], the Greek schools of Plate and Aristotle propagated besides a discipline of more 
formal and critical philosophy, the doctrine of a single source of existence and, therefore, truth. For Plato the 
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theory of friendship he goes beyond Aristotle. Not only does he clarify the moral psychology 
behind the phenomenon of friendship he situates it with wider psychological views. He also 
makes efforts to connect Aristotle with a different philosophical tradition – the Christian 
tradition. Aquinas’ chief focus remained the expounding of the Church’s sacra doctrina, or 
holy teachings.  
To translate Aristotle into a Christian context Aquinas needed to read Aristotle’s 
works, but Oliver (2015, p. 80) claims Aquinas was not privileged with the original 
Aristotelian texts instead he read translations of translations. Aquinas therefore faced the 
challenge of preserving the authenticity and integrity of these philosophical works. He read 
Aristotle’s philosophy as a handmaid for the clarification of the sacred teachings. In the case 
of friendship love the focus of this discussion, Aristotle provided three types of friendship 
that he distinguished according to reason that bring the friends into relationship: pleasure and 
utilitarian friendships; the third develop from a foundation of virtue and goodness (NE 
8.2.1155b17-19).  
These three forms of friendships sustain the pursuit of the friends’ well being and the 
excellence of life binding friends together. Aristotle’s treatment of friendship plays a 
significant role in Aquinas’ treatment of charity. For Aquinas, charity is a “friendship with 
God.”  This kind of friendship corresponds most closely to Aristotle’s friendship of worth but 
transcends it in two important ways. Firstly, Aquinas’ idea of friendship with God requires a 
“participation” in God. This is an idea Aristotle could not fathom since for him God was 
entirely transcendent.  Second, the idea of loving one’s enemies would be absurd from an 
                                               
fully actual.  Secondly, these early theologians of the ancient Church valued Greek philosophical teaching 
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Aristotelian perspective since Aristotle’s conception of love requires the good for oneself, 
one’s family and one’s country. 
Aquinas was obviously convinced that the virtue of friendship in its various forms 
was one of the most important virtues in Aristotle’s ethics. He defended and depended on 
Aristotle’s explanation of these forms of friendship as foundation for his discussion ‘Is 
charity friendship with God?’ (Summa II-II.23.1 cited in Farell 1995, p, 214). Aristotle 
provides a fairly vigorous naturalistic explanation of friendship, and at times can account 
even for radical self-sacrifice on behalf of one’s family or country.  
 Conversely, Aristotle cannot provide an explanation for the kind of enemy love or 
friendship Aquinas discusses in which love is a participation in God, that enables Aquinas to 
claim that we can even love our enemies. Aquinas is always pushing Aristotle’s 
understanding of friendship and charity, and yet he still exonerates Aristotle and his 
philosophy using him to defend his [Aquinas’] own position. This is a key position in 
Aquinas where in the Summa Theologiae he turns to Aristotle in order to probe the nature of 
loving friendship. For Aquinas, Aristotelian philosophy was deployed to scrutinise religious 
teachings or doctrines from a neutral point. Aquinas was adamant the theological context 
underpins all authentic forms of friendliness; this is contra Aristotle (Quinn 1996, p, 270). 
For Aquinas the revealed Christian truth found in the sacred texts and teaching had the final 
word.  
While Aquinas found Aristotle’s position defensible, the Church’s teaching was to be 
preferred as it was based on the witness of Scripture, the teachings of the tradition, and wider 
doctrinal concerns regarding the nature of God’s grace and freedom. Still, Aristotle’s 
thoughts were used even if negatively, to outline more exactly the distinctive meaning and 
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supremely social virtue, he insisted that friendship ultimately be rooted in the special 
relationship that God has with human beings and with [God] himself. This later 
understanding informs and inspires the Christian formulation of friendship.  
Aquinas intuitively turns to Aristotle’s treatise on philia24 as a text on Christian love. 
His reading of Aristotle seems to violate the spirit of Aristotle’s discussion of philos and 
henceforth the Christian understanding of caritas assuming philos is intended to be caritas.  
Undoubtedly, the two cannot replace each other directly thereby making difficult for Aquinas 
to let Aristotle interpret Christian teachings on love. Typical is the question of equality of the 
relationship that develops when people know and share similitude in virtue (NE 8.8.1158b 1-
10). There are various degrees of inequality in human relationships as Aristotle illustrates 
from relationships between parent and child, husband and wife, rulers and their subordinates, 
etc. (NE 1161a 10-13).  
Another difficulty is how human beings can be friends with God: Aquinas had no 
difficulties with this doctrine. Aristotle perceives an insurmountable degree of inequality 
between human beings and God (or gods). Aristotle cannot conceive of there being friendship 
with the deity (NE 1159a 5). Firstly, because the radical likeness shared by friends is their 
common human nature [God or gods who possess divine nature are excluded], the greatest 
                                               
24 I assume a fairly standard opinion of philia/philos that it implies-friend or dear – as in when one person likes 
or love another. Following Julian Anna: (1977) Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism, in Mind, New 
Series, Vol. 86, No. 344, pp. 532-554, I adopt the explanation of philos; suggesting that, “A can be philos to B 
not only when they both like each other and are friends in the full sense of 'friend', but also in two other cases: 
where A likes or is friendly to B whatever B thinks about it, and where A is liked by B whatever A thinks about 
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good that humans wish for their friends is that they be more completely human (NE 1159a 7-
15).  Secondly, the experience of communion between friends (NE 1169b 4-8) is imperative 
for there being contact between them. Aristotle claims friends must be present for each other 
- even live together in order to participate in life-giving activity and the celebration of virtue 
(NE 1171b 31-1172a 8), this claim evidently eliminates the presence of the divine. Aquinas 
was aware of this difficult but still appealed to Aristotle to establish the nature of the 
relationship in which God, in Christ, has shared divine goodness with human beings in loving 
friendship (Farrell 1995, p. 214).  
Annas considers an explanation of philos could be given that demonstrates how 
friendship between unequal persons can be achieved. The same can be applied to friendship 
between human beings and the divine. The explanation is as follows: A can be friendly to B 
not only when they both like each other and are friends [virtuous or decent, good persons] in 
the full sense of ‘friend’, but also in two other cases: where A likes or is friendly to B 
whatever B thinks about it [for political alliances], and where A is liked by B whatever A 
thinks about it [utility friendship] (1977, p.532 – 534).  
This explanation exonerates Aristotle’s blanket application of friendship to cover 
domestic family type of relationships, or relationships between male and female who are 
physiologically different. The explanation also shows how Aquinas could apply Aristotle to 
support friendship between human beings and God who remain ontologically dissimilar.  
Daniel Schwartz in his book Aquinas on Friendship (2007, p. 98.) suggests that 
Aquinas added something to Aristotle’s concept of friendship by introducing friendship that 
covers persons of unequal stations. This is not necessarily the case, we have observed above 
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unequal status; for example, a virtuous person goes out of her way to be friends with another 
person irrespective of what the person may think of the virtuous person herself.  
This is similar with the Christian sense of loving one’s enemies as oneself. The 
Aristotelian doctrine of friendship focuses attention on the existence of a concrete, reciprocal 
and efficacious benevolence between friends (NE 8.2.1155b 27-31; 1162b 8-9). In perfect 
friendship a person will not only practise virtue for the sake of her friend but rather will 
sacrifice self-interest for the other (NE 9.4. 1168a 34-35). Perfect friendships are 
comparatively rare in life (NE 8.7.1156b 24; 1158a 10-14). Equality is a key motif of 
friendship relationship that develops when people know and share with each other a 
similitude in virtue (NE 1158b 1-10).  
 Aquinas wants to demonstrate that the love one loves herself with is not, strictly 
speaking, friendship (qua Aristotle) but something greater; that is, it is unity rather than 
union. Nonetheless, Aquinas is employing the supposition that the concept of charity, that is, 
Christian love for neighbours and self can be clarified with reference to Aristotelian 
friendship. Hence Christian love for neighbour and self are the same at least in the case of 
relationships directed not towards self but to others. Aquinas is committed to the identity of 
charity and friendship as well as to the identity of charity and what Aristotle’s terms philia. 
But then he has to react to whether love is friendship.  
 Aquinas contends that love is not useful or pleasurable friendship; love is not 
conjoined by the utility of the friend’s estate, nor by the presence of particular bodies, not by 
subtle and flattering adulation of other, but rather by the fear of God and the study of the 
Holy Scriptures.’ Love is not friendship; (NE 9.8.1157a18) the friendship of the good as 
implied in this Aristotelian text, because Christians as represented by Aquinas, love even 
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Notwithstanding, all through these considerations the enduring fact is, we found Aquinas’ 
indebtedness to Aristotle. Considered from a contemporary time, it becomes apparent that 
Aristotle and Aquinas perceived that practical rationality presupposes some single end which 
completely calibrates the choice-worthiness of actions, and that that single end is one’s own 
happiness.  
2.9  Conclusion 
 
Aristotle’s thinking on self and self-love involves immediate knowledge of both self 
and something other than self. His understanding of the self is that of being aware of 
something else accordingly, as one is also concomitantly aware of oneself. Knowledge of self 
has to be represented in terms of sensible objects, the things upon which cognition has its 
basic bearing.  Anything else is represented as concomitant to, and somehow involved in, the 
sensible things, as they exist in human cognition. Aristotle argued further that, sensible things 
that exist in themselves and are really other than our sensations and ourselves are what is 
prior in our perception. Therefore, the self that one is concomitantly aware of in every act of 
cognition is basically represented as a sensible thing.  
One finds oneself spatially extended throughout one's own body, as existent in it 
outside the cognition. This is the self immediately recognized as something there in itself, 
independently of the cognitional act by which it is observed. Aristotle's principle is firm, on 
the unity of the agent in human activity. Human activity implies a concern for the cultivation 
of human character as it contributes to the flourishing of human life or living well. 
 Virtues are dispositions to act, desire, and feel that involve the exercise of judgment 
and lead to a recognizable human excellence, an instance of human flourishing becoming the 
foundation of living well. Aristotle’s conclusion was that virtues should be thought of as 
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lead into the arena of human character and its contribution to the realization of what is of 
value in life.  
 Virtues involve values because they make possible prudent judgments about what 
constitutes a lasting good. Aristotle argued that such prudent judgment was dependent on an 
important element of virtues often to form the mean to balance out two vices, where the mean 
lies between extremes. Acting virtuously, we embody values and contribute to human 
flourishing as a sense of living well. Virtues in a sense are conceived the enduring elements 
of what constitute persons as specific individuals. 
The virtue of friendship in its various forms in Aristotle’s ethics is one of the most 
important virtues. Similar to justice, friendship is one of the virtues that relate the acting 
person to another beside herself. Friendship is more basic than justice. Aristotle offered three 
general kinds of friendships, between the virtuous or good or decent persons; the second 
formed out of the quest pleasure and the third is utility friendship. While Aristotle has been 
criticised for laying emphasis on true friendship as that among equals, he has retracted at 
certain points to accept that even unequal friendships are based on some proportion between 
the unequal partners. Friendship in the domestic family relationship is a good example. All 
friendships equal or unequal must therefore be based on mutual benevolence. The question of 
similitude is important for Aristotle’s theory of friendship as it allows him to discuss the 
different forms of human interrelation as forms of friendship without forcing him to reduce 
the discussion to the perfect friendship or the virtue friendship only. 
Aquinas's notion of friendship on his part is a reworking of Aristotle’s classical 
notions of friendship. By seeking to situate Aristotelian ideas in theological premises 
important in his times, Aquinas succeeds in producing a theory of friendship that is more 
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proposed by Aristotle. Two areas that Aquinas has concerns with Aristotle’s theory of 
friendship include:  
First: the question of the particularity of perfect friendship. I argued Aquinas 
broadened what was Aristotle’s aristocratic and exclusive conception of friendship. The 
broadening allowed Aquinas to apply Aristotle’s theory of perfect friendship into the 
theological virtue of love [Aquinas’ caritas] of neighbour. I argued also that Aquinas needed 
to reconcile Aristotle’s perfect friendship whose source is virtue, and the New Testament 
question of loving enemies, who neither correspond to friendship for pleasure nor friendship 
for utility; he needed this broadening to support a seemingly indefensible Aristotle on 
friendship of an enemy.  
 Secondly: regarding friendship with a god, Aquinas explicitly claimed that charitable 
love of God is friendship in the highest degree. Aquinas argued further that the primary and 
proper object of perfect friendship is God and not human beings. This is the most obvious 
transformation of Aristotle’s theory of friendship that Aquinas makes. He applies the 
Aristotelian category of friendship between unequals the perfect form of friendship – this is a 
combination impossible in Aristotle. Aquinas argued that God as the highest principle of 
human beatitude is the most lovable object human beings can charitably love.  
God is the basis and principle of the complex order of charity; God is perfect 
friendship to the highest degree. God is the highest form of perfect friendship that also 
extends to others. God is to be loved as principle of beatitude. Aquinas concedes that an 
individual is to love herself insofar as she belongs to God and capable of achieving beatitude 
and only then does she love her neighbour. Because oneself is closer to God one is obligated 
to love God more than self or anyone else besides God [the principle of beatitude], one then 
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noble thing and should be encouraged. The noble persons unlike the morally base and 
irrational, in self-loving or loving themselves most of all, by being morally serious persons 
they unknowingly benefit friends and fellow citizens often in extraordinary fashions. Adam 
Smith to demonstrates how self-love may be expressed in terms of self-interest and how such 
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     Chapter  3  




Augustine was not exempt to Aristotle’s claims that true friendships seek to build the 
other up and aid them in their journey to virtue, and bad friendships look only to destroy 
through evil and thoughtless acts. It is incredibly simple therefore, for one to ‘shape’ their 
friend and lead her either higher or lower, all in the name of friendship.  
Perfect human friendships, Aquinas presenting Aristotle observed seeks the ultimate 
and highest good: God and looks to bring others to Him. Augustine spent his entire life 
searching for God, in essence searching the only way to be friends with himself:  Confessions 
book 1, 1, “For our hearts are restless until they rest in you, O God”, and when Augustine 
finally found God his joy knew no bounds he had ultimately found himself.  
For, it was in looking for the truth in human friendships that Augustine obtained the 
greatest friendship of all, friendship with God and also friendship with himself. It is a 
friendship that enabled Augustine to lead others to God and shape them through his holy 
example. Before and after arriving at friendship with God, Augustine worked his way 
through various ideas and concepts to satisfy himself that he had arrived at that, which is a 
good that he had always been looking for.  
I start my discussion in this section with Augustine’s emphasis on the interiority of 
the subject. This interiority appears to undermine the importance of the external world. 
Augustine at the same time affirms the power to know the truth and therefore critiquing 
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remains the most rigorously of Augustinian themes that have influenced the existentialist’s 
tradition as the priority of the self for an understanding of being or existence.  
I then discuss his concept and practice of self-love whose reflections have taken on a 
fresh cogency by, which Augustine still speaks to the condition of human breakdown even in 
21st century. Next, I will discuss how from his Confessions Augustine argued that an agent 
only loves herself truly by loving God as her highest good.  
A brief discuss Oliver O’Donovan will follow, as he remains a stalwart in all 
discussions of self-love in Augustine.  He has raised the question of the un-reconciled and 
mutually incompatible assertions that Augustine made about self-love, that prevail today. 
Finally, I will discuss the Pauline influence on Augustine's basic epistemological 
understanding emphasising the interiority of the subject in a way that seems to undermine the 
importance of the external world.  
By this action Augustine has played a central role in the development of the modern 
understanding of personal identity. In facilitating an inward turn, he is credited with inventing 
an inner space that has profound theological and philosophical implications. Pauline and 
Augustinian distinction between the "inner" and "outer," forged into a powerful tool of self-
analysis. 
3.2 The Augustinian Interiority  
 
Augustine is perceived as an individualist in his orientation and discovery of the 
interiority (Hampson et al 2010, p. 550). His emphasis on interiority is therefore considered 
to be anti-body and anti-pleasure and repressive. How does Augustine arrive at this point of 
interiority? This is predicated by the question of self-knowledge, where, self-knowledge 
becomes a question of place or regionality (Smith 2001, p. 276). It is a question of topos; to 







  100 
questions included, where is God that I should call upon him? What place is there within me 
wherein God could enter and dwell? The very need to call God to ‘come’ implies a distance 
between God and Augustine’s self. It is not necessarily a departure by walking or moving 
through space (Confessions 1.18.p.38-39), but rather ‘spiritual spatiality’ alienation.  
We notice this alienation from the Origin of the self is also a self-alienation. In 
Confessions (1.6.p.24-27) the question of origin is a question of place when Augustine writes, 
“I do not know whence I came to be in this mortal life or, as I may call it, this living death? I do not 
know where I came from.” Augustine is here expressive of a soul that has departed from God.  
It is a soul that does not know itself [as imago Dei] and therefore does not understand 
itself within the horizon and or definition of the creator. Augustine observes further that the 
wandering soul finds itself   “dying by my alienation from you” (Ibid. 1.13. p.33-35) when it 
abandons its origin, its highest good, in order to “pursue the lowest things of your creation” 
(1.13.21). 
The Augustinian self carries certain mysteriousness and ambiguity that appears 
grounded in the depth of the soul’s interiority. In the search for an answer to the question, 
‘Who am I?’ A question that always already asks, who is my God? Augustine retrospectively 
is turning away from the outside world and into himself. This is an inward turn towards 
reflection on himself (Ibid. 10.6.p.211-213).  
Smith (2001, p. 279) observes that in Confessions the ‘first half of Book 10 recounts 
this inward turn, couched in the Neoplatonic metaphor of interior ascent, ‘a journey from the 
outer world to the secret recesses of the soul.’ In this ascent Augustine starts by considering 
the external world then the movement goes on to the self as body, on to the self as soul, 
through the stages of vegetative and sentient soul, and finally to memory (Confessions 10.8.p. 
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antithetical in that, it is in fact more of a descent into the abyss (Ibid. 10.2. p. 207-208), 
penetrating deeper and further deeper into the soul until it reaches the ‘caves and mountains 
of my memory’, writes Augustine (Ibid. 10.17.p. 223-224; 10.8. p. 214-215).  
It is in these interior caverns that the self becomes even more mysterious; that is by 
penetrating to the heart of the soul, where one was to find at its centre a bottomless abyss that 
could not be sounded. Consequently, Augustine reflecting on the powers of memory is struck 
and overwhelmed by an infinity (Ibid. 10.8. p. 215). The power of memory is very great; it is 
vast and infinite profundity. It is by the power of his mind, that he himself cannot grasp the 
totality of who he is.  
The self cannot grasp itself, neither can it conceptualise itself. That is not because it is 
outside or external to or of itself, but simply because the self eludes itself on account of its 
own depth that opens onto an infinity. The journey into the recesses of the soul brings the 
self-face-to-face with its own mystery. It encounters the secret that cannot be made present 
except to God, for whom “the abyss of human consciousness” is an open book. The self 
further eludes conceptualisation precisely because it evades language.  
The self as a radically private interiority is incommensurate with the public traffic of 
language. Accordingly, the strategy of “confession” plays an important role in this 
problematic ordering or conceptualisation of the self. Augustine has to return to himself, to 
his interiority. The turn is a reflection, a return to consider exactly who he is (precisely what 
Pascal on the other hand says we run from).  By returning from the exterior world to the 
interior life of the soul, Augustine runs up against its derivative nature, that it is created and 
therefore must be inferior to that which made it. Subsequently, it is precisely in reflecting on 
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being as imago Dei. Through this inward turn, by which the self is confronted simultaneously 
by its own nature and its Origin, what Augustine encounters is Being itself. 
While Augustine finally engages in confession perhaps as the only way out of this 
abyss the self is continually descending into, he still has difficulties with understanding 
herself, “I at least, Lord, have difficulty at this point, and I find my own self hard to grasp. I have 
become for myself a soil which is a cause of difficulty and much sweat” (Ibid. 10.16. p.222-223; 
Foucault 1978, p. 57-59).  
It is as if to say the more he works this soil, the harder he finds this exercise that is 
causing him much sweat. The ground is not yielding easily as he would have liked. This 
encounter with memory that is actually with himself is an encounter with infinity that causes 
amazement: “Great is the power of memory, an awe-inspiring mystery, my God, a power of 
profound and infinite multiplicity. And this is mind, this is myself’ (Ibid. 10.17.p.223-224). But we 
are still left with the question: “What then am I, my God?’ (Ibid.) The mystery or ambiguity of 
the self, then, is grounded in its interiority, which signals an interior transcendence an infinity 
whose end I never reach. 
3.2.1  Augustine’s inwardness on reason  
Augustine recognises the limitations of words for describing the essential features of 
the self, which is the reflection of God's 'image and likeness' in each of us. However, his turn 
to the self was a turn to radical reflexivity that made the language of inwardness irresistible 
(Taylor 1989, p. 131). The inner light shines in our presence to ourselves exposing us to who 
truly we are. It is different from the outer light since it makes the image of inwardness 
compelling as it illuminates the space where ‘I am present to myself.’ It is from this one’s 
self, that one is drawn away from and becomes absorbed into the world, loving and enjoying 
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But a return to the Origin is in Augustine’s thoughts synonymous with a return into 
himself his innermost citadel (Ibid.7.10. p146-147). It is by his returning from the exterior 
world to the interior life of the soul that he becomes an authentic self once again.  Augustine 
thus introduced the concept of inwardness of radical reflexivity significant now for modern 
epistemological thought. The step to inwardness for Augustine was a step towards God.  
The truth dwells within and God is the truth. This truth shows itself in our attempt to 
prove God’s existence. Augustine thus tried to show his interlocutors that there is something 
higher than reason: something that deserves to be called God. Reason in fact recognises that 
there is a truth that is critical to it [reason] that is a standard on which it [reason] regulates 
itself that is not its own making but rather beyond it and common to all.  
His pursuit of the usefulness of reason brings him to the conclusion that there are base 
objects as well as higher common objects, applicable to all who apply reason. Truth available 
to all can be apprehended by reason.  Augustine observes that, all can also enjoy truth and in 
fact this store of truth does not run out. So, Augustine’s proof of the existence of God is by 
experience of knowing and reasoning that is done by going inward where actually one gets 
drawn upward.  
Augustine took this thought process to show that God is or may be found not just in 
the world but also importantly in the foundations of the person. God is or may be found in the 
intimacy of self-presence. Consequently, God as Truth gives human beings the standards, the 
principles of right judgment, not through the spectacle of a world that is organised by ideas 
but rather by that ‘incorporeal light.’ It is a light by which human minds are irradiated so that 
they judge rightly of all things (Taylor 1989, p.134). Augustine faced the question, what is it 
that one turns to inward that propels her to be drawn upward and unto God or the Truth? 
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everyday the recovery of the past imprints. Memory for Augustine contained past experiences 
but included principles of intelligible higher order by which a person is capable of 
formulating them and making them explicit, even though they may have never been 
presented explicitly to us in the past.  
Augustine implied that memory is capable of innate ideas, that deep within us there is 
an implicit understanding that we have to think hard and deep in order to bring it to explicit 
and conscious formulations. It is in one’s ‘memoria’ that one’s implicit grasp of who she is 
resides, that guiding her she moves from her original self-ignorance and grievous self mis-
description to true self-knowledge.  
Augustine perceived God to be the source of this implicit understanding. God was the 
source of the light that lights every person coming into this world. Augustine argued that the 
human soul, at the end of its search for itself, if it goes to the very end, the soul finds God.  
Augustine implied that it is in this, my paradigmatic activity where I strive to make myself 
more fully present to myself, to realise the full potential that resides in the fact that I, the 
knower and known are but one.  
By this self-knowledge I come tellingly and convincingly to the awareness that God 
stands above me. It’s at the very root of memory that the soul finds God. In Augustinian 
understanding the way into memory leads above to God, hence going into memory takes one 
beyond. He inadvertently draws out the thought that the implicit grasp within memory 
suggests that training does not put knowledge of the ideas of principles and intelligible reason 
into us. The capacity is already there, teaching only but awakens what is already there.  
The concept of the inwardness suggests an Augustinian path leading from the exterior 
to the interior and from the interior to the superior (Gilson 1961 cited in Taylor 1989, p.136). 
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sustaining and directing the human activity of striving to know. Human being grasp the 
intelligible not just on account of their soul’s eye being directed to it but primarily because 
the Master within directs them.  
God is behind the eye, as well as the One whose Ideas the eye strives to discern 
clearly before it. This God is found in the intimacy of my oneself-presence, he is closer to her 
than she herself (Confessions III.vi.11). Augustine went on to claim that God can be thought 
of as the most fundamental ordering principle in a person. The soul animates the body, so 
God does the soul. He vivifies it. ‘As the soul is the life of the flesh, so God is the blessed life 
of the man.’ (Ibid. VII. 1. 2)  
3.3 Augustine and a transcending self 
 
The most rigorously Augustinian theme that has influenced the existentialist’ tradition 
is the priority of the self for an understanding of being or existence. This understanding of 
being (arguably to be described ontological) is integrally linked to self-knowledge and self-
knowledge has relationship with knowledge of God and knowledge of self. In (Soliloquies 
1.1.1; 1.2.7) Augustine engages in dialogue with oneself, where he raises the question of self-
knowledge.  
For Smith (2001, p. 275) Augustinian question of self-knowledge is actually a 
question of being, of one’s own being. It is simply that to know oneself is always already to 
raise the question of being as a question of one’s Origin. For Augustine his Origin is of 
course God who has made human beings in his own image and similitude, ‘which everyone 
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the	opening	of	the	Confessions	and,	indeed,	determines	the	entire	structure	of	the	text.	There	in	Confessions	Augustine	asserts	that, 
“…. you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.” 
(Confessions1.1. p.21). 
 
The Augustinian self being made for and by God therefore remains restless if it departs from 
him [God]. But as the imago Dei, this same self finds its definition and meaning in its origin 
[God]. If the self is or was to lose this understanding of itself within this horizon of its 
definition as the image of God, it remains restless and anxious. Augustine therefore 
concludes that to be without self-knowledge is to be without the knowledge of God; and to be 
without the knowledge of God is to experience anxiety about one’s own identity.  
Augustine describes his experience, “I had become to myself a vast problem” (Ibid. 
4.4.p. 75): he was ‘not herself,’ not ‘at home’ with himself but rather constantly ‘restless.’ 
Augustinian self finds its “meaning” or its identity and definition in its relations, in its “love” 
as its intentional aim. This self is defined by what it loves, by what it directs itself toward, 
what it refers itself to. Although in Augustine, consciousness is intentional the priority is not 
on perception but love as an intentional mode of consciousness. The Augustinian self is, in a 
sense necessarily transcending and referring itself outside of itself and beyond itself in order 
to find meaning.  In an existentialist reading of Augustine, it is important to appreciate the 
significance of one’s “love” in determining the meaning of the self.  
For Augustine, the self is defined by the object of its love. What is at stake here is a 
certain ethics of self-constitutions: who I am is determined by what I love, how I relate 
myself to “the world”.  Arendt (1996, p. 18) comments on this Augustine’s thoughts, “Since 
man is not self-sufficient,”…. “and therefore, always desires something outside of himself, the 
question of who he is can only be resolved by the object of his desire.” Augustine reminds himself 
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of self that directs its love toward the “world,” departing from the relation where it is at home 
and finds its meaning. On account of this inauthentic self, Augustine recounts, “My sin, 
consisted in this, that I sought pleasure, sublimity, and truth not in God but in his creatures, in 
myself, and other created beings” (Confessions 1.20.p.40-41). The inauthentic self has its 
love misdirected and absorbed in the world, thereby dissipating and dissolving the meaning 
and identity of the self who is divided and anxious.  
The self which departs from its Origin is a divided self, scattered and fragmented by 
its own absorption in the world of multiplicity: “As an adolescent I went astray from you, my 
God, far from your unmoved stability…’ (Ibid.11.10. p.52-53). The inauthentic self25 is the 
prodigal self like the Lucan son in Luke 15: 13 who attempts to find meaning in the world 
that lacks transcendence. Augustine found out that the soul couldn’t be nourished in a 
“distant land” where it was experiencing famine. In contrast, the authentic self directs its love 
and finds, it’s meaning in its Creator and is thus defined as imago Dei. It has returned home 
for the feast. The	abstruseness	of	the	self,	grounded	in	the	interiority	and	depth	of	the	self	in	Augustine,	points	to	the	transcendence	of	the	self	as	always	already	referring	beyond	itself	to	its	other,	its	Origin	[God]	(Smith	2001,	p.	280).	The	Augustinian	self	therefore	finds	it’s	meaning	in	relation	to	something	other	than	itself.	Its	withdrawal	into	the	cavernous	depths	of	the	self	did	not	solve	the	question	for	Augustine,	but	rather	made	manifest	a	deeper	mystery	and	a	fundamental	ambiguity	that	continued	to	point	
                                               
25 The Augustinian inauthentic self finds itself travelling ‘into a distant country’ Luke 15: 13 far from home, 
restless and anxious, having “squandered his estate ‘ with loose living’. Far from home, he is also far from 
herself, is not herself, and lacks a sense of selfhood or identity. The self is spent, dissolved, dissipated, scattered, 
pulled apart by an absorption in ‘the world.’ It has spent its fortune, its being. The prodigal self is less than a 
self, even less than human, not able to enjoy what unclean swine are fed. However, there is a sense in which this 
prodigal, inauthentic self is not aware of its condition; it thinks itself to be free, to be enjoying life.  
Not until a moment of crisis and reflection, does the self realize its destitution. That is, it is not until the prodigal 
“comes to herself’” that he then reflects on his state and realizes that he was better off at home with his father 
(v. 17). This coming to oneself, then, is that experience or crisis which precipitates Augustine’s return, a 
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the	self	elsewhere	to	the	Infinite.	Consequently,	the	question,	“Who	am	I?’	becomes,	for	Augustine,	a	question	concerning	God,	the	Infinite.		
The self will therefore find its authentic meaning only in relation to its Origin [God], 
its Father. The fundamental relation that determines this meaning is found in the intentional 
structure of love. The object of self’s love determines the meaning of the self. Accordingly, 
the question becomes, “What do I love when I love my God?’ (Confessions X. 6. p. 211-212) 
“What is the object of my love?” (Ibid. X 7. p. 213-4). Further questions that Augustine 
needed answers to included, at what does my love aim? Where do I look for meaning?  The 
world could not provide him with answers, as demonstrated in this response to self, “‘We are 
not your God,’ they responded; ‘look beyond us”’ (Ibid. X .6 p. 212). He equally could not 
find any answers from or by himself as he goes on to show that the depths of the self, 
memoria, continues to refer him beyond himself (Ibid X.17. p. 218). The beyond himself 
pursuit finds its resting place in God, and yet there still remains a further quest, what is it that 
Augustine loves when he loves his God? Arendt comments,  
“What Augustine expects of God, is an answer to the question, ‘Who am I?’ - the 
certainty of which all previous philosophy had taken for granted. Or, to put it another 
way, it was because of this new quest for the self that he finally turned to God.” 
(Arendt 1996, p. 25). 
 
Augustine’s self seeks and finds meaning outside of itself more probable in becoming 
aware of the Other or the Origin that is God. Smith (2001, p. 281) suggests the Augustinian 
self can be described as “ekstatic’ self. The self’s quest for meaning and the quest for God are 
inextricably tied to the quest for the happy life (Confessions X .20. p.226).  
It is the mechanical characteristic of the self to seek its own happiness, the search that 
can go in different directions and find joy in the world instead of God (Ibid. X.23.p.229-230), 







  109 
of joy as he is himself that joy. Augustine’s Confessions continue to be approached 
consistently as documents of clinical relevance by psychoanalysis.  
While it reads as an autobiography of some kind it also offers a study of personality 
processes for behaviours and responses fitting various psychoanalytic formulas26. On a 
personal level Augustine, in Confessions, formulated this primal situation when he asked, 
“Who am I? What kind of man am I?” (Ibid. IX, 1, p.181).  Notwithstanding the urgency, it 
took an enormous effort to articulate the answers; “I had placed myself behind my own back, 
refusing to see myself” (Ibid. VII, 7, p. 169). He needed, first of all, to return to his self, 
“Under your guidance I entered into the depth of my soul” (Ibid. VIII, 9, p. 145). He had 
formed the conviction that it is there, in the recesses of the inner self, that one finds the 
essential qualifying element: “It is in my heart that I am whatever I am” (Ibid. X, 3, p. 209). 
Augustine became thoroughly involved in this task and visualising himself, as a field 
of his own labours is his own self. His sense of introspection could be compared to a land 
which a ‘farmer works only with difficulty and at the cost of much sweat’ (Ibid. X, 17, p. 
223). His self-examining stance took a dialogical character. This is from the moment he 
began to analysing what was for him, a chronic situation of dispersion and internal 
divisiveness of an impoverished, crumbling self.  
                                               
26 Augustine's personal story has been recognised as a pioneering self-analysis and a forerunner of modern 
psychology and existentialism, or as an exhaustive study of the self by one of the great minds in history (Nino 
1990, p. 9). Urged by an internal dissatisfaction and a persistent desire to find the ultimate truth, Augustine also 
attempted to go beyond common aspirations of fortune and prestige. He was a person of peace and inwardness. 
The Confessions documents form a revision of his life at a critical juncture in the form of a dialogue between 
the self, God, and the other [reader]. In Confessions he wanted to explain his conversion, the major event of his 
adult life, at a time when he had a deeper understanding of its meaning and implications. In it he art-fully 
presents self-conscious interpretations of his life and being, from the vantage point of a meaningful centre 
(Weintraub 1987, p. 26). Augustine’s inquiry about the nature of the self and God, structured in a highly 
personal, direct, and unabashed language, initiated a radical change in the ways others will later explore the 
vicissitudes of the human condition and the quest for an ultimate truth. He set the foundations for a new ideal of 
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The expression in (Ibid.  II, 2, p. 44), engulfed in danger, misery, and bondage, full of 
fear and worries seem to confront any reader of his narrative and touch the heart of our own 
experience. Augustine is in fact describing a scene of a patient in today’s society in a 
psychoanalyst’s clinic. Augustine’s experience is of one wounded by an anticipatory despair 
of the crushing self and the final defeat of his aspirations (Nino 1990, p. 11).  
He still was capable of that critical effort to search for what seemed to be missing in 
his life. He not only searches and explores the potential for enlightenment that may be 
available in other people, but also reads eagerly everything that may offer an answer, from 
the books of the Platonists to the letters of St. Paul (Confessions VIII, 20, p. 154-155). While 
focusing on God upon whom the Confessions themselves are focused, Augustine 
correspondingly entertained the contributions of others in the roles they played in the process 
of his restoration.  
Although in the Confessions we see Augustine as one fumbling desperately in the 
darkness of his already long journey into a wasteland of futility, this particular predicament 
opened to Augustine another perspective that in turn, further clarified the nature of his search 
and the ultimate answer to his quest. In retrospect he found the answer that he was looking 
for, the realization that he had strayed from God, his Creator, and as a consequence had lost 
his inner equilibrium. He wrote in the Confessions:   
‘You made us for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in you. . . . You 
raised me up so that I could see that there was something to be seen. . . . I realized 
that I was far away from you.’ (Ibid. I, 1, p. 21; VII, 10, p. 147).  
This is a phenomenon of one becoming aware of an Other within and beyond one’s 
self. He is here representative of a certain universal preoccupation with questions of ultimate 
meaning that many if not all people are confronted with. If these questions are adequately 
formulated and consistently pursued through the unfolding of the life narrative, individuals 
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experience represents a particular experience qualified as religious, but he is representative of 
aspects that are visible in the problems many present in therapeutic settings. 
3.4 Augustine on concept and practice of Self-love  
 
Augustine remains a key contributor to the Western [Latin] Christian doctrine and 
ethics to the point that all medieval law, history, psychology, political theory and social 
thought stand in debt to him (Beach et al, 1973 ed., p. 100; Chadwick, 1986, p. 2). His 
reflections on self-love have taken on a fresh cogency by, which he still speaks to the 
condition of human breakdown even in 21st century, addressing the age-old debates of self-
love and self-denial, which continue in the Christian community. (Schlabach, 2001, p. 3)  
Many regard self-love as incompatible with the self-sacrifice of Christ. Others, 
especially feminists and liberation theologians (Ibid. 2001, p.143), contest the notion that 
self-sacrifice is the test of authentic Christian love. The resolution to this dilemma, lies with 
St. Augustine, argues Schlabach (Ibid. p.145, 146), eager to show how Augustine attempted 
to reconcile self-love and self-denial in a unified Christian love. Schlabach observes that, the 
crucial role continence played in Augustine’s teaching demonstrates continence is much more 
than just an attitude toward sexuality. 
 On the contrary it is the operative mode of Augustinian caritas, and Augustine 
conceded love a paradox that remained an agent’s personal quest for happiness, but which 
equally implied some self-renunciation and the pain of becoming what one is not. Schlabach 
observes further that putting Augustine side by side with historical theology, contemporary 
Christian ethics, feminism, and pastoral considerations, one affords tracing the role that self-
denial played in Augustine's teaching. Sclabach is convinced that an integration of self-love 
and self-denial enabled Augustine to distinguish between true Christian self denial from mere 
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whether directed toward neighbour, enemy, or self - is not self-serving but rather a 
participation in a mutual relationship with God and His creation.  
Thus, Schlabach through his critical retrieval of Augustine's thought shows that self-
denial is meaningful only when ordered to a higher good. Augustine’s example is that of 
Christ, he (Christ) endured the suffering of the cross. Christ’s example demonstrates practical 
applications of how charity working through continence can maintain right self-love and 
proper self-denial in an agent’s daily life. Augustine concedes and proposes that Christian 
self-sacrifice is the willing acceptance of a good derived from working on behalf of others.  
3.4.1   The case for Nygren’s agape against Augustine 
O’Donovan suggests Augustine’s discussion on self-love constitutes a problem, when 
Augustine claims that, “Self-love is loving God and it is also hating God. Self-love is 
common to all men; and it is restricted to those who love God.” (O’Donovan, 1980, p. 1). 
Nygren on the other hand sees Augustine’s concept of love from which derivatives of self-
love may arise as an unsuccessful attempt to synthesis Platonist Eros and Christian Agape 
(Nygren 1982, p. 449-558). Nygren has argued agape is the uniquely Christian love fully 
expressed in the cross. It did not seek its immortal good. Agape becomes Christianity’s 
defining characteristic of fundamental motif. The content of Christian morality for Nygren, is 
determined by this self-giving love. Agape becomes value-creating principle (Nygren, 1982, 
p. 75 -81) while remaining un-attracted to the value.  
Contra agape, Eros was the Platonic conception of love that even when in its noblest 
religious form and has nothing to do with eroticism or sensuality it remains for Nygren 
significantly acquisitive and egocentric. This is because the object of its desire remains the 
beauty of the divine. Eros is essentially and in principle self-love, and notwithstanding love 
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Nygren’s reading of Augustine’s caritas draws out the conclusion that it is primarily a 
love for or to God and not God’s love for an agent. Schlabach argues that Augustine was 
convinced God’s love poured into an agent’s heart by the Holy Spirit (Romans 5:5) is a love 
the agent receives from God, and such a love constitutes a gift (Schlabach 2001, p. 8). 
Nygren observes that Augustinian interpretation obscures the priority of God’s love for an 
agent (Nygren 1982, p. 452-55).  
Augustinian caritas for Nygren although it continues to portray authentic Christian 
love it retains egocentricity, acquisitiveness and self-love. Augustinian doctrine of love for 
Nygren rests substantially on the foundation of Eros, which means it has very little to do with 
agape love. Even God’s love insists Nygren, seen through Augustinian eyes, it aims at 
evoking love back to God a character trait true of acquisitiveness. God’s love in Augustine 
becomes a self-seeking, that being the case it undermines neighbour love. Nygren is 
convinced that however Augustine’s love is interpreted all the time that love for God always 
starts in the self-love that conceives God as an agent’s good (Ibid.524-34)  
Nygren’s key problem with Augustine’s concept of caritas is his (Nygren’s) attempt 
to remove Eros entirely from Christian love of God, as if God was never the desire of the 
human heart. Nygren’s loses sight of the fact that, Augustine sought to find in Goodness that, 
which is love’s source as well as its satisfaction. To do so he accommodates a measure of 
Eros, which strains ceaselessly inwards and upward into the creative and caring Agape that 
redeems. Harrison (1992, p. 253-4) on her part observes that Augustine did not perceive any 
differences in scripture as those that are attached to love. Augustine in De Doctrina 
Christiana 1:35 making a reference to the use of love in the Gospel according to St. John 
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Nygren tends to do. Significant is the fact that, all love according to Augustine has its origin 
in God’s gift of the Holy Spirit.  
It follows even Eros that Nygren would like to extract from the Christian doctrine 
remains a product of God’s love.  But how does Augustine differentiate when Eros has been 
applied as against agape, if both loves originate from God’s love? In Confession XIII. 9. 10, 
Augustine charges that love can be rightly or wrongly directed, depending on its object or 
goal. When an agent seeks to possess and enjoy lesser things than herself with no reference to 
God as her Creator her love for these things may be categorised as Eros.  
When on the other hand she loves so as to refer all her love to God her creator, even 
with the love of lesser things than herself, she loves with agape. Disregarding, several of 
Nygren’s concerns could be justified from the point of view that Augustine himself at certain 
points eventually took greater stock for example, of the dangers of perverse self-love 
(Nygren, 1982, p.532-538). Augustinian self-love cannot be “acquisitive” in the egocentric 
way that Nygren alleges, because the only self worth loving is a gift of God’s grace. 
Augustine’s doctrine of Christian love (caritas), suggests that all loves find their unity in a 
gestalt vision of mutual love among all creatures in God, united in shared love of God as 
their highest good and participating in God’s own Trinitarian life. 
3.5 Loving God for God founded on scriptures 
 
Augustine herself claims that an agent only loves herself truly by loving God as her 
highest good. It is difficult to love God while in pursuit of love for self or love that is to 
satisfy self. Such an action will mean objectifying and using God to satisfy an agent’s own 
goals and desires determined independent of God. An agent who loves God does not desire 
God for her own private good. Conversely, if none other than God is the object of and reward 
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that an agent does not love God for the sake of a reward apart from God; this argument 
contradicts the notion of self-centredness.  Burnaby (1991, p.160-161) suggests that when an 
agent loves God, God will not allow such an agent’s will and desires to go unchanged.  
Loving God must therefore transform the self. This is the self which an agent loves, 
that is transformed to the point that the agent increasingly desires what God wills for self in 
relation to the common good rather than the private good of the agent’s own choosing.  
Augustine argued that love that enjoys fits well only with God. All other love of 
created things including that of the other of an agent becomes love that uses such goods for 
the enjoyment of God, but because an agent’s other is his neighbour such a neighbour cannot 
be used to enjoy God. Against this preceding argument, Augustine favoured the notion of an 
agent enjoying a neighbour in God.  
Augustine perceived in Aristotelian rational love the agent as having an admiring 
appreciation of the good of the object. In rational love the agent recognises that the object has 
a purpose or telos, but it is not a telos that she herself the agent imposes. O’Donovan 
surmises rational love to involve an observer’s disinterestedness and it may also encourage 
her detachment. Rational love thus provides a more flexible and coherent statement of the 
order of love unlike positive love (1980, p.29-32).   
Of the four Augustinian loves the most satisfactory was benevolent love, which 
rationally acknowledges an objective order of created good. It in essence adds something 
more to rational love. From a creator’s point of view, each creation and hence every agent as 
a creation has a destiny to fulfil in the order of things. A loving agent recognises the destiny 
to fulfil the order of things and affirms, albeit he may not have devised that order, he adds 
weight of his agency toward the complete realisation of the order. Benevolent love 
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An agent in loving the other and self seeks after the good of the loved not in 
accordance with a teleological order that she imposes, but rather according to God’s will for 
herself and the other. She loves within the teleological ordered good of the whole, therefore 
not even Augustinian self-love can be egocentric on the contrary it becomes theocentric. 
Augustine’s speculative views were always influenced by the necessity of agreeing with 
scripture.  
If he was going to say anything about love let alone self-love, scriptures became the 
source.  Hence his conception of self-love takes its cue from that specific necessity, of 
agreeing with scripture. In scripture the agent is asked to love God with her whole heart, soul 
and mind and love her neighbour as herself (Luke 10: 27).  In this command there is no 
expression on how an agent ought to love herself, or whether it is right for an agent to love 
herself or whether it is right for an agent to wish that others love her (Burnaby, 1991, p.116). 
What the agent is left with is a matter of approximation on how to love self.  
Love God as God, your neighbour as yourself these are the standards for loving God 
and neighbour. There is no other equal to God, so that an agent may be asked to love God as 
that other. However, to the agent’s neighbour the agent is shown a rule by being given his 
neighbour as her equal. It is with this approximation Augustine perceived an agent as loving 
self to be the criterion from which such an agent loves. Augustine’s perspective is important 
because his considerations turnout to be companion for contemporary thinking on perennial 
issues of moral life. The complexion of human moral life appears multi-coloured by 
Augustine’s feelings that human beings long for God essentially for the sake of their own 
happiness (Meilaender, 2006, p.3-4). The question then is, whether seeking God to obtain a 
happy life is selfish or perhaps whether loving God with one’s whole heart, mind and soul is 
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ascertain pleasing God, in which case the focus shifts away from God to oneself. Yet, to 
attempt to seek happiness for oneself can equally lockout an agent off from the grace, which 
engenders happiness. This is because the focus will undoubtedly have shifted away from God 
to oneself.  
Indeed, it is possible that the wish to love God with one’s whole heart, mind and soul 
in this earthly life can easily close off the love that God himself offers an agent through the 
presence of the neighbour. When this happens the focus again shifts from God to an agent 
herself. The question raised with this consideration of love for God and love for self is, what 
is the criterion from, which an agent may love self without the fear of turning away from 
God, and how does she love and enjoy God as an end in itself? 
3.5.1  From what criteria may an agent love one’s self? 
Augustine perceived the single essential to moral goodness to be the right direction of 
the will toward God. The love of God becomes the ultimate form of Christian decision into 
which contents of behaviour are to be placed. In The City of God Bk XIX chap., xiii, 
Augustine observes, ‘Love God, and do what you want.’ 
It is from the love of God Augustine concluded God alone is to be enjoyed for being eternal 
and unchanging (De Doctrina Christiana, Book 1. 22.20).  
 All other things are to be used in order that an agent may come at last to the 
enjoyment of God. Augustine grasped from the Neoplatonists the ontological divide between 
the transcendent immutable creator (God) and mutable temporal creatures (Harrison, 2006, p. 
29-30). This understanding provided Augustine’s central belief in one transcendent God and 
the absolute dependence of creation upon him as Creator. He adopted this distinctively 
Christian doctrine of creation, from nothing, as a basis of reflection upon the central articles 
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p.1). He understood God to be a Being who is the principle cause of all being, able to be 
perceived metaphysically. But, metaphysics for Augustine is not attained by natural reason it 
has its recourse to revelation. Revelation is achieved through the love of God who himself is 
wisdom.  
 In wisdom synonymous with God is found not only charity, which is the love of God, 
but also faith, which is the mind adherence to truth or God. Since the essence of love is to 
seek union with the beloved, love becomes personal, in the sense that it drives the agent 
towards a loving union with God himself. The love of God highlights an agent’s awareness of 
the ontological chasm between the omnipotent, transcendent God and a creation, which God 
has drawn from nothing and has made good, oriented and dependent on God. An agent as a 
creature loves correctly or rightly only because her will is oriented toward God. An agent 
cannot therefore act justly let alone love, through her own reason; hence reason for Augustine 
does not merit that place of virtue.  
 For Augustine perfect virtue and justice are only found in Christ and human virtue is 
always conditioned by humility since it is never entirely comprehended by reason. An agent 
who lacks faith ultimately lacks humility to accept the irrational notion of divine incarnation 
and mystery. Such lack immunises the agent to Christ’s justifying grace, the agent is then 
beyond the ability to stand in right relation to God. The enjoyment of God stands out as the 
criterion from which an agent is able to love herself. When an agent acknowledges the 
omnipotence and freedom of God, against her own subversive system that emphasises 
independent self-achievement she understands the nature and effects of human sinfulness and 
of evil, she is therefore able love correctly. This is because her love is firstly directed at her 
Creator God. The agent enters a right relation with God by obeying especially the 
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agent who is not a believer deceives herself in a false piety, which offer but temporal 
security. She fails to come to love herself or her neighbours or the true God and in this she 
fails to seek the ethereal good (Dodaro, 2004)  
A question is raised, should an agent be regarded as a thing to be enjoyed, or to be 
used or indeed both? I observed above sometimes love demands of an agent to use the other 
(neighbour for example, as a thing) as a means to enjoying God. Augustine argued against 
this understanding proposing the notion of an agent and neighbour enjoying one another in 
God (O’Donovan 1980, p.24-29)  
For Augustine an agent is commanded, to love another; and so the question is whether 
an agent is to be loved by others for her own sake, or for the sake of something else. If an 
agent is loved for her own sake she becomes a thing to be enjoyed, but if she is loved for 
something else she becomes a thing to be used (a means) but a means to what? Most likely, a 
means to enjoying God.  
When an agent loves a created thing rather than the Creator, the agent’s love becomes 
distorted, disordered and unsatisfying and insatiable on account that it is directed toward 
what is relative and contingent rather than the Creator [God]. It is also true that it is 
impossible for an agent to love God in order to satisfy love of self, since this is objectifying 
and using God to satisfy the agent’s own goals and whims that are determined independently 
of God (Burnaby 1938, p.121) Such is a love [cupiditas] turned downward from God to the 
temporal things. The love of God transforms all the respectable virtues of the civilised 
person. Whereas the Greek laid emphasis on the virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance and 
justice, Augustine swings radically and argues that these virtues’ worth is determined by the 
complete intention in, which they are cultivated. When these virtues are sought for the sake 
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conversion of the Greek moral ideal of justice, wisdom, courage and temperance by love. His 
belief was that the truth of Christianity should not be put alongside Greek wisdom, nor put 
above it as a superstructure but rather Christianity should convert, permeate and redeem 
Greek wisdom.  
In Augustine’s understanding there are four things, which are to be loved, the first is 
God who is above human agents, then is the human agent herself, the third is another human 
agent and the fourth are those things below human agents (De Doctrina Christiana Book 
1.23). Augustine argues that God did not see the need to issue a love commandment to an 
agent to love self nor such a commandment for an agent to love things below her human 
level. God’s only issued command is binary for an agent to love that one thing above human 
agent’s level [God] and that, which is on the same level with a human agent, that is another 
human being. Augustine’s advice is that an agent need not find enjoyment in herself and 
therefore love herself for her own sake but rather for the one whom the said agent is to enjoy 
[God]. Augustine offers this observation, 
‘But if they love themselves for their own sakes, they are not relating themselves to 
God; rather, in turning to themselves, they are not turning to anything unchangeable.’ 
(De Doctrina Christiana, Book 1.21)  
An agent’s enjoyment of herself in Augustine’s understanding is to some extent 
defective, this is because self is changeable and does not offer the security of the 
unchangeable good. Augustine also speaks of an agent loving herself for the sake of the one 
whom the agent’s love is most rightly directed to as its end, in the Confessions this is the 
Origin. An agent can therefore love herself but not for her own benefit, rather for the sake of 
God at whom her love is directed as its end. Loving God with one’s whole heart, and one’s 
whole soul and one’s whole mind implies an agent has his whole focus on God. That focus 
leaves no room for wanting to enjoy something else outside of God. In essence, the loving of 
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to be loved must be carried along toward that point to, which an agent’s whole loving 
impetus is hastening toward God. 
3.5.2  How may an agent practice self-love? 
The notion of self-love has always and continues to remain a paradox in Christian 
theology. The two synoptic Gospel scriptural texts of Mark 8:35; 12: 31 have kept the 
paradox in view. The bible however, also provides other texts that form a biblical foundation 
that when applied somehow this foundation serves to uphold bewilderingly multifarious and 
inconsistent ways of speaking.  So that, whereas Calvin (Institutes III.7.4) describes self-love 
as a ‘noxious pest’, Joseph Butler laments that persons have not enough regard for 
themselves.  
Unquestionably, it is impossible for an agent who loves God not to love herself. It is 
only an agent who loves God that has proper love and is aware how to love best. With love 
for God such an agent aims diligently at the attainment of the chief and the true good, the 
enjoyment of God. What therefore, is to prevent such an agent from loving herself and since 
she has firstly loved right by loving God and neighbour, should she not find it a mutual bond 
of love to love another who is self? This certainly is true, by loving God right or in the 
correct manner of soul, mind and whole heart an agent should find it possible to love self and 
neighbour more easily; but she only loves self and neighbour with only part of her being. 
Commenting on the texts of Mark 12: 30-31; Leviticus 19: 18; Deuteronomy 6: 5, 
Augustine understands the rule of love God set for human beings to require an agent to love 
her neighbour as herself. This loving of neighbour as self leaves room for an agent to want to 
enjoy something else, and we have seen that other something to be God. It becomes apparent 
that an agent loves self better and correctly or suitably when she loves God first.  Therefore, 
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love the neighbour as herself. Augustine argues that what an agent desires in her love for self 
the enjoyment of God. God becomes her chief end, and the agent loves the neighbour as self 
with perfect affection as a conduit to God who remains the chief end. Indeed, an agent does 
not love her neighbour as self unless she wants to draw the neighbour to that good which she 
is in pursuit (God).   
Only the pursuit of God offers room for an agent and her neighbour to pursue him 
concurrently, this means an agent must remain benevolent to her neighbour (Beach et al, 
1973, p. 117). Augustine observes, things to be loved are those, which relate to God and to 
the human agent in a social companionship, and not all things that are used are to be loved. 
Augustine however concedes that an agent ought to be taught in what measure she may love 
herself so as to be of service to herself, for only then will she be loving herself for the sake of 
God (De Doctrina Christiana Book 1.25).  Augustine somehow like Aristotle seems to 
postulate that an agent can be a neighbour to self, such an agent can see in herself a true 
friend since such a friend reminds the agent of self.  
Augustine senses that to love the neighbour as self is at once and the same for how an 
agent ought to love herself, and inadvertently in doing so sees herself in the neighbour. Love 
of self is not overlooked in the commandment to love the neighbour as self. Self becomes the 
measuring ingot by how which a neighbour is to be loved.  For an agent to love anything else 
other than her real self in the neighbour is to err. The case for an agent’s desire to love herself 
and desires to be good to self is an indisputable fact. But such an agent, ought also to be 
taught how to love self wisely and within due limits. The caution indicates the propensity of 
an agent to love self for her own sake, in which case she becomes an end in herself taking the 
place of God who is to be loved on his own account more than anything else. There is a 
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more than an agent’s own body. First because the agent is the measuring rode for love of the 
other; secondly, the others are not loved as an end in themselves but rather these are being 
loved for God’s sake. If all people are to be loved equally as Augustine observes in (De 
Doctrina Christiana Book 1.29) then the love of an agent of self is justified, for then an agent 
cannot love the neighbour or the other more than herself.   
While it is true not all self-love has a legitimate place in Christian ethics, true self-
love is consistent with a theocentric desire for the other to participate in the common good of 
God’s creation. God’s self-revelation as love becomes for an agent an appeal or a demand 
and a command or a standard as I have discussed, to love the neighbour as God loves. The 
neighbour is loved by an agent on account that the neighbour shares the same human nature 
as the agent, it is a command to love the other and that in the other God’s presence is 
exhibited.  
To Augustine all love is acquisitive, a craving that rises from our lack of some good. 
An agent’s love proceeds from the status of her human being as a creature. Her insufficiency 
pushes her to seek the source of her being, consequently expressing her dependency on that 
source and not on her own self-sufficiency. This is the basis on which correct self-love 
consists, in loving God.  The quest for good (bonum) is the most fundamental urge of human 
life. Humans are created as finite beings insufficient in themselves. They must desire in order 
to love, and love in order to complete their incompleteness. Every good desired by an agent 
satisfies the self, and consequently all love is by the same token self-love. In Augustinian 
understanding, love of neighbour and love of God are not free of self-love because the self 
rightly enjoys such a privilege. For Augustine even, God in the Trinity is a community of 
self-love. Therefore, self is not denied but fulfilled in Christian love. Instead of the lust 
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way of loving. Christian tradition has followed Augustine in fulfilling rather than rejecting 
the self in love.  
There are rigid ascetics who prefer the negative path of Buddhism in cutting off desire 
as the source of all evil. But desire is also the source of good, and to deny all desire is to ask 
for unconscious Nirvana. To deny the self completely is to prefer death to life, a strange way 
falling in love with annihilation. This is not the Christian way self-love is understood. 
Augustine argues that revelation teaches an agent that her final well being lies in God, and to 
love God is the greatest service she can render to herself (City of God 21.27).  Augustine 
recognises self-love as a natural phenomenon. Nature in itself is something good. No one 
ever hates herself (De Doctina Christiana, 1.24.24), and there is evidently legitimate natural 
love. For Augustine natural self-love is not always identical with the true search for 
happiness, seen from a moral perspective self-love can be good or evil. Augustine observes;  
‘Self-love despite God made the earthly city, love of God despite one-self made the 
heavenly city.’ (City of God 14.28) 
 
Augustine’s claim is that the city of this world loves itself so much that by 
comparison it despises God whereas the eternal city loves God so much that by comparison it 
despises itself. Yet, self-love is good. It is good when it is not contrary to the love of God. In 
knowing how to love herself correctly agent ipso facto loves God. If she does not love God, 
her self-love occurs inappropriately, as she is in a manner hating herself (De Doctrina 
Christiana, 4.4).   
Human beings are full of weakness, this in itself demands that an agent must hate 
herself as a being, or perhaps hate the evil in herself; if this did not happen she may not make 
progress toward what is better (Soliloquies. 9.9-10; 169.15.18).  An agent’s hatred of self 
does not mean she despises herself, since this would mean a denial of the dignity she has 
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and here for support Augustine falls back to the New Testament text of St. John 12:25; 
‘Whoever hates his soul (life) in this world will keep it for eternal life.’ 
The text suggests to an agent that if she hates in the correct way then she in essence 
loves. Augustine also repeats in (Soliloquies 96.2.2) ‘Learn to love yourself by not loving 
yourself.’ It is also possible that hatred of evil in self by an agent can be formulated in a 
positive way, suggesting an indication of the benevolent of self-love. An agent can therefore 
apply her will to serve her own advantage (De Dcotrina Christiana 1.25.26), on account that 
doing good is a duty she owes herself. This concurs with the Kantian understanding of the 
provision of duty to self.  
Augustine would want to reiterate that an agent cares for her own well being in a full 
and deeper sense of the word when she has a genuine concern for the inmost meaning of life, 
which is to be found in the love of God. This is a gift an agent can give to herself. The self in 
Christianity is not rejected but purified of selfishness, lust, and pride. The Lord’s Prayer does 
not ask God to deliver us from self but to “deliver us from evil. It is the evil of false 
selfishness that cries out for deliverance, and from such temptation the prayer leads to the 
social values of God’s family— “for thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, for 
ever.”  
Such prayer strengthens rather than abnegating self by leading self to active 
participation in a larger cause of social love. In the family of universal love every self is 
strengthened by mutual respect and approval, human and divine. There is nothing an agent 
hungers for so much as approval, to be accepted by, others as a worthy member, not to be 
rejected or condemned, but affectionately treated with understanding and appreciation.  
In the human family parental love strengthens the growing selves of the children to be 
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neurotics and criminals who are unable to work or play constructively with others by reason 
of their self-rejection and emotional insecurity. There is a huge difference that family love 
makes in the ascendancy of good over evil in each self. 
3.6 Oliver O’Donovan’s reading of Augustine 
 
3.6.1 Augustine’s expression of amor sui or ‘self-love’ 
The Problem of Self love in Augustine as O’Donovan perceives it, arises from the un-
reconciled and mutually incompatible assertions that Augustine made about self-love; that in 
fact self-love is loving God, yet it is hating God; that self–love is common to all persons, yet 
at the same time it is restricted to those who love God. O’Donovan sets out to sort out what 
appears to be incompatibilities or perhaps ambiguities of self-love in Augustinian corpus. In 
doing so O’Donovan wants to shed light on the wider ethical and theological issues which are 
involved in an Augustinian application of self-love. In his introduction to Augustine’s 
thinking of self-love O’Donovan raises the question of ambiguity when Augustine says;  
‘The primal destruction of man was self-love.’ ‘There is no one who does not love 
himself; but one must search for the right love and avoid the warped.’ ‘Indeed, you 
did not love yourself when you did not love the God who made you.’ (O’Donovan 
1980, p.1)  
 
On setting side by side these sentences, one encounters great difficulties determining 
what was Augustine’s baseline understanding and application of self-love.  O’Donovan 
acknowledges that Augustine was the first Latin Father to give serious attention to the 
expression "amor sui." (Ibid. p. 2) Whilst he was also the first of all the Fathers to discuss its 
connection to Christ's commandment to love one's neighbour "as oneself," Augustine himself 
has given us no explicit "theory” of self-love and seldom tells us what he means by it (doing 
so misleadingly at times). The problem of self-love in Augustine as O’Donovan sees it, arises 
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self-love is loving God, yet it is hating God; self-love is common to all men, yet it is 
restricted to those who love God; O’Donovan seeks to sort out as much as is possible and to 
shed light on the wider ethical and theological implications involved. O’Donovan concludes 
that many points are left unresolved and incoherent within the Augustinian corpus. 
Nonetheless, Augustine’s writings on self-love are not only the "product of Augustine's most 
important psychological and theological speculations," but play an important role in his 
"eudaemonist ethic": "self-love finds its only true expression in love of God"; "all moral 
obligation derives from an obligation to God which is at the same time a call to self-
fulfilment."   
3.6.2  O’Donovan’s interpretive battlefield of self love 
Discussing self-love in Christian tradition on the back of Nygren’s publication of 
Agape and Eros was to set oneself or find one’s self at the centre of claims and counter 
claims for and against self-love. While Augustine’s claims of self-love may have been 
accepted during his time and the period that followed virtually without question, these views 
are not any longer met with universal approval. Nygren was convinced that Augustine had 
dealt a lethal blow to the self-denying agape of the Gospel by synthesizing it with the 
essentially self-regarding Eros of Platonic philosophy. Others have since rallied to 
Augustine's defence, but without always doing full justice to the complexity of his thought. 
O’Donovan himself is convinced that Augustinian concepts of both love and self are 
important (Ibid. p. 5-6) in any attempts to understand his application of the term self-love. 
Further still O’Donovan is persuaded that Augustinian nuances of love (Ibid. p.11) need to be 
brought into play to demonstrate how Augustine applied the word in different settings. 
 Although some of the nuances of love are backed by scriptural texts (1st John 4: 8, 16 
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clear resolve to distinguish nuances that are scripturally backed from those that are not. It is 
in chapter one of the book that O’Donovan lays the groundwork for assessing the ambiguity 
generated by Augustine in the application of the concept of self-love. The groundwork for 
such an assessment starts by sorting out the various meanings of amor and its analogues and 
by sorting dilectio in Augustine's works. Four ‘aspects’ of love emerge as distinct but related. 
These are cosmic, the positive or subjective, the rational, and the benevolent love.  
These loves, respectively, are appetition patterned on physical motivations, the pursuit 
of subjective and objective goals, the reasoned approval and appreciation of what is judged to 
be good, and finally the altruistic willing of the good of others. These four, form the 
foundations upon which the exploration of the manner in which, on the basis of the division, 
Augustine was able to reconcile self-love with the two commandments of the love of God 
and neighbour. Although this analysis made of the four loves is striking, O’Donovan does not 
seem to apply much of this analysis in the latter parts of his discussions. He simply makes a 
telling observation from this analysis, that is, that Augustine believed firmly in a teleological 
order (Ibid. pp. 35 -36).  This belief allowed Augustine to pass smoothly ‘between the 
proposition and the purpose, between the expression of rational love and that of benevolence. 
’O’Donovan suggests that as Augustine’s thought system matured these four nuances of love 
took on the subtler nature about ordered love. Subsequently, these four nuances of love 
formed a flexible and imprecise language that enabled Augustine to appeal to more than one 
aspect of love at once. O’Donovan sees a theological benefit that is served by this looseness 
of this concept of love in Augustine, that it enabled the unity of ‘every volitional impulse in 
the service of the love of God.’ This is the conclusion O’Donovan arrives at after his 
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By this conclusion O’Donovan is convinced the question of coextension helped Augustine 
explain that right self-love is benevolence towards oneself.  
This means right self-love coincides with love of God; cosmic with benevolent love; 
and the useful with the right. The coincidence is learned under the guidance of Scripture: it is 
possible, even natural, not to know it (Campbell 1982, p. 413). Whilst Augustine remains 
ambiguous on whether it is possible not to love oneself, and this reflects a general ambiguity 
in his works: authority is continuous and discontinuous with reason the criteria for right self-
love are objective and subjective.  
3.6.3 Comparative evaluations between self-love and love of God 
O’Donovan follows his conclusion and that of Augustine that right self-love coincides 
with love of God, by describing the distinction between correct and incorrect comparative 
evaluation of both self-love and love of God. The two distinctions are determined by the 
nature of the self, whereby on one hand this distinction is between the created self and the 
distortions that have marred it; and on the other hand a distinction between the self as it is 
now and that that it is to become (Ibid. p. 61). These quantitative evaluations between self-
love and love of God are next distinguished from qualitative evaluation of the soul, 
particularly as non-material. Importantly, the soul is described as first withdrawing from the 
lower, that is the material, and returning to itself, that is to correct quantitative evaluation. 
The soul then rises in faith to unity with eternal things in contemplation of God27. The 
continuity of the movement of the soul depends on the desire for happiness. Thus, 
psychological self-love on the other hand is occupied with the concept of the self, whether 
                                               
27 The soul wandering away from this contemplation finds itself “dying by my alienation from you” (1.13. p. 
33-35) when it abandons its Origin (which is also its highest good) in order to “pursue the lowest things of your 
creation”.  
This is an interior ascent, a journey from the outer world to the secret recesses of the soul. The journey itself 
begins by considering the external world, then to the self as body, on to the self as soul, through the stages of 
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contemplative, that is converted and perfected, or unconverted and deformed. Perfected, 
benevolent self-love therefore involves both a ' horizontal' rational movement of the mind to 
its objective, and a 'vertical' movement based on faith in divine authority. 
While raising new difficulties with this simplistic interpretation O'Donovan finds that 
after the year 4oo Augustine began to stress the notion of a perverse self-love that is quite 
opposed to the love of God (1980, p.94). O’Donovan focuses on Augustinian comments on 
Psalm 44 (Ibid. p. 93, 96), and in the famous passage from the City of God on the two loves 
and the two Cities. It becomes clear from this analysis that the mature Augustine had not 
completely overcome his difficulties in reconciling love of self and love of God.   
O’Donovan concludes that there is no 'finished' concept of self-love in Augustine, 
since Augustine does not have a coherent view on whether it is possible not to love oneself, 
or on how to love our neighbour 'as' ourselves. However, self-love nonetheless plays a 
significant part in the supporting structure of Augustine's eudaemonist ethic, his view is that 
moral obligations derive from obligation to God, which is at the same time a call to self-
fulfilment. So far, O’Donovan has been useful leading into examining what Augustine’s 
thoughts were regarding self-love, the ambiguity we set out to dispel still lingers, demanding 
further examination, for now I turn attention to an Augustinian theological indebtedness to St. 
Paul. 
3.7 Augustine and Pauline Influence 
 
There is no doubt that Augustine’s theological propositions were doctrinally and 
hermeneutically shaped by his reading of Pauline materials in the New Testament. The 
Neoplatonic circle to which Augustine belonged was interested in parts of the New 
Testament texts. These parts included the prologue to St John, and numerous texts from the 
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theology in an effort to counteract the Manichean’s determinism and dualism (Clark 1994, p. 
2-3).  Augustine as a Manichean was not exempted from reading and engaging with these 
New Testament texts. In Confession VIII. 12.29 he writes that ‘a light of certainty’ enveloped 
him and ‘all shadow of doubt disappeared.’  
It will be wrong to think that this is when his conversion took place. He has 
previously in (Confession Bk VII.7) said he is a believer in Christ, ‘the faith of Your Christ, 
our Lord and Saviour, in the Catholic church stuck fast in my heart, though in many respects 
ill-formed and fluctuating outside the norm of doctrine.’ (Cary 2008, p. 63-4)  
He found the transition from Platonism to Christianity was not simple, albeit platonic 
tradition had given him an effective foundation on which to work out his Christian tradition, 
and significantly so after his conversion (Clark 1994, p. 6-8) In reading Pauline texts 
Augustine began to see himself reflected and transposed in the life of the apostle, and 
particularly the manner of the apostle’s conversion. Reading through the Pauline epistles 
Augustine came to accept the certainty of God’s existence (The Confession VII.21) He also 
came to the conclusion that his turning to Christianity was not motivated by a desire to move 
away from the uncertainties of his philosophical scepticism, but rather dissatisfaction with 
himself. As with Paul, Augustine came to faith despite himself, solely through the grace of 
God. Augustine on his part was perhaps confronted with Paul’s texts in Romans chapter 7: 
19-25, a chapter to which he took special interest (Clark 1994, p. 48-9). In these texts Paul 
explains how he (Paul) was miserable because of his inability to do what is right and correct, 
indeed each time he attempted to do good he failed. He always ended up doing that which he 
did not want to do. Augustine found that the conflict within himself intensify, on grounds that 
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perform. (Beach et al 1973ed., p. 103) This practice made his life miserable, until he 
acknowledged the complete work Christ did on the cross.  
Augustine saw Paul’s conversion as a compulsion from God, and he saw his own 
conversion equally in those violent terms. He felt his conversion experience incorporated 
elements both from above and here on earth. He saw God representing interaction from above 
where God was extending his right hand as it were in the abyss of human misery and 
corruption to snatch Augustine out (Confessions Bk. VIII.12-IX.1)  
While God’s hand was extended from above, here on earth Augustine was expected to 
offer his hand in return and cling to God. Augustine saw his conversion therefore in the light 
of Paul’s conversion, where Paul was violently confronted by a force from above to which he 
Paul from below needed to respond by extending his whole self to cling to God.  
Augustine echoes these Pauline thoughts as he exegetes Pauline texts, which give him 
the suitable external call in God’s bringing about an interior change of his will. Conversion 
for Augustine meant the will turning from the love of the temporal good to the love of the 
eternal goods. It is to Pauline texts that Augustine turned when disputing the positions taken 
by the Donatists in their protest of the Catholic Church’s use of state force.  
Augustine referred to Acts 9, to show how Christ compelled Paul first before he 
taught him (Paul) of his mission to the gentiles. Therefore, the Donatists’ protest were not 
founded since the Catholic church first needed to apply state force to compel persons into the 
church and only then will the church begin to teach. Grace was only available in the Catholic 
Church, any agent outside though he may will and freely do so, that will was only free to sin. 
Nothing outside of an agent’s will compelled its evil choices; the agent’s will willed these 
choices itself. For an agent’s will to will rightly it needs to be touched by grace, only then 
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as he repeatedly invoked Romans 5:12 in support of his support of the idea of the seminal 
transmission of original sin.  
In his other controversy with Pelagius on the will and humanity’s radical dependence 
on grace, he appears independent of Pauline nuances. Christianity since St Paul and other 
New Testament writers had began boldly to assert that the eternal Logos had been manifested 
in the personal history of Jesus Christ. This claim run counter to older ways of 
philosophising, which had continued characteristic of classical philosophy.  
The Platonists, who applied reason in order to apprehend the divine, had accepted this 
classical philosophy (The Confession, Bk.VII, 9). Augustine argued that, although reason 
may approach the threshold of the Christian faith, it finds it impossible to enter. Reason 
refuses to acknowledge the grace of God through Jesus Christ and the disclosure of the divine 
to human kinds through incarnation. Whereas reason may accept the universal it is unable to 
accept the universal in particular; that is to say reason accepts the discarnate of the [Logos] 
but deny the Incarnate of the same {Word-Logos]. Augustine thus, strove to reconcile reason 
and faith as he accepted what he regarded as the overwhelming weight of the Platonic theistic 
tradition founded upon reason. He had no doubt that reason availed much for the 
apprehension of the existence of the divine, that is to say, natural theology could afford 
knowledge of the divine, however if natural knowledge is unguided by faith it err. Natural 
theology perceived by Augustine as synonymous with reason needed faith in order to 
apprehend the divine disclosure to humankind.  
Paul and his New Testament compatriots had affirmed positively that God had drawn 
close to humankind, with God’s self-disclosure in history to the believers. Pauline theology 
and that of other New Testament writers held that, apart from reliance upon God’s own 
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perverse and futile. St. Paul whom Augustine admired considerably, had written earlier that 
this divine disclosure was to ‘confront the wisdom of the world’ with the ‘foolishness of the 
preaching.’ Paul had declared rightly that ‘the foolishness of God is wiser than men.’ As 
Augustine entered the scene in his efforts to reconcile faith and reason he attempted to make 
clear how and why the foolishness of God is wiser than men. (Cushman 1950, p. 271)  
It becomes apparent that both Pauline thoughts and Paul’s figure as an apostle played 
a key role in the development of the theology and pastoral practice that Augustine exercised. 
In Confession Augustine expressed the prominent place of Paul in his conversion, the 
centrality of the grace of Christ in his theology and the polemical nuances that marked the 
Pauline and Augustinian ministries. These points although not exhaustive are some of the 
indications of the importance of Pauline influence on Augustine shaping his understanding of 
himself as a Christian, theologian and perhaps as a Bishop. No doubt the critical impact of 
Paul upon Augustine forms a part of a much wider arena of Pauline interest.   
Augustine on his part undertook a systematic and perhaps comprehensive theological 
exposition of Paul and interpretation of Pauline works in which Augustine made attempts to 
bring the apostle’s authentic thought to light, thus superseding what others (Origen for 
example) had achieved earlier in their works on Pauline texts. In the Confession Bk 1.17.27 
is Augustine recollecting his school days’ classical commentary tradition, which he found 
wanting at the time he himself took to the task of writing commentary to Pauline texts.      
Augustine’s continued involvement in the theology of Paul stems from two points, 
that of doctrinal concern and secondly that of ethics or concerning the living of the Christian 
life and the search for holiness. These two areas for Augustine and other fathers earlier on 
suggest, an attraction to Paul as conversion model, ascetical guide and spiritual guru. Pauline 
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his theology. Paul has equally in his works in the New Testament showed the spiritual crisis 
surrounding the collapse of the world he lived in, and the need for him to challenge the pagan 
world that was in decline.   
The Manicheans to whom Augustine subscribed found Pauline theology and text 
useful and they gave the apostle a prominent role in support of their religious claims. 
Augustine must have come across other Manicheans who used Pauline texts; as he himself 
claims to have heard Ambrose preaching on Paul in Milan (Confessions Bk. 6.4.6). 
Augustine was aware of the various commentaries available in his time on Pauline works; 
however, it is argued that he appears not to have used any of these commentaries to rebut the 
controversies of his time. It is only during his disputation with Julian Eclanum that Augustine 
found himself making his own explicit theological defence for his Pauline interpretation; this 
afforded him the benefit of reaching his own Pauline conclusions.  
Augustine’s familiarity with the numerous traditions of commentaries during his time 
on the Pauline texts served as a dialogue rather than foundational sources for his thought. 
These commentaries would therefore have suggested themes and highlighted motifs and 
problems that pushed Augustine back to reading Paul’s original New Testament texts. Armed 
with what others had already said in their commentary works on Pauline texts, with is own 
re-reading of Paul; Augustine was able to clarify his own understanding and articulate a 
unique Pauline synthesis.  
The Confession Bk. 8 Augustine speaks hugely of his conversion; this conversion was 
one whereby he joined the church of Christ rather than the kind by which an agent decides to 
believe in Christ. The decision to believe in Christ appears in Augustine’s life to have taken 
place way back in The Confession Bk.7.  Cary (2008, p.65) is convinced that to read 
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narrative of a much later era’, yet The Confession defies assimilation to Protestant conversion 
narratives. 
Evidently, Augustine heeds Paul’s admonition to change his heart in respect of 
observing the law as expressed in Romans 7, which is a command to do something in 
reverence to changing life (Clark 1994, p.48). This command seems to fly against the 
message of the Gospel, which is the promise of grace in Christ. The binary understanding of 
the message of salvation appear to have suggested to Augustine the need for authority and 
reason, or grace and law respectively. Equally true is the fact that his platonic philosophical 
training was reacting to the texts of the Bible and Christian doctrine; it afforded him the same 
parallels of authority and reason as routes to the truth where authority represented Christ and 
reason represented by Plato. Chadwick observes that for Augustine, ‘Authority can give 
direction which reason subsequently understands.’(1986, p.27)  
On account that authority is Christ himself, he is prior to reason in time, but reason 
remains prior in order of reality. Although a well-educated agent like Augustine would prefer 
to follow the philosophic paths of reason, reason by itself alone remains insufficient in 
providing all the required guidance. Reason and authority are both needed, since an exclusive 
reliance on authority is easily beset by great danger. Indeed, without reason it becomes 
increasingly difficult to discriminate between competing claims to authority. Augustine 
argues that, for an agent to distinguish between authentically divine authority and the 
authority of venerated inferior spirits of paganism of divination or soothsaying for example, 
she needs reason.  
3.8 Conclusion  
 
Augustine worked out his interpretation of love in relation to the metaphysics of Neo-
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criticised because it is the critical point in the development of Christian doctrine or early 
Christianity. This synthesis has been the vision in many ways that informed most subsequent 
Christian thought.  
Nygren attacks the synthesis by isolating agape from Eros as two utterly different 
concepts of love, an attack that seems to be misplaced. I argued that the difficulty with 
Augustine’s synthesis is its failure to develop a metaphysical thought that provides for a 
complete social relationship between God and human beings. Augustine espouses 
significantly the single mindedness of devotion to God. In this devotion he finds a synthesis 
of self-giving and mutuality in the being of the Trinity where all love agape and Eros 
participate directly in the structure of the divine being and has nothing to do with 
disinterestedness.   
Nygren and other Augustinian critics must accept that, to complain about Augustine’s 
metaphysics by which he insisted there is an objective, final good for an agent, such a 
complaint cannot be appealed to, to contest the place of right self-love. This is because self-
love would admit the kind of perverse self-interest critics claim it conceals. To reject 
Augustine’s use of a teleological ordering to relate the claims of self, neighbour and love of 
God is to fail to notice Augustine’s teleology or his notion of self-love could not have been 
egocentric. For Augustine his teleology and notion of self-love were theocentric. Where this 
understanding suggested conflict between reason and authority, Augustine’s response would 
be that an agent does not need to be taught to love self rather he needs to be taught how to 
love properly. When an agent loves God completely above all other loves and for God 
himself and not for his gifts, such an agent becomes capable of loving herself correctly.  
She sees herself as God sees her, forgiven and beloved of God and able also to love 
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and ethics continues to influence and infiltrate much of our contemporary society and in 
some instances he is directly lifted from his mediaeval settings and applied to contemporary 
settings. His use of Pauline thought, and assimilation of Pauline writings offers him what 
appears a natural focus for a Platonist conception of key Christian concepts. Cary (2008, 
p.30) is convinced Augustine needed a Platonist transformation of the concept of free will in 
the direction of the Christian doctrine of grace to be able to fully understand what loving is 
like. Pauline writings provided a useful basis of grappling with the concept of love especially 
within Christian doctrine.  
He perceived that an agent’s external works or actions are motivated by love of one 
form or another. Paul in the New Testament epistles had already referred to these works as 
good works, which can come only from love (Gal. 5: 6), love that is synonymous with love of 
God and neighbour. Augustine’s persuasion that good works in turn merit the promised 
reward of eternal life derives this conclusion from Paul’s writings in New Testament text.
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     Chapter 4  




According to Kant’s first formulation of categorical imperative (Ground work of the 
Metaphysic of Morals 1996), certain actions cannot be considered as moral on account their 
maxims cannot without contradiction even be thought as a universal law of nature. That said, 
other maxims although universally conceivable, could not be willed as a universal law because 
they would entail a contradiction within the agent’s will.  
Therefore, for action to be considered morally permissible it must first pass what many of 
Kant’s commentators refers to as ‘contradiction in conception test and then the ‘contradiction in 
the will test’. Contemplating Kant’s thinking on self and self-love will obviously bring us into 
contact with some of these contradictions of conception and of will. With his voluminous 
literature we will simply look at what Kant said or perhaps thought about the areas of concern 
that are discussed below to include, Kant’s concept of self, self-respect, duty to oneself, Kant on 
self-love and Kant and contemporary philosophical discourse on selfhood.  
4.2 Kant and the concept of the Self 
 
Kant’s discussion of the self is always argued to be a response to David Hume’s (Kitcher 
1982, p. 41-72; Wolff 1960, p. 117) denial that there can exist a self across time, the kind of self 
that is a unitary entity, and in some sense unchanging and persistent. Hume by denying any real 
or necessary connection among mental states is in fact denying any relation of existential 
dependence among mental states. Hume in essence is denying human beings’ ability to know 
that the self, presumably an independent system of mental states actually exists. 
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 Notwithstanding, Mijuskovic (2010, p. 111) observes that Hume presents an empirical 
and phenomenalist paradigm of the self. Such a self is a construction of qualitatively simple 
impressions and complex ideas. These complex and simple ideas are classified under the generic 
title of perceptions, perception that are essentially mental in their nature. The constant motion of 
external material particles in space causes these perceptions. The result is that the self dissolves 
into a bundle of discrete atomistic impressions each pursuing the next with an inconceivable 
rapidity.  
Hume offers an analysis of the disintegration of the self, besides his attack was on 
metaphysicians who attempt to establish personal identity based solely on the soul’s immaterial 
simplicity, unity, and identity (Hume 1955, p.248-252). Hume admits to an awareness of a 
temporal succession of perceptions of impressions and ideas, thus surrendering as it were all that 
is required for the establishment of personal identity (Ibid. p. 251). Seen from this perspective, a 
genuine presence of a singular self can be advocated; suggesting there is some self-conscious 
awareness of a passage of time. The awareness is of a succession of perceptions whose transitory 
thoughts can be recognised as personal by an agent. That is, I am self-aware of their passage 
without which otherwise, I could not be transitionally aware of their migration. 
Nonetheless, Hume's scepticism concerning personal identity (Wolf 1960) was known 
and regarded as false but as worthy of philosophical refutation. In retrospect Kant appreciated 
the insights behind Hume’s sceptical conclusions. The discussions that follow take for granted 
that there could be made a case for a unitary self. Without having to pursue Hume28 any further, I 
                                               
28 Hume believed that the entire contents of the mind were drawn from experience alone. The stimulus could be 
external or internal. In this nexus, Hume describes what he calls impressions in contrast to ideas. Impressions are 
vivid perceptions and were strong and lively. “I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions as they make 
their first appearance in the soul. Ideas were images in thinking and reason.” (Flew 1962 p. 176). According to 
Hume there is no mind or self. That is to say the perceptions that an individual has are only active when one is 
conscious. “When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, 
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will consider what must be true of the self that Kant discussed, how is it to be conceived, when 
Kant attempted to respond to Hume’s scepticism?   
Kant demonstrated that experience necessarily involves knowledge of objects. He 
validated this necessity independently of, although in parallel with, the necessity of the 
representation of a unitary experiencing subject (Powell 1990, p. 11-12).  But Kant’s discussion 
of the self is protracted and sometimes an opaque argumentation leaving one overwhelmed as to 
which self should be considered uppermost. Kitcher writes, ‘The problem with Kant's views about 
the self is that he has too many of them because the self has too many roles to play in his system.’ (1982, 
p.41), and yet Kitcher appears convinced that a single self can be deciphered out of these many.  
Pursuing Kant’s self via his discussion of self-identity appears to lead to a plausible 
Kantian theory of the self as a continuing cognitive being that can complement theories that have 
tried to account for human beings continuity as moral beings. By this perception Kant is able to 
respond to the Humean argument. Kitcher (1982, p. 55) observes that whilst Kant’s theory of 
personal identity is supposed to be a response to Hume, at the same time Kant herself did not 
adequately define the relation of co-personality. Kant only but, ‘sketched a general kind of 
relation of which co-personality might be a species’. Kitcher is convinced that Hume also was 
never specific in his criticism of personal identity, never focused on a single criterion. One can 
then argue that it is because of the generalities that Hume engaged, in his criticism of personal 
                                               
and may truly be said not to exist.” (Flew 1962, p.259). Hume is reducing personality and cognition to a machine-
like existence that may be turned on and off. Death brings with it the annihilation of the perceptions one has. Hume 
argues passions as the determinants of behaviour. Hume also appears as a behaviourist believing that humans learn 
in the same manner as lower animals; that is through reward and punishment (Hergenhahn 2005). Hume’s starting 
point seems too be that experience in the form of impressions cannot rise to the constancy of a self in that would be 
constant to give rise to all future experiences. The concept of the self, Hume argued does not amount to a single 
impression, rather several ideas and impressions in itself. We cannot account for a constant impression that is 
enduring in an agent’s whole life. Different sensations as pleasure and pain, or heat and cold are in a constant 
continuum that is variable and never constant. “It cannot therefore be from any of these impressions, or from any 
other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently, there is no such idea (Hume 1789). 
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identity that perhaps drew out the too many versions of selves in Kant’s response account of the 
self. Kant’s views of the self are dependent on his idealism or transcendental idealism.  The self 
in Kant is bifurcated to include even the Humean views he is claimed to be refuting. Most 
discussions of the Kantian self (Brooks 2013, Marshall 2010; Kitcher 1982) agree on the point 
that there is no single description by Kant of the self. Brooks for example sees the consciousness 
and knowledge of self expressed in several ways. These include; two kinds of consciousness of 
self whose source is the inner sense; then there is the representational base of the consciousness 
of self that is dependent on the apperception that give rise to consciousness of oneself and one’s 
states. Brooks then discusses consciousness only of how one appears to oneself. He collates 
Kant’s views to suggest that neither consciousness of self by virtue of apperceptive acts nor 
empirical consciousness of self as the object of a particular representation yields knowledge of 
oneself as one is.  
The fourthly, the referential machinery consciousness of the self, suggesting that to know 
that anything is true of an agent, the agent must first know that it is her of whom it is true. The 
fifthly, no manifold in consciousness of self, proposes it is not just identifying properties but any 
properties of oneself whatsoever that one need to know in order to refer to oneself as oneself. 
Sixthly, consciousness of self is not knowledge of self. 
 Kant put the idea of transcendental designation to work to explain how one can appear to 
oneself to be substantial, simple and persisting, but without these appearances reflecting how one 
actually is. In seventh and final discussion of self as garnered from Kant’s works, Brooks 
considers consciousness of self as single common subject of experience. In this last of Kant’s 
thesis about consciousness of self is the idea, that to think of oneself as plurality of things is to 
think of oneself being conscious of this same plurality, a factor that requires an undivided self.   
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Siegel argues that multiplicity of the self draws out first the self as a substance that made 
stable experience possible. In this case the self could provide both unity and continuity for the 
shifting data of the senses. The unity afforded this self is a product of its awareness of itself as 
the site and agent of all experience and by a consciousness that explicitly or implicitly 
accompanies each perception (2005. p. 305)29.  Seigel observes that the first Kantian self is 
transcendental; easy to distinguish from his second version of self the empirical self discoverable 
in ordinary life. The empirical self is embodied and therefore subject to the laws and limits of 
material existence, and eventually a self codified in biology and physics. The third self that 
Seigel draws out is the practical or moral self encountered in certain kinds of behaviour.   
Colin Marshall (2010) on his part arrives at four categorisations of possibilities that the 
metaphysics of the self may represent. For Marshall (p.9) Kant applies the same basic 
ontological categories as his predecessors when discussing the nature of the self. On this 
ontology, the world consists of substances and their accidents, and particularly the accidents of 
power or force by which substances influence each other’s accidents. Relations [of substances 
and their accidents] then become species of representations that are obvious candidates of an a 
priori metaphysics of the self. Marshall identifies the key desiderata for a plausible interpretation 
                                               
29 This is a conclusion that is challenged Hume, who challenges the existence of the self and hence any selfhood. In 
Book 1 of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume disagreed with the idea of the self as an agent capable of exercising 
radically free will. He went as far as to challenge the very existence of the self. Hume acknowledged that persons 
have experiences, memories, imagination, and an idea of personal identity. But Hume denied that human 
manifestations of any of these capabilities or human holding of this idea required the postulation of an entity lying 
behind them. Hume argued that through human experiences, memories and imaginations, persons create a sense of 
identity that does not exist in any of these impressions themselves. Therefore, human beings have experience, but no 
coherent idea of the experiencer of these experiences. Hume argued that, the self or person as experiencer is an 
illusion that is to be resisted if persons are to fashion a straightforward account of the world and the human place 
within it. Hume writes,  
“It must be some one impression that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one 
impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference. If any 
impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same through the 
whole course of our lives, since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression 
constant and invariable………It cannot, therefore, be from any impression…. that the idea of self is 
derive, and consequently there is no such idea.” (David Hume, A treatise of human nature, 1963, p. 173) 
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of Kant’s views on the self. At the outset is the interpretation of the self as a substance (mental 
substance), on the grounds that earlier on in his work Kant talks of the self’s being a substance, 
and that further on much of Kant’s talk about the self in the Critique suggests continuity with 
earlier rationalists’ views (Ibid. 10).  
The second interpretation that Marshall deciphers from Kant’s works is that of the self as 
a bundle of representations. This interpretation puts Kant in Hume’s company who famously 
claimed as I discussed above, that the mind is nothing but a ‘bundle or collection of different 
perceptions.’ Marshall thinks Kant is simply offering a more sophisticated view of Hume’s 
famous claim that there can be no criterion of personal identity. Like Hume, Kant is rejecting the 
common-sense view that a mind is something distinct from the representations that it has30.  
 Marshall third understanding of Kant’s self is that of self as a force or understanding of 
self as ‘existing in the act’ or seeing the self as an act or activity. Considering the self as an 
activity could have appealed to some section of society, but he is sceptical that Kant would have 
been drawn to this understanding of the self. This understanding would have sounded strange to 
Kant, that the act is the condition for the self’s existence, especially when in a section above 
Kant intonated the self in some sense to be a substance. It is difficult to see how a substance can 
then turn into an act or activity. The fourth interpretation of the self is the self as form or 
                                               
30 Marshall envisions two problems of why a Humean reading of Kant is implausible, even with setting aside the 
metaphysical commitments of Kant’s moral philosophy. The first problem is that Kant certainly has the vocabulary 
to express a Humean bundle view but chooses on the contrary to typically express relation of the self to 
representations in terms that would be hard for a Humean reading to accommodate. Marshall textual evidence is 
found at Paralogisms (cf. A77/B103) Kant’s argument, of the self as the thing that combines representations in 
synthesis. Secondly, a Humean reading of Kant is implausible on account that Kant is emphatic that agents do not 
know themselves as they are in themselves. Agents are simply only aware of the appearances of themselves. 
Appearances are themselves representations, so if agents are bundles of representations, then there needs to be 
another level of representations that is the appearance of that bundle. This would certainly be held as a Humean 
reading of Kant, but Kant holds the view that agents can directly attach a ‘self’ or ‘I think’ to any representation 
(textual evidence for Marshall, Paralogisms cf. B131), and there is no indication on Kant’s part that this amounts to 
the appearances of a representation. 
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structure. Marshall does not delve much into this form of a self within Kant’s work; he rather 
calls upon mostly secondary works that consider the self being interpreted in this way. Kitcher 
(1982, p. 72) on her part has argued that from Kant’s discussions of Transcendental Deductions 
as a response to Hume’s challenge to the notion of personal identity, Kant described the self as ‘a 
continually interconnected system of mental states’.  
 Kitcher concludes her discussion that, the belief of the impossibility of acknowledging 
real or existential connection among mental states has its foundation in Hume’s claim that there 
can be no criterion for personal identity. Kant’s challenge to Hume’s claim is founded on this 
basis for regarding different mental states as states of a continuing being. Kant is therefore led to 
reflect on the necessary assumptions involved in regarding human beings as knowing agents. 
These are agents who must regard their state as standing in relations of continual causal 
interconnection. 
Kant ascribes structures to human agents and their representations, but without any 
suggestion that a form could perform the kind of actions Kant ascribes to human minds. 
Discussing the Kantian self from the point of view of the metaphysics of the self, the self from 
our foregoing discussions is many things. The self is the mind, it is the thinking subject, and it is 
the soul, as Kant seems to have applied it. What has become very clear is that Kant never gives a 
precise statement of the relations between most of these terms as he applies them in his works. 
Marshall has argued in Kant’s Metaphysics of the Self (2010) that it is only under this topic that 
we can find Kant using all these terms effectively in the same way. Kant recognises a broad 
application of the term self, ‘I’ that refers to the ‘whole man’ therefore involving body and soul 
(Anthropology Lectures 27:265); elsewhere of course Kant describes the thinking self that exists 
outside of appearances as an agent’s ‘proper self’ (Groundwork 4:457). The self I am trying to 
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establish in this discussion is what will appear perhaps as the narrower understanding of the 
Kantian self applicable to human beings who possess the sort of mind that is more than mere 
representations that according to Kant even animals possess. It is the self that encompasses all 
the seven aspects Brook’s (2013) itemised and Seigel and Marshall’s four listed interpretations 
of the self. Apart, the self is all these different formats of understandings; it is still possible to 
depict a perceived unitary self in Kant as – ‘the whole man’. This is the self that I am working 
with in the whole of this discussion on Kant’s thinking on self and self-love, and my next step is 
to attempt to find out how does this self – ‘the whole man’ fair in self-respect. 
4.3 Kant’s Concept of Self-respect 
 
4.3.1 Self-respect as a conceptual “off-spring” of respect 
Kant is acknowledged as the catalyst for much of the contemporary interest in respect for 
persons. But this claim is not without some contest that neither contemporary moral philosophers 
nor Kant himself should accept this traditional picture (Cureton 2013, p. 167). Others before 
Kant had an interest in the question of respect [Aristotle on Self–respect]. Respect is a feeling 
concerned with worth, esteem, dignity, or how others regard an agent. Kant offers different 
characterizations of respect, (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785/1996, 4:429). 
First, it is a ‘feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept’, secondly, characterisation of 
respect, that is, ‘the immediate determination of the will by means of the law and consciousness 
of this [determination]’. And third, Kant calls it ‘the representation of a worth that infringes upon 
my self-love’.  
Kant appears to generate with these characterisations a certain ambiguity that leaves 
readers to make up their own minds which particular characterisation does one consider to be 
primary. Reath (2006, p. 10-11) is of the opinion that the second characterisation is primary, 
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therefore for him conveying the primary notion of respect. But, did Kant intend these seemingly 
different characterisations to support each other in determining what exactly respect is? If we 
consider as Reath does that respect is the attitude appropriate to have towards a law [this is 
expressing the second characterisation], it follows that that attitude needs to bear on rational 
feelings [involving the first characterisation] and feelings are always personal and infringing on 
one’s self-love [this draws on the third characterisation]. Kantian agents having understood their 
uniqueness as rational agents and the dignity that such a status necessarily involves, they extend 
their respect for themselves to respect for other rational beings. They extend this respect to those 
belonging to the same kingdom of ends, where each being must be treated as an end in itself and 
never as a means to an end.  
This extension is again purely cognitive; there are no emotions (such as compassion or 
kindness) involved, this is unlike Aristotle for whom respect and (other) moral virtues shape 
each other (Russell 2005, p.105; Hill 1993, p. 14-15). With this concept of respect Kant is able to 
articulate a special kind of metaphysical, agent-neutral and intrinsic value or status that all 
persons are thought to share in virtue of their rational nature (Cureton 2013, p.166). Accordingly, 
Kant in this claim offers value distinct to all and gives everyone sufficient reason to respect, and 
not just promote or maximise the dignity of all. Kant’s argument for the duties of respect toward 
others, relies on a substantive conception of what it takes to respect one’s self (discussed below).  
Kant aims to argue from the self-regarding rational dispositions that persons have in 
virtue of their rational nature to other-regarding moral requirements about how to treat other 
persons who possess the same rational self-concern. Kant’s account of how and why we must 
respect others seems to lead to his account of the perfect duties to oneself. These perfect duties 
are characterised as the ‘highest duties of all’ (Ibid. p.175).  The perfect duties to oneself are 
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most naturally a set of rational requirements about how to value oneself in a special way. That is 
to say, as having a dignity that is above any price, without equivalent and inalienable. 
Subsequently, when an agent mutilates herself, gives over to lust, or prostrates before others, for 
example; Kant thinks such a person values herself in a lesser and inferior way, as she values 
things with a price or equivalent.                                                                                                  
4.3.2  Kant and Self -Respect       
 A person with a sense of self-respect identifies with a project, code, or status that 
provides a standard of worthy conduct and a line is always drawn past which one does not go. 
The person is committed to this standard, confident that by and large they are the right 
commitments, and tries to live accordingly31. Many public discussions by contemporary 
philosophers about self-respect create impressions that all contribute to a unitary discursive 
tradition about a single concept. Roland and Foxx observe self-respect is a complex and elusive 
concept that requires to be placed in its ‘conceptual family’ in any attempt to understand it 
(2003, p.248).  They perceive self-respect is professed a conceptual “off-spring” of respect that 
allows its logical placement into the same conceptual family as dignity, regard, esteem, and 
honour because all are concerned with worth. While Roland and Foxx acknowledge modern 
discussions of self-respect are grounded in different historical traditions, they make a reasonable 
attempt at grouping discussions about respect into their originators and their historical precedents 
(2003, p. 248-259). Kristjan Kristjansson (2007, p. 230) is unhappy with the divisions Roland 
                                               
31 Kant commonly is perceived the originator of these views expressed; whose summary could perhaps be stated 
that persons have a rational nature, so they should be respected like other objects of ‘awesome’ value. They should 
be cherished accordingly, treasured, protected, exhibited, honoured and so on. Kant is considered to have 
championed this deep inspiration, if not an outright adherent, of a view that emphasized this compelling and widely 
influential claims about the ‘objective’, ‘unconditional’, ‘incomparable’, and ‘absolute worth’ of persons, whose 
‘dignity’ is ‘above all price’, ‘without equivalent’, and places severe constraints on how we may be treated; views 
expressed both in Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals 4:434–6; The Metaphysic of Morals 6:435–6. 
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and Foxx compiled. He on the contrary suggests that any historical discussions of self-respect 
can only adequately be explored on two fronts, a Kantian and Aristotelian concept of self-
respect. Generally, most if not all accounts of self-respect are born out of the idea or the concept 
of respect. Of itself the concept of respect for others usually assume that persons have a rational 
nature so they should be respected like other objects of ‘awesome’ value. Kant’s views about the 
‘value’ of humanity that have inspired contemporary discussions of respect have been interpreted 
in this way.  
That is to say persons owe each other the recognition of and respect for their status as 
agents capable of acting on the basis of reasons. This makes an agent an autonomous author of 
the moral law to which she is subject. An alternative interpretation has Kant proceeding from 
one’s own rational self-regard, through one’s willingness to reciprocate with others to duties of 
respect for others. Kant’s discussion of the concept of respect has huge implications for self-
respect as its offspring. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 6.449, Kant introduced a 
topical perspective to the concept of self-respect, namely, that all persons deserve respect, 
regardless of their character.  
His formulation,  
“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an 
end,” is considered to be the “preeminent statement of the principle of respect for 
persons” (Dillon, 1995, p. 14).  
The idea, that everyone must be respected and that all persons should behave in ways that 
maintain that respect, is a major contribution to the understanding of self-respect. Kant proposed 
that human beings have the ability to rationalize, think, and choose; therefore, individuals have a 
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moral duty to respect others and themselves. This proposed activity requires individuals to act in 
certain ways and not others.  
The foundation of Kant’s concept of self-respect was one’s dignity as a person, which 
was also the foundation of all morality. Self-respect carries the responsibility to only act in ways 
that reflect one’s status as a moral being. For Kant personhood and its inherent dignity form the 
core of his moral philosophy (Cureton 2013, p.168). Persons are ends in themselves, in virtue of 
their ability to rationalize, think and choose, and must respect themselves and others as such. The 
duty of self-respect is the supreme moral duty for it is a precondition of respecting others. In 
effect, there would be no moral duties if there were no duties to respect one’s self. Self-respect is 
thus understood holistically, as a global trait of one’s character as a whole (Russell 2005, p. 104). 
Self-respect evidently forms one of the self-regarding duties in the moral sense by the law 
within a person that forces from her respect for her own being. It is a subjective feeling of a 
special kind (Kant, 1996, 162) and not a judgment toward an object it intends about. It is the 
humanity in a person that is the object of the respect a person demands of herself and other 
human beings.  
She cannot forfeit this fact. It demands of her to value herself both as a sensible and 
intelligible being [the former as a mere animal and the later from a moral predisposition]. To 
have self-respect, is to have a sense of oneself as a person, morally responsible agent, or 
someone capable of participating in the deliberations of moral law.     
 It is in essence a relation to self (Honneth 1995, p. xiv-xvi).  Kant argues that there is no 
obligation for one to have self-respect because self respect among other moral endowments lie at 
the basis of morality as a ‘subjective condition of receptiveness to the concept of duty (The 
Metaphysics of Morals 1996, 159).’  It is a natural predisposition of the mind affected by the 
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concept of duty, and it is by virtue of a person possessing it that she is held under obligation. 
Kant writes in The Metaphysics of Morals, 
‘Since he must regard herself not only as a person generally but also as a human being, 
that is, as a person who has duties his own reason lays upon him, his significance as a 
human animal may not infringe upon his consciousness of his dignity as a rational human 
being…’ (1996, 187) 
 
A person cannot therefore of her own accord or by action of others disavow her moral 
self-esteem or desist from pursuing her own end. This is because this end is itself a duty not of 
one seeking favour for self and therefore disavowing one’s dignity, but rather it’s ones own 
consciousness of ‘sublime moral predisposition’ and this in essence is self-respect, which is a duty 
to self.  
Kant cautions against arrogance, which he considers ‘a conviction of the greatness of one’s 
moral worth, but only from failure to compare it with the law’ this for Kant is wrong. (Ibid.187). 
There is also the activity of ‘waiving any claim of moral worth in one’s self, in the belief that…’ a 
person will then be perceived worth, this for Kant is morally-wrong and it is in fact false 
humility. Kant conceives that any effort directed at a diminished comparison of one’s self with 
other human beings does not count for duty. Such efforts deny self of self-respect, as it can 
sometimes be an attempt to equal or surpass others indirectly and therefore propagating a false 
sense of humility. From such an activity often, ensues a sense of believing that one will 
ultimately receive a greater inner worth but this is contrary to one’s duty to others and cannot be 
counted as humility.  
True humility for Kant, ‘follows unavoidably from a sincere and exact comparison of ourselves 
with the moral law (its holiness and strictness) (1960, 126).’ There is an internal lawgiver within each 
individual compelling self to revere the moral human being within one’s own person. From 
within a person also arise self-esteem. Self-esteem as a result of moral law generates feelings of 
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inner worth in terms of a person standing above any price because such a person possesses an 
inalienable dignity that instils in her respect for herself. True humility does not encourage self-
abnegation nor claims of disinterestedness because this is likely to instil in others a negative verdict 
on a person to the point of despising such a person, and that would be contrary to one’s duty to 
self- that of self respect. 
A low opinion of self in comparison to others does not imply humility and it can never be 
a virtue. Kant reckons this to be ‘a monk’s virtue and not at all natural’ (1960, 127), and as already 
observed above this form of humility is in a sense a kind of pride. Kant admits that every person 
is permitted to consider herself equal in estimation to someone else and therefore allowed to pass 
judgement upon one’s self.  But, one would preferably be advised to draw a comparison between 
self and the purity of the moral law. This is because one fails when she compares herself with 
those she considers righteous who like herself attempt to model themselves on the moral law. It 
is at this point that Kant makes this huge claim that ‘The Gospel does not teach humility, but it 
makes us humble.’ Elsewhere Kant has observed that the ‘Gospel first presented morality in its purity, 
and there is nothing in history to compare with it.’ (1960, 128)  
The Gospel therefore lays before a person the indisputable fact that she is weak, but this 
recognition in no uncertain terms has got to be by sacrifice of her good disposition. This is 
because to receive God’s help one must be found worthy of it. When a person depreciates the 
value of her human virtues she does harm to self in accordance to duty of self-respect. Kant 
argues that self-respect is a pragmatic activity in accordance to rules of prudence and 
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reasonableness and these rules do not permit or demand a person to humiliate or even value 
herself less than others.  
In fact moral rules ascertain the claim that human self-esteem may arise from self-love, 
self-love, which is favour and partiality towards one’s self requiring self-respect. At the same 
time moral self-esteem grounded in the worth of humanity cannot be derived from comparisons 
with others but rather from moral law. In this way one is able to curb self-conceit in face of 
moral law, and therefore pass judgement upon one’s self in accordance to moral law, she is in 
essence exercising duty to self; and it is the consideration of duties to oneself that we turn. 
4.4 Kant on Duties to one’s self 
 
The model of duty outlined by Kant primarily that of duties to others makes it clear that a 
duty to one’s self is one in which a single agent occupies both the subject and source positions. 
According to the First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative, an agent discovers her duties 
to herself in exactly the same manner she discovers what her duties to others. This is through 
universalization of her maxim (Paton, 1990, p. 223 – 224)32. Universalization however, fails for 
example, to establish that the duty of preservation of an agent’s life is a duty the agent has to 
herself [this is in the case of suicide]. The agent is both the subject of duty and the source of the 
claim on that subject's choices and so the same agent may (Schofield 2013, p. 1), but need not be 
the ‘beneficiary’ of such duties. For Kant it is not easy to ascertain what these duties to self are, 
and perhaps difficult to know how an agent should react to those who, in his judgment fail to 
fulfil these duties to self. Although, the problem can be addressed as long as there are reasonable 
                                               
32 The universalization maxim works by creating awareness in the agent that, he cannot consistently will that there 
be a law for example, permitting suicide each time the future seems to hold more pain in store for him than pleasure, 
to the extent he knows he has a duty to refrain from taking a suicidal act. From the same understanding when an 
agent finds out that he cannot will that everyone should make false promise that to duty him to resist the temptation 
to promise falsely becomes clear. 
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principles establishing certain facts about an agent’s self. Kant concedes that an agent needs to 
demonstrate her capacities for rational choice as the source of reasons for her to regard or treat 
herself in certain ways that establishes duties to self. It is this understanding of duties to self that 
tells us in some measure Kant’s general understanding of certain features of duty and obligation.  
Duties towards one’s self suppose non-prudentially based reasons for adopting given 
attitudes towards one’s self. This includes an agent valuing certain of her powers or capacities, 
her interests or moral standing and so forth. Reath (2006, p. 231) observes that, ‘. …absolute value 
of humanity provides a perfectly general basis for respecting …’ these capacities in others. This places 
human beings in a special position of either supporting, or neglecting or even undermining these 
relevant capacities and interests.  
Not to respect self and others, one acts in ways that demonstrate failure to properly value 
these capacities and interests. This creates a situation that gives an agent an occasion not to apply 
to herself general reasons whose foundation is the absolute value of humanity that considers the 
self-regarding and the other regarding duties. Although the self and other-regarding duties seem 
to have a common basis there however does not seem to exist a precise correspondence between 
them. This is because the failure of self-respect to which an agent may be liable to does not seem 
often to parallel the characteristic failures to respect others that prompt duties to them. This 
supports the claim that to have a supposed share in the dignity due every human being because of 
their humanity does not always guarantee one will enjoy the benefit of other-regarding duties 
from an agent. In section 1-3 of the Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics (MdS 6: 417-20) Kant 
raises a foundational concern about the concept of duties to one’s self. The impression of a duty 
to one’s self at first seems contradictory. However, it is acceptable that there are duties to one’s 
self, since if there were not, there would be no duties whatsoever. Kant attempts to resolve this 
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by securing the possibility of duties to one’s self in two different appreciations of understanding 
the agent at the centre of these duties.  
A more detailed account of this apparent absurdity is discussed below (Is duty to self a 
contradiction?). Kantian duties to oneself may therefore not be as problematic in the way that 
many have figured duties to one’s self to be.  His treatment of self-regard [respect] in our 
discussion above demonstrated not only how one’s self-regard can be construed as a duty to 
one’s self, but also what Kant himself had to say about what constitutes self-regard as a duty. 
Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, especially the Doctrine of Virtue principally aims at presenting 
arrangement of persons’ duties as human beings. The duties are divided between juridical 
duties33 and ethical duties that determine the division of the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine 
of Virtue respectively.  
In considering the duties to one’s self the focus here is on the ethical duties rather than 
juridical duties. Ethical duties must not be externally enforced, since that violates the right of the 
person coerced. Instead, the subject herself through her own reason and the feelings and motives 
arising a priori from her rational capacities that include, the feelings of respect, conscience, 
moral feeling and love of other human beings, must constrain herself to follow them (MS 6:399-
404). Another notable division of duties under the ethical duties is that between the duties to self 
and others. Within the cluster of duties to self there is a further division between duties that are 
strictly owed, requiring specific actions or omissions and whose violation incurs moral blame, 
and duties that are wide or meritorious, the specific actions not strictly owed, but deserving of 
                                               
33 Juridical duties are duties that may be coercively enforced from outside the agent, as by the civil or criminal laws, 
or other social pressures. 
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moral credit or merit34.  Regarding duties to ones’ self, there is also a further division that is 
between ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ duties that a person may exercise to themselves. Concerning 
duties that a person owes to others these tend to narrow down to ‘duties of respect’ with the wide 
or meritorious ones as ‘duties of love.’  
Although Kant has these numerous divisions of duties, he does not appear to cover all the 
ethical duties raised. Kant confines the ‘metaphysics’ of morals only to those duties that are 
generated by applying the principle of morality to human nature in general. Kant holds that there 
are universal duties persons have both to themselves and to others simply as human beings. Kant 
regards these duties in some sense as the foundations of all our duties within which persons also 
acquire duties in consequence of social customs, institutions and relationships. Kant is convinced 
that moral philosophers err when they regard the idea of duties to self as an appendix to moral 
philosophy on grounds that a person should give thought to herself only after completing her 
duty toward others.  
In the English-speaking tradition of moral philosophy, the concept of a duty to oneself is 
commonly attributed to alleged duties to promote one’s own welfare. This is a view that finds 
significant support from religious foundations upholding ‘the golden rule.’ It is in the application 
of this golden rule that voices are lifted against self [as an obstacle to Christian altruism, and 
Christian self-love]. Kant in the Metaphysics of Morals (1996) has no doubt that there must be a 
reason or a basis from, which to advocate a self-regarding duty, ‘the laws of pure reason of 
categorical imperative’.35 He observes that, 
                                               
34 Kant treats these latter as ‘duties’ because the actions in question are conceived as fit objects of self-constraint that 
is to say things persons can make themselves do through the exercise of reason and the moral feelings arising from 
the application of practical reason to their faculty of desire. 
35 The biblical golden rule, which stats that we ought to act toward men as we would wish to be acted upon, was the 
prior to Kant the ‘the universal law’- of the pre-modern world. In the Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
gives a modern retelling of the ‘golden rule’ in the form of his categorical imperative. Therefore, every rational 
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  ‘It was taken for granted that a man’s duty towards himself consisted in promoting his 
own happiness.’ (Ibid. pp.117) 
 
For Kant to achieve happiness, everything will depend on how an agent determined her 
own happiness36. Therefore, an agent’s self-regarding duties would consist in the universal rule 
that demands her to satisfy all of her own desires in order to increase her happiness. But to take 
this cause of action, it is countered, is actually likely to have a great negative influence against 
executing one’s obligations toward others. There is no doubt in Kant’s mind, that duties towards 
one’s self are of immense importance and should take precedence, this is because not much can 
be expected from an agent who dishonours herself. Kant writes, 
‘He who transgresses against himself loses his manliness and becomes incapable of doing 
his duty towards his fellows.’ (1996, p. 118)  
 
Kant concedes that even a person, who performs her duties towards others badly, may 
nevertheless possess a certain inner worth on account of acting well to self. It follows that the 
prior condition of a person’s duty to others is duty to self. The former duty can only be fulfilled 
in so far as the latter duty to self is first fulfilled. An agent submitting to any kind of indignities 
for the sake of gain or profit or making one’s self the plaything of others is to cast away one’s 
worth (Cureton, 2013, p. 169). To transgress one’s duty to self is to do more harm than to 
transgress against another. Kant claims that (1996, p. 118) although a liar may not harm anyone 
with her lies she however becomes an object of contempt. She throws away her personality. Her 
                                               
being must so act as if he were by his maxims in every case a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends. 
Kant was keen it seems, to remove the biblical nuances of the golden rule which made the rule too situational, based 
on the assumption that someone else would by necessity wish what you wish, but this assumption relied on there 
being a law giver of the universal law-the divine being. Kant’s ethical concern is to establish a rational, universal 
ethic, which at the same time protects the individual’s autonomy. 
36 This proposition adheres to Kant’s wishes of providing mankind with the realization that it is possible to live in a 
world where one can know what is right and good, by using the faculty of reason, rather than through external or 
situational obligation, and the essence of things is not altered by their external relations. 
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behaviour is found to be vile as she has transgressed her duty toward herself37. Kant makes a 
further interesting claim that to receive favours and benefits is a breach of duty to self. In doing 
so an agent can never be on equal terms with the person who conferred the favours. Whoever 
confers the benefits evidently makes a huge demand from the recipient. This echoes in 
contemporary term the idea of being, debt free. It is the duty of the agent to herself to ensure she 
owes nothing in order to uphold her dignity [this is one way to uphold duty to self-]. Kant echoes 
Aristotle who writes, 
‘…therefore as, in the case of loans, debtors wish their creditors did not exist, while 
creditors actually take care of the safety of their debtors, so it is thought that benefactors 
wish the objects of their action to exist since they will then get their gratitude, while the 
beneficiaries take no interest in making this return.’ (Nicomachean Ethics, 9.7.1167b 20-
24)  
 
To uphold duties to self, a person must be prepared to live in a way that does not degrade 
self. This is the only way to make a person worthy her personhood, and anything that make a 
person unworthy makes such a person unfit for anything and she ceases to be human. This means 
a person cannot abandon herself at the pleasure or even at the cost of saving another. To do so is 
to allow a person to be treated as a thing.  To treat self as a thing is to fail to uphold one’s 
personhood and that fails to adhere to the fact that the first duty one has to observe is the duty to 
one’s self.  
“Only if our worth as human beings is intact can we perform our other duties. A man 
who has destroyed and cast away his personality, has no intrinsic worth, and can no 
longer perform any manner of duty.’ (Kant, 1970, p.121)   
 
Kant re-enforces the fact that duties to one’s self are not depended on the relation of the action to 
its outcome [happiness]. If this was the case it will imply dependences on human inclinations, 
which are often themselves governed by rules of prudence in The Metaphysics of Morals, (1996, 
                                               
37 This point is also treated above under footnote number 2. 
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p. 11-12).  But such rules will be found wanting in moral terms, as they only indicate the 
necessity of means of an action to satisfying the respective inclinations (Korsgard 1998, pp. 52-
53). This then brings us to the question of whether the concept of duty to one’s self, which 
allows freedom to act, is in essence a contradiction. Undoubtedly also love38, which takes delight 
in others (considered as duty of love and not duty to love, Fahmy 2010, p. 327), will constitute 
duty to them since it is the judgment of delight in their perfection. It follows that love that takes 
delight in the other must equally take delight in self resulting in one being well content with 
one’s self.  
To be well content with self (which should suggest loving self) in judging one’s own 
perfection, is an inclination that constitute duty [duty which implies moral freedom] and even 
more so duty to self (Korsgard 1998, pp. 49-52). Kant considers duties to one’s self to fall under 
the essential morality that is composed of duties towards everything in the world. Nevertheless, 
the first and foremost duty owed is that to one’s own self. Kant makes the claim that,  
‘My duty to ward myself cannot be treated juridically; the law touches only our relations 
with other men: I have no legal obligations towards myself; and whatever I do to myself I 
do to a consenting party: I cannot commit an act of injustice to myself.’ (Kant, 1979, 
pp.117) 
 
Kant’s statement is made from supposition that discusses the use of liberty in respect of 
one’s self. In the discussion of duties to one’s self he raises at least two issues. First, he warns of 
how in moral philosophy the question of duty to one’s self has continued to receive defective 
treatment on account of the absence of a proper concept of self-regarding duty. Secondly, Kant 
                                               
38 There are those who argue that one of Kant’s faults in his philosophy lies in the fact that there seems to be no 
important role for love to play in human life. Wennmann (2000), argue that Kant’s duty-centred ethic often contrast 
duty and self-love as a kind of inclination, and since moral law demand that an agent acts for the sake of duty and 
not inclination Kant cannot find love of humanly satisfying this condition, seeing an activity preceded by love is 
taken on as an inclination. 
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acknowledges from the outset that the concept of duties to one’s self contain a contradiction 
(Reath 2006, p. 232). This is because the concept of duty to self contains an element of being 
passively constrained. Any proposition that asserts a duty to one’s self involve being bound to 
one’s self as an active obligation, albeit this draws out an absurdity.  
4.4.1  Is duty to self a contradiction? 
It seems to be the case that purely social conceptions of morality in retrospect leave no 
room for duties to one’s self. To advocate for such conceptions of morality is to argue against the 
existence of duties to one’s self. On the other hand, proponents of duties to one’s self have 
argued against purely social conceptions of morality. However, if an agent assumes a conception 
of morality as social she will find herself attributing to Kant and even endorsing the idea that 
duties are generated by a kind of volitional activity between agents.  
This may be characterized ‘as the reciprocal interaction and mutual influence of rational wills 
of agents who co-exist as members of a community of ends’. (Reath 2006, p. 246) From this assertion 
there is no reason to believe a social conception of morality excludes the possibility of duties to 
one’s self. How then can duties to one’s self be consistent with and fit into an essentially social 
conception of morality? 
A conception of morality as ‘social’ hugely affects the concept of duties to self because 
of an agent’s belief that moral principles somehow arise out of relations between agents. This 
presupposes some kind of interaction between agents. An agent gets different conceptions of 
morality as social in nature depending on whether the interaction that the particular agent has in 
mind occurs at what Kant terms the ‘legislative level’ or at the ‘level of agency’.  
Proponents of the conception of morality as social take moral principles or the need for 
moral principles to be generated by a kind of interaction between agents at the level of agency. 
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This is demonstrated by demands that agents make on each other as persons advancing their own 
interests in a social setting.  The seemingly conflicting interests of hugely self-concerned agents 
create the need for morality. This view presupposes the need for morality to be that of regulating 
interaction between agents in some impartial manner that establishes limits on personal conduct. 
It means persons have to conceive of themselves and of other subjects as participants in a social 
world with pluralistic ends which they all share and mutually support. Morality, in Kant’s sense, 
is therefore not parasitic on the social world, but rather is its organising principle (Rosseler 2013, 
p. 15). The concept of morality as social necessitates a setting out of legitimate demands that an 
agent may advance against another person.  
Therefore, the conclusion one draws from a conception of morality presumed as social is 
that, such a concept appear to leave no room for duties to one’s self. Kant is attributed with the 
view that the legislative capacities that an agent possesses as an individual are to be exercised by 
a guided regulative aim of arriving at general principles that all members of a community of ends 
can endorse. This in itself is a social conception of morality that takes moral principles to be 
generated by interaction between agents at the legislative level (Reath 2006, p.122). When this 
legislative process is gleaned over for moral principles concerning how individuals should treat 
themselves, sufficient room for duties to one’s self within a social conception of morality 
becomes apparent.   
It is from the premise of a person’s humanity that considerations of duties to one’s self 
are perceived as fundamental, but also to be negative by virtue of restricting one’s freedom in 
respect of one’s inclinations aimed at one’s welfare. Reath (2006) is of the opinion that Kant in 
asserting the foregoing premise or arguing for it, did not take note of the contradiction in the idea 
that a being with personality or inner freedom can have obligations to herself. Kant however, 
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recognised this apparent problem of contradiction and examined it. Kant observed that if an 
agent that imposes obligation is one and the same agent who is put under obligation, a duty to 
one’s self in respect of this agent is in essence a self-contradictory. This is because the concept of 
duty to one’s self upholds the concept of an agent being bound and an agent who is capable of 
obligation has obligation to herself. This agent must also possess deliberative capacities of great 
value, capacities that make claims on her choices and attitudes towards self. In Metaphysics of 
Morals Kant observes that, 
‘One can also bring this contradiction to light by pointing out that the one imposing 
obligation…. could always release the one put under obligation… from the obligation…, 
so that (if both are one and the same subject) he would not be bound at all to a duty he 
lays upon himself. This involves a contradiction.’ (1996, 173) 
 
Kant taking note of this contradiction accepted nevertheless, that a human being has duties to 
herself. Kant acknowledged the contradiction in sufficiently general terms to the point of making 
it affect both moral and legal varieties of duty. Having acknowledged this contradiction it 
became difficult to exonerate himself argues Reath (2006, 236).  
 Notwithstanding, Reath is convinced that Kant is rescued from this dilemma by the 
acceptance that an agent acts on two levels, that of an animal nature and that of an agent’s own 
humanity. The first level Kant perceives an agent as a natural being [as phenomenon] for whom 
the concept of obligation does not come into play. The capacities that come into play are those, 
which make special claims on an agent’s choices attributed to self [as noumenon] or the 
personality. It is the legislative capacities of the noumenal self [an agent’s humanity or 
personality], which imposes the demands on her choices and attitudes as noumenal self.  
Secondly, the foundation of duties to one’s self are the claims that an agent’s own humanity 
makes on her actions and attitudes. Therefore, the apparent contradiction in the concept of duties 
to one’s self is removed by accepting that an agent is vested with certain capacities whose values 
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she acknowledges that bind her by volition.  
 The basis for duties to her becomes perfectly general value of her humanity (the capacity 
of humanity in herself). Marcus Singer (1959) argues duty to one’s self will always entail a 
contradiction. He concedes the commonest division of duties as based on distinctions of those 
duties to one’s self and duties to others. These distinctions are founded both in traditional moral 
philosophy and in ordinary moral perception.  But Singer does not accept that there is a duty that 
one owes to self. Kant has already observed that duties toward self are of primary importance 
and should therefore take precedence of duties to others. Indeed, the kind of self-constraint 
involved in laying down obligations on one’s self is the foundation of all duty.  
I have discussed above, any difficulty in the idea of constraining one’s self that vitiated 
the concept of duties to self would in fact undermine duty generally. Singer argues that for there 
to be any duties to self in a literal sense, a person must be able to hold themselves obligated to a 
duty. The same person must be able to free themselves from such an obligation if need be, and it 
is this idea of freeing herself that spells out a contradiction. This is because the obligated person 
being the same one who can free herself from the obligation, will always almost inevitably free 
herself and never remain accountable. Singer disputes that ‘duties to one’s self’ are genuine 
moral duties to an individual. When duties are genuinely moral he observes, then they fail to 
remain duties to the individual.  
He observes, 
‘But a duty to one’s self, then, would be a duty from which one could release one’s self at 
will, and this is self-contradictory. A “duty” from which one could release one’s self at 
will is not, in any literal sense, a duty at all.’(Singer 1959, p.202-203) 
 
Singer concedes that all duties entail accountability to some other person for the performance of 
these duties. If this is the case, then the idea of accountability to one’s self is preposterous. Wick 
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in Ethics (1960) responds to Singer by arguing that, ‘without duties to ourselves in a sense to be 
explained, the moral point of view makes no sense’ (1960, p.158). The key point of contention raised 
by Singer is that one cannot say she has a claim against self [for Singer this is absurd]. This is 
because the understanding of a duty from which one can release one’s self at will is self-
contradictory. Wicks argues that Singer is mistaken in that the alleged contradiction is specious 
and springs from a failure to distinguish between moral duties from legal obligations (Wicks 
1960, p.160), where the legal is essentially contractual binding duties from that one can be 
conclusively released or legally absolved.  
Wicks argues that moral duties that often form the bulk of duties to one’s self are not 
similar to legal duties. Further still, that they are not the kind of duties from, which one can be 
absolved or released, a view echoed by Mothersill (1961, p. 205). Wicks speaking of moral duty 
has in mind the categorical imperative of Kant. Given that this is the premise from which Kant is 
addressing duty to self, to say one has moral duty to treat others [and herself] with respect, is to 
imply this activity is an end in itself and not a means. Wicks observes further that for Kant the 
concept of binding one’s self is already implied in that of duty.  
The fact that a duty is obligated by necessity implies its binding one’s self and it is on this 
argument Kant perceived the contradiction (Wick 1960, p.162).  In any duty there is an agent 
who is passively constrained and an agent who is actively responsible for constraining through 
an act of volition.           
 The later agent imposes the obligation on the subject (or the former agent) through her 
will and becomes the agent to whom duty is owed. It is in this respect duties to one’s self require 
a single agent occupying both roles. This is a feature of Meads’ understanding of the self that is 
  
  
  166 
characteristic of being an object to itself (Mead 1934, p. 136-7)39, the idea is also carried out in 
Adam Smith’s impartial spectator working in conjunction with Smith’s man in the breast (to be 
discussed in a later section).  
The Kantian agent can therefore be said to experience herself, in the sense of an agent 
entering into the experience of her-self. The agent while being the subject of duty to herself [who 
exercises the duty] she also becomes the object up on whom the duty is performed. It is this 
absurdity of the concept of releasing one’s self from an obligation that Kant has to accept and 
deal with. Conversely, if there were no such duties as duties to self as already observed above, 
Kant is convinced and argues, then there would be no duties whatsoever and hence no external 
duties or duties to others.  
A person recognises herself to be under an obligation to others at the same time she puts 
herself under obligation. The law by virtue of which such a person regards herself as under 
obligation proceeds in each case from her own practical reason and this later claim is key for 
Kant. To treat humanity as an end is to treat self as one treats others. A person is not to be valued 
merely as means to the ends of others or her own ends but as an end in herself.  
On grounds that she possesses an absolute inner worth she exacts respect for herself from 
all other rational beings. She values herself on the same measuring scales with other rational 
beings because of this inner worth or self-regard, and it is to this self-regard I turn and briefly 
consider Kant’s presentation. 
 
                                               
39 Mead writes that, ‘It is the characteristic of the self as an object to itself that I want to bring out. This 
characteristic is represented in the word “self” which is a reflective and indicates that which can be both subject and 
object.  This type of object is essentially different from other objects, and in the past, it has been distinguished as 
conscious, a term which indicates an experience with, an experience of, one’s self” 
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4.5 Kant on Self-love 
 
Self-regard or self-love40 refers to the rationally guided interest in the satisfaction of one's 
inclinations, perceived to be indifferent to the interests of others. In self–love persons are 
perceived to love themselves more than they others and being moved by self-love individuals 
have out of love for themselves the same standing, as it were, to treat each of their subjective 
concerns as though they were objective reasons for actions. Individuals act without regard to 
their subjective concerns as reasons that make claims on anyone else (Reath 2006, p26). Self-
love thus treats subjective considerations as objective or justifying reasons for acting. This 
personal understanding of self-love, as objective reasons for acting does not preclude the agent 
recognising that others have the same self-concerns. That conclusion leads the agent to recognise 
that others likewise have to treat their subjective considerations as objective reasons.   
Kant offers two kinds of motivational tendencies comprising of self-love and self-conceit. 
I focus on self-love the dominant of the two. Self-love is a predominant benevolence towards 
one’s self. In Kant’s understanding the moral law or pure practical reason responds to self-love 
in different ways. Kant’s Pure practical reason ‘merely infringes upon self-love it only restricts it 
as natural and active in an agent even prior to the moral law, placing it in agreement with this 
law.              
 For Kant, a well-regulated character is not simply a matter of the absence of counter-
incentives. The goal is rather to transform our self-love so that it promotes and advances 
compliance with the moral law. Kant refers to it as ‘reasonable self-love’ (Critique of Practical 
Reason 1996, 5: 73), Aristotle’s rational self-love (NE 1168b35-69a3) and Joseph Butler cool 
                                               
40 Self –love falls under Kant’s consideration of an agent’s predisposition to animality- that concerns self-love 
expressed in human impulses for self-preservation, propagation of the species, and community with other human 
beings. This predisposition to humanity concerns self-love expressed in human cultural strivings and social 
dependence upon and rivalry with others. 
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self-love (Butler 1827, p.153). Self-love’s main objective is to ‘strike down’ and ‘humiliate’ self-
conceit. Or as Kant later says, the moral law ‘excludes altogether the influence of self-love on 
the highest practical principle’, but ‘forever infringes upon self-conceit’ (Ibid. 5: 74).  
Notwithstanding, the influence of self-love needs to be controlled (Ibid. 5: 75) so that an 
agent may act on self-interested inclinations when properly constrained. Self-love provides 
different concern that one can have or fail to have toward others. The object of self-love is an 
agent’s welfare or the satisfaction of an agent’s ends. An agent’s concern for another's well-
being could be based either in feeling for or attachment to the agent’s (‘delight’) in the person or 
pleasure in the person's perfections, or in the duty of benevolence.  
Self-love is feeling of respect directed at the self and an agent may have various formats 
how she interprets these feelings. She interprets self-love, as a love of one’s self manifesting 
itself as interest in one's own welfare and in the satisfaction of one's own desires. This love of 
one’s self may comprise inclinations directed at ends outside the self. It however tends toward a 
form of general egoism where an agent takes her inclinations as sufficient reasons for her actions 
and is prepared to view the inclinations of others as sufficient reasons for their actions.  That 
being the case the agent and the other are therefore permitted to pursue their respective interest 
as they see fit.  
From a Kantian perspective self-love may be perceived as a tendency to treat an agent’s 
inclinations as objectively good reasons for her actions, which are sufficient to justify them to 
others. Self-love can presume itself to be lawgiving, and moral law according to Kant only 
restricts self-love, which modifies an agent’s inclinations only when such inclinations conflict 
with one’s overall happiness. Kant is claimed to have argued that rational choice is guided by 
considerations that an agent regards as good and sufficient reasons for action.   
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This is a constitutive feature of free rational choice that an agent is guided by 
considerations that have a normative force for others as much as for herself, and that an incentive 
motivating through the judgments provides a sufficient reason for action. What motivates is the 
recognition of the authority of the moral law, or the feeling of respect and its effective dimension 
in a way in which the agent experiences the authority and motivating influence of moral 
considerations.   
Morality, Kant would argue counteracts the influence of inclinations and non-moral 
interests (Hill Jr. 1993, p. 1-3).  However, moral considerations can equally motivate through an 
agent’s recognition of their authority, to the extent that non-moral desires acquire their purchase 
on the will when an agent accommodates them to provide sufficient reason for action. Kant’s 
understanding of self-love is of a love, which takes delight in one’s self. A love, which has the 
inclination of being contended with one’s own self-judgment and perfection. True self-love is 
moral self-love devoid of arrogance or self-sufficiency.  
For Kant there are two formats into which self-love may be described; the first is self-
love compounded with arrogance, this may also be referred to as selfish self-love; which always 
only but pretends to be possessed of more moral perfection than it actually has, and it is this, 
which makes it morally defective. Such self-love has an inclination or a tendency to be satisfied 
with one’s perfection and therefore proud of its moral perfection and arrogance. True self-love 
(Aristotle’s sensible or rational self-love) makes no unwarranted claims ‘simply believing itself 
blameless and innocent’. (Kant 1996, p. 135).   
The second format of self-love is that with an unwarranted claim to merit unlike false 
self-love. True self-love is not proud of its moral perfection and makes no claims for itself, rather 
is satisfied with itself and has no need to take itself to task to prove that point. The sensible or 
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rational self-love [Aristotle] in Kant’s judgment, ‘tests itself by the moral law’. Aristotle here 
argued that rational self-love first and foremost finds its example in a good friend, because a 
friend is an expression of another self.  
Kant on his part argues that it is a risk to use other people’s moral experiences as a 
measuring standard. This is because often these examples from moral persons’ experiences lack 
the criterion of reason, a key component of moral law. This lack makes self-love suspect when it 
relies in its application to the experiences of other moral persons. Because such experiences are 
likely to provide a narrow and an indulgent view of moral law, and in the absence of reason it is 
more likely an agent will express a moral judgment that is impartial. Kant writes,  
‘A man may compare herself with others and esteem only himself. This is moral egoism. 
We ought not to measure our worth by comparing ourselves with others, but with the 
standard of moral law.’ (Kant 1996, p.137)  
 
Kant is convinced that for a person to measure her standard against the moral worth of others is 
to apply an inaccurate measuring standard, which ‘may lead to a very different estimate of our 
worth.’ (Ibid. p. 137). When an agent utilises another’s experience of moral law, they in essence 
apply a ‘fortuitous standard’.  This standard almost always leads to a very different estimate of 
one’s own worth. From such a standard one may conclude that she is of a lesser value than others 
creating feelings of indifference or even hate for the other. Kant explains that parents often find 
themselves in awkward situations when they lose sight of principles of moral law by which to 
bring up children, but instead point to other children as examples. Kant writes, 
‘The less strict our view of the moral law and the less strictly the judge within us judges 
us, the more arrogant we are apt to be.’ (1996, p.135) 
 
In his explication of self-love Kant introduces self-esteem that for him connotes intrinsic worth. 
He elucidates that people esteem that which has intrinsic worth. Often, they do so by error 
because they do so irrespective of the purpose to which that which is esteemed is to be applied. 
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With self-love, we love that which in itself has worth and bears ‘on something else’.  
 For Kant, a person who does her duty and does not denigrate her personhood, such a 
person is esteemed, although she may not be sociable. Since she who is sociable is almost always 
loved and this foundation provides premise to judge on whether one is worthy of esteem or self-
love.  It seems that for Kant a combination of self-esteem and self-love provides a basis for a 
person to wish herself well, a natural thing to do. Kant quickly cautions that this natural thing to 
do is not the same with having a good opinion of self, which often generates a false sense of 
esteem, for that is the slippery slide into arrogance. 
4.6  Kant and Contemporary philosophical discourse on Selfhood 
 
 The notion of autonomy is Kant’s organising idea of selfhood. Selfhood signified self-
respecting autonomous agency realised when one is recognised as possessing the capacities of 
morally responsible agents. Kantian understanding will be that freedom consists in a person’s 
ability to determine her ends independently of domination by her own inclinations and desires; 
and such freedom consists in a person’s ability to select and pursue her own ends independently 
of domination by other persons.  
 Beate Rossler (2013, p.14-15) has argued that a Kantian discussion of autonomy is 
primarily concerned with the question: what should I do? Or perhaps, which of my actions – or 
maxims - could others reasonably reject?  Rosseler feels that she is correctly interpreting Kant’s 
discussion of autonomy, pausing these questions.  Kant has been misunderstood she contends, by 
other philosophers but particularly Honneth (2011), in her case.  
 Rosseler  (Ibid. p. 15) explains that Honneth wanting to make his point as forcefully as he 
possibly can reacting to Kantian autonomy: what Honneth calls ‘moral freedom cannot, by 
necessity, take into account its own social preconditions and its own rootedness in the life-
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world.’ She argues that Kant always understood ends, as always already adopted by subjects in 
their social contexts. Honneth at whom Rosseler is reacting argues that a Kantian impartial 
morality is only superficially related to its social conditions and cannot describe and interpret 
what it means, for example, to be a real friend and at the same time a morally responsible agent. 
 Moral freedom Honneth argues means that one frees oneself from personal relations and 
obligations and that one cannot, under the idea of moral freedom, act at the same time as a 
friend, or lover, mother, compatriot (Honneth 2011, 201 cited by Rosseler 2013, p. 16). 
Rosseler’s response is simply that Kant’s ethics is an ethics for agents and their questions about 
how to act in their social relations with others. Kant’s ethics is not necessarily an ethics that is 
directed at finding moral faults in others.  
 Rosseler’s interpretation of Kant’s ethics suggests that as autonomous agents human 
beings have to make a judgment for mistake of moral fault committed, this is irrespective of 
whether the judgment is to solve a personal conflict or another’s conflict. There is no amount of 
moral freedom that can exonerate human beings, because as autonomous agents they have to 
decide. One cannot compromise her moral convictions and therefore fall short of her ethical 
obligations because of the freedom that accompanies her autonomy.  
 In Kantian ethics, it is still possible to properly articulate a genuine conflict between 
ethical obligations toward friends on the one hand and the claims of impartial morality on the 
other. Accordingly, it is the autonomous agents themselves who have to solve moral, ethical, 
social, and role-related problems. The foregoing discussion attempts to show how Kant’s 
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autonomy and the freedom it prescribes to selfhood still raises serious discussions in its 
application. But what does Kant himself say about autonomy? 
For Kant autonomy was, “the property of the will by which it is a law to itself 
(independently of any property of the objects of volition)” (Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals, 4:440).  For Kant any law must be universal it is the condition of an agent who is 
“subject only to laws given by herself but still universal” (Ibid. 4:432). This meant that the self 
would achieve its freedom by following the self-made laws of its own rational nature (Seigel 
2005, p.298). Autonomy was hence, the ability to make not just free choices, but refers to the 
ability for self-determination41.  
The Kantian rational will therefore, is essentially autonomous or free in the sense that it is 
the original author of the law that binds it (the categorical imperative) and also the constant 
protector of that same law. It is not only negatively free (from external influence) but, more 
importantly, positively free as its own author, and freedom to choose its own law has inherent 
worth. Autonomy is, thus, nothing less than the lifeblood of Kantian categorical imperative and 
morality. 
On account that all rational individuals in principle are equally capable of achieving 
selfhood and seeing that many indeed achieved it by pursuing the same rules, this makes 
selfhood universal42. This conclusion also dispels the feminists’ claim of autonomy historically 
                                               
41 We should emphasize at this point that, autonomy cannot be taken merely in a negative sense, in the sense that the 
laws that we accept must be legislated by us, rather than by God, the government, the inclinations of nature, or some 
other way. Unless human beings are going to be turned into Kantian rational moral machines, Kant’s demand for 
autonomy must be combined with a cultivated ability for spontaneous thinking and action. There must also be 
autonomy in a positive sense. Autonomy taken in the positive sense is to understand the laws, to grasp the value they 
advocate and the binding power they assume. This conception of autonomy the challenging part in it, perhaps the 
part that Kant least comfortable with, is that one’s ability to choose laws for one’s self is intimately connected with 
his/her ability to see when such laws would be irrelevant, or superfluous, or misapplied (Cicovacki 2002, p.392-
393). 
42 Kantian autonomous selfhood was distinct from the expressivist selfhood that projected a self that was free in the 
sense of not being determined by external objects or relations (Taylor 1989, p.368-90).  While Taylor attributes this 
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as a masculine (Slote 2004, p.294) ideal43. While Taylor emphasises the distinction between 
Kantian autonomous selfhood and Leibniz expressivist selfhood (Taylor 368-9) it is the case that 
this distinction argues Seigel (Seigel 2005, p.299), remained uniquely German. These forms of 
selfhood depended on the isomorphism between individuals and the world. Kant’s idea of 
autonomy (Taylor 1989, p. 364) owed much to Rousseau, although Rousseau developed it only 
in the context of politics44. Seigel reiterates the fact that these two forms of selfhood appear to 
have required the same kind of homology (Ibid. p. 299).  
In essence these two forms of selfhood were internally related to each other.  There 
should be no surprise that the two tend to feed new life into each other. Seigel observes further 
that the kinship of the two forms of selfhood continue to exhibit in each other radical and 
moderate forms, in their support of self-realisation, as they attempt to posit a world in harmony 
with the self. It is notable however, that each form of selfhood is capable also of setting limits to 
the self in the present, where the Kantian autonomous selfhood recognises that humans are 
                                               
expressivist selfhood to Leibniz, to which Seigel seems to concur, it is the opinion of Seigel that Taylor does not do 
Leibniz justice by attributing to him the credit due him in this respect. The expressivist selfhood itself did not 
legislate rules for itself or others rather it simply followed the innate principle of its own nature.   
43 Many feminists’ protagonists to include the voices of Carol Gilligan are attempting to rehabilitate autonomy as 
masculine notion in order to accommodate an ethics of caring grounded in an ideal of connection with, rather than 
separateness from (suggested by autonomy); others would prefer perhaps to completely displace traditional 
masculine approaches and give us a total picture of what can be validly said about the ethical. [Carol Gilligan, In a 
Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (1982; reprint, with new preface, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1993); and Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education 
(Berke- ley: University of California Press, 1984). 
44 Autonomy for Rousseau was an idea that described the freedom of the citizens who were at once sovereign and 
subject to in the politics they created. It is a freedom that did no seem to solve the problems of personal wholeness, 
since its social contract continued to divide citizens. Rousseau it seems did not invoke reason as a power able to 
integrate personality and ground personal moral autonomy in the manner Kant had done. 
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material creatures as well as rational, and the expressivism acknowledges that every self has to 
dwell in a world occupied at the same time with others. 
4.6 Conclusion 
I set out to look at Kant’s concept of the self and self-love. My discussion began with the 
self-concept in Kant’s works. I became aware firstly that Kant, with general opinion, was 
reacting at Hume’ objection to the idea of personal identity. Kant attempted to demonstrate that 
there actually can be made a claim for the self. The problem I found was that this Kantian self 
started to slip into various interpretations that appear to deny Kant a clear and concise 
description of a unitary self. These various interpretations of the self however, became key to 
how other Kantian ideas and concepts were to be discussed. Self -respect is one of the ideas that 
springs up in Kantian discussion of the self.         
 I argued that self-respect in a Kantian understanding accords an agent a real opportunity 
to exercise the universal capacities constitutive of personhood. I recognised that self-respect is a 
complex character state involving a disposition not to behave in a manner unworthy of oneself. 
That is to say it is a disposition to shun behaviour that one views as contemptible, degrading, or 
otherwise immoral. Such understanding was important therefore on how to interpret duty to self.  
Kant’s claim that a person has certain duties to herself has greater importance for 
understanding his ethics and exonerates him from charges of abstraction. Kant provides a 
doctrine of duties to self, which is concealed in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 
that has to do with how an agent esteems herself. This concealment is perhaps the reason for 
preoccupation in modern ethics with Kant’s universalization as the defining feature of duty.  
The theory under which Kant propagates duties to oneself, grounds these duties in the 
notion that humanity deserves practical respect while embracing an impartiality that does not 
  
  
  176 
exclude an agent’s own humanity from duties so grounded. Human autonomy seems to be 
central to this understanding of duties to oneself.  
It is notable how Kant makes no use of universalization in the arguments for duties to 
oneself, yet this feature (universalizability) appear important recalling Kant’s ‘Law of Nature’ in 
the formulation of the Categorical Imperative that obligates an agent to act as if the maxim of 
her action were to become by her will a universal law of nature. In responding to the application 
of duties to oneself that involves self-respect, self-regard, conscience implying the inner court of 
moral judgment and self-love, Kant invites a sense of interpersonal and temporal 
universalization.  
I discussed how Kant argued that under Categorical Imperative with self-love leading to 
self-preservation an agent cannot consistently will or even just once, to self-destruct from self-
love. According to Kant there cannot be without contradiction of a universal law of nature that 
self-love lead to self–destruction when it must always lead to self-preservation.  
Given Kant understands self-love as having a destination of self-preservation, it cannot 
be the case that agents’ self-love always in fact aims at dutiful self-preservation. This is because 
the same motive of self-love may lead to transgressions of duty, for example, to suicide perhaps. 
 It becomes apparent that universal temporal self-destruction from self-love runs contrary 
to the concept of self-love insofar as it is conceptually true that self-preservation is its 
destination. It seems that following Kant’s argument there is contradiction sometimes in letting 
natural purposes run their course and other times impeded by them. When an agent wills her 
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maxim to impede to become universal, she must always impede that natural purpose that 
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     Chapter 5  
  Philosophies of Self and Self-love – Adam Smith 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous section a Kantian account of the self and of self-love, showed Kant begins 
with selves that are individuated by experience, with entities that are jointly responsible for 
unifying sensations into a single experience thereby constitute a single self. This understanding 
of the self has implications on self-love of an agent, and how she may have duties to herself or 
she may be obligated to her own self.  
Kant called on conscience as the adjudicating faculty of an agent in order to resolve any 
cases of latitude that include how an agent can obligate duties to herself. This seemed to produce 
an irreconcilability of the agent’s action. Calling upon conscience, Kant somehow captured the 
dialogical quality of the Smithian impartial spectator who acts as the internal court in the human 
being, although of course, the Kantian description of conscience as incorporated in person’s 
being, as an original and (since it is the thought of duty) moral disposition clashes with the 
empirical basis of Smith’s conscience. 
The self in Adam Smith’s understanding raises a different set of issues. The standard 
vision of the self in economics generally is attributed to Adam Smith, unfortunately with a 
misrepresentation that has more in common with egoistic notion of Thomas Hobbes (Dixon et al 
2014, pp. 623-4). This Hobbesian version of the self is characterised with a set of interests, 
passions or preferences and the capacity to reflect on alternative courses of action with a view to 
best satisfying those ends. The ideal place of the self in Adam Smith is in “universal economic 
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liberty within the context of law and commutative justice” (Werhane 1991, 180), where Smith’s 
conception of self is quite different from that usually associated with orthodox economics.  
In what follows in this section I will discuss the self of Smith in a number of contexts. 
First the self of Smith is of a deeper competence and a more complex form of selfhood than 
conventional economic analysis is able and/or willing to admit. In Smith’s account, the 
Hobbesian view that articulates that this is all we are, fundamentally miss-specifies the human 
self and how it comes to act and think.  
I argue that the concept of the self in Adam Smith provided an explanation on the role of 
self-love in motivating parties to exchange, a view that has significantly and widely been 
misunderstood. A discussion of Adam Smith in the context of intellectual history will show 
while not exhaustively that Smith occupies a unique context.     
 I will discuss also how, Adam Smith has become better known for his political economy, 
less for his social and moral thought both that remain equally important and, arguably subtler. 
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (henceforth TMS) develops a sophisticated account of the 
social physics Smith saw emerging to accommodate the economic changes of his time.  
It is this social physics discussed, that situates Adam Smith and contemporary notions of 
‘homo oeconomicus’ in a context responsible for his reputation. I will attempt to draw a 
conclusion considering the apparent usefulness of Adam Smith to my research question.  
5.2  Adam Smith and the Concept of Self 
 
There is more to Smith than the founder of a tradition that works outwards from an un-
explicated (simple) view of the self and its interests in order to demonstrate the possibility of a 
liberal-economic order or the need for ethical foundations. The self is commonly the factor 
differentiating self from others and from the rest of the universe. Self provides an agent with a 
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sense of ‘I-ness’ or ‘at-one-ness’ (Humphreys, 2010). Self allows an agent to become an 
individual. The awareness of self makes an agent to experience solitude, love and to be 
responsible for others. Self provides awareness of the past and the future, of life and death. Self 
also provides a sense of values and ability to plan ahead as well as being conscious of evolution 
and perhaps ability to influence its course. Self writes MacCannell (1977, p. 890), 
 ‘…as a term implies more substance than it can convey, more unity and individual 
specificity than a reflexive pronoun available for any referent can provide.’  
 
MacCannell suggests that each discipline in its own understanding treats self uniquely of its 
definitional opposites, for example; divisiveness and otherness, so we find frustration and 
alienation in the essence of self (psychoanalysis), and on the other hand in self is dependency 
upon the other for determination (sociology). The concept of self in Smith is a reflexive concept 
similar to Aristotle and Augustine. A self exists where there is self-reference  (Buss 1965, p. 47). 
In TMS Smith offers a theory of how the self and its acts are constituted – and of how 
individual and society are related. This function of the self is in stark contrast to the 
presuppositions of modern mainstream economic theory whose conception is more Hobbesian 
than Smith45. The self often associated with orthodox economics is characterised as a set of 
interests, passions, or preferences and the capacity to reflect on alternative courses of action with 
a view to best satisfying those ends.  
Smith’s theory of the self on the contrary, is not solely built on an individual who 
relentlessly pursues her self-interest (however that interest may be conceived). This view 
misinterprets Smith’s social theory (Wilson et al 2009, p. 75-76).  Smith’s social theory is rather 
                                               
45 Though Smith is claimed as a seminal figure in the development of the modern mainstream economics, its 
conceptions, based as they are on a strategically rational understanding of human behaviour, owe more to Hobbes 
than to Smith. Smith’s social theory is the culmination of a long and quite vehement reaction to Hobbesian action-
theoretical presuppositions rather than a contribution to 
their development (Dixon et al 2104, p. 627 – 628). 
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concerned with appropriately constraining the self and the institutions. The logic of Smith’s 
account of the self drives Smith to view an individual’s action in terms of society rather than 
society via the actions of individual persons. A self caught up in this presupposition soon finds 
out that human interaction is not a straightforward matter. Smith reasoned that society is 
necessarily antecedent to self, and that self and mind develop through interaction with others, 
therefore, self control derives from social control and people are actors as well as reactors whose 
moral action is founded on epistemologies of the individual and social.  
Smith divides the self into ’examiner and judge’, on the one side, and the person ‘whom I 
properly call myself’, on the other.  Mead’s consideration of the ’me’ (1934, p.173) ’taking the 
role of the other’ and discussion of the self appears paralleled. For Smith it is the position of 
spectator from which one assesses one’s own self conduct from the point of view of another. 
Smith’s ‘agent’ has the same function as Mead’s ‘I’, that is, it is the individual component of the 
self of which one is forming a specific opinion. Smith’s self consists of two components which 
unite the dual tensions of selfhood and society that is how he manages to account first for an 
individual epistemology followed by a social epistemology. Personhood consists in the 
resolution of this tension, the coexistence of individual spontaneity and the demands of the 
community.  
Haig (2009) suggests that in reading Smith’s TMS a locus of moral responsibility, and a 
sense of self itself, emerges as one flips back and forth between one’s own self perspective and 
the perspectives of others, and as one attempts to reconcile and adjudicate among the different 
springs of internal action. To understand others the self avails itself via the imagination means 
taking an imaginative leap based, initially, upon one’s own person. The attitude that this produce 
what Smith refers to as ‘sympathy’.  Sympathy, for Smith is ‘to denote our fellow feeling with 
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any passion whatever’ (I.i.1.5). It is not synonymous with compassion or empathy; it is not an 
attribute of personality. It is a faculty, possessed by all human beings. It is a mechanism 
employed in courses of social interaction and without which knowledge of others would be 
impossible.  
By way of sympathy Smith showed that in every social situation there are persons acting 
and those acted upon, and this sympathy is a manner of explaining this activity. Sympathy allows 
the feelings of others to become accessible, since it involves imagination and allows individuals 
to conceive the experiences of others by way of representations. The process is necessary 
because others are separated from one’s self by time and space, therefore imagination provides 
the immediate best alternative for one to be able to conceive of what she herself should feel in 
the like situation.  
5.3 Adam Smith and the idea of Self 
 
Smith, in his discussion of the self’s development, expressed a basic tenet of [symbolic 
interactionism46] the notion that the social self cannot emerge unless an individual is able to take 
account of others’ images of her. Smith suggests that, surveying one’s self and conducts as they 
appear to self, one enters into emotions or judgments previously alien to herself, sentiments that 
could be entertained only through sympathy. At times, sympathy may even make one displeased 
with an act or quality advantageous to self, simply because the act affronts others, but sympathy 
                                               
46 Symbolic interactionism is a theory attributed to American sociological society or community that argues of 
difficult to conceive” of a symbolic-Interactionist theory of society developing in Scotland and England, where 
monopolized power and restrictive social conventions prevailed until the twentieth century. An interesting 
observance has been that this theory has its origins among the American sociologists, although overwhelming 
evidence suggests the rooting of this symbolic interactionism to be in the eighteenth-century Scotland and England 
thinkers, but more specifically the Scottish eighteenth century moralists, again here Adam Smith has been singled 
out (Shott 1976, pp. 39-46; Cotello 1997, pp. 81-109). The theory itself claims that, human interaction and 
communication is facilitated by words, gesture, and other symbols that have acquired conventionalized meanings. 
George Herbert Mead 1863-1931, who was one of the key proponents of this theory.  
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remains central to Smith’s understanding of Self. Smith never espoused a specific form of the 
self, unlike his compatriot Hume and his predecessor Locke. It is Smith’s general reflections that 
provided for how the selves are formed (Shott 1976, p. 43). His discussion of this process 
observed that children learn how they are expected to act in a situation or what view of it they 
should take from others’ “definitions of the situation”. The attainment of a social self occurs, 
according to Smith, when the child has internalized an impartial spectator that monitors its 
behaviour. At this point an individual has fully acquired a reflexive self in the sense that her 
sentiments, acts, and physical appearance incite reflection and “role-taking” in order to ascertain 
their effects on others. That this social self carries a sense of self-evident whenever one’s “self-
feeling” is determined by the imagination of how one appears to others.  
Smith’s accounts of the selves suggest a relational self, where the virtuous behaviours are 
grounded in the individual’s capacity to govern the self (TMS VI, iii, 2; 241). Smith presupposes 
the idea that one might find empirical evidence for a unified self. From his opening lines of the 
TMS, we find the self of any given person having to align with the natural principles that interest 
one in the affairs of others.  
The self becomes compelled to mind the welfare of others without anticipating 
recompense except for the pleasure of seeing the happiness of others. Smith develops his moral 
philosophy with sympathy as his corner stone. He portrayed the active character of self, as 
depicting people as actors as well as reactors (Shott 1976, p. 43). Seigel (2005, p.139) observes 
moral philosophy in Smith was no longer a discourse on the nature of virtue or goodness contra 
Aristotle; rather an inquiry into how self achieved the capacity to govern. Smith assumed a self 
that was irreducibly explained as social, moral and ethical.  He identified any self-direction 
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human beings were capable of attaining as rooted in passions and feelings. These passions and 
feelings were at once governed by causal relationships making the self-relational.  
Selves are formed by interaction with others, while at the same time selves achieved 
command over themselves by interactions with selves. Smith made the self depend on actions 
individuals carry out on themselves. Costello (1997, p.96) writes that Smith’s basis for the self to 
judge the conduct of others depended upon the ability to represent to oneself what one imagined 
the other is feeling. This dependency was not constituted of an activity carried out in isolation 
either from the bodily drives and urges or from social relations as was discussed here in chapter 
1. Selfhood denotes a transformation of passions orchestrated when self’s concern was placed 
against the basic human need for society with others. The chief passion out of which virtuous 
behaviour originates is sympathy, Smith concluded this was in a way the extension of self-love 
to others.   
The human need for society issues in a spontaneous impulse to put [imagine] self in the 
place of others, or fellow feeling, and out of this compulsion arise the stimulus to govern the self. 
Fellow feeling for Smith was the principle of ethics, presuming that through fellow feeling arose 
an ordering principle of the moral society. The total language of TMS thus, hinges on Smith’s 
fundamental investigation of the human self and its action (Wilson et al 2004, p. 121) as 
depicting “natural harmony” of the human capacity to act, rather than motives of the actor. A 
human being in essence is a self designed for harmony, acting in ways that involve the taking 
within itself present events and being in a pre-reflective anticipation mood of the attitudes of 
others, what Smith called sympathy.  
Sympathy is the vicarious experience of others’ actions, emotions, tastes, and reasons. It 
is central to Smith’s account of the moral sentiments. Sympathy in Smith is a social practice 
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through which morality is inter-subjectively produced in shared physical spaces. This 
understanding counter frequent assumptions that sympathy is an emotion for Smith, or a virtue. 
Forman-Barzlai (2005, p.190-191) observes that the dramatic activities of surveillance and 
discipline, suggests that Smith’s description of sympathetic activity entails a rich moral 
psychology of culture formation.  
Sympathy has practical as well as sociological dimensions. Sympathy for Smith is not 
just one of a number of attitudes that the self might strike in relation to others, on the contrary 
self and its interest are constituted in the imagining of the situation the other is experiencing. In 
applying sympathy as how the self and its interest are constituted, Smith draws a distinction 
between the nature of virtuous conduct and the way in which all forms of human conduct, 
virtuous or not, are constituted. Sympathy depends on watchful imagination, where self places 
itself in another person’s situation exciting itself to some degree of emotions the other is 
experiencing (TMS I, i.1.1-2. p.9). Sympathy is mindful imagination, by which the self places 
itself in another person’s situation (Seigel 2005, p. 142). 
5.3.1  Self’s sympathy not automatic 
The self’s capacity for sympathetic judgment although individualised, can be generalised 
to the point that any body within the society could and should provide or withhold sympathetic 
approbation. These sympathy judgments grounded in propriety become publicly motivated 
considering they occur in specific contexts. But Smith also wants to show that these sympathetic 
judgments carried out by selves in society and in specific contexts, provide a framework in 
which a more generalised point of view about morality may be internalised (Wilson et al 2004, p. 
129). This means the actual external spectator relied on from whom selves learn as children in 
society, ultimately matures to become Smith’s man within the breast. That man allows each 
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individual self the ability to judge one’s own action in the same manner as the impartial spectator 
would judge these actions. This process of judging is the cultivation of conscience. Conscience 
may be viewed the great demigod within the breast that provokes self into austere self-judgment, 
becoming individuals’ secular imitation of the work of a divine artist (TMS VI.iii.25: 247-8). 
 The theistic residues implied speak of more than a focus on passionate contiguity. It 
means that natural desires for approbation become both the cause and results of sympathy and 
spectatorial judgments (Kelly 2013, p. 207). All sense of moral duty therefore stems from that 
which selves have become explicitly conscious of. A platform is provided from which the self 
becomes exceptionally conscious of the manner in which its own actions, and its judgments of 
the actions of others, is governed by the relationship between sympathy and propriety.  
Through time and space persons have imagined themselves taking the places of others as 
if entering into their bodies and therefore sharing their feeling in their place in that particular 
situation. For Smith this process is the source of fellow feeling that remains a basic component 
of sympathy (TMS I, I, 1-2; 9). We observed that it is the relationship between sympathy and 
propriety that governs actions that reflect moral duty. Sympathy however, does not flow 
unchecked and is not automatic and along the way it experiences limitations. 
5.3.2  Self’s sympathy as Calculative 
Because sympathy is not always automatic it follows that selves do not always share 
every emotion that others display.  Especially when such emotion is considered unrestrained or 
likely to make one feel distant from the person displaying it. Sympathy becomes calculative 
weighing out every emotion exhibited so as to arouse identification from the onlookers (Seigel 
2005, p.143). Take an example; although grief and joy are feelings only shared to some degree, 
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humans very seldom share with the intensity of the person who displays any of these emotions to 
them.  
Sympathy therefore is more than just a natural tendency to which the selves of persons 
respond in tune with others. There is always a calculative element or an element of judgment in 
sympathy before it is deployed. When one sympathises, she seeks the correspondence of 
sentiments between the other and self. Therefore, in sympathising with others, self in seeking 
their sympathy is more than just the amplification of one’s feelings it is the correspondence 
between their feeling or sentiment and self, and persons do not go about exercising this passion 
indiscriminately. This understanding is contrary to Halteman (2003, p. 458) who argues that 
‘sympathy is not a rational transporting of one into another.’ Although involuntary the instinct of 
sympathy is calculative if calculative then more than possible rational. 
In order to sympathise with the passions of the other, the self must deliberate that the 
passions of the other are appropriate or proper. Self must seek to be convinced in the suitableness 
or the unsuitableness, in the proportion or disproportion that the affection bears to the cause or 
object that is the reason for it (TMS I, I, 3-6; 18). To sympathise or not, is the judgment self 
makes on whether it would partake their feelings in their place.  
It is the same process others undertake to sympathise or not with self and we care about 
whether they do.  Because sympathy is not automatic selves can coexist with others with whom 
they do not concur on various opinions [literature, politics etc.], but they will find it hard or 
intolerable to one another when such people have no fellow feeling for each other’s deep 
concerns in their joys or misfortunes. It is this need for society with others that pushes people to 
not only to regulate their behaviour but to also moderate their feelings on which that behaviour is 
founded. A sense of self restraint is expressed and is two-sided and mutual, this restrain is 
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calculative not allowing for sympathy to be expressed automatically and rendering a sense of 
limitation to sympathy. 
5.3.3  Self’s sympathy is not limitless 
Another feature of self in exercising sympathy is that sympathy is not limitless. There 
comes a point where the self of a given person cannot continue sympathising indefinitely, 
because of spatial [constrains] limitation (Forman-Barzilai 2005). Although Seigel (2005, p.143) 
would want to argue that unlike Hume, Smith does not present sympathy in spatial limitation to 
those closest to an agent, there is a significant degree of difference in the sympathy imagined for 
those closest compared to those a far. Hume (1983 cited by Forman-Barzilai 2005, p. 190) 
observed that,  
“sympathy . . . with persons remote from us [is] much fainter than that with persons near 
and contiguous” and that this effect on our sentiments necessitated a more impartial 
foundation for our moral judgments” which Hume located in general standards that are 
drawn from “social intercourse” and “general usefulness.”  
 
Hume is representative of the discussion on sympathy during his time, giving a 
naturalistic account of a science of man that is grounded in passions but framed in the idea of 
natural history (Kelly 2013, p. 201). Smith through this mechanism of natural history was able to 
think through the relationship between passions, actions and political judgments (TMS 
VII.ii.1.38: p 289). Smith articulates that humankind is naturally biased by its self-love; besides, 
each individual naturally desires the approbation of others. Approbation is received when 
another individual reacts similarly or feels the same as one’s self does. The closer self to other, 
the easier it is to share the same feelings and the less effort self has to exert to develop command 
over its passions (Paganelli 2010, p.425-426). To gain the approbation of someone far away, an 
individual has to reach out and strongly control her passions. In spatial limitation of sympathy 
Smith adopted his orientation to the effects of proximity on sentiment, that is, human sympathy 
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tends to fade as the object becomes further removed. Smith drew substantially from Stoic moral 
psychology that physical proximity begets familiarity, which in turn makes affection stronger. 
Physical proximity further begets understanding that is more accurate, therefore making 
sympathy likelier, and other-concern more natural and appropriate (Ibid. p. 428).  
Forman–Barzilia (2005, p.190) interprets Smith as appealing to the rich spatial texture of 
sympathetic responses and stimulations. Forman-Barzilai observes that the issue of physical 
proximity rouses more questions than it resolves. It seems to be neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for sympathetic response since the question of proximity seems also to 
demand cultural and affective considerations. (Ibid. p.198). Self’s sympathy also finds 
limitations through the medium of vision and its perceptual limits.  
Although visual persuasion is a necessary judgment to activate sympathy it remains 
insufficient because selves assess the propriety of agency in a variety of ways. Two notable ways 
of assessment are language and the imagination and Smith was certainly aware of this, and in 
paying attention to imagination Smith was cautious of how self might be easily deluded about 
what it sees and hears, and therefore about what self perceives as appropriate in the first place. 
 Such delusion was not aberrant in the judgment of the actions of others, but that, selves 
are equally often deluded about what is truly in their own interest. The gaudy attraction of wealth 
rather than one’s own tranquillity is a pertinent example of this delusion. Despite the delusional 
possibilities any judgments on actions either of the self or others is dependent on the relationship 
between sympathy and propriety. This relationship is itself filtered through the medium of 
imagination, where this imagination for Smith is a concept constituting a compound of 
perception and moral judgement.   
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5.3.4  Self’s sympathy as imaginative 
In Smith’s understanding, imaginative capacity of the self for sympathetic judgment 
[moral approbation] can be generalised but not underrated (Oslington 2010, p. 11-12). That is to 
say, the self’s ability to project into the sphere of another self, or see things their way, is an 
exercise undertaken individually in their thinking, acting and judging (Halteman 2003, p. 458). 
This self of an individual can only make the feelings of others accessible by making them 
available as if they were one’s own. It is through imagination that the self comes to sympathise 
with others, on the basis of the imperfect information provided by the filters (Marikoski 1999, p. 
13-14).  
Imagination endeavours to find out something which may fill up the gap by serving as a 
bridge; or at least unites those seemingly distant objects therefore rendering passage of thought 
between them smooth, and natural, and easy. Imagination introduces understanding into human 
experience. It has the ability to transport selves to the scenes of distant and forgotten adventures 
and to imagine oneself acting the part. Therefore, imagination makes past events part of the 
present.            
 When Smith talks about sympathy in terms of a natural desire for approbation, he has 
imagination in mind as the baseline from where he sees the demand of sympathy as intimately 
connected to one’s own natural sociability. This is re-enforced by the fact that most of what 
persons see is not everything that is visible. Persons are required to apply their own senses in 
combination with their imagination. The senses of self alone, ‘never did, and never can carry us 
beyond our own person ... it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what 
are [the other’s] sensations’ (TMS I.i.1.2).  
Imagination is not simply an aptitude of the self for reasoning. It is notable that, the self 
that is sometimes the spectator cannot physically experience the agent’s sensations or feel her 
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emotions, except when she sees the agent’s blood and tears, hears her cries and laughter, and is 
drawn by imagination into the circumstances that gave rise to the process. The spectator of 
another’s unhappiness therefore attempts [through imagination] to put herself in the situation of 
another and to bring to self every infinitesimal circumstance of distress that can possibly occur to 
the sufferer.   
The self of the object of the imagination or the person being observed equally tries to 
make her emotional condition sympathetic to others, by lowering her passion to that acceptable 
pitch that the spectator is capable of going along with in the spectator’s imagination (Seigel 
2005, p.143). She lowers her passion in order to reduce it to harmony and concord with the 
emotions of those around her (TMS I., i. I. I-2; 9), she inadvertently exercises self-love to 
motivate others into sympathy with her. 
5.4  Self-love in Adam Smith’s Works 
 
The question of correctly interpreting what Adam Smith said about self-love in book 1, 
chapter 2 of The Wealth of Nations 1776 (hereafter WN) is a continuing one. It appears founded 
on an agent’s quest that the other must be deliberative, calculative and within limits as well as 
imaginative in appropriating through sympathy the sentiments of her current state.  It is this 
appropriating of sentiments that remains central in Smith’s explanation of the role of self-love in 
motivating parties to exchange, albeit this has been widely misunderstood (Black 2006, p. 7).  
Noticeably, understanding the textual setting of Smith’s reference to self-love is crucial 
to its correct interpretation. The first two chapters of WN must be read as a whole and in light of 
Smith’s idea of “sympathy” from the Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS 1759) for a full meaning 
of the appeal to self-love. A close orientation to TMS and WN about self-love returns no 
necessary dichotomy in human behaviour. Criticisms of Smith for turning political economy into 
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the science of egoism or by founding such science on self-love are unfounded. Adam West 
(1969, p. 95) notes that Smith, in TMS, viewed self-love in the context of Christ’s admonition to 
“love your neighbour as yourself”. More precisely, Smith saw self-love as a Stoic virtue and one 
that could not have implied greed is good. This interpretation is false by a close examination of 
Smith’s reference to self-love in WN.  
Self-love in WN, the word appears twice in the book. Both occurrences are in the same 
strategic place of the often-quoted passage in book 1 chapter 2, where Smith discusses the causes 
of the division of labour (WN, bk. 1, chap. 2, 13–14). This passage while it remains key to self-
love interpretation, it offends many because it seems to prefer selfishness to benevolence. The 
passage also somehow appears to contradict the theme of sympathy as the foundation for moral 
judgments in Smith’s earlier text on moral philosophy (TMS).  
Such apparent contradictions in Smith’s views on human nature comprise the “Adam 
Smith Problem.” But such casual readings of WN that attribute to Smith the worst possible 
meaning of the passage, that he advocated outright selfishness in commercial exchange are 
flawed. Notwithstanding, pure and immoral selfishness is not what Smith meant by self-love. 
Nor is his idea of sympathy purely other oriented or equivalent to benevolence (TMS, 10–11, 
editors’ note 1). Misunderstandings of Smith’s terms beget various misunderstandings of his 
ideas.  
  Smith’s use self-interest and self-love interchangeably at times, probably for variety of 
expression, means simply attending to one’s own interests but not necessarily at others’ expense. 
I argued above that attending to one’s own interests was important to Kant as he drew up his 
ethical demand of duty to oneself. Black (2006, p. 8-9) notes that Smith’s use self-love derived 
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its meaning from the Stoics application that every person is first and principally recommended to 
her own care.  
 Secondly, every person is certainly, in every respect, fitter and abler to take care of 
herself than any other person. This Stoic understanding of self-love is symptomatic, as I shall 
argue later, of the Christian virtue that is corresponding and equal love for one’s neighbour. The 
editors of TMS have raised this understanding in editors’ notes, ‘note 1 in TMS (1976, p. 23-24). 
Examining the passage on self-love in light of a closer investigation of the exact wording of the 
text itself, its immediate context, and the broader context of the first two chapters of WN shows 
how for example, the beggar in WN is crucial to Smith’s meaning regarding the role of self-love.  
5.4.1   Adam Smith on Self-love [self-interest] in WN 
In WN immediate context of paragraph 2 of book 1, chapter 2, and the broader context in 
book 1, chapter 1 and other parts of chapter 2, reveal more precisely what Smith meant about 
self-love. What is needed is a representation of these lesser known ideas in WN that precede the 
more popular passage about self-love. In the first two chapters of book 1 of WN, Smith examines 
the following five themes:  
(1) the division of labour has led to increased productivity (the pin factory); 
(2) the division of labour has also increased the complexity of production 
(the day labourer’s woollen coat);  
(3) human activity tends toward exchange, unlike the animals (the “propensity to truck 
and barter” compared to the apparent cooperation of the racing greyhounds);  
(4) specialization and complexity in production affect the way in which we are able to 
meet our needs (the spaniel and his master versus our relationship to the butcher, the brewer, 
and the baker); and  
  
  
  195 
(5) the beggar is able to meet some needs but not all in a timely fashion. These ideas form 
a unit and harmonize with Smith’s idea in TMS that human behaviour is capable of self-love 
and benevolence, not one or the other. Many would be interpreters of Smith’s discussion on 
self-love leave alone these themes preferring to focus on the most popular texts. An approach 
that focuses on the popular texts does not show for example, how Smith discussed 
specialization and the division of labour, and consequent improvements in machinery multiply 
labour’s productive power, leading to increased exchange and improving living standards. 
 Another motif that is missed out by casual interpreters or readers of WN is, to what 
extent are humans and animals able to meet their needs through mutual exchange, individual 
activity, or begging? While domesticated animals are restricted to dependent effort or to 
begging, animals in the wild act independently. But humans cooperate, and their “propensity to 
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” is a uniquely human tendency. Greyhounds 
running a rabbit may seem to work together, but they do not trade bones. Smith does allow that 
domesticated animals may obtain their needs from humans but not through trade (WN, bk. 1 
chap 2, 118).  
It is on the backdrop of such lesser-known texts that Smith offers his explanation of the 
concept of self-love. He perceives the role of self-love as that of motivating individuals and 
party groups in exchange. He explains that meeting one’s needs in a world tied to the economic 
means of production and exchange including division of labour, complex means of production, 
consumer needs and wants cannot be selfishness, and persons are capable both of self-love and 
benevolence. Nonetheless, Smith’s self-love gets bad press when its application is linked with 
transactions among the locals for whom it is argued benevolence should be the overriding motif 
(Black 2006, p. 15). The local brewer is supposed to trade with her local butcher who in turn is 
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dealing with the local baker; and it is assumed benevolence is the motif underpinning their 
trading relation. Smith’s discussion of self-love did not point to purely selfish behaviour but to 
the efficiency of appealing to the merchant’s self-love rather than to her charity.  
While local tradespersons can appeal to each other’s benevolence for the provision of 
their needs, such appeals will only yield a few supplies at particular times. They cannot appeal 
to each other’s benevolence for the supply of all their needs and wants all of the time. The 
brewer cannot depend on the benevolence of the butcher to supply him the daily portion of 
meat all the time, nor can the butcher depend on the benevolence of the baker for his daily 
supply of bread all the time.  
A point is reached in these exchanges where it becomes necessary for each of these 
tradespersons to acknowledge the limits of each other’s benevolence, whilst they are still 
interested in the product each trader is supplying. Each trader begins to understand that if she is 
to continue to receive her supply of meat, bread, or beer etc., she has to do something else than 
depend on a charitable spirit. None of them can remain charitable to each other at all the times 
by supplying their needs, unless their relationships change where they feel obligated to supply 
each other’s needs and wants.  
However, as an everyday fact, the continual supply of the bread to the butcher by the 
baker, the butcher must create an understanding in the baker that it is in her interest (she the 
baker) to exchange her bread for the butcher’s meat. The exercise is appealing to others’ self-
love, which is less egoistic than begging and generally more beneficial to society (WN, bk. 1, 
chap. 2, 13–14). Smith’s passage above from WN seems problematic to many, as it suggests 
preference to selfishness and not benevolence. Pure and immoral selfishness is not what Smith 
meant by self-love or self-interest. Self-interest and self-love that Smith uses interchangeably, 
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probably for variety of expression, imply attending to one’s own interests but not necessarily at 
others’ expense. West (1969, p. 95) notes that Smith, in TMS, viewed self-love in the context 
of Christ’s admonition to “love your neighbour as yourself”.  
Smith’s analysis of self-love in chapter 2 of book 1 in WN (1976, p. 13-14) does not 
present a narrow psychology of the homo economicus person (West 1969, p. 82). Smith was 
aware that his butcher, brewer, and baker could be benevolent or self-interested. Nevertheless, 
society gains when they mutually meet one another’s needs rather than beg for their needs 
(Philips 1997, p. 51-66). Smith puts the emphasis here on mutual benefits of exchange. He 
criticises begging in the above texts and not poorly defined ideal of mutual benevolence. 
 Begging does not even fully suit the beggar herself because on a productive day of 
begging gifts are lumpy although consumption is smooth. Predictability of goods begged is not 
guaranteed, so that too few gifts of clothing one month and too little food another force the 
beggar to abandon complete dependence on benevolences and to appeal to the self-love of 
others (Black 2006, p. 16). Although occasionally an agent may gain the benevolence of those 
she knows, she cannot depend constantly on their benevolence. This problem is augmented by 
distance and space to exercise sympathy from those to be the agent’s [beggar’s] benefactors, 
and even more worse, when the agent is dependent on the benevolence of those she does not 
know and has never met.   
Smith was concerned less with the shopkeeper but more with the customer, standing in 
need of supplies. Efforts to convince shopkeepers to be more benevolent and ethical in their 
dealings do not violate the sense of the passage above, for it is directed toward the customer: An 
agent will be more able to meet her needs and wants if she appeals to the self-interest, rather than 
to the benevolence, of others.  
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Notwithstanding Smith’s argument, the choice is not necessarily between benevolent or 
self-interested exchanges as many have come to presume. The choice Smith poses is between 
self-interested appeals to others’ self-love through exchange or self-interested appeals to others’ 
benevolence through begging. In begging an agent puts her needs first rather than the needs of 
her benefactor. Smith suggests that even if it means begging, a beggar is more likely to benefit 
the most when appealing to the self-interest of her patron.  
Black (2006, p. 17) writes that ‘appealing to others’ self-interest ensures a steadier and 
more-balanced supply of necessities in a world of complex production.’ Smith should be 
interpreted as saying that a steady, balanced supply of necessities and not self-interest is actually 
the mainspring of mutual exchange. However, complex patterns of exchange in the production 
process make begging inefficient. The connection of self-interest to begging and the division of 
labour is apparent, to the extend that; division of labour causes begging to be a poor method of 
pursuing one’s self-interest. Myers (1983, p. 113) and Black (2006, p. 18) are of the opinion that 
Smith creates a sense in which he links moral philosophy and the division of labour. Myers 
writes, 
 ‘Consequently, the division of labour arises from a desire to serve one’s self-interest but 
in such a way as to engage the self-interest of others’ (Ibid. p. 113).  
 
Myers makes the division of labour depend on self-interest. Black is convinced Smith is 
suggesting a subtler context of the relationship between division of labour and self-interest (pp. 
8-9). The propensity to enter into multiple transactions of production and exchange leads to a 
division of labour and complex patterns of production and trade. These patterns of production 
and exchange must be supported by reciprocating appeals to the self-interest of others in order 
for exchange to be conducted for the social good. These exchanges on their part are depended on 
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the ability of the consumer and the producer through sympathy to appeal to the self-love of the 
other.  
5.4.2   Adam Smith’s Self-love in TMS 
In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, self-love is described as a morally neutral category, 
and the first sentence of the book alludes to what Hume ([1751] 1983, 90) once called the 
“selfish hypothesis” in order to refute it: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are 
evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others” (Smith 
[1759] 1976, I.i.1).           
 Smith develops in TMS a human behaviour system derived not from one, but two 
principles: self-love and sympathy. In TMS self-love is directly referred to or inferred. It is in a 
sense appealing to another’s self-love as the basis for socializing people while remaining 
indifferent of spatial proximity or even in different cultures.  
From the opening of the book (Book I.1.i.1) Smith is convinced however selfish human 
beings may be, there is something that motivates these selfish beings to act unselfishly. If 
promoting cooperation among disparate groups of people is the goal, mutual exchange is a 
powerful tool. Human reason and sympathies tells an agent that, in a world of complex 
production and distribution, society gains when the agent chooses to motivate others to serve her 
by offering to serve them as well. Smith was promoting common courtesy, not unbridled 
selfishness as claimed as critics have alluded.  
In moral theory in TMS an agent approves of the conduct and character of another person 
if, when they imagine themselves to be in that person’s situation, their ‘sympathetic’ feelings 
accord with those that they observe to motivate the person’s behaviour. Similarly, an agent 
disapproves of actions or attitudes that they cannot enter by this sort of imaginative change of 
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situation (Campbell 1975, p.70). In TMS Smith defends the idea that all sentiments depend on 
self-love. He reiterates the thoughts of the first sentence of the book in this, section;  
“…whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may be excited, nothing 
pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our 
own breast;.” (1976, I.i.2.1, p. 13-4) 
 
It is only because an agent has such love for self that by it she is able to associate or 
account for the pleasure or pain of others. Smith was equally aware how self-love could at other 
times arrogate itself (Ibid. II.ii.2.2. This means self-love needs to humble itself to the level others 
can associate with it, since if not properly guarded it can discolour, magnify or misrepresent an 
agent’s view of any given situation (Ibid. III.4.3).  
An agent is not however abandoned entirely to the delusions of self-love (Ibid. III.4.7), 
since by considering the conduct of others the agent is insensibly led to arrive at certain general 
rules concerning what is appropriate and what is not, the former to be engaged in and the later to 
be avoided. When the exercise of considering the conducts of others is repeated again and again, 
the agent begins to form certain habits from which general rules, eventually, are derived.  
These general rules of conduct become fixed in an agent’s mind by habitual reflection. 
They become of great use in correcting misrepresentation of self-love concerning what is 
appropriate and what is not fit to be done in a particular situation. Smith further introduces the 
question of how self-love ought to have regard for the will of the deity (Ibid. III.5.12). He singles 
out regard for the will of the deity to make good for those who believe God’s existence.  
Religion therefore has the propensity to enforce the natural sense of duty to self and 
others in the format of Kantian ethics. This is the reason that an agent puts great confidence in 
the probity of those who are deeply committed to religious sentiments. They are presumed to act 
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under an additional tie, (besides those of the impartial spectator and the man in the breast 
particularly) which regulates the conduct of other people.  
Therefore, natural principles of virtue do not abstract from the truths conveyed to 
humankinds by Divine Revelation.  Human nature of itself is not capable of doing anything 
meritorious without the assistance of Divine and Supernatural grace. Unfortunately, today the 
divine has been left out and the selfish individual is upheld as the centrepiece of economics as a 
science and essential foundation stone of all theoretical achievements. 
5.5  Adam Smith in the context of intellectual history 
 
Smith is discussed more as an economist than the moral philosopher perhaps he was, a 
point from which economists have progressively adopted a more impoverished view of the 
individual. Economists applying economic theory in economics leave out an essential dimension 
of Smith’s moral philosophical vision (Wilson et al 2006, p. 252; Evensky 1987, p. 447-448). 
 Smith wrote considerably on matters of economics, jurisprudence, and astronomy but his 
starting viewpoint was always moral philosophy coached in natural philosophy with distinction 
between natural and moral philosophy. Smith never abandoned the notion that morality must 
ultimately be derived from the purpose or telos for which people were created (Haltmen 2003, p. 
453).  
He did not exclude human telos from his work and his moral system has enduring 
qualities that can sustain the market economy if followers of Smith are willing to integrate his 
moral theory with his economic system. On the contrary, MacIntyre (1984, p. 54) argues that the 
Enlightenment’s quest for unconditional scientific truth, of which Smith is a part of has 
contributed to the marginalization of questions about meaning and value in contemporary 
philosophy and social science. MacIntyre asserts further, the Enlightenment thinkers when 
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dealing with ethics and morality grounded behaviour in speculation about people as they happen 
to be given their nature as well as their social and cultural setting. MacIntyre observes the 
rejection of objective reason as a foundation for ethical and moral judgments cause such 
judgments to fail as meaningful guides in life (Ibid. p. 19).  
MacIntyre is reacting to the fact that, if people are to make sense of moral precepts, they 
must understand their lives as having a telos that originates outside of their own nature and, 
toward which, these moral precepts give guidance. Inside such a teleological framework the 
moral precepts lead to socially constructive behaviour that when institutionalised provides an 
effective social glue. He concludes that Enlightenment thinking, diminished the essential 
importance of teleology faded and moral precepts were left hanging without an anchor (Ibid. 
p.25).  
A side effect of the Enlightenment failure is a world that sees people operating as the 
economic person, homo economicus for which Adam Smith is responsible as one who 
contributed to the decline of a telos-based morality. But blaming Smith for this decline is 
debatable, since Smith appears to have gone to great pains to understand humans as they happen 
to be and as they ought to be to realize their true telos (Haltmen, 2004, p. 456). 
5.5.1   Smith a moral philosopher that was an economist 
Smith saw economics as a branch of moral philosophy and capitalism as an ethical 
project whose success required political commitment to justice and freedom, not merely an 
understanding of economic logistics (Wells 2014, p. 90). Appreciating the difference between 
natural and moral philosophy provided Smith with a vision of how institutions and individuals 
evolve. He figured how their evolution makes possible the development of the civic ethics 
necessary for the emergence of constructive liberal societies. Central to this understanding is the 
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recognition human condition is unique in nature. Subsequently, the nexus of human reason and 
human frailty puts humankind in an unusual and problematic position. Smith is therefore able to 
extend his economic reasoning to a variety of nonmarket exchange problems observes Anderson 
(1988, pp. 1068-1075), to include discussion of religious behaviour. Smith viewed participation 
in religion a rational device by which individuals enhanced the value of their human capital in 
economic perspectives47.  
Economists on the contrary, have not always readily applied their distinctive kinds of 
reasoning to problems other than those involving exchange across well-defined markets in which 
prices are clearly defined. A growing interest is developing where economists now extend 
models of rational maximisation behaviours to problem areas outside of economics. These new 
homo economicus assumptions imply a returning to Smith's conception of human nature as 
incorporating a multiplicity of motives including the capacity for ethical behaviour. Smith it is 
argued adopted language, and not the mechanics as the model of inquiry (Lindgren 1969, p. 899; 
Small 2001edit, p.7-9).  
Smith drew a fundamental distinction between the methods of inquiry in the natural and 
the social sciences. His were narrow technical and mathematical elements that were indirectly 
supported by labelling his methodology Newtonian (Redman 1993, p. 226).  These have become 
however, increasingly amplified in the twentieth century into economics theorems, as economics 
endeavours to dissociate itself from the social sciences and align itself with pure or natural 
sciences. WN is the reason Smith is cast as an economist rather than a moral philosopher. 
                                               
47 Smith provided a religious thought system similar to Max Weber: Weber in his studies in The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism, argued that the redefinition of the connection between work and piety in Protestantism 
and especially in ascetic Protestant denominations, particularly Calvinism, shifted human effort towards rational 
efforts aimed at achieving economic gain. In Protestant religion, Christian piety towards God was expressed through 
one's secular vocation (secularisation of calling). The rational roots of this doctrine, he argued, soon grew 
incompatible with and larger than the religious and so the latter were eventually discarded 
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Readers who do not approach WN singularly from a production; distribution and exchange 
viewpoint will notice that Smith’s projects are rooted in moral philosophy. Economic thinking 
that interprets things in light of their origins and what influenced them has Adam Smith at the 
centre, and the germs of all subsequent economic theories are to be found in Smith’s many-sided 
work.  
Evensky (2005, p.109-110) re-creates Smith’s vision of moral philosophy showing its 
relevance for today and that Smith sought to do for moral philosophy what Isaac Newton had 
done for natural philosophy. Which is to imagine and represent invisible connecting principles 
that determine the course of nature, hence, Smith's moral philosophical realm was humankind. 
 What Smith wanted to portray was not so much the invisible hand of the market, but 
rather the invisible hand of the deity who is responsible for the world in which people live. This 
deity, according to Smith’s natural religion was and is responsible for the principles according to 
which the world has evolved and will evolve in the future. Human beings on their part can learn 
to sense these principles, but they can never acquire full knowledge of them. In TMS Smith 
conceded all kinds of societies are held together by ethical beliefs. The same is true of 
commercial societies that need to be held together by ethical beliefs as well as laws and 
institutions. When commercial societies take into account ethical requirements their economies 
function properly, they flourish. It is increasingly obvious now that, Smith’s formulation of the 
new moral economy of the commercial age was always intended to complement his political 
economy. Fundamentally, pragmatic in its construction Smith’s approach was conceived to 
support markets and developing an increasingly differentiated society. Was Smith therefore more 
of a social scientist than an economist? Economists will answer in the negative because he is 
heralded as the father of modern economic practice and perceived less as a social scientist. Smith 
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and his equals are generally seen as sociological precursors, or figures of historical interest and 
not genuine resources upon which to draw for undertaking sociological investigation (Comim 
2002, p. 93-96). Although there is a general assumption among students of contemporary social 
science, that the content of Scottish thought and providers has nothing substantive to offer, it is 
actually economics in light of Smith that has subsumed his sociological standing. Smith is 
therefore never perceived as a sociologist, just as he rarely is counted on as a moral philosopher, 
this is because his economic reputation has run away with him.  
Unwittingly however, the TMS (originally published in 1759) has fallen outside of social 
science proper. There may be some worth to reading it as a work of sociology alongside the 
Wealth of Nations, seeing the latter book is widely read in social sciences without being strongly 
integrated into histories of sociological thought (Dow 1987, p. 344-48). Given that Smith 
discussed the need for morality in TMS and a legal system in Lectures on Jurisprudence and 
explored the economic dimension of society in WN, the jury is still out even after all these 
decades regarding his writings on the question of unanimity; that these writings contain a system 
that links them all together. The jury is still deliberating on the argument that it is hard to 
reconcile the ideas of TMS (1759) with those of WN (1776). Hence, the so-called Das Adam 
Smith Problem to which we now turn. 
5.6  Adam Smith and contemporary notions of homo economicus 
 
Smith is best known as an economist. Specifically, the defender of the “invisible hand” of 
free-market economics, wherein the self-interested actions of private individuals, mediated 
through free markets are argued to generate results that are good for society as a whole. A great 
deal of contemporary (neo-classical) economics is founded in translating Smith’s invisible hand 
metaphor into a systematic theoretical form, with a particular emphasis on the economic 
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efficiency of perfectly competitive markets. This economic view attributed to Smith has resulted 
into a double erroneous emphasis.  
First, it is based on the narrow foundations of a few selected texts from Smith’s WN 
taken in isolation as summing up Smith’s economic theory. Secondly, these texts have been 
analysed in a particularly narrow way. Together these selections and interpretations are driven by 
contemporary mainstream economists’ interest in justifying orthodox economic methodology 
and their peculiar Mandevillian rather than Smithian assumption of the selfish utility-maximising 
homo economicus.  
Stigler aptly sums up the WN upon which this economic view is founded and writes; 
“The Wealth of Nations is a stupendous palace erected upon the granite of self-interest” (Stigler 
1975, p.237). Homo economicus has become a cornerstone on which economic theories are built. 
It is the prevalent model of human behaviour among economists and has also permeated other 
social sciences through rational choice theory.  
In the standard view of economic theory human beings are integrated, consistent, 
maximizing, utility-seeking, calculating creatures (Roberts 2014, p.227-228). Homo economicus 
is fundamentally self-interested, while not denying that the consumption of others might enter 
one’s utility function. It is the characterization of persons in some economic theories as rational 
beings that pursue wealth for their own self-interest. The economic person is described as 
avoiding unnecessary work by using rational judgment. 
 The assumption that all humans behave in this manner has been a fundamental premise 
for many economic theories. Persky observes that the economic person is “solely as a being who 
desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means for 
obtaining that end” (1995, p. 321), that is to say, obtain wealth, as well as seek to maximize 
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pleasure. The economic person is usually assumed to be perfectly rational and able to predict 
every possible outcome for all her choices, making her decision be the one that will maximize 
her utility. Exclusive of complications such as personality, value, belief, and emotions, economic 
person’s behaviour can be explained by her own self-interested orientation; so, it is assumed. But 
the economic order is not as simple as that.  
Peach (2002, p. 29) observes that the economic order is a complex process with its highly 
developed intensity of division of labour, specialisation combinations and its numberless 
convoluted relationships that make persons dependent on one another to an unprecedented 
degree unlike in the past. On this premise the homo economicus person characterised in 
economic theories as a rational being pursuing wealth for her own self interest (O’Boyle 2007, 
p.321-2) is unsustainable. 
   Smith is notable for claiming that, merely acting on her own self-interest, the economic 
person unintentionally promotes public interests. Ng et al (2008, p. 267) argues freedom of the 
economic person pursuing self-interested gains is not unbounded, because a free market can 
work well only when the divisions of labour and unfettered competition are built on a civilised 
society. It clearly emerges that in real life people do not always make rational decisions based on 
established preferences and complete information.  
In many ways their behaviour contradicts the homo economicus model. The behaviour 
people exhibit trying to cope with the complexity of the world around them is by approximating. 
Because collating and evaluating all the factors of relevance to a decision overtaxes people’s 
mental processing capacities. Subsequently, economic approximation methods may deliver 
serviceable results, but also lead to distorted perceptions and systematic flaws (Schneider 2010, 
p. 3-5). In the light of the financial market crisis, people are more than justified in questioning 
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whether the theory of rational expectations, even in its weak version, describes economic reality 
adequately. Some economists are beginning to question the homo economicus model underlying 
the current economic theories that claim economic persons are driven by self-interest; exercise 
rational behaviour in maximising personal utility and react to constraints and fixed preferences 
from the complete information they have.  
It is argued that as the economic person travelled into neoclassical economics, she 
became an analytical tool for the prediction of outcomes and a model for the self-interested 
utility maximizer operating with finite resources within a society. The neoclassical period 
presented spinoffs of the economic person to behavioural, contractual, and social dimensions as 
criticisms were mounted upon its original concept. The economic person of homo economicus 
became perceived as an abstraction that typifies social behaviour in the market place. Adam 
Smith is credited with the creation of such a figure and of giving it a place in economic science. 
But Smith’s economic person is not such a free flowing person without constraint in exercising 
her economic expertise. 
In the TMS the economic person is governed by natural law and the passion of sympathy. 
Smith embraced not only the analysis of simple acts of exchange, but also issues of opportunism, 
strategic actions and changes in tastes, norms, and sentiments, collusions among agents and a 
reciprocity and altruism as much (Bowles et al 1993, p. 84).  Smith therefore accounted for much 
more than what is embedded in the homo economicus theory. Therefore, the contemporary self 
of the homo economicus is definitely alien to the thought of Adam Smith. Such a self is a 
misconstrued caricature of the true idea of the economic person Adam Smith presented.  
Homo Economicus is an idea very useful just as the idea of a biologic person or physical 
person is accepted as a product of one’s culture. It is not about explaining individuals. It is 
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behaviour about enabling authoritative forecasts of economic variables such as consumption that 
constitutes the aggregation of individual decisions (Schneider 2010, p. 6).  
A sense of abandoning a hedonistic view of homo economicus now prevails after Great 
Crash of 2008, but this does not mean an equally naïve belief that people are wholly-self-
disregarding and virtuous (Hodgeson 2012, p. 4). Human motivation is complex involving more 
than self-interest, is more complex than the theory of homo economicus suggests. Also, an appeal 
solely to self-interest is ultimately self-defeating. Because of the place of moral judgments in 
human activity, economics desperately needs invigorating by the critical study of investigative 
approaches from other social sciences to include theology.  
Although homo economicus theory has fashioned itself as an exact science like physics, 
the moral tradition reflected in Adam smith and Aristotle’s understanding of economics requires 
highlighting and strengthening. Contrary to claims, morality is more than matters of preference, 
convenience, or convention since its claims apply both to the claimant and to others.  
Mackie (1977 cited in Hodgeson 2012, p. 4) observes that moral claims are outcomes of 
deliberations and conversations yet remaining however inescapably emotionally empowered. 
While hailed as the patron saint of homo economicus, Smith has continued to be misinterpreted, 
albeit in TMS he perceived self-regard as foremost in human motivation, but he too had 
undoubtedly a more complex view of human nature than generally attributed to him. He 
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5.7  Conclusion  
 
Smith views human self and the characteristically human way or process of acting or 
sympathy as involving the taking within, hence the pre-reflective anticipation of the attitudes of 
others. Sympathy is the only attitude self strikes in relation to others. It is how the human self 
and its interest are constituted. Smith’s sympathy is not the same as Hume’s sympathy that 
assumes association with considerations of utility.  
While Smith’s description of sympathy as the “communication” of sentiments goes along 
the way with Hume’s subsequent shift in which sympathy was associated more conventionally 
with benevolence, Smith eventually rejected Hume’s claim that sympathy was grounded in 
utility. Sympathy in Smith’s work returns the reader to the metaphor of reflecting mirrors, where 
one sees oneself through others’ eyes, who see themselves through her eyes.  
Sympathy therefore is in keeping with the theme of reflection, and reflections upon 
reflections, (Haig 201, 4). Smith assumed the reflections of a self on the passions, reason, and 
morality. He centred his account of the moral sentiments on the concept of sympathy from where 
the self understood others by putting itself in their situations while judging its own conduct by 
viewing itself from the perspective of an impartial spectator.  
Human faculties of sympathy are therefore both reflexive, that is, reasoned contemplation 
of others and one’s own relations to them. Smith summarily may be perceived to claim human 
moral choices as emerging from a nexus of conflicting agendas of different entities with different 
ends. That suggests a locus of moral responsibility, and a sense of self itself emerging as human 
beings move back and forth between their personal perspectives and the perspectives of others, 
in their attempt to reconcile and adjudicate among the different springs of internal action.  
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The whole movement of the self entering into the passions of others and being able to see 
one’s self with their eyes is depended on imagination (Costello 1997, 93-94). Sympathy for 
Smith depends on imagination by which the self of a person places itself in some other person’s 
situation. Sympathy however, does not flow unchecked and is not automatic and along the way it 
experiences limitations and is always calculative in nature.  
The process is where nature teaches the self of the spectator to assume the circumstances 
of the self principally concerned; it is teaching the later to assume in some measure the 
circumstances of the self of the spectator. It is a position in which they are continually assuming 
and placing themselves each in the position of the other.  For the moment each spectator appears 
devoid of self-regard of preferably self-love and is more concerned with the well being of the 
other.  
Beyond Das Adam Smith Problem, Smith seeks to harness the dominant passion of self-
love for the good of society. Self-love is not necessarily antisocial or a socially destructive 
passion. Self-love can be an extremely potent tool for achieving sociality. Nevertheless, critics 
and proponents of self-love in Adam Smith share the basic conviction that self-love is a problem 
because of its inherent antisocial proper tie.  
I argued that in Adam Smith, reason, law, custom, benevolence, markets, or some 
combination of these regulatory devices could check self-love. Unfortunately, in the evolution of 
economics the theory is stripped of Smith’s intended meaning turning individuals into self-
seeking persons with their own utility as the only standard of morality. Smith's discussion of 
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    Chapter 6    
   Adam Smith and Theology 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this section I discuss the theological dimensions of Smith’s work, and it’s bearing on 
moral life. I begin by asking where was the source that influenced Smith’s theological outlook? 
The familiarity with these influences provides guidance into Smith’s theological content and 
supports efforts in examining neutral concepts like invisible hand, self-interest and self-love in 
Adam Smith’s work. Following after this I will look at Adam Smith’s own interpretation 
(reworking out) of these various theological influences; lastly how he has tried to apply the 
theological content.   
6.2  Adam Smith’s Theological Influences 
 
Smith’s moral philosophy is exceptionally relevant today because, in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis many economists and policy makers are again reflecting on the moral basis of 
the free market. There has been a revived interest in Adam Smith not only because he is known 
for being the father of economics, but also for his ability to embed economics in a broader 
framework of moral philosophy (Adam Smith on the Financial Crisis, in The Economists, 
January 27th, 2015; Bholat 2009, p.60-78; Sen 2009).  
Adam Smith developed important theories about how commercial society could develop 
while maintaining and simultaneously developing a moral framework that could assure harmony. 
I discuss here how Adam Smith’s economic analysis and moral philosophy is embedded in his 
theological worldview.  From the outset, it is notable that there are complicated issues raised 
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regarding Smith’s theological stance. I want to argue that to steer away from them is to risk 
serious damage to understanding Smith’s thought in ignoring this theological dimension. Issues 
raised deepen the understanding of Smith’s theories and well known concepts he employs like 
the invisible hand and impartial spectator that remain complex and subtle.  
Nonetheless, the understanding of Smith’s moral philosophy is especially relevant today 
because, many economists and policy makers are again reflecting on the moral basis of the free 
market. Adam Smith developed important theories about how commercial society could develop 
while maintaining and simultaneously developing a moral framework that could assure harmony. 
No doubt his moral framework was informed by the various theologies he was exposed to, and 
these form our next discussions. 
6.2.1  Stoic Influence on Smith 
Adam Smith’s theology should be firmly placed in the context of the eighteenth century 
within the period of Scottish Enlightenment. To propose and adopt a Smith’s Weltanschauung,48 
one will do so with minor or perhaps no modifications from the Stoics, since the points where 
Smith does not agree with the Stoics, are few and far in between. Smith represents the universe, 
or Nature, as an enormous, sophisticated and subtle machine.  
A machine supervised by an omnipotent, omniscient and beneficent indeed, utilitarian 
deity. The sole aim of the machine and, probably, of the deity himself (TMS VII.ii.3.18), is the 
maximisation of happiness. So, for Smith the world is perfect: one truly lives in a Panglossian 
‘best of all possible worlds’ (Denis 1999, p.73). Since the world is perfect, any appearances to 
the contrary are a result of a human finite partial view of it. It is human failure to grasp ‘all the 
                                               
48 While Weltanschauung remains a concept fundamental to Germany philosophy and epistemology, it none the less 
offers us the ability to refer to Adam Smith’s comprehensive conception or image of the world he inhabited and his 
relations to it.  
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connexions and dependencies of things’. The purpose of philosophy in Smith’s understanding, 
therefore, is to cultivate a fine indifference to whatever occurs (TMS VI.ii.3.3).  
From a theological point of view, Smith espoused a Hutchesonian theology that has 
resonance with Stoicism. It is the case that Smith disparaged Christian enthusiasm and asceticism 
but was attracted to the natural theology of Stoicism. Stoic philosophy remains the primary 
influence on Smith’s ethical thought. It also fundamentally affects his economic theory.... 
Stoicism never lost its hold over Smith’s mind.’ (Raphael and Macfie 1976, p.5-6).  
Smith was attracted to the ‘scientific religion’ of Stoicism on account of its organic 
interpretation of the universe as a designed and integrated system. Such a vision was, Smith 
claims, entirely unknown to the early Greeks. Science proper did not commence until ‘the 
Universe was regarded as a complete machine’, as a coherent system governed by general laws 
and directed to general ends, for ‘Its own preservation and prosperity’, (Smith 1980, p.113, 116–
17). Consequently, Stoicism’s scientific religion is marked by a shift in preoccupation from 
‘irregular’, catastrophic events that Smith purported governed the Christian revealed theology, to 
‘regular events governed by predictable laws’ (Oslington 2007, p. 5). Smith submits that in the 
Greek and Christian religion is where, ‘…. ignorance begot superstition, science gave birth to the 
first theism’ (Smith 1980, p.112–17). Clarke (2000, p.50) considers the main theological 
influence on Smith to have come from Stoic philosophy. Smith rejected the unworldly tradition 
that the soul should be cultivated at the expense of the body and mind.  
Smith also thought that society would be lasting only if it conformed to the laws of divine 
Nature. The proper approach to God was not through the transcendence of the world the wisdom 
of Greek and Christian, but via the world through respect for the rules of Nature. Smith called 
this rule of nature the wisdom of God (Oslington 2007, p.3-4). In eighteenth century Britain the 
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Stoic doctrine that appealed to God and country had become fashionable espousing Stoicism 
naturally.  
Stoicism was seen as a means of taking morals out of revealed religion and putting them 
into philosophy, or in other words as a way to oppose Christian morality. Smith while practicing 
Christian faith did not revert to Stoicism to promote the utilitarian ethic that he rejected. He 
described Stoicism as the most religious of all the ancient sects of philosophers and accepted the 
Stoic notions of Providence, God, and Nature. He however, modified Stoic philosophy to make it 
more compatible with liberalism, but critical that Stoic fatalism had excluded any notion of 
science. The Stoics had never gone beyond declaring that everything was supposed to follow its 
own nature a point Smith strongly supported. Smith argued that Greek and Christian philosophy 
had built on an unscientific notion of a transcendent God.  
Such a God was wholly beyond the world. Smith’s account of theology was also equally 
influenced by the Christian theology of the Scottish’s church that he was brought up with and 
that for which he studied at Oxford. Russell (1961, p.311) claims that the Christian religion 
handed down by the late Roman Empire was in any case constituted of certain philosophical 
beliefs that had been derived from the Stoics. This philosophy included the importance of self-
command as a virtue signalling an Aristotelian teaching. 
The Christian religion that Adam Smith subscribed to would not have been unique to 
espousing the Design argument a central tenet in Stoic’s philosophy. Much of Christianity prior 
to Smith’s time promoted the argument that maintained nature to be the Design of the Deity. 
This thinking increasingly influenced Smith’s form of Christianity and commitment to a 
harmonious natural order and universalism. It had its foundations in the Stoicism of Zeno and 
Marcus Aurelius’ writings, but particularly the latter (Clarke 2000, p. 57).  The Stoic influence 
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on Smith is also brought to light through Raphael and Macfie’s introduction to the standard 
edition of the TMS (1975). 
“Stoic philosophy is the primary influence on Smith's ethical thought. It also 
fundamentally affects his economic theory” (1975 p.5) “Adam Smith's ethics and natural 
theology are predominantly Stoic” (Ibid.  p10). 
 
Stoics’ significantly influenced Smith, and he admired Stoics’ ideas that were popular 
during the Scottish Enlightenment. Smith did not however uncritically embrace all the doctrines 
found in Stoicism. Notwithstanding the Stoic influence on Smith, one cannot be too ready to 
accept as indicated above that Stoicism fully disposed of Christian theological influence on 
Smith. Stoicism and Christianity are not mutually exclusive categories, this is the reason 
Enlightenment Scots were attracted to Christianised Stoicism (Sher 1985, p.325). 
6.2.2   Scottish Church’s Influence  
Besides the Stoics influence on Smith the Church of Scotland had a significant impress 
upon him especially with its Calvinistic theology. It cultivated Smith’s personal convictions by 
locating him in the context of his Scottish Calvinist milieu and the theological ideas at work in 
dogmatic theology as well as the natural theology and moral philosophy of his time (Singh 2013, 
p. 253).  
Calvinistic theology seems to have dominated Scottish life from the 16th century and well 
into the 19th century (Stewart 2003). Calvinism is argued to have been the dominant strand of 
theology of moderate intellectuals in the era of the Scottish Enlightenment. It was a theology that 
emphasised the role of God as creator and sustainer of the world. Its focus on the signs of the 
divine presence as evident in the natural world put the design argument widely assumed to be 
valid at the time, at the centre of its theology and therefore in line with Stoicism.  
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Smith whose work reflects a significant bent towards social sciences must have found 
Calvinism inviting as it addressed the beneficial role of religion in society. Religion was seen to 
contribute to social harmony and order. Smith wrote at a time of change in religious thought and 
this puts into perspective some of his criticisms of religion that appear in TMS. Flanders (2013, 
p.762) concedes that Smith was a child of the secular Enlightenment as well as a friend of the 
atheist David Hume.  
The bulk of recent commentators have concluded that the Scottish Enlightenment was not 
hostile to certain (rational) types of theologies. Smith’s work can therefore be read, and should 
be read, ‘as a transition out of a God-centred universe to one where humans alone make the rules 
and find their own happiness.’49  The ‘new view’50 of Smith’s theology places Smith in the 
mainstream of his time. It is no surprise therefore that Smith argued religion was useful to social 
order and harmony when purged of religious irrational fanaticism and intolerance. Only then 
does faith exercise a cohesive function through the moral direction and its focus on human life. 
Smith carries further a specific criticism of Catholicism in part VII of TMS. Here he refers to 
casuistry, as he locates its cultivation in,  
                                               
49 Considering Flanders’ point, it becomes logical to argue that, although Smith might have repeatedly employed 
such terms as providence, the Author of nature, or the “invisible hand,” and talked of treating moral commands as 
divine laws, such phrases are at best rhetorical flourishes, mere metaphors, or at worst concessions to a less 
enlightened, even benighted, audience. This kind of religious language that Smith employed would not have been 
unique to him. It was a language pervasive in the era in which he wrote and lived. Paul Oslington contributing in 
Adam Smith as Theologian, New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 2 writes in his introduction to the collection, it would 
have “been unusual if [Smith’s] work did not have substantial theological dimensions.” 
50 A new trend of economic historian or historians of economic thought has arisen and is now attempting to re-dress 
the previously held views about Smith and his works. The focus has been to return to Smith’s own intellectual 
context with a particular focus on his works relating to theology. Kleer (1995, p. 275-279) as a strong supporter of 
the new view of Smith’s theology argues that, Smith cannot just be dismissed as having abandoned theology nor that 
his theology was only founded in TMS on ‘the concept of a benevolent divine author of nature’ (1995, p.275). This 
‘original view’ was maintained ‘for a long time thereafter. However, Kleer argues that ‘the principle of a benevolent 
divine author of nature must be considered as one of the cornerstones of Smith’s system of moral philosophy’ (1995, 
p.279). The ‘new view’ (Hill 2001; Alvey 2004 etc.) asserts that Smith held the view that a benevolent deity created 
the universe and that teleological design underpinned Smith’s work. The growing popularity of this ‘new view’ 
reflects dissatisfaction with both versions of the modern view mentioned above. While the evidence for the ‘new 
view’ interpretation is scattered throughout Smith’s works, it is primarily located in the TMS. 
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‘….the custom of auricular confession introduced by the Roman Catholic superstition, in 
times of barbarism and ignorance’ (TMS: 333).  
 
Criticisms by the church of the pre-Galileo view while in Smith’s time were declining (Clarke, 
2000, p.53), they still held sway and were yet to disappear. Smith’s works therefore reflect the 
religious beliefs of his day, a period basically in transition. From a religious point of view this 
was a time linked particularly to the Christian Stoicism of the Scottish Enlightenment. In this 
Christian Stoicism Smith found himself subscribing to a benevolent and wise God who has 
ordered the world so that its moral and scientific laws contribute to human welfare.  
What about Christian faith? Smith leaves no doubt that he finds little attraction in 
Christian doctrine except where it coincides with an enlightened and ‘rational’ (i.e. deist) 
theology.  He seems to obliquely identify himself as a theist in designating theism as a belief and 
devotion to a single, universal ‘God of all’. This is the starting point for him for the natural 
science he admires and seeks to promulgate (Smith 1980, p.112–13 cited by Hill 2001, p.4).  
Such an attempt of promulgation of the natural sciences as the starting point of belief, distances 
him from conventional Christianity whilst at the same time committing him to a belief in one 
God standing in some unique relationship with human beings.  Rothschild (1994, p. 321) is of 
the opinion that Smith’s natural religion is never pious for the mere benefit of a religious 
readership, nor in any way profanely ‘ironical’ as has been suggested.  
Faith for Smith is not in conflict with reason, and he shares with Hume51 his interest in 
the rational explanation of religion and religious institutions, documented in Book V chapter I 
                                               
51 Hume who was friends with Smith and the fact that Hume wrote so freely in their private correspondence suggests 
that Smith understood Hume’s skepticism (Ross 1995, 178-80. Hume espoused his philosophical views on religion 
in terms of the skepticism and naturalism that features significantly in his works the Treatise of Hunan Nature 
(1739-40). Hume is argued to have removed almost all-earlier material in the Treatise that concerned with religion 
on account that he was anxious to avoid causing any “offence” among the orthodox. In the Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding (1748), Hume presented his views on religion in a more substantial and direct manner. In 
Natural History of Religion (1757) and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) both are entirely taken up 
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part III article II of the Wealth of Nations. Smith argued that whatever was taught in universities 
concerning the nature of human mind or of the Deity, such teachings made part of the system of 
physics, and Smith does not seem concerned. He adds that philosophy was taught only as 
subservient to theology. An appreciation of the Calvinist theological elements in Smith shows 
that neither Calvin nor the main strands of subsequent Calvinist theology were opposed to 
scientific investigation.  
There is no suggestion that Smith’s position on religion is undermined by his treatment of 
the relationship between faith and reason. The problem in Christian faith Smith contends, is that 
Christian religion enjoyed a state protected monopoly whereas the ‘pure and rational ‘religion 
                                               
with philosophical issues in religion. The linkage between these various works is that the later writings on religion 
are simply an extension and application of the skeptical and naturalistic principles that Hume developed in his 
earlier writings. There is an intimate connection between Hume's skepticism and naturalism and his irreligious 
objectives and orientation, but this relationship cannot be understood in terms of Hume drawing irreligious 
consequences in his later work from the skeptical and naturalistic principles that he laid down in his earlier work. 
Paul Russell (2013), argues that the traditional account of Hume’s skepticism and naturalism and his irreligious 
[irreligious denotes that Hume aimed at discrediting a vast array of the Christian religion – doctrines of miracles, a 
future life etc., the institution – church, clergy etc.,) …objectives and orientation seriously underestimates the 
irreligious content and aims of Hume's earlier work - particularly in the Treatise. Such a view s liable to overlook 
the way in which 17th and 18th century theological controversies and debates structure and shape Hume's entire 
philosophy — not just his philosophy of religion. Hume's philosophy of religion is integral to his entire 
philosophical system and cannot therefore be viewed as an extraneous outgrowth or extension of earlier concerns 
and commitments that lack any specific irreligious motivation or orientation. 
Hume's views on the subject of religion are not the empiricist/rationalist controversy, but a more fundamental 
dispute between philosophical defenders of Christian theology and their “atheistic” opponents. Hume's philosophical 
writings are particularly concerned with and seek to discredit two proofs for the existence of God — i.e., the 
arguments a priori (cosmological argument) and a posteriori (teleological argument). There are several points from, 
which to starting understanding Hume’s views on the philosophy of religion. I will only name rather than discuss, 
the first empiricism, that is potential for empiricism to produce skeptical conclusions concerning our knowledge of 
God and similar empiricist principles concerning the foundations of human knowledge. The second is the 
cosmological argument and God’s necessary existence.  Third, the argument from design, fourth, the problem of 
evil, fifth, the question of miracles as an essential and fundamental element of the monotheistic religions, sixth is the 
place of immortality and a future state. 
Smith was not always agreed with Hume in spite of their close friendships and private communications. It is claimed 
that a major point of disagreement centres on the question of cause. Hume associated herself with the Godless and 
‘materialist’ system of Epicureanism via his denial of Final Causes and the possibility of evincing a Divine purpose 
(Kettler 1965: 123). He believed instead that order is achieved endogenously via inner self-regulation and growth. 
Smith on the other hand, posits a monistic, externally generated teleology with the universe portrayed as a single 
interdependent and designed unit and not as a collection of autonomous mini-systems that seems to be the case with 
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the example of Stoicism did not have that benefit, thus they had to compete between independent 
sects.52 Smith in (TMS 1975, p.105) accepts a Calvinistic view of the fall writing of the 
irregularity in the human heart or the great disorder in human moral sentiments.  
This apparent disorder however, in the greater scheme of God has a utility in which 
human beings can admire the wisdom of God even in the follies of people. This is a necessary 
part of the plan of the deity or nature (Viner 1927, pp. 205-206).  Smith understands that human 
beings’ limited, and distorted capacities actually works out prolifically in tandem with divine 
providence and humans can be comforted by the fact God the benevolent and all wise Being can 
admit into the system of his government nothing (this to includes evil) that is not necessary for 
the greater good.  Viner observes that  
‘What we have, therefore, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments is an unqualified doctrine 
of a harmonious order of nature, under divine guidance, which promotes the welfare of 
man through the operation of his individual propensities. (Ibid. 206) 
 
Smith’s account of the role of sentiments in the moral life develops with little to no theology, 
apart from pointing out that God implants these sentiments in human beings. Smith sees the 
moral principles that emerge from his account of the moral life as divinely sanctioned. Nature, 
which Smith is analysing, is the product of divine creation and providence to the point that Smith 
considers even flaws in human nature as part of the divine plan (Waterman 2002). 
 
 
                                               
52 Taking the cue from the economic system Smith would argue that, it would be the case that perfect competition 
between diversity of denominations would have produced a culture of tolerance. Such competition would also have 
been responsible for mutual respect whereby over time the teachings of the greater part of each individual sect 
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6.3   Teleology in Adam Smith 
 
The beginning of the design argument goes back to the Socratics, who argued for a 
mechanical or chance foundation of nature (Hurlbutt 1985, p.97-8). Stoics arose and developed a 
philosophical religion of nature based on the teleological53 foundation. Stoicism became virtually 
the official ideology of the Roman Empire exercising an early peak in the teleological doctrine; 
subsequently, the popularity and orthodoxy of the teleological argument followed a cyclical 
pattern (Alvey 2004, p.3, 7- 11). 
I argued above of the Stoics and Scottish church circles from where Smith may have been 
influenced theologically. Whether he continued to make claim to these theologies remains 
debatable. If Adam Smith propagated a theology (let alone a theology of economics), that 
theology significantly hinged upon his application of the metaphor of the invisible hand (Hill 
2001, p.3). It was once widely accepted that the metaphor of the invisible hand54 signalled his 
belief in the existence of a benevolent deity.  Hill observes it is important ‘to remember that 
teleology and the argument from design were still intellectual staples in Smith’s time.’ Therefore 
                                               
53 ‘Teleology’ is a term that had just come into usage in Smith’s time coined in 1728 in eighteenth-century 
philosophical Latin by Christian Wolff in his book Logic (Fulton 1914, p.215; Owens 1968, p.159 cited in Alvey 
2004, p. 4). The term implied final causes in nature and has been readily accepted in modern philosophic 
vocabulary. ‘Final cause,’ the term, itself in turn, extends back to the Scholastic treatment of Aristotle’s theory of 
causation (Fulton 1914, pp. 215-232). In the Physics of Aristotle there were four ‘causes’: the material cause, that is 
the material out of which something is formed; the formal cause, is the form or defining characteristics of the thing; 
the efficient cause, is the agent immediately producing the change in the thing changed; and fourthly, the final cause 
being the end or purpose of the thing changed or produced. Aristotle’s typology of causes was widely used in 
Smith’s time, assumed as background knowledge and used by Smith herself (TMS II.ii.3.5; II.iii.3 title). 
54 Smith is not the first to use the phrase invisible hand, although most economists immediately associate this idea 
with Adam Smith. The last few decades there have been intensive debates among historians of economics as to 
whether Smith used the invisible hand idea in a rhetorical sense or with a theological or providential connotation. 
However interesting these debates are, it was certainly not Smith who coined the term. Smith’s ‘‘invisible hand,’’ 
remains however, one of the very many phrases that have attracted attention albeit there still is no consensus to what 
meaning should be assigned to the phrase, in spite the large body of secondary literature devoted to it. In spite of this 
there is no consensus on what Smith he herself might have intended when he used this expression, or on what role it 
played in Smith’s thought. Estimates of its significance range from the laudatory— ‘‘one of the great ideas of 
history,’’ to the dismissive—‘‘an ironic joke.’’ (Peter Harrison 2011, footnote number 1) 
Commentators are also divided on whether Smith’s ‘‘invisible hand’’ has teleological or providential connotations, 
or whether it is simply a rhetorical device. 
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it will appear any reading of Smith, as an essentially secular mind ought to be approached with 
caution and suspicions of ahistoricity. The design principle was the unit idea of the eighteenth 
century. Arthur Lovejoy (1964, p.10–15 cited in Hill 2001, p.27) defines ‘Unit ideas’ as 
‘endemic assumptions’ that control ‘the course of (our) reflections on almost any subject’ (Love 
Joy 1964 is cited in Myers 1983, p.3).  
A starting point for investigating Smith’s views on teleology is his understanding of 
nature, primarily presented in the TMS. Smith argued that, “In every part of the universe we 
observe means adjusted with the nicest artifice to the ends which they are intended to produce”; 
Smith refers specifically to “the two great purposes of nature, the support of the individual [self-
preservation] and the propagation of the species” (TMS II.ii.3.5).   
He certainly exemplifies the teleological argument to design. Smith shows that 
throughout “every part of the universe” means are nicely adjusted to produce the ends of nature. 
The purposive relations amongst the parts imply a contriver-designer (Hurlbutt 1985, p.8-13). 
For Smith it will seem that, if nature has any ends, it is only for the sake of preservation. At this 
stage in the TMS Smith can infer that God’s wisdom is demonstrated throughout the universe, by 
being adjusted to produce the ends of preservation and precreation.  
Human constitution also follows the design pattern. The uniformity of the design seen 
here, and in the natural theology of Smith’s contemporaries, suggests that there was a single 
designer who drew up a grand blueprint of the universe before creating it in accordance with the 
plan. Not only has Nature determined the human ends but it has endowed humans “with an 
appetite for the means” by which these ends can be realized (TMS II.i.5.10). Smith stresses the 
providential role of nature in the provision of instincts for human beings; the efficient cause of 
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human action is instinct (Cropsey 2001, p.124). Secondly, as a counterpart to this, reason55 is 
downplayed, and thirdly, Smith links his teleological views to the “Director of nature”, teleology 
is one foundation of his theology.  
Teleology argument was strongly offered by the Stoics and Newton. It seems in Smith’s 
time teleology was conventional. Scholars have supposed that Smith’s entire “system of natural 
liberty” rested on this teleological foundation and could not be sustained without it (Kleer 2000, 
Alvey 2004, p.337-339).  However, early in the twentieth century a more secular view arose that 
began to question the place of teleology in Adam Smith’s work. A view strongly endorsed after 
the Second World War. Teleology or final causes, and divine design views initially seen as 
central to understanding Smith’s writings, over time fell out of favour and that trend held its 
place in economics and other social sciences in which Smith is invoked.  
 A new wave of commentators is on the rise and is beginning to undermine the current 
secular orthodoxy that removed teleology from Smith’s work (Alvey, 2004, p. 350-351). A 
teleological view in Smith’s work implies references to a design argument drawn from nature as 
the basis for inferring to an intelligent contriver. Evidence of design drawn from nature becomes 
the foundation for theorizing about God. Smith varied this application of specific arguments and 
analogies over time; however, key features of the design argument and teleology were its link to 
monotheistic religion.           
 Smith also relied on unalterable laws of nature, a general optimistic outlook, and the 
promotion of religious belief in his teleological considerations.  For Smith, the all-encompassing 
                                               
55 Notable here is the fact that reason does not drive human action. The ends of preservation and procreation are 
eminently rational. According to Smith, sub-rational desires lead the means that deliver these ends. As the 
instinctual means are nicely adjusted in us to produce rational to ends and humans could not have constructed these 
instincts, since the means were wisely created by the “Director of nature,” God, in order to achieve the ends, this 
means there is teleology immanent in the human constitution. 
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understanding and application of teleology was aligned on the work of Isaac Newton, who from 
the design argument secured the unity of science and religion—at least in Britain. Smith 
continued to view teleology as implying the arrangement of the human passions as the efficient 
causes that spontaneously bring about benevolent final causes.  
 Alvey suggests this teleology to be immanent in the human constitution or a providential 
path through history (Alvey 2003, p.1). In a teleological account, the operations of nature are 
designed with one or more purpose in mind; the ends of an individual or that of the whole 
species (Dennis 1999, pp. 71-86).  
In cases where the ends of nature were not mutually compatible and therefore clashed, 
Kleer suggest that all apparent imperfections turn out to serve some benevolent purpose; and the 
‘author of nature’ only strives to achieve his ‘main ends’ (Kleer 2000, p. 25). Alvey does not 
think that this would be Smith’s view, and that this view does not fit the nature of Smith’s texts 
(Alvey 2003, p.5). This is because a significant role for human reasoning exists in the WN, 
suggesting that Smith allows a significant role for human reasoning within his teleological 
account.  
Kleer (2003 is perfectly clear that Smith’s teleology has instincts as the efficient causes 
that mechanically bring about the providential final cause(s). This conclusion would seem to 
deny the fact that through his lifetime Smith appears to have shifted from one type of teleology 
to another (Alvey 2003, p. 7). During Smith’s time teleology remained the core of natural 
theology, until Darwinian propositions of evolution as an alternative explanation to the Divine 
design argument. So successful has been the Darwinian argument that in contemporary times 
little is heard of teleology or the design argument. When mentioned, causation is almost always 
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in terms of efficient causation. Teleology has therefore fallen out of fashion after the 
popularization of the Darwinian thesis.  
Teleology has become a victim of secularisation of the natural and social sciences. 
However, if Alvey (2004, p. 2-3) is correct, then the re-examination of the place of teleology in 
Smith’s works is coming back into play, not only that, recent economic crisis has raised 
questions for moral reflection in light of economic policy making and adjudication. Smith’s 
references to a benevolently designed divine order, final causes, and so on, are thoughtful and his 
discussions of teleology are not irrelevant but rather integral components of his argument. 
Smith’s views on theology, however, did develop over time and in some sense, perhaps 
developed away from Christianity. Nevertheless, his fundamental commitment to natural 
theology remained. 
6.4  Theological content in Smith's work 
 
Theory of Moral Sentiments is the main source for Smith’s alleged religiosity, varying 
from his alleged adherence to the doctrines of the Presbyterian version of Christianity, through to 
Providence (God’s plan) and to Deism (belief in an unknowable, all-mighty creator). There is a 
wide range of views concerning the character of Smith’s theology. Haakonssen (2006, p.13-14) 
discuses Smith with certain scepticism,  
“…. whatever (Adam Smith’s) personal religious sentiments may have been of which we 
have no real evidence – he dramatically underplayed all traditional religious ideas of 
conscience as either an inspiration by God or a response to human fear of the might of the 
deity.” 
 
Evidence demonstrating Smith’s religiosity, is variously presented as Christianity, Deism, 
Stoicism, Providential beliefs, or combinations thereof (Evensky 1993, p.205; Denis, 2005, p.1-
32; Wight, 2007, p. 341-58). Markikosi on the other hand observes,  
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“The prevailing scholarly conclusion has been that Smith rejected the Calvinist 
Presbyterianism of his childhood in favour of a natural theology that adopted Stoic 
features found in Smith’s descriptions and understandings of Providence.” (2002, p. 75).  
  
Kennedy (2009b, p.1) observes that scholars ignore where available Smith’s biography, and do 
not consider how it affected the way Smith wrote about religious matters. While Smith may not 
have been a theologian he had very strong theological viewpoints early in his life particularly 
those of a revealed theology56 as expressed in the TMS. Neither the TMS nor the WN was 
designed a theological textbook.  
 Hence Smith’s theology will tend to be implicit in his work particularly the TMS that 
presents his system of moral philosophy more ardently of the two books. Smith refrained, it is 
argued, from making explicit his views on religion in his public writings. It is further claimed 
that reference to controversies over religion, especially accusations of atheism, true or false, 
would have upset Smith’s mother who always indulged him (Ibid. pp. 4-5). This is expressed to 
support how Smith was able to re-edit the TMS from the 1st to the 6th edition between 1784 when 
his mother died and until the year on his own deathbed. Smith made numerous dilutions to his 
theological statements in the final 6th edition of his TMS. But there is no evidence he 
categorically renounced his Christian ethos or religious position.  
                                               
56 Although Kennedy (Ibid. p. 2) suggests that Smith’s time at Oxford diluted the solidity of beliefs, it is difficult to 
account for this. This is because after Oxford he returned to Glasgow where he engaged in devotions at the start of 
his lectures. While the teaching regime at Oxford, Smith does not seem concerned with the content. Smith’s 
willingness to make a ‘solemn promise’ on graduation from Oxford (Scott 1937, p. 42) to be ordained into the 
Church of England and then to become a Minister in the Episcopalian Church in Scotland must have meant 
something significant. 
Adam Smith published Moral Sentiments while at Glasgow University where he conformed in all public respects as 
required from professors at the time. It is believed in 1751 he publicly committed to his being a Christian Protestant 
by reading his dissertation, De Origine Idearum (origins of the idea of 
God), his signing of the Calvinist Confession of Faith before the Presbytery of Glasgow, and by his taking the Oath 
de Fideli (Scott 1937, pp. 138-9; Ross 1995, p. 109). The Kirk Elders rigidly managed public opinion in Glasgow at 
the time (whose motto was: ‘Let Glasgow flourish by the preaching of the Word’- the revealed God). Without 
assurances from his sponsors that he would complete these formalities, Smith would not have been appointed (Scott 
1937, p. 79). 
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Kennedy (2009b, pp.7-16) has provided a detail examination on how Smith appears 
systematically to have reduced down the emphasis of his Christian or religious statements. 
Kennedy’s slide rule suggests that we know sufficient of Smith’s biography to consider how it 
affected the way he wrote about religious matters. The rule concludes that Smith in his later 
years abandoned Christian faith or any form of deism for that matter, although Hill (2001) and 
Alvey (2004) would disagree.        
 Although Coase (1976, p.536) disputed the claim that Adam Smith was a Deist, there are 
numerous instances of where Smith dropped or toned down his original religious statements 
between the 1st and the 6th edition of TMS. This is the period Smith found himself leaning 
toward what was increasingly becoming scientific world, in its reasoning. Smith wanted his work 
to be perceived as scientific in line with the Scottish traditional scholarly thought between1730 – 
1870, rather than theological (Macfie 2009, p.389-91).  
Smith was aligning himself with the characteristic Scottish attitude and method 
ubiquitous in the history of economic thought at this time, the philosophical or the social 
approach. It is this method that Smith was attempting to pattern his work to that compromised 
his assumed religious affiliations. The analytic methods of the WN Book 1 eclipsed the 
philosophic and historical methods of the TMS in which Smith so revelled and showed his Scots 
tradition in philosophic thought.         
 The TMS remains pivotal to Smith’s development, the reason for his continuous editing 
of its earlier materials to provide seamless bedding for the WN. Macfie (2009, pp. 91-392) 
suggests that between Edinburgh and Glasgow universities this method had its foundations in 
Natural Theology (including some Natural Philosophy), and on to Moral Philosophy (thence to 
Justice and Law). It was resulting from this prescription that Smith under the law of contract and 
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private property with its social aspects he developed the broad descriptive collated into WN. 
Smith ably offered critical comments on political economy the kind of discursive comment that 
the philosophic method naturally and richly inspires, and on this foundation Smith’s specialized 
treatment of economics inevitably begins.        
 Such specialisation however, was not unique to him because from the same foundational 
method other Scots gave their own works a special slant toward their own special interest: 
Hutcheson towards morals, Hume towards metaphysical scepticism and history and Ferguson 
towards sociology. Macfie aptly observes that Smith cannot be understood especially from what 
are considered his weaknesses when we disregard the fact that the Scottish method he embraced 
was concerned with giving a broader balanced comprehensive picture from different points of 
view and not a logical meticulousness (Ibid. 392, 399).      
 Smith was a preacher–philosopher of some kind who did not adhere to the law of non-
contradiction as we might read him in contemporary times. He does not follow his analysis into 
its logical components and falls victim of inconsistencies. That is true of his theology which does 
not appear anywhere as a collected body of works, but rather can only be inferred implicitly in 
his surviving corpus. The same thought pattern is applied to his use of the working of the 
spontaneous generation or otherwise the invisible hand arrangement central in his natural 
theology. 
6.5  The Invisible hand embodying hidden theology of Adam Smith 
 
Smith’s idea of the invisible hand continues to attract much attention, while there remains 
no consensus on what he intended in applying the expression. The seeming ambiguity around the 
expression has resulted in it being seen either “one of the great ideas of history,’’ or as ‘‘an 
ironic joke.’’ (Harrison 2011, p.29).         
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 Whether Smith’s ‘‘invisible hand’’ has teleological or providential connotations, or 
whether it is simply a rhetorical device is equally a continuing debate. Smith did not coin the 
phrase, and he did not make it common currency, but the invisible hand remains the most famous 
image in economics attributed to Adam Smith and that has puzzled interpreters. The invisible 
hand is significant as focus for disputes over capacities of markets. Smith’s invisible hand 
summarizes the case for a market economy. Mark Blaug writes:  
“Under certain social arrangements, which we would nowadays describe as workable 
competition, private interests are reconciled with public interests as if by an invisible 
hand” (Blaug 1997, p. 60).  
 
Deirdre McCloskey (2006 p456-8) is of the opinion that the hand reconciles private virtuous 
actions with the common good. Critics of the invisible hand see this image to be Adam Smith’s 
mistake that has cursed subsequent economic analysis (Oslington 2007, p. 1).  There is a fertile 
ground of those who conceive the invisible hand only as a metaphor and nothing more, or as a 
rhetorical use of language while others have suggested it is only incidental to Smith’s scheme 
considering the metaphor was only used at most thrice. To others Smith used the expression 
ironically (Hill 2001, p. 2), and it is the late readings of Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ that has turned it 
into an essentially secular rather than remains Providentialist.  
Hill is persuaded that Adam Smith’s social and economic philosophy is inherently 
theological and that its Providentialist underpinnings cannot be removed without impairing his 
theory of social order. Hill sees an ally in Martin (1990, p. 273) who perceives Smith’s notion of 
a Providential invisible hand not only the centrepiece, but also the unifying principle or 
‘metaphysical core’ of Smith’s entire oeuvre without which much of his thought makes little 
sense. Harrison (2011, p. 45) argues that Smith’s first readers encountering the phrase in his 
writings would naturally have read it in a way that was in keeping with the predominant usage of 
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tis time, as invoking divine providence.       
 Kennedy (2009b, p. 4-5) is not impressed with this conclusion. He suggests that whatever 
evidence is provided for this conclusion is not watertight, seeing that Smith drifted away from 
Christianity as early as 1744 when he deserted his obligation to be ordained and to serve as a 
minister in the Episcopal Church in Scotland. As a matter of fact, the claim of a hidden or 
‘secret’ theology of Smith revealed by examining and disclosing the workings of the invisible 
hand and by exploring its most important constituent elements of faculty psychology and natural 
theology begs the question of wholesomeness. Whatever positions are attributed to the metaphor 
of the invisible hand, they all are but conjectures, since Smith did not elaborate what he implied 
by it.   
Harrison (2001, p. 46) would reply to Kennedy that, Smith casually adopted the invisible 
hand expression on the very few occasions, and introduced it without comment, is to imply his 
acquiescence in its contemporary meaning. Most probable is the fact that if Smith did not intend 
the expression to carry its traditional theological implications, he would have sought for a 
different form of word or words. Actually, the invisible hand expression or idea was relatively 
common in Smith’s time and became increasingly frequent from the seventeenth century onward 
(Hengstmengel 2011, p. 52).          
 There is no doubt that the invisible hand metaphor far from it being presently considered 
a purely secular, materialist approach; Smith assigned it its functions from the argument from 
design to construct a model that is manifestly teleological. This ‘teleological arguments central to 
Smith’s work could be expunged without impairing the cogency of his analysis’ observes (Kleer 
1995, p.275), this makes Glen Morrow’s (1923, p.71) argument that Smith’s moral world is 
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totally secular in arrangement ‘not the order of a divine law-giver’ in my understanding 
misplaced.  
Anthony Flew Morrow (1987, p. 200-1) argues that it is a mistaken gesture to construe 
Smith’s invisible hand as an instrument of divine direction whether this is in the sense of special 
interventions or by reference to design argument. But others (Hill 2001, p. 2; Harrison 2001, 
p.45; Martin 1990, p.272-274) will differ from these claims and argue firstly, that Smith usage of 
the expression that have reference in TMS, first speak of the idea of unintended, yet beneficial, 
consequences. Secondly, the notion is explicit in the excerpt from Moral Sentiments that 
provision for the Deity orchestrated attaining those consequences. It is not only on these specific 
references alone that Smith’s thesis of commitment to a providential understanding of the hand is 
based.  
There are numerous other places particularly in the TMS where Smith seems to be 
affirming providentialist conceptions. He writes that in the economy of human nature, human 
beings are motivated by passions and instincts that are acted upon ‘‘without any consideration of 
their tendency to those beneficent ends which the great Director of nature intended to produce by 
them.’ (TMS II.i.5.10) Subsequently, an individual should direct her attention to the care of her 
own happiness first (implying self-love), that of her family and her friends etc.   
 That is because, ‘‘the care of the universal happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is 
the business of God and not of man.’ (TMS VI.ii.3.6). Harrison has observed that following 
Smith’s train of thought, his use of the invisible hand differed from its use by the Church fathers 
such as Calvin57. While Smith’s use implied the providential matching of proximate human goals 
                                               
57 Calvin tended to the view that God’s providential activity is visible only to the eye of faith. Recognition of God’s 
special providence expressed in revealed theology in particular, required the adoption of a particular attitude to 
events that in other interpretations would be regarded as owing to chance [or what seems to us contingence, faith 
will recognise and accept as the secret impulse of God]. The workings of the secret or invisible hand, in this view, 
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to a general social benefit seems to be attributed to general providence according to Calvin these 
benefits were attributed to actions of a secret special providence. Smith argued that God was 
understood to have instituted general laws that matched human self-love with beneficial social 
ends. Therefore, like all other natural laws of motions, human moral faculties also followed 
general rules that more justly could be referred to as laws of nature. Just like the laws of nature in 
the physical exemplified beneficial design so too are the laws of morality. Smith is perceived to 
imply that the general laws of the moral, as well as of the material world, are wisely and 
beneficently ordered for the welfare of our human species (Harrison 2011, p. 47)58  
 Although the discussion of Adam Smith’s expression of ‘‘invisible hand’’ does not offer 
much in arbitrating between these two interpretations whether it's a secular or providentialist 
expression, perhaps they are not as far apart as they may initially appear. Certainly, on either 
reading, the contention that the invisible hand was ‘‘an ironic joke’’ or ‘‘a rhetorical device’’ 
becomes unsustainable. Even the incredulous hypothesis places providential deism and 
Newtonianism on the same footing, and yet few commentators regard Smith’s references to 
                                               
could not serve as evidence for the existence of God, precisely because they remained invisible to those to whom 
faith was not given.  
The operations of the invisible hand in nature during Adam Smith’s time were rather different, for they were 
typically regarded as falling under God’s general providence—that is, of his law-like and therefore predictable 
provision for his creatures. In the apparent contingencies of history, God’s work was ‘‘invisible’’ not only because it 
was unseen, but also because it was secret and ultimately inexplicable and required to be revealed; in the regular 
operations of nature, God’s activity was unseen, but was nonetheless amenable to rational and indeed mathematical 
explication. For Adam Smith it was precisely the transparent rationality of these newly discovered mathematical 
laws that made them a suitable foundation for a new kind of physico-theological argument. 
58 Smith draws on the strong tradition of the principle of unintended consequences common to the use of the 
expression invisible hand but understands the operation of the invisible hand in the realm of moral economy as 
directly analogous to its regular operations in the natural world. In short, there were certain elements of the revealed 
theology of the contemporary conception of the invisible hand—specifically, those that relied upon a Calvinistic 
conception of special providence—that Smith appears not to have invoked. He however, retained an appeal to 
general providence in a manner consistent with applications of the invisible hand to the natural order. Smith’s ability 
to link up of perceived regularities in the moral and physical realms and his apparent attribution of these to 
providence, provided a clear warrant for reading him as endorsing a general natural theology [as discussed above] 
and of using the invisible hand as another way of speaking about divine providence. Such a stance did not 
necessarily entail an endorsement of Christianity per se, of course, for it was equally consistent with deism or a Stoic 
providentialism (Hill 2001). 
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Newtonian physics as ironic or rhetorical, contrary to what they write of the invisible hand. A 
genuine difficulty with the sceptical hypothesis lies in its potential for self-reference. It seems 
fatally to undermine the validity of Smith’s own efforts to secure an orderly foundation for moral 
economy. If, for Smith, all accounts of the intelligibility of the phenomena of the world, both 
physical and moral, serve only to highlight features of human psychology, it is difficult to see 
how his own moral and economic philosophies could be anything more than impressive products 
of the imagination (Harrison 2011, p. 49).       
 But the same observation could be said of Newton and the law of gravity. That said, 
Smith’s ultimate agnosticism on these questions cannot be definitively ruled out. We could still 
claim that Smith was as committed to providential explanations of the functioning of the moral 
economy as he was to Newtonian explanations of celestial mechanics. That he was conscious of 
being psychologically committed to the validity of both natural science and natural theology. 
 In the specific case, it seems likely, that like the rest of his contemporaries, he believed 
the invisible hand to be the hand of God. It is just that in places he seemed to treat all of such 
beliefs as data for further speculation about general features of human psychology, but this then, 
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6.6 Conclusion 
 
Smith’s work is an attempt to form a descriptive account of the primary processes by 
which communities develop and functions. Smith’s belief system appears to involve 
commitments in a first and final cause of human social behaviour and the institution that support 
it. Smith’s religious thought is complicated because there is no record of his work on natural or 
revealed theology. Evidently, he was more of a Christian philosopher than a theologian proper. 
He most certainly saw himself more as a writer moving in a broad Christian tradition than as a 
theologian.            
 He believed in the existence of a benevolent ‘Providence’, and in a limited extent of 
human control over events. He demonstrated an imitation of Stoic theodicy in his elaborate 
rationalization of apparently vicious human tendencies as indirectly beneficial. Smith would in 
no doubt subscribe to the fact that God exists.  He would argue that the world is the product of 
design and the observable order of regularity in human affairs is a direct result of this design and 
purpose in Nature.          
 Teleology, final causes, and divine design were initially seen as central to understanding 
Smith’s writings. But over time, this view fell out of fashion. With the rise of positivism, the idea 
of teleology has tended to be overlooked or downplayed in its interpretation. A new theistic view 
of Smith’s work is emerging in various interpretations to include teleology that is attempting to 
restore it to its previous position as an essential element in understanding Adam Smith. The 
consensus of this new theistic view is that it presents a new understanding that there is a 
theological viewpoint in Smith’s work, and this theological viewpoint underpins Smith’s moral 
and economic theories. Smith presented the teleological argument, combined with the 
substitution of a utilitarian emphasis on worldly prosperity for conventional definitions of the 
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divine purpose.  I concede in this thesis that for Smith, the world was so designed that a natural 
order would result from individual actions and need not be imposed by the State. This argument 
makes Smith’s belief in a benevolent God, natural order, and natural laws very important, since 
God has established natural laws that regulate individual behaviour to produce social order.  
  Smith’s eighteenth-century religious background and upbringing endowed him 
with the opportunity to use the expression invisible hand a term that has religious connotations to 
describe an economic phenomenon. If the ideal economic order, governed by the invisible hand, 
reflects closely the natural order, an order in some way or other commanded by God, Smith’s use 





















  237 








































  238 
     Chapter 7  
   The message of the Gospel 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 This section begins with a discussion on what constitutes the message of the Gospel. The 
Gospel is appropriated here as a model of the type of personal knowing and witness that gives its 
peculiar status to knowledge in the sympathies. The Gospel according to Matthew, Mark, Luke 
and John constitute a gospel genre, and may each be viewed in comparison with the other 
canonical Gospels in order to bring out its own peculiar slant, particularly the way it reads 
Jesus’s life with hindsight in the light of Easter.       
 Unlike the Greek idea of a Bioi gospels are revelatory statements about who Jesus is and 
what his death means. The Gospels are in fact historical, but they are also theological and 
aretological [virtue-forming] (Long 2013, p. 113). Clusters of discourses associated consistently 
with the gospel message focus on the basic narrative of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ. These clusters include claims that God has brought about salvation through the work of 
Jesus Christ, in an effort consistent with the work of God expressed in the Hebrew Scriptures in 
Old Testament (Campbell 2009. p. 111).  
 The dissertation discussion initiated a claim that the proclamation of the Gospel includes 
an invitation to recognise and accept in a personal decision “the saving Lordship of Christ.”  The 
proclamation of the good news of gospel is not a disinterested storytelling. Whilst the concept of 
disinterestedness still harbours intonations of actions that satisfy self-propelled achievements, I 
argued that self-love is a legitimate attitude tied to one’s relationship that begins in God who 
lives in eternal triune relationship, the creator of all that is very good. I will argue later that the 
gospel message of good news that Jesus proclaimed when presented, is capable of changing 
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personal dispositions, and it appeals to the personal interest of the hearer. The individual is 
invited to make a decision by herself. She responds to Jesus’ call for the Kingdom addressed to 
her self-love. It is to the self-love [self-interest] of each individual Jesus appeals. 
 Philosophically I discussed earlier beginning with Aristotle who showed self-loving is 
one of the virtues of a good life, people are self-loving and more importantly people are self-
loving through as a means of loving others. This explains that when people love others it is 
because they are close to the point that they see themselves in their friends, and by loving their 
friends, they are self-loving.         
 Following Aristotle, Augustine on his part attempted to reconcile self-love and self-denial 
in a unified Christian love and arrived at the conclusion that in loving God an agent [a person] is 
able to love others and self. In discussing Kant, it became apparent that self-love is in essence a 
duty to oneself that one cannot deny herself that duty, for to do so is to err. In the preceding 
section on Adam Smith, I discussed how self-love is a formative of practical rationality in an 
agent that is appealed to by others.         
 This is because self-love is part of the structure of a properly formed character that comes 
about via receiving the right kind of love. This practical rational individual becomes a self-lover, 
and the message of the gospel Jesus proclaimed from its reservoir in the gospels appeals to her as 
a self-lover. This claim is especially apt for bringing out the way that the Gospel story serves as a 
narrative illustration of what is known theologically through faith in Jesus Christ and 
experienced in worship and liturgy. Gospels are theological documents based on historical 
events, contributing to theology and practice but remain sui generis in character. In the sections 
to follow I will discuss although not exhaustively; first in an appraisal manner the content of the 
gospel as a message of beliefs received and professed by Christian communities focused on the 
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“gospel” as basic narrative work of God in Jesus Christ and the claims he consistently made 
about this narrative.          
 Secondly, I will then discuss the language of the Gospel which remain unique and does 
not permit the genre to `flow into history nor ebb out totally into a biography’. This is the 
language used by the early Christian communities through which they expressed Jesus’ 
significance in the lives of the people whom he met and who believed in him. Thirdly, I will 
discuss how the Gospels are considered consummate work of interpretations of how Jesus was 
experienced.            
 Lastly, I will follow this discussion with the gospel’s ability to interpellate individuals as 
subjects and how Jesus’ interpellation carried out in the message of the gospel demands a 
response. My focus now is the Gospels wherein is embedded the claim of self-love. Gospels 
provide texts of discussions featuring the use of the bible in Christian discourse on self-love in 
New Testament text of Mathew 22:39 an adaptation of the Old Testament Leviticus 19: 18 text’s 
rendering of self-love. 
7.1.1 The message of the Gospel 
  Gospel reads as a kind of biography, the life-story of Jesus of Nazareth and purports to be 
a true story about events among a certain people in a particular time and place. It might 
correspondingly be assimilated superficially to history. Gospel is in crucial respects sui generis 
and while considered as a literary genre, is not to be confounded with history or biography. It is 
not about facts of Jesus, but what he meant to these disciples.     
 It shows Jesus revealed God to them in himself becoming their saviour. Central to the 
Gospel is the witness to the power of Jesus to transform human lives and give a fresh meaning. 
The Gospel proclaims a message of salvation rather than simply telling Jesus’ story for its own 
  
  
  241 
sake. The shared meaning of the gospel revolves around the simple narrative that is told by it, of 
Christ’s life, death, and resurrection (Campbell 2009, p. 112). It is the death and resurrection of 
Christ that is the consistent core of the message. 
The Gospel is a prototypical category of subjective knowing and witness that gives its 
peculiar status to knowledge in the humankinds (Franke 2012, p. 413-414). The core message of 
the gospel is the particular way it reads the Jesus’ life retrospectively in the light of Easter. It is 
this revelation of the salvation of the world through Jesus that is core to the message of the 
Gospel.            
 At stake in this revelation is the claim that Jesus is the embodiment of God’s presence in 
the world. Jesus is the Son from the Father who uniquely reveals the way to the Father and 
imparts life and light. In imparting life and light, he gives identity to the people who share it. The 
Gospels represent a consummate work of interpretation, and it is not necessarily about 
disinterested love or disinterestedness. It is about redemptive love that remains consistent with 
Christian faith and self-love.          
 This is the interpretation the present gospels in the form of scriptural witness to God’s 
love revealed in Christ to the world present.  This interpretation has its emphasis on the facts of 
Jesus’ life recounted not for their own sake, but as a testimonial of faith and in order to reveal an 
overarching order of significance, a providential plan for history and redemption (Ibid. p. 415).  
Hooker (2001, p.33) suggests that the gospel as good news is good news of Jesus the person and 
the message he proclaims. She suggests that Mark’s introduction, “Mark’s purpose is clearly to 
set out not just the beginning of the good news, but the good news itself.”  The good news is 
therefore about Jesus and the good news is Jesus herself. He satisfies the understanding of good 
news subjectively as well as objectively. Subjectively the good news is from Jesus and 
  
  
  242 
objectively the good news is about Jesus and it is not necessary to choose between the two. 
Consequently, the good news demonstrates the relation between a fixed essence so-called love 
and the analysis of need and value.         
 This relation results in a constant interweaving of Christian experience and non-Christian 
experience in the perpetual attempt to discover the actions called for by the redemptive love. 
Three areas of focus will be of help to our understanding of the message of the gospel.  These 
three are, the language of the message of the gospel, the place of interpretation and the subject 
who interprets the texts. The primary quest is how the meaning of a gospel text can be discerned 
and displayed in very profound ways by those who respond to scripture as it makes a direct and, 
existential call on their lives. 
7.1.2 The Language of the Gospel 
The language of the gospel is that of the early Christian community, by which these 
communities’ recounted facts of Jesus’ life as a testimonial of faith that revealed an overarching 
providential plan for history and redemption of human kind. The gospels are more than historical 
sources or literary artefacts, not only in their embodiments in the lives of believers but also in 
their formative role in the practices if Christian faith (Burton 2006, p. 8).   
 Stanton (1989, p. 3) observes that Christians acknowledge Jesus as the Son of God for 
which there must be historical evidence support such a claim. The claim forms the basic gospel 
message embedded in New Testament texts and transmitted first through an oral tradition that 
formed the foundation of early Christian creeds (Campbell 2009, p. 13), and aided structure the 
canon of Christian scripture as it developed in the first through the fourth centuries CE.  
Christians accept that in Jesus’ teaching and actions, in his death and resurrection, God 
disclosed himself to mankind in new ways. The need to reconstruct the life and character of 
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Jesus with a sufficient degree of confidence to make such claims meaningful becomes an 
obvious requirement. Stanton (2004, p.13-20) has made important and helpful strides toward 
understanding the origins and development of ‘gospel’ language in earliest Christianity. Stanton 
sees the ‘gospel’ language of the early Christians as having its roots in the post-exilic hopes of 
Deutero-Isaiah.           
 Hooker (2001, p.34) makes similar Isaiah reference where the good news proclaimed is 
the imminent salvation that God is going to work out for his people (Isaiah 40: 9; 52:7; 60:6; 
61:1). This concept describes the ‘good news’ of God’s kingship and his sovereign deliverance 
of his exiled people. Stanton considers this motif an important part of Jesus’ own self-
understanding and his ministry. The good news of Jesus Christ therefore is God’s good news 
expressed in Old Testament first but becomes a continuation with the new gospel an extension of 
God’s emancipation and sovereignty on earth.   
This message is first uniquely expressed in and through the life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus. Snodgrass (2005, p. 31) speaks of dissimilarity between ‘the gospel of Jesus’ and the 
‘gospel about Jesus’. He perceives the ‘gospel of Jesus’ as the distinct message and ministry of 
Jesus. Whereas, the ‘gospel about Jesus’ is the ‘good news’ preached by the early Christian 
church. The ‘gospel’ message preached by Jesus on earth is however, the basis for and the 
backbone of the ‘gospel’ message that was expounded by the church after his death and 
resurrection. The concept of conceiving the Christian message as ‘good news’ stem from Jesus’ 
own appropriation of the motif.  Pahl (2006, p. 212) suggests that the motif of Jesus, as the 
embodiment of these ‘good news’ was present in the late Second Temple Jewish eschatological 
expectation. This understanding therefore must be what motivated the early Christian 
community’s use of noun euangelion. Hooker (2001, p.33) is of the opinion that this Greek word 
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euangelion translated as ‘gospel’ but now understood, as the ‘good news’ was not yet a technical 
term implying a document of any kind. Hooker suggests that nobody before Mark had written a 
‘gospel.’ Albeit Mark’s first readers would have understood Mark in this ‘gospel’ document to 
be referring to a message (Diehl 2o11, p. 173) and that message to be that, which was proclaimed 
by early Christian preachers, but not necessarily to a particular literary arrangement. 
Stanton detects that the ‘gospel’ language of the early Christians mirrored that of the 
Roman imperial propaganda (Stanton 2004, p.22-35). He provides evidence of recent epigraphic 
research into this broader historical and textual study showing that although imperial propaganda 
focused on to the imperial cult, it was not limited to the cult. It was rather widespread in the 
northeast quadrant of the Roman Empire throughout the first century (Ibid. p. 28-32). Therefore, 
evangel language as such was not unique to what we presently accept as the biblical text of the 
gospel but was language relatively common and widely accessible in promoting the imperial 
agenda in this region.  
Pahl (2006, p.212) infers from the grammar in Stanton’s work, that the plural ‘good 
news’ – euangelia – tended to focus on those occasions of accession of emperors and their 
subsequent benefaction to the Empire, to the throne. These were accessions reciprocated by civic 
celebrations and religious sacrifices on behalf of the emperor. Contrary to the world of emperors 
however, the early Christians employed the singular - euangelion as the ultimate message of 
‘good news’ for the world. One would obviously assume that, if this language of the gospel as 
‘good news’ was widespread as such, it could have been applicable to all strata of society within 
the empire a feature from which the Christian community was bound to benefit. This inevitably 
seems to be case in point for these Christian communities. The communities must have used the 
term with full knowledge of its association with the imperial ‘good tidings.’ Stanton (2004, p.52-
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59) sees development in early Christianity in the use of – euangelion from its civic use– 
appearing in the Pauline works in reference to the orally proclaimed salvific message about Jesus 
centred on his death and resurrection. Whilst there is no written gospel in Pauline writings59, 
there is also no evidence of pre-Easter Jesus tradition as an integral part of Paul’s – euangelion – 
good news. Paul however, acknowledges that all the apostles can be described to have 
proclaimed the good news in traditional terms (1 Cor. 15:1-11).  But this post-Easter apostolic 
tradition is not a tradition believed to have originated with the pre-resurrection life and ministry 
of Jesus of Nazareth. Notwithstanding, Paul believed the Jesus tradition included comment on 
the proclamation of the gospel. For Paul the proclamation of the gospel did not of necessity 
include the Jesus tradition of pre-Easter events.       
 Retrospectively however, for Paul – euangelion - the orally proclaimed salvific message 
about Jesus centred on his death and resurrection.  This message, Hengel (2000, p. 61) describes 
as ‘the living “message of salvation”, preached orally and with a Christological stamp’, 
suggesting perhaps the message is also the person. Here is provided the opportunity to 
understand the good news to be either objective news about Jesus Christ or the subjective news 
from Jesus, the two stands undivided. 
7.1.3 Gospels as consummate work of interpretation  
The gospels’ texts resemblances to other literary genres are deceptive, for the Gospel is in 
crucial respects sui generis. Gospel, considered as a literary genre, is not to be confounded with 
history or biography (Diehl 2011, p. 171-2; Blomberg 1997, p. 107). Its purpose is not to narrate 
the facts of Jesus’ life per se, but rather to show what Jesus meant to his disciples. It is the 
                                               
59 It is agreed widely that Pauline writings were produced much earlier than the Gospels, and yet this technical term 
of ‘gospel’ is missing in record of application in Paul’s works or those works produced any time earlier than Mark’s 
wittings (Hooker 2001, 33-34).   
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kerygma, or the proclaimed message given by God for the benefit of his people (Hortbury 2005, 
p. 12).  Unambiguously, the Gospel shows Jesus revealed God to the disciples [and ultimately to 
all his followers] in himself and thereby became their Saviour. The Gospel witnesses to the 
power of Jesus to transform human lives and give them a new meaning. Gospel as ‘‘good news’’ 
is meant to change people’s lives. It declares a salvific message and not simply telling a Jesus’ 
story. If the Gospels only presented the objective facts of Jesus’ historical existence60, they could 
not say what is most important about him that is revealed only by his significance in the lives of 
the people whom he meets and those who believe in him.      
 It is this life-transforming power experienced by the individuals who were changed by 
their belief in him that is supremely important, indeed miraculous.  Gospels accurately seen even 
just as literature, should not be read as transparent to the historical Jesus, but as testimonies of 
faith (Diehl 2011, p.192-3). But even if they were to be read as transparent to the historical Jesus, 
there is a particular manner that Christian usage of the Gospel narratives has assumed.  
The Christian usage has tended to see the Gospel narratives as the fit enactment of their 
authors’ intentions. The primary kind of usage that Christians have made of these particular texts 
(for example the passion – resurrection sequences in the Gospels) is not one where the reader 
looks for a hidden intention ‘that will open up an esoteric meaning behind the façade of their 
apparent meaning’ (Higton 2004, p. 204).       
 Although readers may make observation regarding the intentions of the authors over a 
certain text, such intentions are never meant to run counter to the surface meaning of the texts. 
                                               
60 Albert Schweitzer’s, The Quest for the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of Its Progress from Raimarus to Wrede 
(trans. W. Montgomery; London: A. & C. Black, 1910, remains a pioneering work in the search for the historical 
Jesus. Contemporary continuations of this quest include John Dominic Crossan, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a 
Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1991) and John P. Meier, Jesus: A Marginal Jew. 
Rethinking the Historical Jesus (New York: Doubleday, 1991). 
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The four canonical gospels have recorded fundamentally how Jesus was experienced. On 
considering the texts and the massage of the gospels; what is of crucial importance is what 
meaning does that which is recounted as gospel have for those who experienced and perhaps still 
experience it?  It is this meaning that can be interpreted and re-experienced as true by readers in 
all ages and today’s readers.         
 Excluding, that the Gospel is witness to purportedly historical happenings, it is fully 
unveiled certainly not as naked history but rather always only for those who have made the 
commitment and decision of faith. It is not a surprise that gospel texts therefore have Jesus as the 
narrative subject of the action and where he is not the subject he is its chief object. This claim 
presents a problem that is; where to place or how to interpret Jesus’ own utterances as they are 
presented in the New Testament text.        
 These utterances for example, have been seen as allegories, or classical parable with a 
single central lesson. Then there is the question of whether the parables of Jesus should be 
treated as human parables rather than sacred texts, a process useful perhaps if one was in search 
for the original words of Jesus, although the process may not yield a trustworthy accounts of 
God’s special revelation. The difficulty of this claim is augmented by the fact that there is 
literally no language and no parables of Jesus except insofar as such can be retrieved and 
reconstructed from within the language of the earliest interpreters (Davis 1988, p.193). 
Alexander (2006, p.17) observes that gospel narrative structures work as folktale, since the 
accounts are told for the sake of the events.   
The narrators and audience are principally interested in the events, with Jesus as the hero. 
His followers were given new hope and were empowered to love in previously unattainable ways 
for which they could not possibly have accounted otherwise.  The written gospels hence had a 
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dynamic twofaced interface with oral performances, by being viewed as deposits of oral 
teachings and preaching of Jesus (Ibid. 22).        
 These texts were used as the foundation for on going oral instructions in the early church. 
Therefore, behind what we have today as the written texts of the gospels is a structured teaching 
tradition of oral materials. From the point of view of the four gospels, these materials were 
shaped by repetitious delivery and in accordance Hence, each manuscript of the four gospels 
appear aimed at a specific audience.         
 An important point to emphasise is the continuity observed between the oral tradition and 
text. Alexander observes that, ‘the gospels were little more than compilations of pre-existent 
units of material, arranged and selected like pearls on a string.’ (Ibid.  p.24). Each pearl in its 
interdependency to the others adds something of its own uniqueness to the string. Subsequently, 
when we look at each narrative stringed in each respective canonical gospel of the four gospels, 
it brings its own uniqueness in its interdependency to other narratives.    
 The same can be claimed of the four canonical gospels, which can also be stringed as 
pearls on a string with each exhibiting the qualities and uniqueness of the narratives within it. In 
all these understandings the centre of this oral tradition is ‘all that Jesus began to do and teach’ 
(Acts 1: 1). The centre of Christianity in fact remains the person of Jesus, and the existence of 
the gospels is in itself a testimony this fact.  It is this person of Jesus that is hailing any who will 
stop and answer, to be transformed from mere individuals into subjects (Davis 2012, p. 882; 
Althusser 1971, p. 174). The Gospel in embodying the message of Jesus calls out, and the one so 
called turns around in response (religious wording, repents) 
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7.1.4 The Gospel interpellates individuals as subjects 
The Gospel message hails and interpellates individuals, calling all who hear it to 
conversion of life in the light of the truth it discloses. Persons become subjects of the gospel 
message to the extent that they respond to such hails. They are constituted or interpellated as 
individuals through the process of responding to hails by the gospel.  
Louis Althusser popularized interpellation as a word in his seminal essay “Althusser, 
Louis, 1971, Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (Notes towards an investigation), In 
Lenin and philosophy and other essays, Trans. B. Brewster, New York: Monthly Review Press.) 
Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” is argued at two key points:  
 First, that ideology is disseminated by the ruling class, he argues that state institutions, 
such as public schools, are designed to circulate ideology that in turn supports the state itself; 
secondly, he redefines ideology as something that is constitutive of the social order rather than 
something that merely props up the dominant social order. Althusser explored the relationship 
between the state, modes of (re) producing power and ideology from a Marxist perspective, 
defining ideology as “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence” (Althusser 1971: p.162).  
Althusser, on closer examination in the manner in which he talks about ideology in; 
Althusser, Loui, 2008. On Ideology, Trans. by Ben Brewster, London: Verso; and in 1971. 
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, Monthly 
Review Press; Althusser appears to contradict himself in insisting on ideology as ‘imaginary’ 
and on being ‘constituted’. He claims ideology is “imaginary” and not real and that in fact, 
ideology masks reality, but then concedes that ideology as a matter of fact is constitutive of 
reality; that is to say, ideology creates what is real in the sense of the set of the identities that 
interpellate human beings as subjects. Martin (2013, p. 408) asks, ‘How can ideology be 
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constitutive of reality and be imaginary at the same time?’ Martin’s own response is that, it is not 
possible for one ‘to be interpellated as a citizen—and thereby really constituted as a citizen and 
simultaneously for’ her citizenship to be imaginary. Foucault on his part, while accepting 
Althusser’s idea that subjects are constituted through hailing or Interpellation, nonetheless does 
not apply these two terms; he is persuaded this makes nonsense of the opposition between 
ideology (as something imaginary) and truth. Foucault writes,  
‘The notion of ideology . . . always stands in virtual opposition to something else that is 
supposed to count as truth. Now, I believe that the problem does not consist in drawing 
the line between that which, in a discourse, falls under the category of scientificity or 
truth, and that which comes under some other category; rather, it consists in seeing 
historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses that, in themselves, are 
neither true nor false. (Foucault 2000, p. 119) 
 
Foucault implies that a concept like “citizen” central to Althusser’s theory of Ideological State 
Apparatus is neither true nor false. Furthermore, the use of the discourse of “citizenship” is not 
“imaginary” but rather, produces citizens about which persons can make true and false 
statements. One can truly be a citizen or make statements about them only when a discourse on 
citizenship is regnant such that interpellation makes the truth possible rather than obscures or 
masks it. Martin following Foucault has observed that, ‘… it has been extremely difficult to 
maintain an epistemology according to which we can clearly establish something as definitively 
“true.” I perceive Martin suggesting without something that is definitively “true,” how can we 
contrast truth with ideology? (2013, p. 409). Martin reiterates, Foucault is right to point out that 
what Althusser calls ideology is constitutive of truth rather than merely imaginary; but Martin 
quickly adds that this claim does not rule out the ‘possibility of “imaginary” ideologies that 
obscure or mystify social relations.’  
I concede the two features firstly, of ideology as representing the imaginary relationship 
of individuals to their real condition of existence (Althusser 2008, p. 36) and secondly, that all 
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ideology has the function of constituting individuals as subject (p. 45), to remain as a creative 
way he redefines ideology. Althusser saw ideology functioning as a mediator between systems of 
power [religious, ethical, economic, political, as examples] and individuals. Althusser attempted 
to show the relationship between domination and subjugation by introducing the interpellation 
process, where individuals recognize themselves as subjects through ideology, thus illustrating 
how subjects can be complicit in their own domination. Ideology was not a passive relation 
between the economic base and superstructure. Ideology is a pervasive set of dynamic conditions 
suffusing the institutional apparatus of the state and shaping not just the idea of the person as 
subject, but more importantly for theorists to follow clarifying in structural terms the idea of a 
subject position. It is in this concord political and psychological forces converged to define 
possibilities of action and forces of constraint and repression.       
 More importantly it seems, Althusser wanted to demonstrate as a good Marxist, how 
Marx’s understanding of ideology could prove that that, “The ultimate condition of production is 
in essence the reproduction of production.”  Althusser analysed Marx’s social concepts from two 
perspectives; from the point of view of practice and production . . . and from that of reproduction 
on the other” (1971, p.136). Althusser acknowledges that all institutions in a given state proclaim 
their specific ideology, whether that institution is a state run institution or private. For Hirst 
(2007, p. 398) ideology is a representation of people's 'lived relation' to their conditions of 
existence and that this relation is ‘imaginary’. Althusser claims that ideology for him ‘represents 
the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence’ (1971, p.162), 
whereas for Hirst all ideology entails the Subject as a pole of the 'imaginary' relation whereby all 
such ideologies have common characteristics at all times regardless of the specific socio-
historical circumstances in question (2007, p.393-4).  
  
  
  252 
For Althusser, ideology is constituted in what he terms ideological state apparatuses in 
which he discuses how ideology interpellates or hails persons as subjects. By interpellation 
Althusseer sees ideology as calling out or singling out individuals. All ideology [ethical, 
religious, political, or legal] hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects (1971, 
p. 173).            
 For Althusser, ideology is the lived relation between human beings and their worlds and 
universals because there will never be a totality in which the human subjects who lives in social 
relations can understand them through experience (El Hassan 1986, p. 53). This is because social 
totalities do not exist in a form accessible to experience. Hence, relationship between human 
beings and their lived conditions of existence is, and will ever be, imaginary as indicated above. 
Full knowledge of social relations can never be attained since human beings are, ‘as if’, they are 
living these conditions. 
7.1.5   Judith Butler on Althusser’s Interpellations posing an impossible scene 
Althusser is quick to observe that “individuals are always-already interpellated by 
ideology as subjects”, which implies that “individuals are always-already subjects”, “even before 
she is born” (Ibid. p. 176). Judith Butler (1997b, p. 10-11) concurs with Althusser that the 
interpellative naming is, the individual’s entry into intelligibility and its guarantee of existence 
and legibility. She contends that accounts of interpellation present “an impossible scene,” that of 
a body or individual “that is, strictly speaking, not accessible to us, but that nevertheless becomes 
accessible on the occasion of…an interpellation that does not ‘discover’ this body, but 
constitutes it fundamentally” (Butler 1997a, p.5). Furthermore, the “Individual” for Butler, is not 
a term one can really make sense of as “individuals… acquire their intelligibility by becoming 
subjects” (Butler 1997b, 11). On account of this, Davis (2012, p. 883) concedes that any mention 
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of individuals presents the impossible situation, where one must implicitly presume, in advance, 
the subjects they will become. Althusser has no problem with the term individual even though he 
does not define who or what the ‘individual’ is. He makes it clear that this is not an individual 
that pre-exists the subject (Althusser 1971, p. 175) because the existence of ideology and the 
interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing”.   
 Althusser’s (1971, 175) claim is contrary to Butler (1997b, p. 11) for whom individuals 
must first be subjected through interpellative process. “Individual” for Althusser is a term that 
was necessary to enable him to express the processes of interpellation in a manner that one could 
grasp, and because of its use, one may have thought that there was an individual before the 
subject, an individual that became a subject in the turn. 
Althusser particularises on the workings of interpellation in his essay, “ with a religious 
example: The Christian Religious Ideology” (Althusser 1971, 177–83). He explains that, as the 
structures of all ideologies are the same, the religious, as it is “accessible to everyone” (p. 177) 
provides an ideal ideology where interpellation is exercised. Butler grants this claim but is 
nonetheless critical of Althusser’s choice of example. For her the choice suggests all ideology is 
necessarily theological. Consequently, for Butler the divine power of naming, structures the 
theory of interpellation. Althusser is therefore claiming that social ideology “assimilates social 
interpellation to the divine performative” and so institutes a regime of sovereign authorization 
for all subjectivity (Butler 1997b, 110).  
Butler challenges the divine naming that makes the hailing compelling and authoritative, 
because as divine, it is a “voice almost impossible to refuse” in its command that one must 
submit. A point I have sympathy with Butler. The significance of this, for Butler is that this 
divine authorizing power manifests through each and every interpellative apparatus. State 
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authorities and ISAs (Ideological State Apparatuses) such as the law and its representative the 
policeman, become conduits for the divine voice. The hailing of the passer-by becomes a divine 
imperative made secular, working through the same, non-refusable command as the voice of God 
(Butler 1997b, 110). Again, this makes it impossible to interrogate the authority of this divine 
voice. 
7.1.6 The Gospel message as religious ideology 
Judith Butler has argued that it is difficult for a person to hear the hailing of a divine 
command even if it proceeds from a non-religious state apparatus and ignore. That is it is 
impossible for one to cross-examine the voice of the divine. How then does the gospel message 
as religious ideology get to interpellate individuals as subject? Religious ideology always 
functions as a mediator between the gospel and individuals. The gospel message proclaimed by 
Jesus is addressed to specific human individuals that can be referred to by a specific name.  
 This message of the gospel as proclaimed by Jesus tells them of God who exists and to 
whom the hearers are answerable. Jesus proclaiming the message of the Kingdom of God, he is 
the voice of God. Although Jesus in his time addressed the crowds, still the hearers were 
expected to respond individually. 
…….a police officer shouting out “Hey, you there!” in public. Upon hearing this 
exclamation, an individual turns around, and “by this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-
degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject” (Althusser, 1971: 174). 
 
 The gospel message interpellates individuals because its aim is to transform them into 
what Althusser calls ‘subjects’. The gospel message by interpellating the individual it makes the 
subject free to obey or disobey the appeal (Ibid. 178). I observed that Jesus proclaims the good 
news and at the same time he is the good news. If his message calls the individual by name the 
hearer, is as if addressed by name, thus recognising that she is always –already interpellated as a 
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subject with personal identity, she is expected to respond.       
 If the message of the gospel was to interpellate the individuals in such a specific way that 
she responds, ‘It is I”; if it obtains from that recognition that the ‘I’ really occupies the place of 
the person interpellated, then the message of the gospel that interpellated becomes the main 
Subject. It is this Subject which hails the individual as subject. The Gospel message [Subject} 
interpellates individuals as subjects while presupposing the existence of a Unique and central 
Other Subject in whose Name the religious ideology interpellates all individuals as subjects.  
The Gospel message defines itself as the Subject through itself and for itself, and it is 
itself the message that interpellates its subject, the named individual. The individual called 
recognises that she is the subject, a subject of the Subject and subjected to the Subject. God in 
the message of the gospel is the Subject and we are the subjects interpellated, the Subject’s 
interlocutors-interpellates (Ibid. 179). The message of the gospel thus suggests that, God needs 
us; the Subject needs subjects, just as subjects need Subject. The great Subject needs subjects 
and subjects respond to the Subject by interpellation. The good news message given by Jesus 
“hails,” each individual to fulfil the role of the Christian disciple. Jesus in proclaiming the good 
news language functioned to enlist individuals in a belief system in which they fulfilled specific 
subject roles.  Hooker (2001, p.15) observes that the gospel was to be read aloud in a 
congregation and not privately. This reading aloud is synonymous with the police hailing in the 
street ‘Hey you”, and for the reading Hooker (Ibid. 16) argues was done in toto, or at least in 
large sections, in essence interpellating. If Hooker’s conclusions are correct, then reading aloud 
the gospel texts in public, accords with Althusser’s theory where ‘hailing’ is made in the public 
to draw the attention of a given individual. For Althusser as subjects –in – ideology, Jesus’ 
hearers, each is the subject of language or ideology having to obey its rules and the laws and 
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therefore behaves as that ideology dictates (Klages 2006, p.134-135).  The enhancement of 
language skills by listening to Jesus’ claims in his messages should serve to create listeners as 
subjects of the ideology [Judaism of Jesus] communicated through Jesus’ oral speech.   
 It is clear that language skills are also required for written text, the acquisition of 
language is the process of becoming subject and enhanced understanding of language re-enforces 
how the reader or listener become subject of and to the ideology of the Gospel which is 
Christianity. According to Althusser ideology interpellates individual subjects as subjects.  
 Persons are all always caught up in the process in which they voluntarily acknowledge 
the validity or relevance of the dominant ideology in which they live for themselves and 
therefore subject themselves to it. In the act of acknowledging that it is indeed she who is 
addressed, [when the policeman shout ‘Hey, you there’] the individual thus recognizes her 
subjecthood. One may observe that the individual really has no choice in this matter, but to yield 
to the hail, “Hey you there!” a point of contention between Althusser and Butler.  
If the individual hailed however, was to ignore the call she would sooner or later be forced to 
adhere to it. It is of particular interest that for Althusser (perhaps as a practicing Roman Catholic), 
the most telling examples of the operation of ideology are religious, including his vivid term for 
how the subject is “called61” or “hailed”, interpellation, transferred to the political domain.  In 
Althusser’s account, ideology as such has no history since it is carried in the material, institutional 
forms of social life, and is always submerged back into them (Martin 2013, p. 407-8; Davis 2012, 
p.888-889). Althusser implies that the analytical problem is to preserve a critical focus on the 
                                               
61 Althusser must have had in mind the religious significance of calling, where God calls with respect to men/women 
when he designates them to some special office [Exodus 31: 2; Isaiah 22: 20; Acts 13: 2] and when God invites 
men/women to accept his offered grace. This is evidence in the message of the gospel where God’s call is addressed 
to all people – Jews and gentiles alike [Mathew 28: 19; Mark 16:15; Romans 9; 24, 25; ] 
  
  
  257 
moment of “calling,” as it is at this point the interpellated subject is both created as a subject by 
being called, and subsumed by the very acknowledgement that, “It is I” who is being called (Hirst 
1976, p. 405).  In this sense, one is always dealing with ideologies, not a monolithic doctrine, that 
may show up in any arena of social life, in the family, the school, the church, political parties, 
government, and so on.           
  Althusser’s theory is however plagued with difficulties and many have taken Althusser to 
task (Butler 1997a, 1997b, 200262; Choi 2012). The theory however gives a premise from which to 
consider how the oral message of the gospel as good news functioned in Jesus’ time, and how the 
written text creates subjects of those who read or hear it read in contemporary times. 
Jesus’ proclamations while on earth interpellated his hearers to a role of discipleship. Just 
like the policeman shouting ‘Hey you there!” in public (according to Althusser), so too Jesus’ 
utterances compel the listener to recognise who she herself is, and the need to respond and 
commit to following Jesus’ teachings.        
 In contemporary times when the text is read, the text interpellates its readers to this same 
role of Christian discipleship. One point of contention in this theory is that the hearer or reader of 
the text can refuse to assume the position of subject in the ideology, in which case she cannot be 
                                               
62 Judith Butler’s work presents a continuing challenge to the notion of the subject as a given and self-contained, 
bounded entity that somehow internalizes an external social system synonymous with Althusserian theory of 
ideology. Proposing a subject as a performative (re) materialization of its social environment, she offers the 
possibility for re-envisioning subjects as intimately entangled within their contexts as performative materializations 
of social values and norms. Butler’s performative materialization of the subject and its entry into intelligibility, is 
founded on her examining Louis Althusser’s notion of interpellation as, she notes, it still underlies much 
contemporary theorization of subject-formation (Althusser 1971; Butler 1997b, 106). Althusser’s theory of 
interpellation forms the basis for Butler’s own work on performativity and subjectivity. Butler’s narrative however, 
conceptualises subjectivity in Althusser’s work that is negative and restrictive in vision and by it she has identified 
constitutive paradoxes of subjection in Althusser. While Althusser is plagued with ambiguities in his text, it seems 
these ambiguities are paramount in support to an alternative view of subjectivity to that of Butler. To which Davis 
(2012, p. 882-886), suggests that Althusser’s ambiguities allows one to theorize a materialization of subjectivity that 
does not depend on the notions of subjugation, guilt, and submission that are attendant on Butler’s rendition, but 
rather one that offers a more open, welcoming view of what it is to be a subject. Butler thus, attempts to invert 
Althiusser’s theory of interpellation while using it to conceptualise the subject as a performative materialisation of 
its social environment. 
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controlled by it. To refuse to be controlled, in fact in a culture where the policeman is not vested 
with authority the hailing is of no significance.       
 Equally true the individual being hailed by the gospel message may avoid subjection 
without realising or acknowledging the ideology they reject. The Gospel proclaimed by Jesus 
was able to interpellate the hearers because Jesus was founding his proclamation on beliefs his 
hearers had already acquired; this is because the Judaic ideology already sustained control over 
their actions.  It influenced their beliefs and actions. They could not claim ignorance of the 
ideological system in which they lived and in which Jesus proclaimed the message, neither could 
they claim to have misunderstood the basis of its ideas.      
 It is also true that one’s ideologies may not always be the result of interpellation. Such 
ideologies could develop independently or even in spite of hailing, and that is how perhaps those 
who have never heard about the message of the good news nor have Christian tradition influence 
come to be hailed (Romans 1: 20-21) by the good news of the gospel of Jesus. 
7.1.7  Jesus’ interpellation demands response  
The message of the Gospel shows how Jesus revealed God to the disciples in himself and 
thereby becoming their Saviour (Healey 1988, p.305). Jesus’ proclamation of the Good News of 
the Reign of God looked for reciprocation as a social good. This is because without it one can 
form no reliable expectations regarding the conduct of others and life would become utterly 
unpredictable as "social intercourse” approaches chaos.      
 The message of the Gospel is a witness to the power of Jesus to transform human lives 
and therefore giving them a new meaning (Johnson 2006, p.643, 647) of love of God and self-
love. It is good news that is meant to change people, acting from a sense of disinterestedness to 
self-valuing. Good news proclaims a message of salvation. When the Gospels are objective and 
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present facts of Jesus’ historical existence, they cannot say on their own what is most important 
about him. Because what is important about Jesus is revealed only by his significance in the lives 
of the people interpellated and who believe in him and are therefore changed. It is this life-
transforming power of Jesus that remains indispensable about him for the individuals who are 
changed by their belief in him (Wilson 2013, The Telegraph 26th December 2013).  Jesus in 
essence demonstrated a steadfast and forgiving divine love that should not be misconstrued as 
beyond self-concern, on the contrary as indicative of such. That love is supremely important if 
not indeed miraculous.  
Followers of Jesus are therefore given hope and empowered to love in previously 
unattainable ways for which they cannot account for otherwise. Jesus message tied to the Jewish 
people in the first instance practiced Judaism that idealises love as a fellowship. Later on it will 
become apparent that Jesus embraced the hope of becoming in his lifetime, a causa efficiens 
summoning fresh love into existence that would reflect back to himself.  We can argue that Jesus 
was disappointed due to the moral failures of those surrounding him and therefore not effecting 
the transformation he anticipated.         
 There is no doubt that through the cross Jesus became the exemplar of forgiveness, a 
transforming power exemplified by him and the salvation Christians associate with his sacrifice 
(Wawrykow 2012, p. 21-22). It is this transforming power that defies what historians may truly 
say about Jesus, since they write about a man, but cannot do anything beyond that to say in the 
least what it is that transforms those who put their belief in Jesus. Indeed, the idea of Jesus being 
divine, the Son of God that defies what historians make as observable and recorded facts.  
It is important to record that Jesus spent his public life preaching the Good News of the 
Reign of God, and it can be assumed that the deepest desire of his heart was that people would 
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respond to his proclamation and have a change of heart. Such a conviction was only meaningful 
only in the context of personal relationship. Therefore, the message of the Gospel makes sense 
when appropriated as testimonies of faith, rather than transparent literature to the historical Jesus 
(Schroter 2008, p. 195-197). The New Testament texts serve as the Gospel message to 
demonstrate how Jesus was experienced.        
 The message of the Gospel is always directed towards an actualisation of God’s saving 
grace through Jesus. As I have already indicated, intrinsic to the Gospel message, as a genre is 
purpose beyond just recording what happened, it is a testimony of how Jesus was experienced. 
The gospel is the particular way of reading Jesus’ life retrospectively in the light of Easter. 
 It is apparent that Orthodox Christological interpretation of this Easter message has 
centred on the claimed disinterested love that Jesus demonstrated in his dying on the cross. This 
Selfless love records that agape as self-sacrifice is rooted in a Christology that concentrates upon 
Jesus’ self-immolation upon the cross (Andolsen 1981, p. 69).  On her part Harrison (1985, p.17-
18) observes that the Orthodox Christological interpretations somehow implying that the 
meaning of Jesus’ life and work was to be found in Jesus’ impetuous sprint toward Golgotha and 
on toward crucifixion is false. She argues that Jesus did not seek suffering as an end in itself so 
as to complete the resolution of the divine human drama once and for all.  
Her response to Jesus’ Easter action is that, rather than Jesus being motivated by a lust 
for sacrifice, Jesus was actually motivated by his power of mutuality. I concur with Harrison’s 
conclusion, self-abnegation is not the central feature of love let alone divine love for the world, 
and by making it so we have "deeply confused the Christian moral tradition" (Ibid. p.18).  
One standard text of the agape tradition declares that, like the rain and sunshine, God's 
love falls on all persons therefore human love should imitate God's (Mt 5:43-48). Because God's 
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agape extends universally, it includes one’s own self. Altruistic agapists hold that Christian love 
excludes self-love; they imply that as a Christian one ought not love what God loves. That one 
must exclude from her love precisely that object of God's love that is most available to her and 
that is herself.            
 It means one must exclude that self whom she is most able to help. If she excludes any 
loving involvement with her own-self then she will most surely fail in some of love’s most 
central tasks (Vacek 1994, p.262-63). Within a Catholic framework, on the other hand, grace is 
believed to enable Christians to cooperate with or participate in God's own love, and that 
includes love of self. A new understanding of certain New Testament passages that have 
traditionally been read as challenges "to transcend reciprocal love” is needed in order to recover 
the prophetic tradition capable of addressing the accepted Christian teaching of a selfless divinity 
interpellating all.  
7.1.8 Conclusion  
The gospel is the central element in a fairly small cluster of interrelated beliefs and 
practices that have consistently characterized Christian communities that have persisted through 
a sequence of larger host cultures. The starting point to describe the gospel in Christian 
traditions, as attested to requires exploring some consistently related beliefs and practices, 
including the proclamation of the gospel itself, the professing of the Christian faith and 
identification with the Christian community through the sacraments.    
 Also included is the worship of the triune God, and the study and explication of the 
Christian scriptures normed by the gospel narrative. I have only examined in an appraisal way 
the content of the message of the gospel of and about Jesus, language of communication and the 
gospel as consummate works of interpretations. I discussed how the gospel interpellates 
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individuals as subjects and how Jesus’s interpellations demand a response. The composition of 
the Gospel materials allowed a discussion showing how early Christians who believed that Jesus 
had lived and died in a real historical setting, were able to describe these events in objective 
terms, as we see in the canonical Gospels. 
Pursuant to the discussion on the use of the bible in Christian discourses of self-love, in 
contemporary discussions of Jesus I argued the gospel [message] could actually be obscured by 
gospels [the text]. That is to say the gospel message that preceded the writing of the New 
Testament texts can be obscured by analysis of these texts and other early Christian literature 
abstracted from the earlier Christian traditions that the gospel literature transmitted. The gospel 
as the central message of Christian churches in contemporary times can also be obscured by 
claims that there is not or cannot be such a central message and by focusing almost exclusively 
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7.2 The use of the bible in Christian discourse on self-love 
 
7.2.1  Introduction  
While the Biblical injunction to love one's neighbour as oneself is a 'central pillar of 
morality', logical difficulties prevent its functioning as a genuine moral principle. Its 
importance to morality must lie elsewhere in uses other than as a straightforwardly choice-
directing imperative.  The general and obvious interpretation of the love commandment is not 
integral to morality, not even as 'an ideal which gives direction to one’s moral aspirations. 
However, once one acknowledges how the injunction generally is interpreted in the moral 
traditions in which the commandment ordinarily functions, the logical problems disappear 
(Radcliffe 1994, p. 497).  
Notwithstanding its incoherence as a moral imperative, this second greatest 
commandment remains the foundation from which many appeal for biblical morality, and 
arguments for self-love are derived (Leviticus 19:18; Mathew 22:39). In the Hebraic tradition 
the injunctions of Leviticus 19: 17-18 provided foundations for other works like the Jubilees 
and Josephus’s writings on loving your fellow as yourself (Livneh 2011, p.173-174). The 
interlacing of Leviticus 19:17–18 into stories concerning different generations of Israel’s 
ancestors also serves as a means of illustrating the right relations to be practiced between the 
Israelites and/or between Israel and the Gentiles. Jacob, the prototype of Israel, is portrayed as 
fulfilling the commandment to “Love your fellow as yourself,” while his sons, representing the 
Israelites as a whole, ultimately come to constitute the model of brotherly love (Ibid. p. 198). 
Classical Judaism upholds that the biblical commandment, “You shall love your neighbour as 
yourself” (Lev. 19:18), expresses the heart of the Torah as the essence of Judaism: its ethics 
and its theology (Neusner 2008, p. 294).  
The Mathew 22; 39 text injunction to love your neighbour as yourself in the New 
Testament, functions canonically as the central law or moral principle par excellence (Reinhard 
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2013, p. 5). Neighbour love is a central problem to Christian thinkers of the New Testament, 
where the neighbour has acted as a doctrinal shibboleth for the separation and opposition of 
Jewish and Christian ethics.    
One could be justified in arguing that the neighbour in modern-day time is responsible 
for the emergence of the secular world from the Christian line of interpretation. Neighbour love 
nevertheless, remains significantly important for any considerations of self-love. Many in 
Christian psychology as well as evangelical teachers employ Mathew 22:39 texts as the biblical 
underpinnings for self-love concept. The primacy of these texts provides two familiar divisions 
of psychological interpretation. The first interpretation audaciously asserts that this second 
greatest commandment among other things, is a command to love one’s self (Fisher 1992, 9; 
Trobisch 1976, p.8).  
The second division embraces a greater number of self-esteem advocates. It maintains 
that self-love in these passages is a desirable and necessary part of the emotional well being of 
every individual, but not necessarily a command (Stafford 1992, p.38). While the core of this 
argument lie in its definition of the word "love," proponents take it that love coincides with the 
accepted Christian understanding of self-regard. It is to deliberately love, value, and honour 
one’s self, established on one’s possession of the imago Dei and Christ’s sacrifice for that 
individual. In some cases proponents have viewed accompanying interpretation as proof that 
"love" in this context is equivalent to self-esteem (Young 1983, p.265-272; Narramore 1978, 
p.37). But, Matthew chapter 22:39 reads simply, “A second [command] is like it: ‘You shall 
love your neighbour as yourself.” I argue from the outset that the use of the bible in the 
Christian discourse on self-love does not suggest self-esteem at all in any form or shape. Self-
esteem is a judgment of oneself as well as an attitude toward the self. Self-love is not a person's 
overall subjective emotional evaluation of her own worth. The Mathew and Leviticus texts are 
the platform from which I discuss the use of the bible in the discourse on self-love. 
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7.2.2 Old Testament’s Leviticus Text’s Rendering of Self-love (Leviticus 19: 18) 
The book of Leviticus’ central focus is holiness. Leviticus conceptualizes holiness as a 
unity of proper ethical and ritual conduct and also affirms that religion is not a private matter 
between the individual and God. Leviticus recognizes that one regularly moves between states 
of purity and impurity hence, its legislation is designed for a community that resides in God's 
eternal presence while living in the everyday terrestrial world. Holiness is a theme so highly 
methodical in this document of laws issued to govern the civil and religious life of Israel. It is 
more than ritual cleanliness, proper sacrifices, clean and unclean foods (Wright 1983, p.26); it 
encompasses God’s own holiness that is thoroughly practical.  
In Old Testament terms holiness is the very essence of God (Ibid. p.27). It demanded 
that Israel’s quality of life reflect the very heart of God’s character. Leviticus continues the 
legislation begun in Exodus that forms a self-contained unit that divides at chapter 16 (the Day 
of Atonement). The theology of the Holiness Code (Leviticus chapters 17-26) required that 
resident aliens [a very specific group of people who, according to the Priestly tradition 
consisting of non-Israelites who dwelled in the land of Israel], together with the people of Israel 
to obey certain cultic regulations (Kaminsky 2008, p. 124).     
 Because Leviticus consists mainly of the Priestly Code (Exodus 25, Leviticus 16) and 
the Holiness Code (Leviticus 17-26) that are considered to be corrective measures for specific 
instances of religious failure (Sailhamer 1992, 344), it does not constitute a complete and 
systematic set of instructions of Israelites’ religious system. The regulations are paradigmatic 
and representative, serving as principles for cases and incidents not mentioned in the inspired 
scroll (Childs 1985, p.159). The regulations in Leviticus 19 are not exhaustive but illustrative; 
they required the Israelite to do more than comply with these injunctions alone. She was 
expected to respond similarly in situations for which there are no specific guidelines. 
 Additionally, because the list consists mostly of prohibitions, the self-love implied 
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seems to refers to how one would wish to be treated by another since one can hardly rob, 
slander, or financially defraud one’s self. This self-love first entails caring for the physical and 
material well being of another. Secondly, it concerns the emotional welfare of others by 
instructing the Israelite to care for her neighbour’s reputation, honour, dignity, and happiness.  
Subsequently, the self-love mentioned in 19:18 refers to the innate preoccupation of 
human beings in pursuing procedures that promote their physical and emotional well being, 
whether they can achieve the outcome themselves or are desirous of that treatment from others. 
Leviticus 19: 33-34, the comparative clause "as yourself" reveals the meaning of self-love to 
be the inborn desire for fair treatment and charity. In no way does this understanding suggest 
that, when the OT commands to love one’s neighbour as herself, an overall understanding of 
what it means must include the vital ingredient of suppressing self love to execute brotherly 
love. Brotherly love cannot be the same as neighbourly love.  
Makujina (1997, p.217-218) parallels Leviticus 19 with 1st Samuel 18 and 20 and 
concludes that self-love implied in these texts and particularly the Samuel texts where Jonathan 
is claimed to have loved David as himself is a form of forfeiture. The context texts surrounding 
Jonathan’s actions suggest David had been declared King in waiting, in hindsight he had 
assumed Jonathan’s position of succession to Saul.   Whatever brotherly love of 1st Samuel 18: 
1, 3 may have replaced Jonathan’s self-love; there is no suggestion Jonathan divested himself 
of his own love. All things considered he simply was operating with self-love as the inborn 
desire for fair treatment and charity. Jonathan and any one extending love to the neighbour is 
in all intents responding to the fact that the individual desires the overall well being of the 
neighbour as one desired the good for oneself. 
7.2.3 Self-love a view from New Testament Text Mathew 22: 39 
 
I argued above that the commandment love your neighbour as yourself canonically is 
the ethical essence of Christianity functioning in tandem with the commandment to love ‘God.’ 
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While self-love is implied in love of neighbour, neighbour love itself seems far from rational 
and appears deeply enigmatic demanding a rethink to the nature of subjectivity, responsibility 
and even community.  To sceptical readers religious or secular, neighbour love is an obstacle 
to its own theorisation than a roadmap to ethical living. Reinhard argues that neighbour love is 
not a law to be obeyed literally, nor a theory definitively exemplified, it can only be proved by 
its exception (2013, p.5). Neighbour love does not seem to subscribe to the general thinking, 
that all ethical imperatives involve some ambiguity and therefore requires some form of 
interpretation. Neighbour love serves as a test for affective bond of some sort between the other 
and the self. 
In popular circles this Mathew 22: 39 is often paraded as a text that teaches that we are 
commanded to love ourselves; although R. T. France (1985, p.320), considers ‘As yourself’ to 
imply rather than command, a basically self-centred orientation that Jesus requires disciples to 
overcome. If the texts should be seen as a command to love ourselves, then the implied meaning 
is, “You shall love your neighbour just as you are to love yourself.” But such a view appears 
spurious, stemming from the need to place self-actualization at the top of the pecking order of 
one’s goals.  
It is a secular psychologists’ understanding that made its way into Christian 
psychological treatises (Tjeltveit 2006, p. 9-11; Schmid 2008; Roberts 2007, p.301-303). 
Nonetheless, the statement naturally assumes that persons have a certain desire for their own 
wellbeing. It is therefore assumed that if this text presupposes a command, then the command 
assigns an equal concern for the wellbeing of others as one’s self. Self-love is not a virtue that 
Scripture commends, but as one of the facts of our humanity is that it recognises and tells us to 
use as a standard (Wilson et al 1998, p. 411-12). Therefore, interpreting self-love as a command 
to love self is fallacious. The Mathean verse 39 appears to yield the following expanded 
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translation: “You shall love your neighbour as you already do love yourself.”  Thus, self-love 
is assumed in this text, not commanded.  
The argument for this claim firstly, rests on the fact that in the New Testament Greek 
grammar a comparison normally sets up a standard or norm against which some position is put 
forth.  The Greek particle ὡς suggesting even as, like as (Wallace 2004) is the primary means 
used to suggest such a comparison in the New Testament (and is used in Matt 22:39 of the text 
above).        
When applied the comparison reads for example, in Matt 12:13, Jesus healed a 
woman’s hand, “making it whole, like the other one.”  The whole hand was the standard against 
which the now healed hand was measured.  In Matt 17:2, Jesus’ face “shone like the sun,” the 
sun is the standard by which the comparison is to be made.  In Matt 28:4, the soldiers guarding 
the tomb of Jesus “became like dead men” when they saw the angel. In Pauline writings, Rom 
9:27, the number of the sons of Israel is to be “like (ὡς) the sands of the sea.”  In 2 Tim 2:9 
Paul says that he is wearing chains “like (ὡς) a criminal,” and the Petrine text of 1st Peter 1:24 
says, “all flesh is like (ὡς) grass.”   
In all these texts a comparison is made wherein each comparison starts with a standard 
or norm.  But if Matt 22:39 implies two commands as some suggest, then there is no standard 
of comparison. To argue that we should love our neighbour as much as we should love 
ourselves sets up no standard, no norm.  Secondly, there is particular application of this particle, 
ὡς sometimes found subsequent to a command. When applied, what verb is to be implied in 
the ὡς clause?  At all times, the indicative should be read63. That is, the comparison is not of a 
command to a command, but of a command to a standard that is already being followed.   
                                               
63 Not infrequently, the verb is actually stated.  The indicative is the mood found.  Cf. Matt 5:48 ("be perfect as 
your Father in heaven is perfect"); 6:12 ("forgive us our debts, as we have forgiven our debtors"); 8:13; 15:28; 
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This argument suggests examples like, Matt 6:5—” When you pray, do not be like the 
hypocrites [are]”; Luke 15:19—”treat me as [you would] one of your hired servants” or 2 Thess 
3:15—”Do not look on him as [you would] an enemy, but regard him as a brother”. This 
understanding presupposes self-love as biblical but hardly commanded. It is biblical in that it 
is assumed to be true (cf. Eph 5:29). The primary proof-text for such is Matt 22:3964 that 
demonstrates the text to mean that self-love is assumed, not commanded.  Further, there are 
numerous texts that suggest that our lives need to be other-directed. Phil 2:3 “regard one 
another as more important than yourselves”, suggests we ought to counter-balance any notion 
that our focus in life ought to be on self.   
7.2.4  Conclusion 
Lev 19:18 is central texts in Judaism and Christianity, but one surrounded with potential 
difficulties when placing too much weight upon this single verse in its interpretation. One may 
observe that there might be a problem if one loves one's neighbour only as much as one loves 
oneself. What happens when one does not love oneself enough and thereby wrongs and 
degrades herself? Should she treat others as she does herself? Love of God and love of 
neighbour as self belong together expressing metaphysical as well as ethical concreteness, and 
while they be distinguished they must not be separated. To love God demands openness to 
God’s creative undertakings where one’s self is drawn into that project following God’s 
divinity and accepting God’s otherness. It is the desire to know God and a longing for an 
intensified closeness with God. Jesus’ restatement of the double love commandment (Mathew 
22: 37-39) denotes an appreciation of it for the proclamation of the reign of God in the Synoptic 
Gospels The biblical commandment in Leviticus and the Gospels to love the neighbour grounds 
that love of the other in a more original, basic, or given love of the self.  For Rudolf Bultmann 
                                               
64 Ephesians 5:33 has a similar construction and should be interpreted similarly.  "Husbands, love your wives as 
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(1958, p.117) love is a 'definite attitude of the will' and 'not an affection of peculiar strength 
among the feelings and affections that fill the human soul'.  In Christian ethics, the 
commandment is applied universally, suggesting ‘the life of the neighbour to be affirmed 
beyond the bounds set by natural human sympathy' (Niebuhr 1963, p.30).  This neighbour love 
consists in 'active goodwill toward the other' (Furnish 1972, 195). Neighbour love also suggests 
volitional and practical regard for her as a human being and assumes that one naturally has (or 
should have) the same sort of regard for oneself. Loving the neighbour as yourself, while the 
first part of the neighbour suggests a command, the second part ‘yourself’, self-love is only but 
implied. This is contrary to those who argue it is commanded in both parts (Radcliffe 1994, 
p.501). Given that love cannot be commanded, the injunction might be expressing a hope, an 
ideal, rather than telling one directly what to do. Presenting an ideal life in which one is 
motivated by feelings of affection for everyone, by thinking well of others. It is more a 
statement of fact than a commandment, it could be argued. 
7.3  How did Jesus relate to himself? 
 
7.3.1 Introduction  
The injunction of Mathew 22: 39 stems from Jesus teaching that reflects how he 
wanted those listening to him to act. Proclaiming this double commandment was to illustrate 
the truths of the Kingdom of God he had come to set in place. This was a principle to be lived 
by in this new Kingdom, and he himself was practicing it. How did Jesus relate to himself? 
Did he from a Kantian understanding consider that he was obligated to duty to himself, or did 
he see himself from an Aristotelian point of view subscribing to the subject object 
understanding of the self? Or, how did Jesus view the place of the impartial spectator (Adam 
Smith) or the generalised other of Mead?  
One place to look for a view of how Jesus must have related to himself is in the 
Gospels. Although the gospels are perceived kerygmatic, they also sketch out the life and 
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character of Jesus (Broadhead 1994, p.25). The gospels assume the validity of a historical 
Jesus who raised the question, ‘Who do people say that I am.’ (Mark 8:27-33) The question 
produced a variety of answers to include one volunteered by Peter, ‘You are the Christ’ (vs. 
29).  This response somehow alerts how Jesus related and thought of himself as the true God 
and true man.  
The lives of many people have been influenced by the belief that Jesus was the 
Messiah of God. Jesus himself must have had some form of self-awareness from which he 
drew the conclusion to accept Peter’s answer, ‘You are the Christ’. His followers would have 
reflected on him in this guise growing in their understandings of who he was and what he 
embodied. It is this self-awareness that we seek to explore in this section to aid determine 
how Jesus must have related to himself. There are many evaluations of Jesus used in the 
bible: Rabbi, Prophet Saviour, Lord, Son of Man, Son of God and God not to leave out 
Christos- Messiah.  The evaluation of the Messiah-Christos has been responsible for the 
expression of Christology designating who he was and the role he played in the divine plan. 
 Some believers have stopped at this point of recognising Jesus as the Christ of faith 
responsible particularly for the Christian community, others have insisted on both the 
historical Jesus and the Christ of faith, in this discussion I accept Jesus both of faith and 
history. Looking for the historical Jesus has aimed first at establishing how Jewish Jesus was, 
and secondly, using the same premises others have attempted to show that Jesus was not 
Jewish (Casey 1998, p.96). Proponents of the quest for the Jewishness of Jesus have been 
responsible for the argument that Jesus the Christ of Christian faith was in fact a creation of 
the early church. The historical Jesus never claimed to be the Son of God, the Lord, or even 
the Messiah (Craig 1994, p.242-243). I concede of the Jewishness of the historical Jesus pre-
resurrection. For Evans ‘..the only Jesus who operates in history, is the preached Christ of the 
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apostles (1994 ed. p.56-57).  For a response to how Jesus must have related to himself will 
draw attention to his intentions and his relationship to his contemporaries in Judaism.  
The first is to ask whether Jesus had a self-awareness of being a person that related to 
the times and the peoples of Galilee specifically (Riches 2010, p.351), although his travels 
took him as far as Jerusalem and other areas of the region. The second question asks whether 
that self-awareness was synonymous with Peter’s reply, ‘You are the Christ?’ These two 
questions could be asked differently; did God became human in order that human beings 
might share in a divine reality, what is the point for stressing the Jewishness of Jesus’ 
humanity? Yet, it is as a human being that the enigma of Jesus is presented to those he 
interacted with. The authors of the gospel story show a deepened awareness of how 
interrelated are the events, words, and the works in the life of Jesus with the person he is. 
7.3.2  The enigma Jesus presented 
It is ostensible that whatever else may be involved in the Christological belief, it must 
include a reference to the specific historical person of Jesus (Wiles 1994, p.45).  This is the 
Christ who is the son of Mary but who is also the incarnate Son of God.  Concerning this 
Christ, a reference is therefore made of a particular person at a given moment in history being 
the embodiment of the divine. This embodiment designates a concept of incarnation a term in 
which Jesus’ followers came to sum up their belief.  
The cogent subject of incarnation is God or the second person of the Trinity. 
Incarnation presents us with the ‘from above,’ that is to say it begins with being of God and 
then moves to consider his becoming a man (Ibid. p.11).  In this incarnational work is built 
the uncertainty and curiosity over Jesus’ identity. To all those Jesus encounters, speaks and 
ministers to, his identity seems to change each times (Green 2003, p.4). John the Baptist 
questions Jesus’ authenticity, ‘Are you he who is to come, or shall we look for another?’ 
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(Mat. 11: 3). John’s question expresses the conundrum with which the person of Jesus and his 
ministry presented itself to his contemporaries.  
There continued to be expressed the uncertainty of whether Jesus was actually the 
promised Messiah. To some Jesus presented himself as simply another itinerant preacher, 
cynic, or a charismatic, prophet or indeed an agent of Beelzebub the prince of the devils as 
postulated (Mt. 10; 25). The same enigmatic stance occurs on his triumphal entry into 
Jerusalem as ‘the whole city was stirred and asked, “Who is this?” (Mt. 21:10). Harrington 
(1972, p.154) observes that the documents of the New Testament are about a person whose 
role in history is remembered.      
To this person is attributed an event still close at hand. The body of sayings in the 
gospels even while making allowances for limiting factors in their formation remain coherent 
and consistently distinct and must be seen to represent the thoughts of a single inimitable 
teacher.  These gospels independently contain genuine evidence of the perplexity Jesus 
presented to those who were around him (Young 2005, p.206). Jesus did not seem to fit with 
the previous patterns and expectations of what constituted a messenger of God, a prophet or 
even a teacher of religion (Sanders 1985 cited by Flusser 1986, p.247). He was not a priest; 
and unlike his cousin John the Baptist Jesus did not come from a priestly family. He wasn’t 
even a bona fide prophet in the Old Testament sense. His preaching was not couched in the 
idiom of a reiteration of the word of God.  
Jesus was also not simply an apocalyptic seer or visionary with intend to interpret the 
signs of the times and proclaiming God’s judgement on his community. He could not fit in 
the group of teachers of the law in the Pharisaical sense of the word. He was opposed to the 
casuistry that typified the Pharisees profession. Speaking in parables, aphorisms and 
proverbs, he fitted into the group of teachers of wisdom. He was politically indifferent at 
many points and least motivated by schools of Zealots, nor was he simply another itinerant 
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exorcist, wonder working or charismatic miracle man. In all respects Jesus broke apart 
previous categories and expectations, he simply was “the man who fits no one formula.’ 
(Schweizer 1989, p.86) 
7.3.3  Jesus’ human self-awareness  
While Jesus created this aura of enigma around himself, he also expressed in very 
intimate terms the arrival of the Kingdom of God. In fact, his own intimate address of God as 
Abba, his message that the future domain of God had already broken through in his own 
being and ministry, gave him identity. Jesus’ predictions regarding his own suffering and 
fate, his table fellowship with women and publicans considered social outcasts of his 
contemporary society put him in a league of his own.   
The question of his identity, role or relationship of Jesus to the divine forced itself to 
those who came in contact with him (Green 2003, p.5). Either Jesus was whom he said he 
was, the kind of person who spoke with divine authority, or he was a blasphemer and a fool. 
The gospels entertain several possibilities (Mk. 1:22, 27; 2:7; 3:21). Marsh (1998) concurs 
with Wright (1996, 131) that in the New Testament ’Jesus is reconstituting Israel around 
himself’ (p.78). Jesus’ self –awareness consisted in him calling those around him to a new 
way of being Israel, and therefore making a claim for the crucial role of his own person in 
Israel’s reconstitution in this new way. Jesus was consequently retelling the story of Israel as 
his own story.  
Marsh (1998, p.78-79) citing Wright’s (1996) observes that every activity Jesus 
engaged in had a deeper meaning that encompassed the whole of Israel.  In the parable of the 
sower ’Jesus implies that his own career and kingdom-announcement is the moment towards 
which all Israel’s history has been leading’. Jesus’ own ministry is to be seen as ’the 
encapsulation, not merely the climax’ of the story of Israel. Jesus fully intended his stories to 
generate a new form of community. He was not, then, speaking of Israel as an abstract 
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concept, but very concretely of the way that people inter-related. Jesus created around 
himself a ’fictive kinship’ that undermined contemporary assumptions about family ties. 
There is hence a personal language and style unique to Jesus showing clearly his personal 
characteristics in his sayings.  In their simplicity [sayings], closeness to life and evident of the 
Semitic usage they all point to the person of Jesus. Jeremias argues that in the synoptic 
tradition, ‘it is the inauthenticity and not the authenticity of the sayings of Jesus that must be 
demonstrated’ (1971, p.37).   
It is however, the uncertainty and speculation regarding Jesus’ true identity and status 
that brings into play the encounter and quality of the first Christological reflections (Green 
2003, p.5). The issue of Jesus’ identity did not surface in its beginning as a theoretical 
problem. Green observes further that it seems the question was how this person of Jesus 
could be said ‘to express and unite both the essence of humanity and divinity in a way unique 
and unparalleled in the history of religion.’  Jesus somehow brought this question of identity 
upon himself by how he acted or interacted in his everyday life. His compassion for the poor, 
the sick and all those marginalised members of the society appear to have created difficulties 
for him.   
Further still, his proclamation of the coming kingdom of God and his demonstration 
of the saving and healing reality of that impending kingdom forced his interlocutors to stop 
and notice (Mk 7: 31 - 37).  It must be such a reflection as this; on what he was doing that 
produced the first examples of Christological reflection and confession. We come to know 
Jesus in many ways including how we can imaginatively reconstruct the way he lived out his 
Jewish heritage and sought to transform the life of his people. We also come to know Jesus 
through the eyes of his early disciples in the Gospels (Riches 2010, p.355). 
A central feature in understanding how Jesus related to himself has been the place of 
his humanity. The question of recovering Jesus’ full humanity remains central to Christology, 
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it is the question that sent the communities of Jesus followers into centuries-long process of 
trial and error whose final conclusion were the dogmas of Nicea and Chalcedon. The exercise 
is never completed, this is because Jesus’ impact and significance are to be communicated in 
every place and time, and the Christological quest is a continuing quest. Therefore, the quest 
for the historical Jesus cannot be avoided in our present cultural setting. This is re-enforced 
by the fact that Jesus was this historical figure who proclaimed the Kingdom in his parables, 
healings, exorcism and to the company he chose to keep, he acted out the nearness of this 
Kingdom of God.  
7.3.4  Jesus’ divine self-awareness 
There is the dominant ethical norm in Christian history and tradition that of Christ as 
exemplar tied in our opinion to a false view that he exercised a powerful pure love that was 
free from self-interest and self-love. Thomas a Kempis (1952, p. 83-84) suggests that for love 
to be worthy of the Christian ideal a complete denial of self is required, ‘no trace of self-
love.’ Kempis’ sentiments have been applied capturing the typical ideal of saintliness which 
then bequeathed on the wider historical tradition of Christianity and ultimately based on the 
assumption that Jesus transcended all self-concern.  
Unfortunately, this claim does not account for the fact that Jesus like the God of 
Israel, yearned for the requital of love (Post 1988, p.217). It is apparent from New Testament 
texts that Jesus’ love is more complicated perhaps than the image of an overflowing plenitude 
appear to suggest. While I agree with Post (Ibid. p.218) that Jesus hoped to become a causa 
efficiens calling new love into existence, the love that would reflect back on himself, Post 
would be hard pressed to prove that Jesus was disappointed because of the moral failures of 
those surrounding him65.  Jesus clearly may not have wanted his love to be rejected and 
                                               
65 Later on considering the question of how ‘God’s suffering cannot be devoid of self-concern’; we notice that 
suffering has something to do with the divine’s own self-love; a love, which the divine expects, should be an 
example to humanity. In the divine human love, the divine loves in a manner that cannot preclude human 
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unreciprocated. He may not have willed that the recipients of his love would reject his 
generosity.  
But he had to accept the fact that the divine act of loving like the human act of loving 
included freedom of choice. In love is freedom certainly expressed and this freedom of 
choice of wanting or not wanting to love back is very much what Jesus expected. Albeit if he 
was not requited this love he would not have failed in his mission either. Jesus hence did not 
demonstrate a pure love free from self-interest and self-love and we are not surprised when 
Jesus cried out in wrath tempered by forgiveness, 
O Jerusalem, Jerusalem the city that murders the prophets and stones the messengers 
sent to her! How often have I longed to gather your children as a hen gathers her 
brood under her wings, but you would not have me. (Matt. 23:37) 
 
Jesus’ concern for both himself and his Father is evident: "I have come accredited by my 
Father, and you have no welcome for me" (John 5:43). There is no question here that Jesus 
supposedly exercised a higher standard of selfless love, was this to be the case he would not 
have been agonising over this rejection 
 It is obvious that through the cross Jesus became the exemplar of forgiveness and 
patience the two virtues equated with selflessness, but this is contestable. Since it is equally 
obvious that the virtues of patience and forgiveness would be nonsensical and superfluous in 
the absence of blame attached to non-requital. It seems to me that crucifixion is not 
necessarily the only way to tell the story of salvation as enacted by Jesus. Westerly (1981, 
p.116) observes that ‘mutuality will be devalued as sub-Christian’ when the cross is focused 
                                               
freedom of choice. Love is demonstrated by this freedom. Post (1988, p. 218) suggests that Jesus was 
disappointed in his mission. If Jesus hoped to become a causa efficiens summoning this new love into existence, 
while he would have wanted everyone to embrace it, compelled by the same new love he would have had to 
give room for the freedom of those surrounding him. The difficulties that Post suggest existing between John 
the Baptist and Jesus Christ in how they related to one another in doing each his own ministry is therefore not 
founded, and it cannot be the case that the equilibrium and moral excellence of mutuality was left unrealised, 
but rather to reiterate that divine suffering is not devoid of self-concern although this may appear to be the case. 
Indeed, many tend to or would celebrate the fact that Jesus would have been happy to be conceived to empty 
herself of all self-interest and self-love. 
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on singularly as the way of salvation. To this point Post (1988, p.219) would add that 
considering the action of Jesus on the cross, the penchant for the pain of one-way love rests 
on a mistaken view of Jesus and his mission.       
 But this mistaken view is what Nygren’s identification between selfless love and the 
cross (Nygren 1982, p.115) amounts to, suggesting a simplistic orthodox understanding of 
Jesus death on the cross. It is a simplistic understanding of Jesus’ actions because of the 
assumption that these actions were none-requital but desired, necessary and good. It seems 
when love is given such simplistic dogmatic assumptions it can only be understood as self-
abnegation wholly disinterested in response, rather than as personal communion. 
 Something that appears to have eluded the orthodox Christian tradition is the fact that 
the life that Jesus Christ lived presents no normative model of love that violates the principle 
of reciprocity. Rather, Jesus’ life teaches the tragedy of non-requital and the necessary role of 
freedom in the divine-human encounter. Jesus must have understood that it is human freedom 
that thwarts the divine intention of effecting mutuality, and yet at the same time, any efforts 
to eliminate human freedom by some divine determinism would preclude the realisation of 
mutual love.  
 Jesus must have been clear in his undertakings that the divine desires a free response 
from humanity, for that matter the Kingdom of heaven could not be imposed on anyone. John 
Hick (1977, p. 517) remarks that the life of Jesus was, ‘a hazardous adventure in individual 
freedom.’ Hick appears to imply that Jesus must have known that love that is forced, or even 
manipulated out of the lover is not the kind of love that God wants as the foundation for 
fellowship.  God on account of that, will not, and must not destroy the responsible 
personhood of humanity however much he finds human actions as frantic and cruel 
distortions of right relationship as something that grieves him. It is the only way the divine 
can remain true to his own ultimate purpose. Post has argued that divine ‘mutual love is 
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inextricably linked with freedom, risk, and patience, but never with selflessness.’ (1988, p. 
220) Jesus in his actions never intended the absence of requital nor did he seek after this 
absence. Although a case can be made for an individual’s personal preoccupation with 
motivational purity that may result into disinterestedness and a feeling of sanctity, this benefit 
easily disrupts the movement of love through give-and-take action that defines the Jesus 
ethical ideal founded on mutual love66.  
7.3.5  Conclusion 
It is the case that Jesus did not empty himself of self-concern and that his message 
constantly was that the people would respond to his proclamation and have a change of heart. 
It is this desire of people’s change of heart that solidly establishes mutuality as the highest 
ideal of love when we turn to Jesus and attribute self-concern to him. Without taking up the 
life of Jesus and considering his actions, the traditional orthodox claim of Christus Exemplar 
as a norm of radical self-abnegation remains both uncorrected and a potential obstacle to 
mutuality or reciprocity. To understand Christian ethics through mutuality is to come into 
consistency with the Jewish prophetic tradition. The tradition permits us to think about the 
ideal of love without necessarily making references to the cross. This is because in modern 
times the cross is bestowed with such a high status than perhaps is necessary and therefore 
                                               
66 I argued above that the life of Jesus presents no normative model of love that would violate the principle of 
reciprocity that is summed up in mutual love. Mutual love is redemptive intimacy highlighting the moral good 
of reciprocity and fellowship between the divine and humanity. Jesus’ actions on the cross stand out and the 
cross has been used as the symbol of disinterestedness and of pure utterly selfless love. Distancing from this 
orthodox claim of the cross as the symbol of pure and an unadulterated selfless love we hold on the place of 
mutual love. Considering crucifixion, it seems obvious that Jesus’ enemies exclusively and fully willed his 
murder on the cross, it cannot have been willed by the Father or Jesus himself.  
Jesus spent his public life preaching the Good News of the Reign of God, and it can be assumed that the deepest 
desire of his heart was that People would respond to his proclamation and have a change of heart. If this had 
happened, then salvation through immolation would not have been necessary. While salvation through 
immolation is one way of considering the nature of love and that this is the way through which we are presented 
salvation, it is surely not the best way nor the only way. Westerly (1981, 115) asks, ‘Suppose the Jews had 
heard his call and the nation converted,’ would they perhaps have still gone ahead and kill him? If everyone had 
responded to Jesus message of conversion there would have been nobody to administer his death, on the other 
hand if Jesus had known that he would have to die on the cross in order for salvation to come, then he could not 
want everyone to be transformed by his message. We concede that it is more likely that Jesus hoped and prayed 
that " everyone” would respond to his call and that the significance of his death to be otherwise.  
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undermines the theory of mutuality. I have argued that the cross is never the goal of love, its 
more the expression of the distance to which God is willing to go in order to restore broken 
community and therefore symbolises the violation of love than it symbolise love itself. The 
love therefore that we need is not the disinterested and utterly selfless love but rather the 
deeply mutual love that has both the quality of a gift received and the quality of a gift given 
If this is true, then it cannot be the case as presented by the Orthodox Christological 
interpretation of Jesus’ actions that he simply and somehow his entire meaning of life and 
work was to be found in his headlong race toward Golgotha. It is not true that in his journey 
toward crucifixion Jesus sought suffering as an end in itself to complete the resolution of the 
divine human drama once and for all. Self-abnegation is not the focal point of love especially 
the love Jesus expressed, since Jesus' act appear motivated not in his lust for sacrifice but in 
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7.4.  What did Jesus teach on relating to oneself? 
 
7.4.1  Introduction 
Nothing is more characteristic of the teaching of Jesus than his insistence upon the 
duty of self-sacrifice for his followers and would be followers. Again and again he goes back 
to the same thought, that a person must lose her life in order to gain it; that no one can be his 
disciple unless she deny herself and take up her cross and follow him; that no person can 
serve two masters. These sayings of Jesus made a great impression upon his hearers, and 
there have been no sayings that have given modern Christians more difficulty. Jesus is 
advocating self-denial that takes many forms, moral or otherwise and he [Jesus] asks too 
much of us morally. The sayings fit well in an age of martyrs, but they seem entirely out of 
place in an age of conventional Christianity.  The precept of Jesus seems to be to treat others 
as you would be treated by them, and not as they have treated you or would be likely to treat 
you in future. Jesus goes beyond the doctrine of human rights as presently presented.  While 
the doctrine of human rights67 sets morally acceptable limits to moral self-sacrifice, moral 
conduct remains demanding.         
 And for self-denial68 that Jesus espoused, no formula captures its fate. Below I 
consider some of the texts Jesus called upon as he laid out his injunctions for moral 
commands. I also discuss briefly how Jesus illustrates self-sacrifice and the moral injunctions 
he sets out for his followers. These injunctions championed self-sacrifice as a process by 
which the follower of Christ seeks for the supreme moral good. The Sermon on the Mount 
remains paramount to achieving the moral good.   
                                               
67 Rights-based ethical theories carry the idea that advocating equal rights for everyone enhances the 
preservation of each individual's life and freedom. Modern accounts of rights, therefore, focus more on 
respecting the rights of others or on playing our own 'trump cards' than on showing how respecting others' rights 
and asserting our own contribute to our personal happiness. 
68 While Jesus appears to have implied self-sacrifice and self–denial in his conversations, we subscribe to view 
that at the limit of self-sacrifice is the willingness to die of the sake of acting morally, while at the limit of self-
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7.4.2  Jesus illustrates ethical self-sacrifice 
Jesus’ precepts are beyond the capacity or even the will of most people, who can only 
but moderate them; that is to say we must force them into a compromise (Kateb 2008, p.371). 
A compromise that looks more like a betrayal. Jesus’ own life is a striking illustration of this 
ethical sacrifice. From the first consciousness of his great mission, he schooled himself to 
follow his ideals. His experience of the wilderness Temptation was not a bit of histrionics. He 
actually chose the narrow path in preference to the broad way to immediate success.  
 Life meant much to him, and he was ambitious as few men are; pushing some lesser 
good aside that he might find his meat and drink in doing his Father's will. The people wished 
to make him king, he who was without a place to lay his head. His friends urged him to avoid 
the suffering and death he foresaw awaiting him. While his own nature cried out in 
Gethsemane his choice was steady. He would give his life for others; he would seal the new 
covenant with his blood.  
Although Jesus drew men to himself by the cross, it was not that he wished 
martyrdom, but that he saw his mission was too great to be abandoned at any price. Here 
Jesus language of self-sacrifice is completely contrary to Derrida’s understanding of self-
sacrifice as an act of violence against oneself in order not to subject others to violence 
(Dalferth 2010, p. 78-79).  Jesus equally refused to give his soul to gain the world. And 
therefore, God hath highly exalted him and given him a name that is above all other names. 
He was the totality of a lived Sermon on the Mount.  
Jesus expects his followers to be able to emulate or make the efforts to emulate him in 
living out the Sermon on the Mount, in itself a hard act to follow. Jesus shows us what being 
human means because he defines how to live the good life in this world (Alexis-Baker 2011, 
p. 427). Jesus illustrates simply that, when morally good, our acts of self-sacrifice never fail 
to benefit us because they necessarily advance our deeper desires. This could be said of a 
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father who sacrifices his desire to watch a football game to be present with his son at an 
important moment. The father is not only benefitting his son, he is also advancing his own 
true self-interest because his relationship with his son is more essential to his own happiness 
that of staying home and watching the game.  
Subsequently, when self-sacrifice is ethical it involves sacrificing material or social 
goods. It can be said to sacrifice personal goods only in a very narrow sense. Humans are 
inclined toward communion with others, so that the ethical self-sacrifice they practice 
advances this inclination and consequently personal flourishing. Although ethical self-
sacrifice necessarily forfeits goods of one sort or another it always gains others in their place. 
Otherwise, it might be self-sacrifice, but it would not be ethical. 
7.4.3  The supreme good as expressed in the Sermon on the Mount 
If one clears her mind of the fanciful and over-zealous interpretation of Jesus' call to 
sacrifice, there at once appears the great principle upon which it is based that one must 
choose the supreme good rather than a secondary good. Jesus considered the supreme good to 
be membership in the kingdom of God. Jesus pursues an agent centred ethics, the kind that 
modern authors eschew emphasising impartiality and objectivity (Devettere 1993, p.76).  
Jesus ethical framework suggests acting for the sake of personal happiness, which 
many consider to be self-centred and out of place ethics69.  It is, however, necessary to call to 
mind some of the things which Jesus regards as secondary goods: wealth, whether much or 
little, physical comfort, reputation for piety, even life itself. The language of the supreme 
good that supersede the secondary goods is central in the Sermon on the Mount70, where 
                                               
69 Obviously, Jesus’ ethics does not advocate selfishness. Paradoxical as it may seem, his goal of personal 
happiness is compatible both with seeking virtue for its own sake and with seeking the good of others for their 
sake. 
70 It is not surprising that when Jesus finished the Sermon on the Mount, all of its teachings radical in varying 
degrees, "the people were astounded" (Matthew 7:28). Presently although we have grown as familiar with the 
Sermon on the Mount, the words retain the power to astound and to disconcert, when they are thought about as a 
contribution to moral philosophy rather than as articles of inherited religious doctrine 
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Jesus declares all these secondary goods to be sacrificed when they come into opposition 
with the supreme good. They are to be sacrificed because the supreme good is worth more 
than they.  
The man who sold all he had to buy the field with a treasure in it (Mat. 13: 44), the 
merchant who sold all his pearls that he might buy the one extraordinary pearl (Ibid. verse 
45-46), these men did not count themselves as suffering loss in the exchange. The thing 
obtained was worth more than the things given. This is Jesus' very simple philosophy of 
sacrifice. A person surrenders an inferior good for a greater good. She gives for what she 
gets, but she gets something more valuable than that which she gives. She makes a good 
bargain by giving for instance; physical life to gain eternal life. Jesus’ language of the 
Sermon on the Mount is unique. But in recent literature one often comes across remarks 
implying that from a comparative perspective Jesus’ ethical teaching appears to be banal. 
Reynolds Price (1997, p.49) argues that the Marcan Jesus' ethical teaching, “virtually no 
single injunction or opinion is without its parallel in earlier religious lore—whether Jewish, 
Greco-Roman, Hindu, Confucian, or Buddhist.”   
Wierzbicka (2001, p.442) counters Price’s argument that numerous parallels to Jesus’ 
sayings may have been cited in recent scholarly literature but “these reported parallels are 
superficial and depend largely on an inadequate language analysis71.” It is on this 
understanding of uniqueness that Jesus teaches the great message of the Sermon on the 
Mount that could ‘virtually amount to an introduction to the entire development of Christian 
theology and ethics’ (Davies et al 1991, p. 283). The teachings concentrated in the Sermon on 
the Mount in Mathew chapters 5-7 and scattered elsewhere in the gospels constitute a radical 
                                               
71 Wierzbicka’s point holds on grounds that not many scholars would maintain that humankind's religious 
beliefs can be meaningfully compared through culture-bound concepts like predestination, karma, nirvana, or 
purgatory. (For example, what does Judaism teach about karma? What does Confucianism teach about 
purgatory? What does Buddhism teach about predestination?). It is simply imagined, that only concepts like 
kindness, tolerance, nonviolence, or anger that are of an entirely different nature can be safely relied on as 
analytical tools in comparing ethical teaching across languages, cultures, and religions. 
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view of human conduct (Kateb 2008, p.372).  Acting on some of them would require either 
moral heroism or martyrdom, and one is inclined preponderantly that martyrdom rather than 
heroism is called for.  
The teaching of the Sermon on the Mount requires an interpretation that takes into 
account the literary context of the whole book. Davies et al (1991, p. 285) suggest the 
Sermon on the Mount functions in its larger literary context as ‘a general summary of Jesus’ 
moral demand ‘ on anybody, but more so Jesus’ own followers particularly.  This moral 
demands call for moral virtues and qualities that always involve injunctions to do what has 
not yet been known done. It calls for moral perfection that cannot seem to be achieved 
(Lundbom 2009, p.441 citing Luther 1530).     
The injunctions build up one’s character as one earnestly struggles with no relaxation, 
to reach the unreachable. It is in these higher echelons of the moral demands that the supreme 
good of the domain of God is sought for. A condition of attaining this supreme good Jesus 
demands everything, up to and including the impossible. This is because anything less than 
that, anything less than the eschatological will of God would put a limit on goodness (Ibid. 
p.286).  Jesus’ moral commands portrayed in the Sermon on the Mount call for change in 
such a way that one is constantly evolving towards what is better, being transformed from 
glory to glory, and thus always improving and ever becoming perfect by daily growth, and 
never arriving at any limit of perfection.  
Perfection consists in one never stopping in her growth in good, never circumscribing 
her perfection by any limitation. This forms a bigger picture of what Jesus teaches about 
relating to oneself.  In Matt. 28: 16 – 20 he commands that disciples be made of all people by 
being taught, ‘all that I have commanded you’. Noticeably, the injunctions of the Sermon on 
the Mount appear unrealistic, impractical, impossible of fulfilling and unjust. The evangelist 
who wrote the gospel of Mathew does not seem to directly address these issues. While this 
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remains the case, it seems Jesus had in mind a sense of progressive pursuit of the supreme 
good72. The injunctions commanded in the Sermon of the Mount cannot in any 
straightforward sense be fully possessed or mastered, exhausted, perfected, either by the 
community or the individual (Davies et al 1991, p. 290).  Goodenough (1967, p. 254) 
observes “Jesus would fulfil the Law by looking to impossible ideals rather than 
practicalities”. The point Jesus seems to be making was to teach the necessity of grace. When 
one sincerely undertakes to obey the commandments, one inevitably fails. But this can only 
be a boon for it leads one to confess inadequacy that in turn should throw one back upon 
God's grace.        
Jesus teaches his hearers that they could not, in their own strength, fulfil the will of 
God. The point being made is to teach the necessity of grace. Elsewhere, Jesus seems to 
imply these injunctions can be reached by love, of God, neighbour and of self. Jesus claimed 
God to be perfect or complete in that his [God’s] love is not confined within himself but 
extends to all the created order, so too must the disciple be perfect, it is to be humbly and 
passionately concerned with what is not the self. 
7.4.4 Conclusion 
Modern authors eschew agent-centred considerations in ethics and emphasize 
impartiality and objectivity. They advocate respect for natural rights held equally by all, or 
action for the sake of duty and the moral law regardless of personal consequences, or action 
guided by rules designed to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In Jesus’ 
ethical frameworks acting for the sake of personal happiness appears self-centred and out of 
                                               
72 The apostles Paul [11 Cori.3: 18; Philip. 3] reminds us, that we ought not to be distressed when considering 
the commands of the Sermon on the Mount with their tendency [toward mutability] in our nature. ON the 
contrary we need to place ourselves in a state to change in such a way that we constantly are evolving towards 
what is better. It is being transformed from glory to glory, and thus always improving and increasingly 
becoming perfect by daily growth. We never arrive at any limit of perfection, since perfection consists in our 
never stopping in our growth in good, ort circumscribing our perfection by any limitation. 
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place. The teachings of Jesus are radical, but they feature a formulation of moral guidance 
that need not be radically interpreted.  
When revised, it is the most succinctly useful of all: "Always treat others as you 
would like them to treat you" (Matthew 7:12; Luke 6:31). Jesus’ teachings about relating to 
oneself appears to lay emphasis on an ethic of self-denial, that today some are uncomfortable 
with. The Sermon on the Mount links Christian ethics with personal happiness: the meek will 
possess the earth, the mourners will be comforted, the seekers of justice will be satisfied, the 
merciful will obtain mercy, the clean of heart will see God, the peacemakers will be called 
children of God, the persecuted will have a great reward in heaven (Mt 5:1-12).  
Many people will admit that this is a self-centred ethic whose goal is personal 
happiness and appears to make ethics ultimately narcissistic. If the goal of ethics is always 
my personal good then other people seem to become no more than something I use to achieve 
my goal. The other person becomes what proponents of natural rights, the Kantian moral law 
and the utilitarian principle all condemn; merely a means to my personal end.  Jesus teaches 
that self-sacrifice for others actually provides the greatest measure of personal happiness for 
the hero or martyr. Jesus appears to advocate double paradox that is, acting both for the sake 
of virtue and for personal happiness, and doing good for others for their sake and for my sake 
as well, that is ta say, loving others and loving myself. 
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     Chapter  8   
    Theology of Self and Self-love 
8.1 Introduction 
 
For many Christians ideas of the self represent one of the areas of greatest confusion. On 
the one hand we are exhorted from wayside pulpits to make the order 'God first, others second, 
self last'. On the other we are urged by Christian counsellors 'Be yourself', 'fulfil yourself'. 
Neither injunction seems generally made with any depth of consideration as to why the self 
should be renounced. Or, whether there is a possibility of distinguishing between 'self' in its 
popular usage and 'the self', and to what the Christian understanding of the nature of the self 
might be. Others like Alice Keefe (1997, p. 61-76) have written, "belief in the self as 
independent and self-existent is our fundamental delusion and root poison."   
Reading Keefe one has the impression that it is somewhat paradoxical to speak about the 
self as a form of identity in a Christian religious tradition, which ultimately deny that reality that 
we might claim for ourselves. Keenan (2004, p. 94), suggests ‘a philosophic world accustomed 
to thinking in terms of interconnectedness and complexity theory,’ cannot claim there are real 
substances anywhere.’ This is echoing the post-modernist who claim the death of the subject and 
therefore in our case the death of the self.         
 I subscribe to that reality of the self, convinced that day-by-day most if not all of persons 
experience their identities, including our religious, cultural, and social identities, as neither 
empty nor erased (Bidwell 2008, p.3). I also discuss the fact that modernity now offers a number 
of different cultural possibilities for the self suggesting why identity confusion and fragmentation 
is claimed {in regard to the self-]. A Christian theology of the self is therefore affected by the 
two injunctions raised above, of acknowledging the self as key to personhood or debasing the 
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self-altogether. The “self” with these two injunctions implies a commitment to a particular 
theological anthropology. It is obvious therefore that contemporary Christian thought about the 
self is at pains to stress that; it is only in relation to God and other people that we become fully 
human (Woodhead 1999, p. 67-68). In what follows I discuss the merits and de-merits of the two 
injunctions and from which I will attempt to determine the theology of self and self-love. I begin 
by discussing how determining and presenting the case about the self from theological resources 
is justifiable. It means a Christian religious commitment of some kind in defence of a self or 
Christian theology of the self.  
8.2  Christian theology and self 
 
Christianity provides a distinctive technique of the self, of the practices of confession and 
examination of conscience.  The requisite of disclosing oneself that makes Christianity a 
confessing religion is fulfilled in different ways at different times. In its beginnings this 
requirement was carried out by a ritual recognizing of oneself as a sinner and penitent, a practice 
that later on turned into self-examination.        
 The continuing practice of confessing and the introduction of the sacrament of penance in 
the church made the self a concealed reality. Its truths had to be uncovered by a process of self-
interpretation. This Christian understanding of the self has significantly influenced the Western 
culture.  The self was no longer something to be made but something to be renounced and 
decrypted. The Christian experience of the self is inevitably negative, or at least ambiguous 
(Ward 1982, 178;), because the self is the arena for an endless struggle with evil (Wood 2010 p. 
417-418). 
In an age of increasing secular humanism there is a preoccupation with questions about 
the self. Questions ranging from who am I, how can I improve my life, and how can I know who 
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I am? Regrettably, there subsists today little agreement among philosophers, psychologists, 
sociologists and even theologians regarding the nature of human nature.  The situation is made 
complicated by an assortment of post-modern theories among those claiming the death or 
disappearance of the self altogether (Davis 1990, p.160; Marsh 2002).    
 Aside, earlier theories without neglecting the social factors, laid great stress upon the 
instincts as representing reservoirs of specific energy. Christian theology need to provide 
authentic answers to many questions of the self, that is to say, Christians need to postulate a 
method by which to develop a theological concept of self.  A concept capable to support claims 
that confessional theology has resources for shaping a powerful and innovative re-description of 
the tradition of transcendental subjectivity.  This is a tradition that does not require the self 's 
disappearance (Marsh 2002, p.254).   
If the self constitutes a person willed by God into being, such a person then possesses 
certain completeness constitutive of a being created in the image of God. The self is therefore is 
a portrait of authentic subjectivity that derives from one’s first and foremost independent 
membership in the body of Christ. This account of the self is a portrait of authentic subjectivity 
that is explicitly Christological and Trinitarian (Wood 2010, p.419).    
 This is contra Keenan (2004, p.94) who claims there is no self, that there are ‘no 
substances since all things are empty specifically of substance.’  Furthermore, Keenan observes 
in the mystical body of Christ individuals clearly do retain their physical bodies, with their 
obvious functions and dysfunctions. However, one cannot attribute the definition of self as 
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bounded in these individuals by the skins of their bodies as they have been emptied of any final 
being, because the self has no abiding essence73.  
I argue that in the mystical body of Christ physical body identities are retained, and 
Christ relates to more than just these physical bodies but rather to some supposed core of being 
persons possess uniquely. It cannot therefore be a misunderstanding that Christ’s reality stands 
opposed to human cultures and lives, ready to break in with supernal force exploding into human 
pride and arrogant lives construed upon sin. I discuss below that whether sinful or saved, human 
subjectivity is performative and imitative and whether under sin or under grace, to be a self is to 
imitate God, and this cannot mean to be empty of substance.  
As sinners, humans have duplicitous subjectivity which is a dreadful parody of God’s 
loving act of creation. Conversely, as saved subjects, persons imitate Christ the only fully real 
human being. Persons imitate him by turning away from the self and loving God above all 
things. At the core of human subjectivity, one cannot help but imitate God. But before I discuss 
imitation I will examine first the argument of the disappearing self that is proposed by the 
theologian Stanley Hauerwas among other theologians like Rowan Williams74, since a self 
                                               
73 Keenan wants to demonstrate that, that “the self exists essence-free independence” based upon a host of historical, 
genetic, and cosmic causes and conditions: human families, parents, individuals paths through this life, their genes, 
the very being of the universe and-most especially-human memories, which lead persons back to the time of Jesus 
and incorporate their self-identities within his identity.  
‘There is no final need to carve up the real into units of self and not-self,’ argues Keenan (Ibid. 96) Rather, 
individuals live by passing through "the great doubt"-that they have no firm hold on being, that they do not control 
the flux and change that swirls through their veins-and into an assured and confident identification with Christ, 
mixing their memories and sharing his experience.  
While Keenan wants to use all these collections of experiences to claim that none can stand out to demonstrate the 
abiding essence of the self, we want to argue here that the reverse is actually true; it is only because these 
experiences can be attributed to personhood that they allow us to conceive an active and abiding essence of some 
kind common to all of these experiences. That essence has to be the self.   
74 While Hauerwas (1998, p. 78,79) subscribes to the disappearing self, Williams has great distrust of interiority and 
depth, and rejects all notions of an authentic self as a therapeutic self and therefore questions the self’s integrity as a 
full formed unity created in the image of God. He perceives the self to exist without interiority, with no deep psyche, 
no buried emotional truths longing to achieve authentic expression. Williams seeks to re-describe the self within the 
framework of a non-competitive ethic. This task of re-description Williams argues is the recognition that 
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capable of imitation cannot at the same time be a self that is disappearing unless the 
disappearance is itself a form of imitation.  I argue that to be a self is to be a proper object of 
love loving God above all things through imitating Christ and therefore being an enduring self.  
8.3  Modern theology and dignity of human personhood 
 
Above I discussed how post-modernity continues to speak in the language of the self’s 
disappearance or perhaps in the concomitant annihilation of interiority. This kind of language 
denies that the person willed by God into being possesses certain formfulness [being], which 
does not only suggest pure intentionality or interiority, but rather calls also for a kind of being 
unity constitutive of being created in the image of God. This post-modern claim of the 
disappearing of the self affects Christian theology of the dignity of human personhood. Stanley 
Hauerwas suggests and defends this conundrum. 
8.3.1   Stanley Hauerwas and human selfhood 
In his book, The Peaceable Kingdom (1983), at the dawn of the pot-modernism’s 
ascendance into higher echelons of academic institutions, Stanley Hauerwas was a formidable 
advocate of human selfhood. He argued that, not only is knowledge of self tied to knowledge of 
God, 
                                               
inwardness, hiddenness and interiority of self remain false constructions to the extent that they are presumed to be 
outside the unscripted and unpredictable networks of negotiations and exchanges. 
Williams (1988, 42) observes that the notion of an essential private self is a socio-historical construct, since human 
beings are not in the world as selves contained inside other sort of thing the shell of husk. There is no depth that 
exists in subject until it is created. There is no a priori identity awaiting human beings, seeing that inwardness is a 
processing of becoming. ‘The self is not a substance one unearths by peeling away layers until one gets to the core, 
but an integrity one struggles to bring into existence (Williams 2000, p. 239-40).’ Therefore, for Williams, the idea 
of a hidden self is then a fiction created as protection against the unpredictable and unscripted conversations and 
negotiations with other that is life.  The idea of a hidden self is a fiction created for the purpose of asserting a 
fundamental script, a transparent narrative of eh way things are there is no truthful perception awaiting the self 
through a process of uncovering and un-layering – no ‘swaddling clothes of hidden and given reality... .....….’ (Ibid. 
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`but we know ourselves truthfully only when we know ourselves in relation to God. We 
know who we are only when we can place our selves, locate our stories within God's 
story.’ (1983, p.27) 
 
Hauerwas provided an exposition marked by an unwavering affirmation of God who lovingly 
includes everybody within his own life, and by this inclusion affirms the overabounding grace of 
God for each self. Hauerwas understood grace to be -….’not an eternal moment above history 
rendering history irrelevant’. It is God's choice to be a Lord whose kingdom is furthered by 
human concrete obedience through which humans acquire a history befitting their nature as 
God's creatures (1983. p.27).          
 Hauerwas lays the foundation for a theological conception of the self (Marsh 2002, p. 
258) that claims true self-knowledge requires knowledge of God. This is because in God’s story 
individuals become, the who, that they are.  This re-enforces the fact that truthful knowledge of 
self is possible only on the basis of the God who has revealed himself in Jesus Christ and the 
church. Hauerwas later on jettisoned or perhaps side-lined these The Peaceable Kingdom 1983 
thoughts on a Christian understanding of human selfhood in his later works, Wilderness 
Wanderings: Probing Twentieth-Century Theology and Philosophy 1997; and Sanctify Them in 
the Truth: Holiness Exemplified (1998).  Marsh (2002, p.255) perceives Hauerwas as not being 
interested in the philosophical or theoretical justification for the correspondence between 
Christian claims and truth. It is in the absence of Hauerwas not being able to offer the 
justification for the correspondence between Christian claims and truth that he is able to ask, 
‘How can theologians make sense of the world, given the way we Christians are taught to 
speak in and through our worship of God? (Hauerwas 1997, p. 3). 
 
Hauerwas’ question and the further development of his thoughts suggest he is attempting to free 
Christian theology from prefixing conversations about God with apologies, prolegomena and 
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polemics with other discourses. Nonetheless, there is plenty polemical and prolegomena in his 
work. In his 1997 work where I focus his assessment of the self, Hauerwas writes that 
‘`Theology is best done without apology', (1997, p.1). Hauerwas suggests that Christians’ 
knowledge about God, the world and the self, can be discovered by attending to the practices of 
the church as the `primary set of language games' and to those distinctive practices the church 
keeps. Hauerwas however, is not alone in this consideration as Keenan (2004, p.97) echoing this 
argument writes,  
‘…our identities are defined now, not by the conventions of deluded primal ignorance, 
but by the conventions and practices of pilgrimage into Christ. All identities are 
conventional; all selfhood exists only dependent on clusters of causes and conditions.’ 
 
Clusters of causes and conditions’ is a significant phrase here, as it eliminates any question of 
personal selfhood, suggesting any such selfhood is discovered in the collective practices of the 
church (Eucharist for example].  This collective discovery of the self in Hauerwas applauds the 
postmodern notion of the disappeared self for its capacity to recover an understanding of 
holiness. He sees  .holiness, `…not as an individual achievement but as the work of the Holy 
Spirit building up the body of Christ'. (1998, p.78).       
 Hauerwas suggests that, it is in the collective thinking of physical bodies in the 
framework of a spirituality that makes God alone the agent of sanctification [the framework is 
peasant Catholicism]. For Hauerwas…’. Christianity', `is not a set of beliefs or doctrines one 
believes in order to be a Christian, rather . . . to have one's body shaped, one's habits determined, 
in a manner that the worship of God is unavoidable.' (Ibid. p79). Hauerwas suggests for loss of 
individuality in the body of Christ or the community of the church. This is a view subscribed to 
by Haker,‘….the self participates in a socially and psychically mediated discourse that displaces 
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its individuality and its particularity’(2004, p. 360).,  The process makes any recourse to a “core” 
of subjectivity of the self or of the subject to be a myth of subject philosophy. 
Notwithstanding, it cannot be true that these peasant Catholics do not have personal 
considerations of a goal to holiness, and that they are rather content with embodied practices.75 
Each person is called into Christ first as an individual with a personal identity then, into the 
community of the church.  It is argued from neuroscience’s intriguing findings that the 
anatomical structures of the brain responsible for the sense of self are also the ones involved in 
religious experience (Newsom 2012, p.6), implying a sense of personal autonomy and not of 
fused individualities.  
It cannot therefore be true that in ecclesial practices persons cease to have boundaries nor 
are these boundaries fluid to the point the particularities of these individual’s bodies are lost. 
Conversely, even in liturgy or sacramental life these peasant Catholics do not lose their 
identities. Individual bodies belong to particular selves and not wholly to the other; holiness is 
therefore a matter of individual will.         
 The Peasant Catholics of Hauerwas can only but be selves who follow Jesus with a sense 
of self-reflection. Consequently, in their self-reflection they will uncover the existential subject. 
That is, the subject not merely as a knower but also as a doer; more than that, a doer engaged in a 
self-making. This is the subject who freely and responsibly makes the self to be as a particular 
self (Davis 1990, p.159). 
Although Hauerwas argues otherwise, it is the case that human identity is a matter of a 
self that is seeking to control the body, a matter of perduring, continuous or predictable identity 
                                               
75  These practices to include prayer, celebration of the eucharis, obedience to ecclesial authority and tithing 
practices which show holiness to be primarily related to the matter of bodily gestures and movements. Knowledge of 
God is `habituated' to bodies, in their distinctive practices ± `it is enough that they pray, obey and pay'. 
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(Marsh 2002, 256).  Foucault has argued considering his third axis of ethics [the other two being 
knowledge and power] that, human beings have a propensity to the kind of relationship that 
makes one a moral subject. The genealogy of ethics according to Foucault examines how an 
individual forms that self-relationship that makes one a moral subject. He analyses the various 
practices by which persons attempt to become moral agents (Davis 1990, p167).   
 An action is ethical if it contributes to the formation of our subjectivity and he gives as an 
example, human sexual practices. Foucault (1983, p.208-9) writes contrary to Hauerwas. 
Hauerwas seems to see ethical relationships that one ought to have with oneself as displaced by 
the community. Individual identities of particular person become fused with Christ’s body; 
implied in Hauerwas suggestion is that human bodies belong wholly to others, not to selves.  
Selfhood, in Hauerwas understanding is bestowed by participation in a story-shaped 
church for example (Woodhead 1999, p.68). Hauerwas describes the body of Christ as the 
annihilation of the self. He emphasises the transcendence of God at the expense of God's 
humanity.  There is obviously in every individual a formal identity that is presupposed in the 
habits, practices, and crafts of the church. Without which any foregrounding of sanctified bodies, 
catechumenates, contrite hearts and character falls into incoherence. This supports the theory 
sometimes referred to as "symbolic interactionism" (Blumer 1969) that posits the origin and 
growth of the self-system in a community of selves, the distinctive process and basis of its 
formation involving the symbolic mechanisms of speech, dialogue, and role taking.  
It is however this individuation or the self that is both subject and object at the same time; 
the knower and known, transcendent and empirical that postmodernists and Hauerwas are 
denying.  Notwithstanding, it is difficult to justify Hauerwas (1998, p.78) claim that, `… loss of 
the self . . . can help us rediscover holiness not as an individual achievement but as the work of 
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the Holy Spirit building up the body of Christ'.  Hauerwas seems oblivious to his previous claims 
in (1983 p.27), in the Peaceable Kingdom when he wrote, ‘To learn to be God's creature, to 
accept the gift [of salvation], is to learn to be at home in God's world'. We learn to be at home in 
God first as individual selves and then as a body of Christ or the community of the peasant 
Catholics.            
 There is no doubt that in each of Hauerwas’ peasant Catholics is an inner richness and 
mystery in creation's diversity that always and everywhere witnesses to the divine mystery 
within which it is concealed. Simply stated, the transformation of the self in Christ - being 
crucified with Christ - does not destroy the I for the sake of the Father but reconstitutes it in a 
new life to accommodate the Pauline claim, `the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the 
faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me'. (Galatians 2: 20)  
Moreover, in order to improve one’s self-image one must, value one’s self as an 
individual and not to judge one’s self by achievements. Each person has the duty to know who 
he/she is, that is, to try to know what is happening inside oneself, to acknowledge faults, to 
recognize temptations, to locate desires, and to be obliged to disclose these things either to God 
or to others in the community and hence to bear public or private witness against oneself (Martin 
et al 1998, p.40). The truth obligations of faith and the self are linked together. This link permits 
a purification of the soul impossible without self-knowledge, and self-knowledge presupposes a 
self to which it relates. 
8.4  Theology of the supposedly fragmented self/selfhood 
 
I have argued that self-knowledge presupposes a self to which it relates. It is this self-
knowledge that commonly accepted provides individual selves with an identity that persons carry 
throughout lives despite the various changes experienced. Furthermore, persons know that they 
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have sets of abilities, great or small, that are their own and can used for good or for ill. Many 
people naturally resent being moulded in the image of other people and prevented from 
expressing their own true nature (Thiselton 1995, p.74).     
 Christians locate their identity ultimately in the God who created them in His image. 
Christians claim to be God’s creation made for His purposes and glory and must therefore be 
important as individuals before God. They are not just a small part of the mass of humanity, 
since each Christian is a unique individual self, albeit with some characteristics shared by all 
people but also with a set of characteristics unique to oneself. The fragmented selfhood has 
become synonymous with postmodernism, where one isn’t really a self at all. One has no unique 
identity that is identifiable from birth to death; and therefore there is no real "you" that remains 
constant throughout all of life’s changes. Anderson (1997, p.38) observes that  
‘In the postmodern world you just don’t get to be a single and consistent somebody.’ 
 
Consequently, the resulting "loss of stability, loss of stable identity, and loss of confidence in 
global norms or goals breed deep uncertainty, insecurity, and anxiety.  A self in such 
environments, is argued to live daily with fragmentation, indeterminacy, and intense distrust" of 
all claims to ultimate truth or universal moral standards. One reason for this is that modernity is 
not seen as a single and homogeneous entity but rather as internally diverse interweaving of 
various strands (Woodhead 1999, p.53).   
 Woodhead has identified what she terms as the four influential strands of the modern self; 
and adds that Christianity is implicated in all these strands. This idea of the fragmented selfhood 
appears spurious just like that of the disappearing self. Woodhead argues that the cause of 
fragmentation of modern self does not rest ‘in the actions of monolithic and universal processes 
of modernity’ (Ibid. p. 66), rather fragmentation is a product of the ever-increasing cultural 
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possibilities competing for the self in the contemporary context and cannot, it seems, come to a 
halt since as societies change their cultural possibilities change also76.  There is a sense in which 
Christianity acknowledges the fragmentary character of human life itself, a sense that leads to the 
question of what constitutes our personal humanness?     
 Christian faith is still the ’good news’ persons in contemporary times must find for 
themselves, and Christianity must not alienate persons from their authentic selfhood. Sin 
however does alienate from true essence, from true humanity. In God’s economy sin is the 
reason for a fragmented selfhood and therefore false subjectivity. 
8.5  Theology of the self as sinful and hence false subjectivity 
 
In many disciplines the conception of the self is always tied up or traced to Descartes’ 
understanding (Woodhead 1999, p. 61; Taylor 1989, p. 143-159; Seigel 2005, p. 56-74). It is the 
Cartesian self, which is fully autonomous, disembodied and self-transparent thinker; that 
essentially is unrelated to the other, whether human, divine or even itself.  Many theologians 
have tended to distance themselves from this Cartesian conception of the self by the pursuit of 
other understandings of the self (Woodhead, 1999, p. 55-57; Daly 1973 p. 13-15)  
Away from this Cartesian conception of the self, there is the perennial thought of the self 
as being simultaneously great and wretched; where the plausible explanation of this paradoxical 
dialectic can only be that persons have fallen from some previously ideal state, a teaching central 
to Christian theology. The wretchedness and greatness of the self ensue from two marked 
                                               
76 The change can be reckoned from a single group like a church congregation to a whole people group. Woodhead 
(1999, p. 56) has pointed out that fragmentation is no longer just a historical unilinear view as it is evidenced in 
different cultures. While cultures may not necessarily be characterised by stable, embedded identities, it seems 
individuals in that culture retain certain enduring personhood. Woodhead’s observation appears to imply that there is 
going to be intensified fragmentation of the self in this postmodernity period. If Anderson is correct that persons 
lives are decentered, and that these are persons who are drawn in many directions and are constantly changing and 
being defined externally by the various relations they have with others, there is going to be a proliferation of the 
selves in the postmodern understanding.   
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positions that of the sinful self and therefore false subjectivity synonymous with wretchedness, 
and that of the greatness that is synonymous with redeemed self that is true subjectivity.  
Under the conditions of the fall, the self that is constituted therein is false77 or for Pascal 
it is imaginary self (Wood 2010, p.421-426) that is called into being by an improper self-love. 
Improper self-love as an activity of human subjectivity constantly falls victim of false self and 
has restrictions when only God is worthy of unrestricted love. A false self depicts fallen subjects 
that actively construct their imaginary selves in concert of tacit cooperation with other 
duplicitous subjects. That is to say a false self has the tendency of preforming its subjectivity in a 
dark parody of divine goodness.  
A false self acts with a sense of loss of due subordination of reason to God and of the 
other faculties to reason. The fall, from which according to biblical claims the false self may 
have arisen, has thus destructed the human personality. The project of enacting the false self 
certainly displays the performative incoherence of sin. Therefore, in the full light of a robust 
theology of sin78, the false self is not just logically incoherent but also morally dreadful. Wood 
(2010, p.427) observes that a false self depicts a duplicitous subject that turns away from God in 
her duplicity. The duplicitous subject derides and misrepresents God’s own good activity. 
                                               
77 This is false self not necessarily in the sense of Pascal – of a selfhood that is a fantasy – for whom the selves that 
people manifest to the world are only polite fictions. To be a self is for Pascal to be a false, imaginary self existing 
for the sake of imagined esteem; Blaise Pascal, Pensées. Trans. A. J. Krailsheimer [New York, NY: Penguin, 1966; 
L978/S743] 
78 The doctrine or theology of original sin is important in providing the context in which the false self rises, as it 
shows that false self is a matter of deficiency since its essence is the falling away of self from being that good in 
which, rather than in itself, it ought to have found its satisfaction. Self is fallible on account it is created; it is God’s 
creation and because of self’s creaturely nature it is being that is capable of becoming less that it is. It is simply the 
self abandoning God and to exist in itself, that is to please itself; this act does not however mean it immediately lose 
all being, but rather it comes to nearer to nothingness [Fitzpatrick 2009, pp.459- 460; Heans 2013, pp. 55-57, Kelly 
2014, pp.13-14]. Another point to make is that, a great deal has been written on the subject of Original sin or on the 
biblical texts of Genesis chapters 1-3, and there is virtual unanimity that the account of the fall found there is 
mythology interpreted aetiologically, that is, in a manner to imply a cause for man’s present situation in the world 
(Daly, 1973, pp.14-15  
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Consequently, the false self refuses to recognise in Jesus Christ the limit and condition of 
all authentic self-relation that includes other-relation.  The performances of the false self are at 
root in a sinful performance depicting the self that does not imitate Jesus Christ [God] and is 
therefore devoid of its true subjectivity. Such is the false self of Augustine’s Confessions, 
depicted with the analysis of the self in its relations with God (Drever 2007, p. 237). It is an 
analysis that identifies a fundamental potential instability or mutability in human existence, 
exacerbated by sin79.  
False self becomes a concrete self that through its various relations is broadly construed 
to include material and spiritual relations. Although spiritual reality most intimately and truly 
pertains to the self, it is incorrect to refuse to accept that material reality has substantive value for 
the self. The teachings of incarnation and bodily resurrection advocate the irreducible value of 
material reality [of the body] to the self. Another notable feature of the inward space that 
characterises the concrete, historical self in an Augustinian understanding is that it is a morally 
charged space of dynamic relation, a self that need redemption.  It is a self that is malleable and 
unstable and fundamentally corrupted through sin.  
In light of a theology of sin the false self appears not just logically incoherent but also 
morally dreadful. The false self becomes nothing but the product of a frustrated attempt to 
imitate the creator. It is when the false self (double-dealing self) of a subject turns away from 
God in its fraudulence, that it mocks and parodies God’s own good activity. This false self is a 
matter of deficiency because its essence is the falling away of human being from ‘that Good in 
which, rather than in herself, she ought to have found her satisfaction (Heans 2013, p. 55).  
                                               
79 In Augustine’s case, the ramifications of this characterization of the self permeate the Confessions; the anxious 
grasping of the infant; the conforming effect, for good or evil, of friendship; turning to God during conversion and 
continual struggle with temptations. 
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It is to abandon God and to exist in oneself, that is to say, to please oneself, which is not 
immediately to lose all being; but it is to come nearer to nothingness. It is the loss of all being as 
its ultimate consequence. Human sin has left this inward space opaque and treacherous and likely 
to deceive and corrupt those who enter it [this inward space]. Should a Christian want to enter 
this inward space to arrive at a deeper relation with God, it is important to seek its soteriological 
purification. Following bellow, I discuss the true self as the self that ceases to be a self 
independent of Christ, so that precisely insofar as it imitates Christ by loving God above all else 
it is restored to its original self.          
 Christ is an exception to the anthropological rule that ‘all have sinned and fall short of the 
glory of God’ (Rom. 3:23; cf. v. 10; cf. Ps.14: 2–3).  For the false self to be brought into genuine 
communion with God, it is necessary for God to have entered into the most possible intimate 
solidarity with the self (McFarland 2008, p.399-400). Christ’s communion with impermanence 
achieves that solidarity as it includes the most profound sharing of being vulnerability. However, 
this experience of vulnerability does not lead Christ to share in human sin and this in itself is the 
hope for the self as redeemed and therefore an expression of true subjectivity. 
8.6  The self as redeemed and true subjectivity  
 
I am now in a position to claim that every false self begins life in a state of alienation 
from God. In so far as without grace false self is unable to rise to the level of existence God has 
designed. God loves and creates the world and thereby holds it in being. Creation is good 
because God makes it so. I discussed above that the duplicitous subject does not love God and 
the grace God offers, neither the world as it is nor even herself as she is.    
 Apart, the duplicitous subject is capable of exercising freedom to true subjectivity, albeit 
the false self is bound [will constantly] to fail because if it does not accept God’s grace its 
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freedom counts for nothing since grace respects this freedom (Dalzell 2006, p.93) and will not 
interfere with it. Human freedom is made in the image and likeness of God’s freedom, that 
although the image can lose its likeness to divine freedom, it cannot lose its image character. 
When one acknowledges the primacy of the soteriological dimension within the inward space of 
the self, wherein God’s action is always the prior condition of truth and goodness within the self, 
this counts for redemption.          
 As a result of the fall, we noted above, the fallen self demonstrates the effects of original 
sin80, as loss of due subordination to God, but all is not lost. St. Aquinas and St. Augustine stress 
to varying degrees the residual elements of human original nature (Moriaty 2007, p.111). This 
elucidates the fact that if every self is a false self until redemption sets in, it is the case that such 
a condition is not an accident, but an actively created condition (Wood, 2010, p.426) 
The natural inclination to virtue may be diminished by sin but it is not totally suppressed. 
This is because this natural inclination to virtue pertains to the self as rational beings and to act 
virtuously is to act according to reason.  This natural inclination to virtue also orients self to see a 
deeper directionality that is established between the self’s action and God action. It is a sequence 
that accommodates sinful humanity, which must move from the material to the spiritual or from 
                                               
80Although there is much to be said about the negative impact of the doctrine of original sin, theology still needs a 
doctrine of original sin to describe the common observation that each human being is greatly diminished by what 
has happened prior to her own decisions and actions; and that her striving for perfection does not liberate from 
existential anxiety. The doctrine gives foundation to faith, meaning trust in God’s forgiveness, as a gift from God 
enabling justification. Justification itself is necessary because human beings are born sinners, and victims of other 
persons’ sin and sinful structures and therefore affected by sin lose the trust needed to be able to live in loving 
relationships with others, however God’s new creation can enable them to relate to others and God. 
In contemporary times the concerns of human perfection make the doctrine necessary since human beings are 
creatures seeking happiness, a condition hard to reconcile with human imperfection. It is now no longer sufficient to 
strive only for inner perfection, because human beings are striving also for perfect physical bodies as well as perfect 
social life, in itself a view that places unreasonable demands on human beings to control their own lives. [Granten, 
Eva-Lotta 2009, lays much blame on Luther and Augustine for the contemporary understanding of original sin, but 
does not seem to have considered the Pauline text of Romans 5: 12; Dalzell 2006, p. 93, concurs that whatever 
original sin constitutes can be communicated from one generation to another therefore satisfying Augustinian claim 
by a psychoanalysis process. 
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the temporal to the eternal.          
 St Augustine acknowledges that human beings retain some traces of the image of God in 
which they were created. The self of human beings retains a residual rationality by which they 
can know something of the divine law (De spiritu et littera, XXVIII.48, PL 44, 230). This claim 
is contrary to Pascal’s view in the Pensees that the self is false through and through, if this were 
to be true then there is no chance of a trigger to this false self to turn into true self. Logic would 
demand that any conception of a false self must depend on some prior conception of a true self 
that is the norm from which one deviates.   
Although redemption advances a positive soteriological relation between the divine and 
the self, it does not follow that the redeemed self experiences total or full disclosure of God. In 
redemption God’s creating and saving act that clearly has a triune structure establishes and 
restores the self into the image of God that allows human beings access to God the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit.  While human salvation restores the image of the Godhead within the self, the 
soteriological transformation does not erase the limitations of human creatureliness, and 
therefore preserving a healthy respect of divine mystery (Drever 2007, p.240).    
 The self therefore will always remain creatio ex nihilo and subject to the limitations of 
human creatureliness (Williams, ‘Sapientia and Trinity,’ 321). Most importantly, however, the 
recast of the sinful and so false self and the redeemed and therefore true self thesis is able to 
explain why modern crises of identity take the many different forms they do. Sinful and 
redeemed understandings of the selfhood cease to be blanket explanations but rather become 
more nuanced tools of analysis that help interpret contemporary crises of identity. 
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8.7  Self-Love as Being Proper Self–focused 
 
All self focused actions irrespective of whether they conform to proper self focus or not 
are almost always categorised as selfishness or self-interested actions. These actions are 
considered not disinterested or selfless actions.  To better comprehend proper self focused love’s 
distinction from selfishness and self-interest one needs to examine how self-love is conceived in 
moral theology. Self-love is judged different from selfishness because it never implies excessive 
love for oneself to the extent of excluding and manipulating others.  
On the contrary, it inclusively embraces others and identifies them as part of oneself. It is 
also possible to distinguish self-love from self-interest because an act of self-love seeks others’ 
advantage and motivates also oneself to see the well being of others for their own sake. 
Therefore, a strict theological understanding of self-love would contribute to this interpretation. 
The distinction is based on the distinctive nature of love that is essentially relational, always 
moves the person toward the good and unites the person with God who is the ultimate good and 
the source of all goods (Taylor 1989, p.13).  
A distinction needs to be drawn between 'proper' and 'selfish' forms of self-love or 
perhaps, proper self-focus of the kind necessary for 'becoming a self that helps one find in herself 
a disposition to attend to Self (Lippitt 2009, p.125-126). There is probably nothing more natural 
than this proper self-focus to attend to self. Frankfurt (2004, p. 68) observes that for any human 
being the deepest and most essential achievement of a life lived well and successful is true self-
love. This claim falls victim of those espousing the concept of self-sacrifice or self-denial, but as 
we have seen above self-sacrifice is itself a concept plagued with difficulties to sustaining it. 
 We accept that self-love and self-sacrifice are notorious concepts in Christian thought 
that leave orthodox Christian tradition littered with incompatible claims and counter claims about 
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them. So that for example, in the thoughts of Maclntyre, 'self-sacrifice ... is as much of vice, as 
much of a sign of inadequate moral development, as selfishness’ (1999, p. 160), whereas for 
Kierkegaard, 'self-denial ... is Christianity's essential form’ (1995, p. 56). Proper self focused 
love or self-love is, in its distinctive nature first and foremost, in and of itself, relational. Proper 
self focused love requires others to constitute its sense and qualify its rightness or 
appropriateness. Claudia Welz  (2008) notes,  
“The only convincing mark of love is ‘love itself’, the love becomes known and 
recognized by the love in another”. (p. 114) 
 
This suggests that love is essentially selfless and other-centred. In talking about love, one is 
always talking about an affective relationship between two or more human beings. Where the 
relationship is more than an encounter as it is an exchange of meaning in the world of one with 
the other. Andreas Schuele has asserted that, 
 “the semantics of love become crucial above all in those contexts [Torah] where one 
opens one’s ‘own world’ to the other in order to create an environment that meets with 
his or her requirements for life” (2004, p. 55). 
 
Love possesses the power of moving oneself toward others in search of the reality and meaning 
of life in human interactions. It designates a fastidious form of self-relation in which we 
understand ourselves truly and rightly in our relations with one another (Weaver 2002, p.1). To 
understand love as essentially relational, then self-love in the double love command, then self-
love must be conceived either as a pre-condition for loving others in which one must love oneself 
first in order to love others insofar as love for others entails some affirmation of the self as 
worthy of giving to another.         
 Alternatively, it must be understood as by-product or a fruit of rightly loving others in 
which some goods (e.g., satisfaction, moral habituation, and discipline) may accrue to the self 
organically and indirectly. For Niebhur, 
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“whatever spiritual wealth the self has within itself is the by-product of its relations, 
affections and responsibilities, of its concern for life beyond itself” (1949, p. 117).   
 
Self-love on the other hand if not understood in light of the two alternatives observed above, 
must be viewed as a paradigm for neighbour love in which one loves others as she loves oneself. 
Outka observes that self-love can serve as a model for what neighbour-love involves. In self-love 
persons transfer “prudential reasoning into moral reasoning by invoking some variant of the 
Golden Rule”. (1999, p.485) Father Pinto echoes Meads (1934) stating, “for humans ‘to be’ is 
essentially ‘to be with others’, to exist is to co-exist, to live is to live in relation to others (Pinto 
2006, p. 106).  
 Consequently, all human beings desire warm, loving, stable and fruitful relationships. It 
is by relating ourselves to others that we satisfy our personal, interpersonal and social needs. 
Love is the only way to enter into such relationships.  It is the case, the independent claim of 
self-love as an immoral and a neutral position by itself is evacuated leaving what is the essential 
substance or the basic element that moves the self toward others. That is what makes love a 
relational reality. 
It is also the distinctive nature of love that it tends toward the good. In the act of loving 
one is being united with a kind of ontological good existing either in the self or others. Thomas 
Aquinas defines love in its broadest meaning as, “an aptitude for, or inclination toward, the 
good” (Summa Theologica, Vol. II (Part II, First Section). Aquinas appears to explain that at its 
deepest human level of meaning, ‘love’ refers to the agent’s ‘complacency in good’, a response 
of affective thankfulness of an apprehended goodness.      
 This appreciation of an apprehended goodness could mean either the acceptance of, or 
conformity to the apprehended good, or a desire for union with the unattained good or perhaps 
delight in the presence of the attained good. The central moral meaning of love therefore is a 
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willingness of the person to identify herself with the good in the reality. Self-love consequently 
perceives the reality of being whether one’s own or others as good in itself. Loving oneself 
means identifying oneself with the being of good.  Hyman stresses “love of self has no 
justification and no intelligibility outside of a larger framework that connects the goodness of the 
self to the goodness of the whole (2004, p.48)”.       
 Love of self is both made possible by and is a necessary precondition for love of the 
whole, which is to say, a love of the good.  The claim is, if being is good, it follows that the 
being of others and mine is good too. Since the good is that which one naturally desires and can 
be known only as good for oneself, one loves oneself and others. This loving of others is only 
possible because the good in the self is identical with the good in others and it has love as the 
common ground for all goods in the whole reality. 
More importantly, the good to which the self tends to love is to be originally found in 
God who is love himself. God seeing the creation as good (Genesis 1: 31) proves God’s 
goodness. God himself is the one who brought into existence the whole creation. If the goodness 
of creation proves God’s goodness, and love always seeks for the good, love is to derive from 
God and to be realised in self and others. Aquinas affirms God as the source of this good seeing 
in God as to its cause, “in ourselves as to its effect, in our neighbour as in a similitude” (Aquinas 
2006, p. 234).  
The good that ontologically exists in God is in the first instance accessible in oneself.  
Carmichael avers, “right self-love opens us to God and hence, in God’s love, to others” (2004, p. 
120).  This affords a theological justification for self-affirmation that is inextricably bound up 
with others for our genuine love for them. This claim also satisfies Johnson’s assertion that, 
“self-love can only properly be understood within the three personal dimensions of human life 
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(God – others – self), and in terms of the redemptive-historical meta-narrative (creation, fall and 
redemption)” (2007, p. 559). The theological sense of self-love is in essence received from the 
divine being and practically given to others. Self-love is basically constructed on viewing and 
accepting the ontological relational reality of the self with God and others. It originates internally 
from God and is supposed to be externally shared with others. Self-love is, thus, a responding 
love that turns back to the self, after the self loves God with all its heart, soul and strength, and 
prepares itself to extend that divine love to others (Mt 22:36-40). Schweiker’s fittingly 
emphasises that,  
“one is to love [others] as one has first been loved by God, a love manifest in creation, in 
Christ, and in the reign of God. Christian self-love is grounded not in the self but in God. 
One’s being a Christian is in Christ. There is an ‘otherness’ at the very core of any 
Christian conception of consciousness and the self” (2004, p.103).   
 
 Our being in love with God enables us to love others, hence the one who loves God, also 
loves her brother (1 John 4:16-21). Self-love ultimately is grounded in God and not in the self, 
but loving God means realizing the love God shows us. Instead of saying that one loves God and 
others as if love essentially originates from the self and is to be extended to others, one says that 
she responds to the love of God by giving this love to others. That means unless one first defines 
her identity with the divine being who is the cause of her existence, one never views the full 
sense of love.  
 To fail to view self-love as originating from divine beings, then love of self indeed 
becomes doubtful and even sinful. In which case self-love would easily degrade to either 
selfishness or pure self-interest. In other words, self-love gets out of the moral realm and takes 
the form of either immorality or amorality. Importantly loving God, others and self are 
interdependent, reciprocal and irreducible to each other, so that from a Christian standpoint, one 
cannot have one without some degree of the others. The theological sense of self-love reveals 
  
  
  311 
that an individual exists being ontologically related with God and others. This understanding 
guarantees that self-love will not degrade to self focused love that is entirely centred on the entity 
of the self, nor to pure self-interest that only approaches others in terms of their significance to 
promote one’s own advantage. 
8.7  Conclusion 
 
In Christian theology, the concept of self, or human self-image, is usually described in 
relationship to God as otherness, specifically in the framework of soteriology. These references 
include motifs such as the human condition in the world, relations between humanity and God, 
the way of reconciliation with God, and the realisation of God’s Kingdom. Minimally self 
implies perceiving experiences as one's own. The various self prefixes [for example self-
consciousness] therefore imply that the experiencer has some notion of a self, in that she can 
distinguish between herself and her experiences.  
Reflecting on the self enables one to gain important insights into the basis of morality and 
thus to broaden one’s reflections about the subject of morality, or perhaps the “moral self.”  
Christian theology does not need to become so complicated that it finds itself unable to talk 
about the value and mystery of persons. To be a self entails the remarkable capacity for being an 
object to oneself as subject. Such human self-awareness rises only in the context of "knowing-
with" another [God]. This appears to be the root meaning of "conscience" and "consciousness."  
We know ourselves, then, only in the presence of another [first God and then other 
human beings]. We become or acquire selves when we know ourselves to be known, when we 
are apprehended and valued by a self-disclosing other. This knowing therefore dispels any 
notions of the disappearing self, or the decentred self. The only two selves that endure in 
Christian theology then become the sinful self or false subjectivity and the redeemed self or the 
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true subjectivity. The finite individual self [true subjectivity] is mutually dependent upon and 
mutually determinative of other selves in a network of mutually supporting, interpersonal 
relations. Christian theology constantly reinterprets, re-uses, and uses its own past in seeking 
answers to problems of the present situation and the Christian understanding of the self is not 
exempt to these reinterpretations.         
 For the Christians the conscious centre that is the self is somehow founded between 
subjective experience and the Bible. The Spirit of God renders the Christians’ sense of selves 
deliquesced; furthermore, the kind-heartedness of the worshiping community softens and shapes 
how they understand their lives.  
These lives are shaped in a way that they accept themselves as valued, by God and others 
and selves. Such acceptance generates a sense of good feelings for oneself, that first defines 
one’s identity with the divine being who is the cause of one’s existence, forcing one to view the 
full sense of love from divine being. Not just love for God but for the other and self. Self-love is 
then only properly understood within the three personal dimensions of human life (God – others 
– self), and in terms of the redemptive-historical meta-narrative. Self-love is basically 
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    Chapter  9   
    Conclusion  
 
The study was set in motion by the concern that many contemporary adherents to 
Christian faith have embraced the understanding that the message that Jesus Christ proclaimed as 
recorded in the gospel narratives is about disinterested love. It is argued that the message of the 
gospel that is the good news of love of God for his people proclaimed through Jesus is a about a 
radically disinterested love of God for the people.        
 But I find the message that Jesus proclaimed cannot refer to detachment from selfish 
interest in sense-based, emotional, or temporal acquisitiveness synonymous with self-love in 
favour of seeking the welfare of others. This dissertation carries a mistrust of the radical 
renunciation of the natural inclination of the self towards personal happiness and that the central 
message of the Bible is the good news about the person and work of Jesus Christ.  
I argued that Christian virtue ought not to soar too high above the range of human nature, 
it is the only way benevolence does not become so radically pure and disinterested as to demand 
that persons act "inconsistent with themselves”. The consideration in this thesis presupposed that 
the communion between God carried through the message of the gospel, self, and other(s) is the 
highest ideal of Christian love.        
 Fundamental to the communion is the giving and receiving love that is too often lost sight 
of in Christian ethics. It is a moral duty upon occasion to lookout for one’s self interest in many 
respects. Kant asserts that one must not give up her claims to her own happiness because under 
certain circumstances, it is a duty to her to be concerned with it. I consider Kant was simply 
referring to self-love. This kind of self-love is distinguished from self-interest on account that it’s 
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an act of self-love that seeks others’ advantage and attempts to motivate oneself to see the well-
being of others for their own sake.  
This is love fully coextensive with and supportive of love for God. This self-love is taken 
to be a paradigm for equal regard of others per se because it is basically independent of 
idiosyncratic attractiveness. This self-love needs to be able to stand-alone rather than be 
correlated to neighbour love as expressed in the gospel narratives; it is the only way to morally 
evaluate religious accounts of self love and the divine-human-relation.  
This self-love is however, beleaguered by the complex theoretical accounts of the self 
widely thought to be philosophically untenable and morally suspect. It is thus a platitude of 
modern-day theological anthropology that the Enlightenment has bestowed to us a penurious 
conception of the self. A conception often traced objectively or not back to René Descartes.  
 This Cartesian self is a fully autonomous, disembodied and self-transparent thinker. It is 
not essentially related to other persons, whether human or divine. Indeed, this self is not even 
essentially related to its own body. Nonetheless, even as theologians distance themselves from 
the Cartesian subject, the need to present a robust account of subjectivity that is not only anti-
Cartesian but also theologically rich becomes apparent.  
Given an earlier account of the self in the beginnings of this dissertation that was 
followed by the philosophical discourses and ethics, the challenge of delineating some general 
term to denote what the self is, remains. It was necessary to look for an overarching term that can 
empty of content as much as possible, nevertheless one that hopefully still had enough meaning 
or reference to guide a descriptive and comparative study.      
 Taylor was helpful in this regard I argued, by providing an understanding of a self that is 
constituted through its own self-interpretation and therefore moral or ethical. The constitutive 
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source of Taylor’s self was Aristotle who argued that human beings are self-interpreting animals. 
By it was implied that a human being is a being with a certain moral status, or a bearer of rights. 
But underlying the moral status, as its condition, are certain capacities. A human being is a being 
who has a sense of self, has a notion of the future and the past, can hold values, make choices; in 
short, can adopt life-plans. At least a human being must be the kind of being who is in principle 
capable of all this, however damaged these capacities may be in practice. 
I argued that the question of what the self from a theological anthropology is could be 
settled somehow with two accounts following the premise provided by Taylor. Both accounts 
encompass the self as the totality of what an organism is physically, biologically, socially, 
psychologically and culturally . . .. It includes what one would like to be as well as what one 
hopes she never become. The first account is a portrait of fallen subjectivity, selfhood under the 
reign of sin. On this account, the self is imaginary, in a special sense. It is one’s own imaginative 
construal of oneself. That is to say, what I call my “self” is therefore, just the story that I tell to 
myself about myself, my subjective narrative identity.  
Aristotle has already told us that the "Self" uniformly describes the human agent 
responsible for her choices, the originating source of her own conduct. The term remains central 
to Aristotle's analysis of friendship. From Aristotle’s inferences I discussed the self as underlying 
the notion of what one is when being a friend of the genuine kind culminating in self-loving. 
 The self thus, is the unique, irreplaceable individual who thinks, acts, has affections, 
wishes, and chooses. Adam Smith on the other hand gave us the self the examiner and judge as 
the same person that is engaged in self-interest (self-love) consistent with self’s ability to feel for 
others, where self and others together are the building blocks of the ideal society.  Smith claimed 
the chief passion out of which virtuous behaviour originates is sympathy, which Smith concluded 
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was in a way the extension of self-love to others. Even in the much-derided text of the butcher, 
the baker and the brewer as seeking after their own interests, Smith demonstrated that these 
trades persons and their clients each seek to activate self love in the other in order to enter into 
any exchange. The customer has to appeal to the self-love of the trader in order for the trader to 
engage in exchange; in the same breath the trader has to appeal to the self-interest of the 
customer, to show it is to the benefit of the customer to enter into exchange.  
 Augustine was equally very helpful in demonstrating this kind of self through the story 
he tells in the Confessions. This subjective self as an imaginary construct that typically does not 
correspond to the way I really am, Augustine argued. Augustine needed to go deep within 
himself to find the divine and therefore to find himself. This first account of the self is in fact 
doubly imaginary because one always sees oneself through the eyes of other people. Aristotle 
already told us that the other already settles the question of the self. It is the other through whom 
the self is validated.  
My subjective narrative identity is therefore the story that I imagine that other people 
would tell about me. This subjective narrative identity leads me to me and assigns me duty to 
myself that includes self-love. The second account of the self is a portrait of authentic 
subjectivity. This account is explicitly Christological and perhaps Trinitarian.   
 I argued that authentic subjectivity derives from one’s membership in the body of Christ. 
The way of living Christian faith has the capacity to transform the self by illumining its thoughts, 
redirecting its desires, and recasting its goals. Therefore, for someone influenced by Jesus Christ 
all her activities are differently determined and all impressions differently received. That 
understanding, I argued is central to the message of the Kingdom of God embedded in the gospel 
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that Jesus proclaimed and recorded in the New Testament texts. This is the message an agent is 
expected to live by daily. It influences every aspect of her life style.  
For Kant, empirical views of redemption as the resources for human transformation are 
already inherent within the self through reason and nature. But, I want though, to emphasize the 
causal efficacy of an actual historical person for transforming the self. Perfected human nature is 
that which expresses the divine. Jesus mediates the divine causality to others through the power 
of his God-consciousness. The efficacy of transformation or redemption is thus communicated 
through historical and social influence. An important aspect of these two accounts of the self is 
that, whether sinful or saved, our subjectivity is performative and imitative. That is, whether 
under sin or under grace, to be a self is to imitate God.  
As sinners, our duplicitous subjectivity is a dreadful parody of God’s loving act of 
creation. Equally true, as authentic Trinitarian subjects, we imitate Christ, the only fully real 
human being, by turning away from some aspect of the self and loving God above all things. 
Either way, at the deepest core of our subjectivity we cannot help but imitate God, this imitation 
resonates with duty to self.         
 Transformation of the self thus becomes synonymous with the Christian faith of the 
person-forming activity of Christ on an individual such that, all her activities are differently 
determined ‘… and even all impressions are differently received, meaning that the personal self-
consciousness too, becomes different.’ Kant’s view of the moral self and of the relation of 
religion to morality is here contrasted. Contrary to Kant, religion is not only consisted of 
schemata of the good principle and the moral life, religion also does transformative work. But 
what kind of causality is at work in the transformation of the self?  
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In response, I argued how the transformation of the self is specifically tied to how the 
gospel message interpellates persons as subjects and how Jesus’ interpellations demands a 
response. This makes the message of gospel that Jesus proclaimed, which message at the same 
time is the person of Jesus central to Christian faith. The gospel is the central element in a fairly 
small cluster of interrelated beliefs and practices that have consistently characterized Christian 
communities and that have persisted through a sequence of larger host cultures.   
 In its proclamation Jesus gave the summation of the laws in the Torah and 
commandments; into a single command – the double love commandment. Jesus himself as the 
embodiment of this double love command has the ability to transform all those whom he ‘hails’ 
–Hey you there… In this hailing Jesus extends the love of God of neighbour and of self.  
In this way he empties the cross of its wonder. In any case, the cross is never the goal of 
love as many in the Christian tradition have claimed, it is more the expression of the distance to 
which God is willing to go in order to restore a broken community and therefore symbolises the 
violation of love more than it symbolises love itself. The love therefore that we need is not the 
disinterested and utterly selfless love, rather the deeply mutual love that has both the quality of a 
gift received and of a gift given. 
It is not true that in his journey toward crucifixion Jesus sought suffering as an end in 
itself to complete the resolution of the divine human drama once and for all. Self-abnegation is 
not the focal point of love especially the love Jesus expressed, because Jesus' acts are not 
motivated in his lust for sacrifice but in his power of mutuality. In the power of mutuality 
Christian theology cannot become complicated that it finds itself unable to talk about the value 
and mystery of persons. To be a self entails the remarkable capacity for being an object of value 
to oneself as subject. Such human self-awareness rises only in the context of "knowing-with" 
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another [God]. This knowing therefore dispels any notions of the disappearing self, or the 
decentred self. The only two selves that endure in Christian theology then become the sinful self 
or false subjectivity and the redeemed self or the true subjectivity. 
But as this dissertation has demonstrated, there endures a claim particularly in the 
Western church tradition that makes huge theological and ethical claims for a disinterested 
gospel. These claims continue to be found and subsequent claims to include, that Jesus calls for a 
total self-denial and self-sacrifice and even a sense of self-abnegation. Jesus’ death on the cross 
is taken as the cornerstone. His followers must therefore sacrifice for the sake of the other. 
Perhaps such claims are justified in a Western individualistic economic society; however, I do 
not see Christian social ethics demonstrating such a clear-cut dichotomy, or a narrow dualism 
between self-esteem and the common good, self-acceptance and compassion for others, self-love 
and altruism or introspection and community. 
It behoves the church community therefore, in proclaiming the traditional moral teaching 
that selfishness is wrong, and unselfishness is right, to make it clear that ‘selfishness is only a 
vice perceived undue regard for the self, unselfishness is only a virtue if it is countered by self-
respect.’ This exercise is however conditioned by the understanding of the self.  I am reminded 
of Metzinger’s difficulties whether to make the claim that, “there is no such a thing as a self,” or 
that “the self is not quite what we supposed it to be.”   
From this dissertation, the need for a new more inclusive metaphysics in which reality is 
not reduced to only that which can be manipulated by science is urgent.  A continued re-casting 
of the unity of the self is crucial. Self-love I identified works well for a unified self. If this 
unified self was to be replaced by a multiplicity of divergent self-images, who or what exactly 
bears the image of God is the enduring question. If identities are diminishing or transitory or 
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fragmented who or what subjectivity is burdened by sin and what subjectivity is finally redeemed 
by Christ’s interpellations?  
I contend that at any given moment a person who self-loves has a unified sense of self 
and over the course of a life, although such an individual may construct a variety of relatively 
autonomous sub-personalities; in the end she is able to claim her in a way she tells a single 
coherent story of her life. In spite of presumed multiplicity of the self, such an individual retains 
a sense of singularity capable of God’s ‘self-disclosure’ in the ‘personal encounters’ with Jesus 
of Nazareth. Hence, an interdisciplinary understanding of the self remains an enduring pursuit to 
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